The invisible empire: border protection on the electronic frontier by Kent, Michael Ian Anthony
The Invisible Empire  
Border Protection on the Electronic Frontier 
 
 
 
Submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
by 
 
Michael Kent 
 
School of Media, Communication and Culture 
Murdoch University 
2005 Declaration 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main 
content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary 
education institution. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Michael Kent    
8/08/2005 
 Copyright © July 2005 
Michael Kent 
   iii
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my family for their support and encouragement throughout my 
research, without which I doubt this thesis would have been produced. I also have a 
fantastic group of friends who have also played a large role in the completion of this 
thesis. 
 
Of equal importance has been the mentoring, support and driving force provided by 
my supervisor Associate Professor Tara Brabazon. I could not have hoped for a 
better supervisor. I am both proud and grateful to join the ranks of those who have 
produced a thesis under her auspices. 
 
Amanda Ellis has tolerated my late nights, erratic behaviours and general untidiness 
more than anyone should have to. She has been a source of personal and professional 
support well in excess of what anyone could expect and I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank her for being there for me. 
 
My thanks also go to Associate Professor Matthew Allen whose enthusiasm and 
encouragement got me started. 
 
Finally, my colleagues at the Popular Culture Collective have been an invaluable 
source of insight, critique and competition. They help make Murdoch University the 
vibrant and interesting place that brought me back there to complete this research. 
 
My cat Spirit has not really helped at all, but I thought he deserved a mention. 
 
Mickey K.   iv
 
   v
List of Contents 
Declaration..................................................................................................................i 
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................iii 
List of Contents........................................................................................................v 
Illustrations..................................................................................................................x 
Publications and Conference Presentations........................................................xiv 
Publications..........................................................................................................xiv 
Conference Papers ............................................................................................xiv 
Abstract......................................................................................................................1 
Introduction.................................................................................................................6 
Chapter 1  A History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal 
Service Obligation in Australia.............................................................................34 
History of Telecommunications in Australia and the.......................................39 
Universal Service Obligation.............................................................................39 
Changing Definitions. Shifting Paradigms........................................................59 
Service..............................................................................................................60 
Universal...........................................................................................................66 
Obligation.........................................................................................................68   vi
Home, Hearth, and DSL?.................................................................................72 
Public Telephone Networks...............................................................................80 
Argument Against the USO in Australia.......................................................85 
No Service? .........................................................................................................88 
Access within Indigenous Communities.........................................................90 
Access by People with Disabilities................................................................95 
Access within Rural and Remote Communities.............................................96 
Global Telephone Access.................................................................................99 
Chapter 2  The Gates of Empire: Internet Access..........................................105 
The Screen........................................................................................................106 
The Matrix of Access.......................................................................................112 
Cultware .............................................................................................................130 
Chapter 3 Networks and Digitisation.................................................................142 
Introduction.........................................................................................................143 
Networks.............................................................................................................145 
Changing Conditions........................................................................................160 
Welcome to the Digital Economy....................................................................163 
The Digital Self................................................................................................177 
Chapter 4 The Digital Citizen............................................................................189   vii
What is Citizenship?..........................................................................................195 
The Digital Citizen...........................................................................................202 
Digital Deviants.................................................................................................206 
The Digital Underclass....................................................................................216 
Chapter 5 Digital Sovereignty............................................................................222 
The History of the Sovereign: God, Church, and Nation State...............224 
The Crown: the Sovereign Identity.................................................................225 
The Nation State: the Sovereign in Space..................................................240 
The Evolution of the Citizen and the State: the Sovereign in Time..........242 
Sovereignty and the Invisible Empire ..............................................................247 
Digital Sovereignty...........................................................................................254 
Who are the Digital Sovereigns?.....................................................................268 
Who Controls the Grammar of the Internet? ..................................................273 
Forbidden Texts................................................................................................275 
Chapter 6  Core and Periphery: The Invisible Empire .....................................280 
The History of the Analogue Empire ............................................................282 
The Invisible Empire..........................................................................................307 
Digital Colonialism.............................................................................................313 
MMORPGs and the Virtual Sweatshops of the Invisible Empire .............326   viii
Chapter 7  Resistance and the Nation State....................................................354 
Introduction.........................................................................................................355 
The Colonial Critic...........................................................................................356 
The Nation State and Colonial Resistance..................................................365 
The Nation State and the Invisible Empire...................................................366 
Tuvalu.................................................................................................................369 
Southafrica.com.................................................................................................375 
Chapter 8 The Digital Subaltern.......................................................................394 
Introduction.........................................................................................................395 
The Subaltern...................................................................................................399 
The Intellectual ..................................................................................................403 
The Digital Subaltern......................................................................................407 
Consciousness...................................................................................................411 
The White Man’s Burden of the Digital Flâneur?.........................................422 
The Edge of the Screen..................................................................................431 
Conclusion: The Intellectual.................................................................................437 
Appendix A: Bibliography...................................................................................448 
On Screen:........................................................................................................448 
Books .............................................................................................................448   ix
Journals and Academic Papers....................................................................450 
Government Publications ..............................................................................451 
Web Sites......................................................................................................453 
The Press.......................................................................................................458 
Motion Pictures..............................................................................................464 
Videos .............................................................................................................464 
Off Screen: .......................................................................................................465 
Books .............................................................................................................465 
Journals and Academic Papers....................................................................483 
Government Publications ..............................................................................489 
The Press.......................................................................................................491 
Appendix B: CD-ROM The Invisible Empire, Digital Version....................493 
   x
Illustrations 
Figure 1  Doonesbury Cartoon, 13
th November 1994..............................................6 
Figure 2 The Dot Com ‘Bubble’ in Technology Stock Prices, 2000.....................21 
Figure 3  Sam Boulding (1992-2002).......................................................................34 
Figure 4 USO Extended Zones and Pilot Areas  ...................................................49 
Figure 5  Networking the Nation Funded Internet Access Facilities...................76 
Figure 6 1800 Reverse Web Advertising.................................................................81 
Figure 7 Teletypewriter Locations: Perth..............................................................83 
Figure 8  Teletypewriter Locations: Regional Western Australia.......................84 
Figure 9 Power Supply to Indigenous Communities in Australia........................92 
Figure 10  Telstra Advertisement, 2003..................................................................94 
Figure 11 Fixed Telephone Line Penetrations Rates.............................................98 
Figure 12 The Damascus Gate of Jerusalem........................................................105 
Figure 13 Wetware, The Novel..............................................................................115 
Figure 14 Cartoon by Randy Glasbergen, 2003...................................................116 
Figure 15  Coca-Cola Advertising and Traffic Lights in Kings Cross...............118 
Figure 16 Windows NT...........................................................................................119 
Figure 17 The Matrix of Access.............................................................................124 
Figure 18 ABC Online Tech Talk Forum.............................................................126 
Figure 19 Australian Football League Web Site..................................................128 
Figure 20 Australian Football League Web Site: translated by Loband...........129 
Figure 21 Evolution of the Digital Citizen............................................................130 
Figure 22 Cultware.................................................................................................135 
Figure 23 Cartoon by Fran....................................................................................138 
Figure 24 St Stephens Gate of Jerusalem.............................................................140 
Figure 25 Missile Tracks Across the Net..............................................................142 
Figure 26 Growth in Network Value.....................................................................146 
Figure 27 Effects of Limited Network Utility.......................................................148 
Figure 28 Moore’s Law ..........................................................................................150 
Figure 29 1989 Maestro Modem............................................................................151 
Figure 30 2004 Billion ADSL Router....................................................................152 
Figure 31 First Page of the World Wide Web, 6th August 1991........................155 
Figure 32 Slowing of Internet Growth in the United State.................................157   xi
Figure 33 Maverick.................................................................................................159 
Figure 34 The Marketplace at Pontoise by Ludovic Piette, (1826-77).................163 
Figure 35 ASX.........................................................................................................164 
Figure 36 The Introduction to Brooke’s Poem ....................................................174 
Figure 37 William Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, 1996.................................176 
Figure 38 Nokia Advertisement.............................................................................179 
Figure 39 Content Creation and Different Applications.....................................182 
Figure 40 Audience and Different Applications...................................................183 
Figure 41 Mapping Digital Identity. The Terrorism Information Awareness 
Program..........................................................................................................185 
Figure 42 Cartoon by Charles Barsotti, 28
th October 2002................................187 
Figure 43 Photography by Grant V. Faint...........................................................189 
Figure 44 The Digital Citizen.................................................................................206 
Figure 45 Cartoon by Matthew Diffee 29
th May 2000.........................................209 
Figure 46 Sherman Austin.....................................................................................212 
Figure 47 Norton Internet Security.......................................................................215 
Figure 48 Cartoon by Harley Schwadron.............................................................216 
Figure 49 Cartoons by Garry Trudeau, 21
st – 25
th January 2003......................222 
Figure 50 The Coronation of HM Queen Elizabeth II, 2
nd June 1953...............224 
Figure 51 The Tudor Rose .....................................................................................226 
Figure 52 Dante’s Hell............................................................................................227 
Figure 53 The Australian Army Rising Sun Badge.............................................228 
Figure 54  Charles I, King of England, Scotland and Ireland............................230 
Figure 55 Apple Computer Inc. logo.....................................................................231 
Figure 56 The Snake and Angels Wings by Hugo Simberg, Tampere Cathedra232 
Figure 57 The Trial of Wycliffe, Manchester Town Hall, by Ford Maddox......234 
Figure 58 Tyndale’s Bible ......................................................................................235 
Figure 59 Europe in 1648, Peace of Westphalia...................................................240 
Figure 60 Time by Dave McKean..........................................................................242 
Figure 61 St Paul Preaching in Athens, painting by Raphael. ............................244 
Figure 62 Mahatma Ghandi attending the Round Table Conference in London, 
1931..................................................................................................................245 
Figure 63 David Cake.............................................................................................246 
Figure 64 Crown Pictures ......................................................................................254   xii
Figure 65 Tux the Penguin, the official Linux Mascot........................................256 
Figure 66 KaZaA ....................................................................................................260 
Figure 67 Motion Picture Association of America...............................................261 
Figure 68 The Tower by Dave McKean.................................................................267 
Figure 69 User Friendly by Illiad...........................................................................269 
Figure 70 Australian Communications Authority...............................................270 
Figure 71 World Wide Web Consortium .............................................................272 
Figure 72 Saint Isidore of Seville...........................................................................278 
Figure 73 Where does my loyalty lie if not here?.................................................280 
Figure 74 The Roads of the Roman Empire.........................................................283 
Figure 75 The Roman Empire at its height..........................................................285 
Figure 76 Roman Legionnaires .............................................................................286 
Figure 77 British Imperial Bases, 1898.................................................................288 
Figure 78 The Spread of English...........................................................................290 
Figure 79 Peter Pett and the 'Sovereign of the Seas’.............................................292 
Figure 80 Advertising Posters from the Empire Marketing Board, May 1928 293 
Figure 81 Maori Christ walking on the water of Lake Rotorua – lakeside 
Anglican Church............................................................................................295 
Figure 82 Gurkha Soldiers, 1896...........................................................................296 
Figure 83 F18 Hornets of The United States Air Force.......................................300 
Figure 84 United States Military Deployment .....................................................301 
Figure 85 Location of United States Military Bases............................................302 
Figure 86 World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C.................................304 
Figure 87 The Internet, July 1999.........................................................................309 
Figure 88 First Monday Readership.....................................................................310 
Figure 89 Internet Mapping Project  ...................................................................311 
Figure 90 World Wide Web around Wikipedia...................................................312 
Figure 91 Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, January 1927
..........................................................................................................................318 
Figure 92 Digital Photomontage by Gregory Heisler for Time Magazine, 27
th 
December 1999...............................................................................................322 
Figure 93 Photograph by David Burnett, Time Magazine, 27
th December 1999323 
Figure 94 Photograph by David Burnett, Time Magazine, 27
th December 1999324 
Figure 95 Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, April 1927.324   xiii
Figure 96 MMORPG Subscriptions, July 2005 ...................................................327 
Figure 97 Lineage II ...............................................................................................328 
Figure 98 Invuln Plate Mail $49 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown .......329 
Figure 99 Bundle of Hay $16 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown.............330 
Figure 100 Castle: $2,053 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown ..................335 
Figure 101 EBay......................................................................................................336 
Figure 102 Breakdown of MMORPG Players by Profession and Gender  ......337 
Figure 103 Gaming Open Markets........................................................................344 
Figure 104 Lore Brand Comics .............................................................................346 
Figure 105 Virtual Sweatshops in Fujian province, China.................................349 
Figure 106 Spinning the Web: the global cotton industry..................................351 
Figure 107 Resistance.............................................................................................354 
Figure 108 Bishop Bartolome Las Casas..............................................................356 
Figure 109 Adam Smith .........................................................................................357 
Figure 110 Edward Said.........................................................................................360 
Figure 111 Protesters in Paris during the May 1968 general strike ..................361 
Figure 112 Flag of Tuvalu......................................................................................369 
Figure 113 Map of Tuvalu......................................................................................373 
Figure 114 South Africa.com.................................................................................375 
Figure 115 Virtual Coutntries.com .......................................................................376 
Figure 116 Flag of the Republic of South Africa .................................................376 
Figure 117 New Zealand.com ................................................................................380 
Figure 118 New Zealand Coat of Arms ................................................................381 
Figure 119 The Popular Culture Collective .........................................................383 
Figure 120 Domain Name Registrations, April 2005  .........................................384 
Figure 121 The Real Digital Divide.......................................................................394 
Figure 122 The Spectrum of Access......................................................................409 
Figure 123 Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, December 
1928..................................................................................................................422 
Figure 124 Evolution of non-English-speaking Online Population....................427 
Figure 125 Internet users by language..................................................................428 
Figure 126 Online language populations..............................................................429 
Figure 127 The Manticore......................................................................................435 
   xiv
Publications and Conference Presentations 
Publications 
Kent M., ‘Spam Regulation and Australia: National Sovereignty and the .au’ AQ, 
The Australian Quarterly. July-August 2004, volume 76, issue 4. 
 
 
Brabazon T., Cull F., Kent M. & McRae L., ‘Jingling the single: The i-Podification 
of the music industry’ AQ, The Australian Quarterly. Forthcoming 
 
 
Brabazon T. & Kent M. (eds), Access All Areas: Building an E-Democracy. Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
 
Kent M., ‘Universal Service Obligation’, in Brabazon T. & Kent M. (eds), Access All 
Areas: Building an E-Democracy. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
 
Kent M., ‘He who pays the piper must call the tune?’, in Brabazon T. & Kent M. 
(eds), Access All Areas: Building an E-Democracy. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
 
Brabazon T. & Kent M., ‘What’s in a domain? Tuvalu and the building a digita 
pacifica’, in Brabazon T. & Kent M. (eds), Access All Areas: Building an E-
Democracy. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
 
Brabazon T. & Kent M., ‘The Digital Door Bitch’, in Brabazon T. & Kent M. (eds), 
Access All Areas: Building an E-Democracy. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006. 
 
 
 
Conference Papers 
Kent M. 
‘The Invisible Empire’  
Cultural Studies Association of Australasia 
Perth, Western Australia 2004 
 
Kent M. 
‘Colonial Revenge, Virtual Resources, and the .TV Domain’ 
Cybercultures: Exploring Critical Issues, 3
rd Global Conference 
Prague, Czech Republic 2005  1
Abstract 
The first codes of the Internet made their tentative steps along the information 
highway in 1969, connecting two computers at UCLA. Since that time, the Internet 
has grown beyond institutions of research and scholarship. It is now a venue for 
commerce, popular culture and political discourse. The last decade, following the 
development of the World Wide Web, has seen access to the Internet, particularly in 
wealthy countries such as Australia, spread throughout the majority of the 
population. While this proliferation of users has created many opportunities, it also 
profiled questions of disadvantage. The development and continuation of a digital 
divide between the information ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ was framed as a problem of 
‘access.’ In the context of the increasing population online, debates into social 
inequity have been directed at technical barriers to access, the physical infrastructure 
and economic impediments to the adoption of the medium by all members of society.  
 
This doctoral research probes questions of access with greater subtlety, arching 
beyond the spread of broadband or the expansion of computers into schools. Forging 
dialogues between Internet and Cultural Studies, new theories of the screen – as a 
barrier and border – emerge. It is an appropriate time for such a study. The 
(seemingly) ever expanding growth in Internet access is stalling. New approaches are 
required to not only understand the pattern of events, but the type and mode of 
intervention that is possible. 
 
This doctoral research takes theory, politics and policy to the next stage in the history 
of digital access. By forging interdisciplinary dialogues, the goal is to develop the   2
concept of ‘cultware’. This term, building on the history of hardware, software and 
wetware, demonstrates the imperative of understanding context in the framing and 
forging of exclusion and disempowerment. Mobilising the insights of postcolonial 
theory, Popular Cultural Studies, literacy theory and socio-legal studies, a new 
network of exclusions emerge that require a broader palette of interventionary 
strategies than can be solved through infrastructure or freeing codes. Commencing 
with the Universal Service Obligation, and probing the meaning of each term in this 
phrase and policy, there is a discussion of networks and ‘gates’ of the Digital 
Empire. Discussions then follow of citizenship, sovereignty, nationalism and the 
subaltern. By applying the insights of intellectual culture from the analogue age, 
there is not only an emphasis on the continuities between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media, but 
a confirmation of how a focus on ‘the new’ can mask the profound perpetuation of 
analogue injustices.   
 
Access to the Invisible Empire occurs for each individual in a solitary fashion. Alone 
at the screen, each person is atomised at the point where they interface with the 
digital. This thesis dissects that point of access. The three components of access at 
the screen – hardware, software and wetware – intersect and dialogue. All three 
components form a matrix of access. However, the ability to attain hardware, 
software and wetware are distinct. An awareness of how and where to attain these 
literacies requires the activation of cultware, the context in which the three 
components manifest. Without such an intersection, access is not possible. The size 
of the overlap determines the scale of the gateway and the value of access. There is 
an interaction between each of these components that can alter both the value of the 
access obtained and the point at which the gateway becomes viable and stable for   3
entry into the digital discourse. A highly proficient user with developed wetware is 
able to extract more value, capital and currency from hardware and software. They 
have expert knowledge in the use of this medium in contrast to a novice user. In 
dissecting the complexity of access, my original contribution to knowledge is 
developing this concept of cultware and confirming its value in explaining digital 
inequalities. 
 
This thesis diagnoses the nodes and structures of digital and analogue inequality. 
Critical and interpretative Internet Studies, inflected and informed by Cultural 
Studies approaches and theories, offers methods for intervention, providing 
contextual understanding of the manifestations of power and social justice in a digital 
environment. In enacting this project, familiar tropes and theories from Cultural 
Studies are deployed. Particular attention is placed on the insights of postcolonial 
theorists. The Invisible Empire, following the path of the digital intellectual, seeks to 
act as a translator between the digital subaltern and the digital citizen. Similarly, it 
seeks to apply pre-existing off screen theory and methodology to the Invisible 
Empire, illuminating how these theories can be reapplied to the digitised 
environment. 
 
Within this context, my research provides a significant and original contribution to 
knowledge in this field. The majority of analyses in critical and interpretative 
Internet Studies have centred on the United States and Europe. While correlations 
can be drawn from these studies, there are features unique to the Australian 
environment, both socially and culturally, as well as physical factors such as the 
geographic separation and sparse distribution of the population, that limit the ability   4
to translate these previous findings into an Australian context. The writer, as a white 
Australian, is liminally positioned in the colonial equation: being a citizen of a 
(formerly) colonised nation with the relics of Empire littering the symbolic 
landscape, while also – through presence and language – perpetuating the 
colonization of the Indigenous peoples. This ‘in-betweenness’ adds discomfort, 
texture and movement to the research, which is a fundamentally appropriate state to 
understand the gentle confluences between the digital and analogue. 
 
In this context, the screen is the gateway to the Invisible Empire. However, unlike 
the analogue gate in the city wall that guards a physical core, these gates guard a 
non-corporeal Invisible Empire. Whereas barbarians could storm the gates of Rome 
without the literacy to understand the workings of the Empire within, when an army 
masses to physically strike at these gates, the only consequences are a broken 
monitor. Questions cannot be asked at the gate to an Invisible Empire. There is no 
common space in which the digital subaltern and the digital citizen cohabitate. There 
is no node at which translation can occur. These gates to the Invisible Empire are 
numerous. The walls cannot be breached and the gates are only open for the citizenry 
with the required literacy. This literacy in the codes of access is an absolute 
requirement to pass the gates of Invisible Empire. The digital citizen transverses 
these gates alone. It is a point where the off screen self interfaces the digital self. 
Social interaction occurs on either side of the screen, but not at the gateway itself.   
 
Resistance within the borders of Invisible Empire is one of the founding ideologies 
of the Internet, tracing its origin back to the cyberpunk literature that predicted the 
rise of the network. However this was a resistance to authority, both on and off   5
screen, by the highly literate on screen: the hacker and the cyber-jockey. This thesis 
addresses resistance to the Invisible Empire from outside its borders. Such an 
intervention is activated not through a Luddite rejection of technology, but by 
examining the conditions at the periphery of Empire, the impacts of digital 
colonisation, and how this potential exclusion can be overcome. Debates around 
digital literacy have been deliberately removed or bypassed to narrow the debate 
about the future of the digital environment to a focus on the material commodities 
necessary to gain access and the potential for more online consumers. Cultware has 
been neglected. 
 
The Invisible Empire, like its analogue predecessors, reaches across the borders of 
Nation States, as well as snaking invisibly through and between the analogue 
population, threatening and breaking down previous understandings of citizenship 
and sovereignty. It invokes new forms of core-periphery relations, a new type of 
digital colonialism. As the spread of Internet access tapers, and the borders of 
Empire close to those caught outside, the condition of the digital subaltern calls for 
outside intervention, the place of the intellectual to raise consciousness of these new 
colonial relations, both at the core and periphery.  My doctoral thesis commences 
this project. 
   6
Introduction 
Image Removed 
Figure 1 
 Doonesbury Cartoon, 13
th November 1994 
http://www.doonesbury.com/  
[accessed 15.3.2003] 
‘I have said on numerous occasions, and I still believe, that with the 
development of the Internet, and with the increasing pervasiveness of 
communication between networked computers, we are in the middle of the 
most transforming technological event since the capture of fire. I used to think 
that it was just the biggest thing since Gutenberg, but now I think you have to 
go back farther. There has been much written both celebrating and denouncing 
cyberspace, but to me this seems a development of such magnitude that trying 
to characterize it as a good thing or a bad thing trivializes it considerably. . . .  
Over the long haul, I'd say that society, everything that is human on this planet, 
is going to be profoundly transformed by this, and in many ways, some of 
which will be scary to those of us with this mindset [refusal], some of which 
will be glorious and transforming.’  
 
– John Perry Barlow, co-founder Electronic Frontiers Foundation1 
                                                 
1 J. P. Barlow, S. Birkets, K. Kelly & M. Slouka, ‘Harper's forum: what are we doing online?’, 
Harper's. August 1995, pp. 35-46.   7
The Invisible Empire is not a history of the Internet. Myriad texts (re)tell this 
streamlined chronological narrative.2 The Invisible Empire is not a history of the 
World Wide Web. Many tales of CERN (Consiel Européen pour le Recherche 
Nucleaire), Netscape and Explorer tell this e-commerce story.3 Instead, my research 
configures a critical and interpretative analysis of Web access. Deploying 
longitudinal and quantitative studies from PEW’s ‘Internet and American Life 
Project’ and others,4 I strategically work through the data to provide context and 
                                                 
2 Examples of these histories, or chronological narratives, include the following texts:  K. Hafner, 
Where Wizards Stay up Late: The Origins of the Internet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. 
T. J. Misa, Leonardo to the Internet: Technology & Culture from the Renaissance to the Present. 
Baltimore, Md. & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
J. Naughton, A Brief History of the Future: From Radio Days to Internet Years in a Lifetime. 
Woodstock N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2000. 
H. Poole, T. Schuyler, T. Senft, & C. Moschovitis, History of the Internet: A chronology 1843 to the 
Present. Santa Barbara: ABC – Cleo Inc, 1999. 
3 Please refer to T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the 
World Wide Web. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999, M. A. Cusumano, Competing on 
Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and its Battle with Microsoft. New York: Free Press, 1998, J. 
Gillies & R. Cailliau, How The Web Was Born: The Story of the World Wide Web. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, J. Quittner & M. Slatalla, Speeding the Net: The Inside Story of Netscape and 
How It Changed the World. London: Orion Books, 1998. 
4 The scale and breadth of PEW’s longitudinal studies provide a strong foundation for interpretative 
research.  To view examples of these reports, please refer to the following range of reports.  M. 
Madden & L. Rainie, America’s Online Pursuits: The Changing Picture of Who’s Online and What 
They Do. Pew Internet & American Life Project, 22
nd February 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=106&Section=ReportLevel1&Field=Level1I
D&ID=463 [accessed 29.4.2004]. 
A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever Shifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r
=88 [accessed 5.7.2005]. 
K. Aisbett, The Internet at Home: A Report on Internet Use in the Home. Sydney: Australian 
Broadcast Authority, 2001.  http://www.aba.gov.au/internet/research/home/ [accessed 25.4.2005]. 
National Office of the Information Economy, Survey of Australian Programs to Increase Individual 
and Community Access to the Internet. Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia, October 2000. 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/access/Archive/cps/ [accessed 6.12.2003]. 
N. Selwyn, S. Gorard & J. Furlong, ‘Whose Internet is it Anyway?: Exploring Adults’ (Non) Use of 
the Internet in Everyday Life’, European Journal of Communication. 2005, volume 20, issue 1. 
National Office of the Information Economy, The Current State of Play: Australia’s Scorecard. 
Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia, April 2002. 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/Progress/ie_stats/CSOP_April2002/CSOP_April2002.pdf 
[accessed 3.12.2003]. 
National Office of the Information Economy, The Current State of Play May 2001. Canberra: The 
Commonwealth of Australia, May 2001. 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/progress/ie%5Fstats/csop%5Fjune2001/readiness/readine
ss1.htm [accessed 31.3.2003].   8
social understanding for the statistics and trends. This is a (post) access research 
thesis.   
 
The growth of the World Wide Web can no longer be described as ‘exponential’ or 
‘revolutionary.’ Theoretical discussions of the ‘digital divide’ rarely link 
contemporary technological exclusions with historical inequalities.5  The Invisible 
Empire configures a critical and interpretative evaluation of a mature World Wide 
Web. Deploying the interdisciplinary insights of Internet Studies and Cultural 
Studies, my original contribution to knowledge is to present the consequences and 
causes for not addressing and contextualizing Web access as a primary concern, and 
what will happen to culture, economics and the management of social difference if 
we continue to avoid questions of education, literacy and colonisation. Deploying the 
term cultware to stress the significance of context-embedded web literacies, I 
                                                                                                                                          
H. Bonfadelli, ‘The Internet and Knowledge Gaps: A theoretical and Empirical Investigation’, 
European Journal of Communication. 2002, volume 17, issue 1. 
F. Fan , U.S. Internet Usage Shows Mature Growth, Forcing Innovation of New Web Offerings, 
According to Nielson//Netratings. Nielson//Netratings. http://direct.www.nielsen-
netratings.com/news.jsp [accessed 24.3.2005]. 
The Information Industries Taskforce, The Global Information Economy: The Way Ahead. Canberra: 
Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, 1997. 
5 J. McConnaughey, D. W. Everette, T. Reynolds & W Lader (eds), Falling Through the Net: 
Defining the Digital Divide. Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999.  
A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever Shifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r
=88 [accessed 5.7.2005]. 
M. Madden & L. Rainie, America’s Online Pursuits: The Changing Picture of Who’s Online and 
What They Do. Pew Internet & American Life Project, 22
nd February 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=106&Section=ReportLevel1&Field=Level1I
D&ID=463 [accessed 29.4.2004]. 
R. Azari & J. B. Pick, ‘Technology and society: socioeconomic influences on technological sectors 
for United States counties’, International Journal of Information Management. February 2005, 
volume 25, issue 1, p. 21. 
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demonstrate that strategic political interventions are necessary in the digital 
landscape. With precision, I also display where they should occur. 
 
In February 1999, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published The Economic and Social Impacts of Electronic Commerce: 
Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda. This report specifically called for 
further study into the effects of the Internet and electronic commerce and how they 
will contribute to distributional inequalities.6 This paper confirmed the need for 
further investigation of the impact of the then emerging technologies on socio-
economic disparity and polarisation within society. My research addresses the 
distributional inequalities perpetuated and increased through electronic commerce. 
To understand these inequalities, it is necessary to extend beyond the narrow analysis 
of electronic commerce that was prominent at that time and look at the wider social 
divisions that may occur as a result of the inequitable distribution of access to the 
Internet. The Internet needs to be framed not just as a delivery system, but rather as a 
mode of communication. This change alters the way that it is theorised, researched 
and politicised. Rather than viewing it as a passive and ideologically neutral 
technological system that simply delivers goods and services,7 the Internet is 
transformed into a context that encases goods, services, roles, functions and 
ideologies. From this point of view, the importance of having or not having Internet 
                                                 
6 A. Colecchia, & A. Wyckoff, The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999. 
7 My first book relating to the Internet was C. Crumlish, A Guided Tour of the Internet. San 
Francisco: Sybex, 1995. It came free with my Internet dial-up account, and is typical of the ‘user 
guide’ view of the Internet as an ideology free technology. A more recent good example of this type 
of publication is P. Gralla, How the Internet Works. Indianapolis: Que, 2004. Writing in the mid to 
late 1990s often portrayed this cultural neutral understanding of the Internet. Examples include: 
R. Hammond, Digital Business: Surviving and thriving in an on-line World. London: Hodder and 
Stoughton Ltd,1996. 
D. Northfield, The Information Policy Maze: Global Challenges National Responses. Melbourne: 
RMIT Press, 1999.   10
access takes on new inflection. Lury has noted that in a consumer culture, the ability 
of an individual to consume goods and services, as well as how they are provided, 
defines their social position.8 Goods and services delivered through the Internet are 
also transformed by being accessed through the Internet. Those who access these 
contents, goods and services, interpret them differently to their analogue alternatives 
off screen. In reframing access, the term can now be used to convey the ideas, items, 
and ideologies delivered by the Internet. Such a study produces a more complex view 
of Internet access than is otherwise acknowledged.9  
 
Understanding the Invisible Empire requires more than investigating the Hyper Text 
Mark-up Language (HTML) of the World Wide Web. This communication medium 
is best understood in the context of the economic, political and power structures of 
disadvantage and the exclusion they enable. Marx famously affirmed that ‘The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle’.10 The Internet 
transforms the nature of this struggle. Material wealth and its distribution are not the 
sole determinates of social positioning. Literacy and social capital are involved. My 
research project, The Invisible Empire, encompasses and describes not only the 
Internet, but also what the Internet enables and what is denied to those without 
access. Travels with the (metaphoric) ‘digital flâneur’ reveal that this empire is a 
complex and fluid structure. Those with access, literacy and resources to access 
through the screen – the gateway of the Empire – project themselves into the digital 
                                                 
8 C. Lury, Consumer Culture. Oxford: Polity Press. 1996, p. 43. 
9 These limitations are particularly observed within the research literature focusing on commerce and 
technology.  To view these restricted definitions, please refer to the following research texts.   
J. FitzGerald, Business Data Communications and Networking. New York: John Wiley, 2002 
D. Chaffey (ed), Business Information Systems: Technology, Development and Management for the 
E-Business. Harlow: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2003. 
W. Stallings, data and Computer Communications. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000. 
10 K. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967. 
http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html [accessed 26.5.2005].   11
realm alone at the screen. This does not allow for a shared space for interaction with 
those denied access by those same conditions. Those without access do not manifest 
in the digital world. They cannot experience that from which they are excluded, 
except at the level of metaphor. It is this lack of shared space and perception that 
renders the Empire invisible. 
 
‘Internet access,’ as a term used in this thesis, refers to the traditional areas of where 
and how people find computers connected to the Internet and how they use them, but 
it also takes into account the actual content and services that are utilised through the 
network. By widening the framing of the Internet, I acknowledge the context in 
which the Internet manifests. When using this definition, areas such as content 
provision, regulation and literacy become essential parts of the analysis. In addition, 
this new understanding of Internet access requires a closer focus on the type of 
Internet connection that is available to an individual, and that individual’s ability to 
effectively utilise that connection. When governments place both public and private 
sector goods in the domain of the Internet, how does government policy and practice 
work to ensure access to this medium? The answer to such a question is both a 
determinant and frame for the formulation of social relations in society.  
 
Within this context, my research provides a significant and original contribution to 
knowledge in this field. The majority of analyses in critical and interpretative 
Internet Studies have focused on the United States and Europe.11 While there are 
                                                 
11 The scale and range of these studies stressing the United States and Europe, without an awareness 
of Asian and Pacific sensibilities and histories, are as follows. D. M. Anderson & M. Cornfield (eds), 
The Civic Web: Online Politics and Democratic Values. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.   12
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correlations with access in Australia, there are features unique to the Australian 
cultural and social environment, as well as physical factors such as geographic 
separation and the sparse distribution of the population that limit the ability to 
translate these previous findings into an Australian context. Research on the Internet 
also has a tendency to date rapidly and much of what has been produced is either 
irrelevant or misleading due to subsequent changes and developments in technology 
and policy, including hardware, software and services. Innovative and reflexive 
research is constantly required to understand and model the changes and challenges 
in the current context.   
 
To investigate these inequalities, I assume the metaphoric role and function of the 
digital flâneur. The activity of this research was not only about searching the Web as 
a digital pedestrian, a vista summoned from the online world. Rather, I walk with 
purpose through the Invisible Empire of the Internet, traversing on screen and off, 
making observations, studying inequalities and the boundaries between these two 
spaces. To enact such a project involves a complex negotiation of research methods 
and materials. The distinct places and identities that they illuminate are often hidden 
from the view of the majority on the digital street. By embracing the role of the 
digital flâneur, I walk along and through the spaces and complexities of this Digital 
Empire.12  
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Publishers, 2002. 
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Internet Journal.  In relation to education, publications such as International Journal of Educational 
Technology, Journal of Research on Technology in Education and the Journal of Education Media are   14
 
The Paris newspaper Le Flâneur published May 3, 1848, issued a description of the 
flâneur’s condition and appearance: 
To go out strolling, these days, while puffing one's tobacco, while dreaming of 
evening pleasures, seems a century behind the times. We are not the sort to 
refuse all knowledge of the customs of another age; but, in our strolling, let us 
not forget our rights and our obligations as citizens. The times are necessitous; 
they demand all our attention, all day long.13 
 
The function of this old practice in informing a new circumstance is embodied and 
performed through this doctorate. The strolling with purpose of the digital flâneur in 
the Invisible Empire tracks the development of the World Wide Web. This 
behaviour, method and metaphor are fundamentally appropriate:  access to this 
application comes through the use of browser software. While other digital 
pedestrians might use this software to engage in passive observation and undirected 
wandering,14 as Le Flâneur observed, the digital flâneur is a role that demands a 
critical eye on the inequalities and disadvantage that is illuminated by their travels. 
 
This wandering and wondering has revealed that the context of access to the Internet 
has changed. Until recently, the population of the Invisible Empire was booming. An 
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ever greater proportion of the world’s population has gained ‘access.’ This term is 
rarely specified or explored. However this growth is levelling off as the Internet 
market ‘matures’.15 Recent research by the PEW Internet and American Life 
Project16 has indicated that this rate of growth has reached an apex and crucially, that 
those left outside of the Invisible Empire have no desire to gain access.17 The 
percentage of the population that is predisposed to gain access to the Internet and the 
World Wide Web has been saturated. The borders of empire, once easily traversed, 
are closing on the excluded. Gaining access for the remaining population will require 
different strategies to those that have served the more empowered classes, groups 
and communities in gaining Internet access. The invisible nature of the Empire 
serves to hinder this process, as the empowered and disempowered not only have no 
dialogue, but no shared place of common digital manifestation. In this context of 
change, the role of the flâneur, strolling with purpose must – at times – make way for 
the interventionary intellectual. Antonio Gramsci constructed the organic intellectual 
as a role where the existing order needed to be contested and the underclass given 
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voice and consciousness.18 In the Invisible Empire, the intellectual is needed not only 
to translate for the digital underclass but also to act as a light to illuminate the 
invisible nature of the Digital Empire, and the walls it creates. As this thesis 
progresses, the movement from flâneur to organic – and interventionist – intellectual 
becomes overt. 
 
The Invisible Empire has been written with a style to match its subject. Text is 
deliberately broken up with quotes and images that intrude on the formal flow of the 
writing. I emulate – through paper and ink – the hyperlinked structure of the Web. 
This layout is intended to add depth, intertextuality and mixed media to the print,  
rather than text-based, discourse. The focus is on important passages and precise 
interpretations without cluttering the prose. Similarly wherever possible, references 
that are available online are provided,19 both as Web addresses in the hard copy and 
as active links in the digital rendering of this dissertation.20 Illustrations and figures 
where possible have also been taken from Internet links, and as much as possible 
from collections in the public domain.21   
 
The history of the Internet can be tracked using a number of different methods and 
sources. One of these involves tracking those who have written and spoken about the 
                                                 
18 A. Gramsci, ‘The Intellectuals’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated and edited by 
Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, pp. 3-23.  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/editions/spn/problems/intellectuals.htm#nD [accessed 
14.6.2005]. 
19 Significantly, this desire proves easier to satisfy with the older texts that are no longer subject to 
copyright than with more recent publications. 
20 This analogue hard copy is the examinable form of this thesis. The CD ROM is included to assist 
examiners in the verification of scholarly protocols. If this thesis was written as a digitized, hypertext 
format, the mode and structure would be different, while this CD is provided as an appendix it is not 
offered as an examinable element. 
21 This desire to take the potential of mixed media seriously is the justification for many images 
derived from Wikipedia and other public domain collections. While the scholarly ‘value’ of 
Wikipedia is a site of dispute, their image database is a strong resource for this dissertation.   17
Internet, and who have sought to influence the discourse of sovereignty that 
regulated the environment. These changes in the position and ideology of 
commentators track the changing nature of the medium itself. The early history of 
the Internet is synonymous with the commentary of the technician, knowledgeable in 
the workings of the hardware and software that drove the network. Subsequent to the 
growth of the Internet as a medium of mass communication, following the enormous 
rise in take-up rates through the mid 1990s, this role was usurped by the expert. The 
expert focused on the application of the Internet and e-commerce applications. Now 
as Internet penetration rates start to stabilise as the market ‘matures’ and the borders 
of the Invisible Empire begin to close, the critique of the intellectual becomes a 
necessary voice in the discourse. The intellectual, building on the knowledge of the 
technician and the expert focuses on the consequences of the Invisible Empire. 
 
The technicians, or more accurately the technical expert, were the early 
commentators of the Internet. They were the voice of the early adaptors. They spoke 
from and about the on screen environment, with the knowledge that access was not 
universal or even available to a majority of the population. In the pre-World Wide 
Web Internet environment and before popular operating systems supported Internet 
connections,22 a highly developed level of ‘wetware’23 or literacy was required and 
expected of those with Internet access. These individuals typically did not see this 
literacy as a problem. Wetware acted as a welcome gatekeeper to the Empire, 
keeping out those who did share their world-view and experience.24 The Declaration 
                                                 
22 Prior to Windows 95, Microsoft operating systems did not support Internet connections.  
23 Wetware is defined and explored further in Chapter Two, ‘The Gates of Empire’. 
24 K. Hafner, ‘The Epic Saga of the Well’ Wired Magazine. May 1997. 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/ff_well_pr.html [accessed 16.6.2004].   18
of the Independence of Cyberspace25 is a document that sets those on the Internet 
aside from others. Much like a Nation State,26 it does not seek to enlarge the number 
of digital citizens. Rather, it addresses the concerns and demands of those who 
already possess that citizenship.  
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace 
27 
by John Perry Barlow <barlow@eff.org>  
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, 
I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather. 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I 
address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always 
speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral 
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true 
reason to fear. 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. 
You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do 
not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your 
borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public 
construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself 
through our collective actions. 
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you 
create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, 
or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could 
be obtained by any of your impositions. 
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use 
this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don't 
exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify 
them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social 
Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, 
not yours. Our world is different. 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, 
arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a 
world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice 
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. 
                                                 
25 J. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.  
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html [accessed 26.8.2003]. 
26 The construction of the Nation State and its interface with the Invisible Empire is examined more 
closely in subsequent chapters. 
27 This was written in response to the Telecom Reform Act, 1996 passed by the United States 
Congress. J. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.  
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We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her 
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or 
conformity. 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and 
context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter 
here. 
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by 
physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and 
the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may be 
distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all our 
constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope 
we will be able to build our particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot 
accept the solutions you are attempting to impose. 
In the United States, you have today created a law, the 
Telecommunications Reform Act, which repudiates your own Constitution and 
insults the dreams of Jefferson, Washington, Mill, Madison, DeToqueville, and 
Brandeis. These dreams must now be born anew in us. 
You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world 
where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your 
bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly to 
confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and expressions of 
humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the 
global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the air that chokes from the air 
upon which wings beat. 
In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the United States, 
you are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at the 
frontiers of Cyberspace. These may keep out the contagion for a small time, 
but they will not work in a world that will soon be blanketed in bit-bearing 
media. 
Your increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate themselves 
by proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself 
throughout the world. These laws would declare ideas to be another industrial 
product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind 
may create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global 
conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish. 
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same 
position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination who had to 
reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must declare our 
virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to 
your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no 
one can arrest our thoughts.  
 
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more 
humane and fair than the world your governments have made before. 
 
Davos, Switzerland  
February 8, 1996  
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The voice of the technician, given this assumed (and advanced) level of wetware and 
cultware, is directed primarily at hardware and software issues. The voice of the 
early adaptors has left an impact on the discourses that followed. This residue can be 
seen as it informs the debate about the Universal Service Obligation (USO) that 
specifies the hardware requirements to deliver bits at a suitable speed. David Silver 
tracked this phase in Internet development, analysing the analysis that occurred off 
screen about the Internet. He characterises this stage as ‘Popular Cyberculture’. 
Analysis of the Internet is primarily journalistic, introducing a non-technical 
audience to the technical environment of the pre-World Wide Web digital 
environment. Significantly, the metaphor that came to be the dominant descriptor of 
the Internet at this point was the ‘frontier’.28 
 
The Web reduced the level of technical knowledge required to access the technology 
and enhanced the utility of the Internet. This was a driver for the massive growth the 
medium experienced from the mid-1990s.29 The ideology of the early adaptors, as 
promoted in commentary by the technician ensured that the software required to 
enable the Web should be free and easily available. This in turn leads to the uptake 
of the medium by the wider population. The gate previously locked by the literacy 
requirements for entry was opened to greater numbers of people. The technicians lost 
their monopoly in the Invisible Empire. 
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With the wide take-up of the Internet, a new type of commentator developed. While 
most experts previously were early adaptors, the ideology of the Internet as a free 
shared space was abandoned for the ideology of capitalism and the market. The voice 
of the expert was at its most prominent peak during the Internet boom years at the 
end of the twentieth century during the ‘dot com bubble’30 of tech stocks. Their 
dogma focused on the enormous potential of the Internet and drove the dot com stock 
market bubble and subsequent collapse at the end of last century.31 There was less 
focus on access, except in terms of potential online consumers yet to be active 
participants in the new economy.  
 
Figure 2 
The Dot Com ‘Bubble’ in Technology Stock Prices, 2000 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dot_Com_Bubble 
[accessed 16.7.2005] 
 
                                                 
30 The dot com bubble emerged in the late 1990s. The NASDAQ exchanges value peaked on the 9
th 
of March 2000 at 5048.26, a value that had more than doubled in the preceding fourteen months. It 
declined just as quickly, by October 2002, the market had lost 78% of this value to close at 1114.11 
‘Looking back on the crash’ The Guardian. 10
th March 2005.  
31 ‘The dot.com bubble bursts’ New York Times. 24
th December 2000.  
N. Munro, ‘When the Dot-Com Bubble Burst’, National Journal. 10
th February, 2001, volume 33, 
issue 6.    22
The expert is also tethered to the ‘ideology of technology.’ Burnett and Marshall 
have pointed to a problem with the reasoning behind the adoption of new technology, 
and the World Wide Web in particular: 
An ideology that is concerned with technology therefore makes any new 
technology not only natural and normal for the culture, but also what is needed 
to make the society better. In other words, an ideology of technology creates a 
desire for the cultural transformation promised by technology. It serves to 
reduce the public debate about the technology and shift most discussion to a 
functional level of how expand, implement and integrate the new technology 
into our everyday lives. Critics have called this ideology a form of 
‘technological rationality’ (Marcuse 1964; Habermas 1975) or ‘instrumental 
reason’ (Horkheimer and Adorno 1987) where there is a simple means-end 
approach to its implementation. For the Web, debate might be reduced to how 
do we get greater numbers of people online rather than what kind of content or 
structures will be available online.32 
 
Questions of what happens to those without access are not disclosed. Antonio 
Gramsci proposed that there are people who specifically perform the function of 
intellectuals within society.33 The expert filled this position. Occupying the role of 
Gramsci’s ‘natural intellectual’, they served the role of perpetuating and supporting 
the existing order. Gramsci proposed a second type of intellectual, the ‘organic 
intellectual’, whose role was to critique and intervene in the existing order. This is 
the place now needed to be filled in this analysis by the (digital) intellectual.  
 
                                                 
32 R. Burnett & P. D. Marshall, Web Theory: An Introduction. London & New York: Routledge, 
2003, p. 9.  
The references referred to in the text: 
J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. 
M. Horkheimer & T. A. Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum, 1987. 
H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964. 
33 A. Gramsci, ‘The Intellectuals’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated and edited by 
Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, pp. 3-23. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/editions/spn/problems/intellectuals.htm#nD [accessed 
14.6.2005].   23
For Silver, this second stage of intellectual analysis of the Internet was characterised 
as ‘Cyberculture Studies’.34 Some of this writing evolved from the previous 
journalistic discourse, and Silver singles out the work of Julian Dibbell, and his 
analysis of the ‘Rape in Cyberspace’ that occurred in the LambdaMOO multi-user 
domain,35 that introduces the concepts of digital citizenship in Chapter Four of this 
thesis. He also selects Howard Rheingold’s Virtual Communities, and Sherry 
Turkle’s Life on the Screen, as pivotal texts to have come from this period.36  
 
By the late 1990s, Silver noted, analysis moved to Critical Cyberculture. While 
Cyberculture Studies focused on the development of online communities, critical 
Cyberculture Studies sought, rather than to merely describe cyberspace, to 
contextualise and critically examine the on screen environment.37 Concerns with 
access and the digital divide also become a focus of academic research at this point.38 
At this stage, the Internet was of a significantly different order than today’s mid-
                                                 
34 D. Silver, ‘Introducing Cyberculture – Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Cyberculture 
Studies 1990-2000’, in D. Gauntlett, Web.Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
http://www.com.washington.edu/rccs/intro.asp [accessed 10.7.2005]. 
35 J. Dibbell, ‘A Rape In Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
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rd December 1993. 
36 H. Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. Reading, Mass: 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1993. 
S. Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in The Age of The Internet, New York: Simon & Schuster 1995. 
37 D. Silver, ‘Introducing Cyberculture – Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Cyberculture 
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A. S. Hammond, ‘The Telecommunications Act 1996: Codifying the Digital Divide’, Federal 
Communications Law Journal. December 1997, volume 50, number 1, pp. 179-214.  
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2000s. Internet penetration was still rapidly increasing, and the economics of 
electronic commerce was undergoing massive growth and contraction associated 
with the ‘bubble’ in technology stock prices. The Internet has now evolved. The 
‘bubble’ is now in Internet time a distant memory, and more importantly Internet 
penetration throughout society has peaked.39 Those on either side of the screen are 
fixed in their position. To create movement at this point requires incisive 
intervention.  
 
Summoning the digital intellectual represents a relatively new role in Internet 
commentary. Conditions at the colonial periphery are often overlooked, irrelevant or 
redundant at the core of empire. Without a voice to translate the experiences of the 
colonised to those at the core, and occupying the role of an advocate for change, the 
conditions of the remote and disempowered are perpetuated. As the natural growth of 
the Internet slows as the market ‘matures’ those who fall outside the requirements of 
access will be increasingly excluded, creating a digital underclass.40 It is for this 
group that the intellectual seeks to intervene: to act as a translator across the gates of 
Empire between the digital citizen and those who are excluded from the Invisible 
Empire.  
 
                                                 
39 A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever 
Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, 
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Resistance within the Invisible Empire is a founding ideology, tracing its origin back 
to the cyberpunk literature that predicted the rise of the network.41 However this was 
a resistance to authority, both on and off screen, by the highly literate on screen, the 
hacker and the cyber-jockey. This thesis addresses resistance to the Invisible Empire, 
not through a Luddite rejection of technology, but by examining the conditions at the 
periphery of empire, the impacts of digital colonisation, and how this potential 
exclusion can be overcome. Debates around digital literacy have been deliberately 
removed or bypassed to narrow discussion about the future of the digital 
environment and focus on the material commodities necessary to gain access and the 
potential for more online consumers. The policy focus is placed on what can easily 
be converted into currency.42 An understanding of the manifestation of class, race, 
regionalism and age is required to intervene in breaching the ‘gap’ of translation to 
the digital subaltern. Literacy must be created in order to allow access to software 
and hardware for those for whom technological and cultural literacy is a barrier. The 
intellectual must possess multiple literacies to translate across class, race, ethnicity, 
age, gender and is in a position to talk both to and for the digital subaltern. To 
translate for those without a voice requires the literacy to write and create for the 
appropriate and changeable cultural environment. The intellectual fills the role of 
Gramsci’s organic intellectual whose place is to challenge the existing order and to 
speak for the underclass.43 It is the role of the intellectual in society to translate 
                                                 
41 W. Gibson, Neuromancer. New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1984.  
N. Stephenson, Snow Crash. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1992. 
42 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’ translated by R. Nice. http://www.viet-
studies.org/Bourdieu_capital.htm [accessed 15.9.2004]. Originally published as "Ökonomisches 
Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital." in Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), 
edited by Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983. pp. 183-98. 
43 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak warns of the dangers inherent in trying to speak for the subaltern, of 
standing in the way, as well as in the place of the underclass when trying to speak on their behalf. The 
role of the Intellectual and the Subaltern is discussed further in Chapter Eight, ‘The Digital Subaltern’. 
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across borders and gateways that sets them aside from the expert, as an advocate for 
change and intervention.  
 
It has now reached the stage, not only in the history of the Internet but also the World 
Wide Web, that intervention is required. This doctoral thesis diagnoses the nodes and 
structures of digital and analogue inequality. The role of critical and interpretative 
Internet Studies, inflected and informed by Cultural Studies approaches and theories, 
offers methods for intervention, providing contextual understanding of the inflections 
of power and social justice in a digital environment. In enacting this project, familiar 
tropes and theories from Cultural Studies are deployed. Particular attention is placed 
on the insights of postcolonial theorists. The Invisible Empire, following the 
ideology of the digital intellectual, seeks to act as a translation between the digital 
subaltern and the digital citizen. The research methodology follows the tradition of 
Cultural Studies and Postcolonial Studies. This thesis seeks to bring analysis to the 
existing information and primary research that currently exists in the field. Similarly, 
it seeks to apply pre-existing off screen theory and methodology to the Invisible 
Empire, illuminating how these theories can be reapplied to the digitised 
environment. 
 
My research traces key concepts and identities through time, tracking their 
development to illustrate how their manifestation within the Invisible Empire can 
represent both a radical transformation and a manifestation of continued trends over 
time. Much of the philosophical and historical perspective comes from a European 
perspective. This is partly driven by the philosophical historical bias that underpins 
                                                                                                                                          
Speak’, in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: 
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the Internet as an essentially Western construction,44 and also the influence of these 
ideas through the colonial domination of western power and thought, formally up 
until the end of the Second World War, and enduring in the post colonial condition. 
That the writer of this research is derived from Australia adds complexity and 
breadth to this investigation. The difficulties and inequalities forged through 
colonisation, and perpetuated on Indigenous citizens and a landscape unconducive to 
the easy development of digital architecture and infrastructure, add grit to this 
sojourn through the edges of empire. 
 
Walking with the digital flâneur along the borders of the Invisible Empire takes this 
dissertation through a journey along the digital boulevard. In Part I, the first three 
chapters focus on the foundations and construction of the Invisible Empire. Chapter 
One, ‘A History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal Service 
Obligation in Australia’, begins with an examination of the history of 
telecommunications access in Australia, specifically tracking the development of the 
Universal Service Obligation, the regulations governing the distribution of access to 
what is considered a basic and required level of access to telecommunications for all 
Australian citizens. Taking as its starting point the tragic story of the death of the ten 
year old Sam Boulding, this trajectory illustrates the changing understanding of what 
constitutes the essential level of telecommunication access and the government’s 
place in making this available. On the edges of the telecommunications network 
                                                 
44 In the Web’s earlier incarnations, this libertarian politics was derived from the early adopters who 
were English-speaking United States writers holding libertarian politics. Weinberger traces these 
philosophical linkages in Small Pieces Loosely Joined: A Unified Theory of the Web.    
D. Weinberger, Small Pieces Loosely Joined: A Unified Theory of the Web. Cambridge MA: Perseus 
Books Group, 2003. See also: A. Leoussi, ‘IT in Western Culture: A New Technology with Ancient 
Roots’, Knowledge Technology & Policy. Summer 2000, volume 13, issue 2. The increasingly post 
colonial nature of the Internet as it evolves from this perceived Western origin is investigated in 
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where the distribution of individual household phone lines do not reach, access is 
provided through public telephones, or is absent. This provides a guide for where to 
look for the digital underclass in Australia, the digital subaltern. This background in 
telecommunications provides a guide to the future direction of how access is 
distributed in relation to the Internet.  
 
In Chapter Two, ‘The Gates of Empire: Internet Access’, focus turns to the 
construction of Internet Access. This examination focuses specifically on the Internet 
and the Invisible Empire, examining how the gateways to the Empire – the screens 
through which the Internet is activated – are constructed from a matrix of hardware, 
software, wetware and cultware. This chapter unpicks the generalised notions of 
access, exploring the requirements to ensure and build access, and focusing on the 
applications of access. Each person accesses these gateways alone, and this will have 
consequences. There is no shared space where the excluded and the digital citizen 
simultaneously manifest.  
 
Chapter Three, ‘Networks and Digitisation’, continues the development of the matrix 
of access, evoking the interplay of hardware, software, wetware and cultware and the 
impact on network utility: the value of the Internet network available at any point of 
access. The consequence of the growth in a value of networks proportional to each 
user, as set forth in Metcalf’s law,45 and the growth in the computing power of 
hardware, a consequence of Moore’s law,46 can be seen to parallel the growth in the 
Internet in general and specifically since the development of the World Wide Web. 
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46 G. Moore, Electronics. 19
th April 1965, volume 38, number 8. 
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This chapter addresses some drivers of growth and the rationalization for the tapering 
of penetration, while also tracing the factors that limit Internet access, from hardware 
and software, to wetware and cultware. The process of digitisation, of entering the 
Invisible Empire, is transformative. Goods, services, and value manifest differently 
through the gates of Empire. This chapter monitors these transformations. 
 
Part II of this doctoral thesis turns to the on screen digitised environment. Chapter 
Four, ‘The Digital Citizen’, examines the self and citizenship and how these are 
transformed when taken from the analogue world and reconstructed on screen. The 
role of the non-citizen, both the digital deviant who fails to meet the responsibility of 
citizenship, and the digital underclass, or those who do not meet the requirements of 
citizenship, are highlighted in this chapter and feature in the analysis to follow. 
Chapter Five, ‘Digital Sovereignty’,  traces the trajectory of sovereignty and its 
relationship to the control of the production and distribution of information. In this 
context, and inspired by Benedict Anderson’s landmark Imagined Communities,47 I 
specifically examine the role of the Bible as a text of sovereignty. This discussion is 
then used to inform the complex construction of digital sovereignty as a discourse of 
sovereignty. In the digital environment, sovereignty is transformed. Without the 
monopoly of legitimate use of violence traditionally represented by sovereignty, the 
discourse is fickle and subject to reinterpretation and change at each manifestation.  
 
Having tracked the construction of the Invisible Empire via the screen in Part II, Part 
III of this thesis then pushes through the permeable matrix, stressing the 
consequences of the Invisible Empire as it interfaces with the off screen, analogue 
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world. Each person accesses the Internet alone at the screen. The consequences of 
this isolated gateway are the focus of this analysis. Chapter Six: ‘Core and Periphery: 
The Digital Empire’, investigates this construction from the core, how the Invisible 
Empire, following in the steps of preceding imperial powers, crosses the borders of 
analogue Nation States and confuses old understandings of sovereignty and 
citizenship. The Invisible Empire creates its own core and peripheral relationships 
both within nations and across national borders. While some relationships perpetuate 
and enhance existing inequality, others create new barriers and borders that are not as 
easily understood through analogue geography. Chapter Seven investigates 
resistance to this imperial colonisation. As the title suggests, ‘Resistance and the 
Nation State’ examines the role of the Nation State as a place where resistance to 
imperial domination has historically been activated, and how this construct can 
potentially be used as a site of resistance to the digital colonization of the Invisible 
Empire. 
 
Chapter Eight’s work on ‘The Digital Subaltern’ shifts the perspective and direction 
of the doctorate’s research trajectory. Rather than the core of the Invisible Empire, 
this chapter looks at the consequences of the Empire for the periphery, those who are 
increasingly locked out of this new structure. In this context, the potential for 
intervention, to eliminate or temper the level of exclusion experienced by the 
subaltern, becomes a focus. The Invisible Empire itself becomes postcolonial. The 
core fragments as the Internet incorporates new languages and cultural practices as 
its population grows beyond its English-speaking origins. In this context, the 
potential intensifies for the digital subaltern to be rendered further invisible and 
marginalised. The role of the digital flâneur, strolling with purpose, is set aside and   31
the intellectual acting as a translator and advocate for change must take its place. 
This leads to the conclusion of the thesis. The Intellectual is a call for a proactive and 
interventionist role to be more widely embraced.  
 
As the penetrative growth of the Internet tapers, the once permeable walls of empire 
become harder to transverse for those locked in the periphery. The Invisible Empire 
cannot be seen from outside its gates, and does not see those at the periphery. 
Without intervention these barriers and the disadvantage they represent will become 
further entrenched and perpetuated. An understanding of class, race, regionalism and 
age is required to intervene in breaching the ‘gap’ of translation to the digital 
subaltern. Literacy must be created in order to allow access to software and hardware 
for those for whom technological and cultural literacy is a barrier. For the 
intellectual, an understanding of cultware provides the literacy to engage with the 
cultural difference manifest in class, race ethnicity, age and gender required to talk to 
the digital subaltern. To speak for and to those without a voice requires the literacy to 
write and translate between cultural environments. Such an initiative, while 
politically and theoretically ambivalent, is necessary. Debates around digital literacy 
have been deliberately removed or bypassed to narrow the debate about the future of 
the digital environment. When talking about the digital future, the concept of culture, 
class, race and age is displaced from the analysis. The role for the intellectual then 
becomes to re-establish this discourse, to breach this gap in the analysis, and to speak 
for the digital subaltern. 
  
While this research concludes with a discussion of the consequences of colonization, 
it is this structure that also informs its beginning. Australia is a former settler colony   32
of the British Empire. It is in this context that telecommunications services were first 
delivered, and it is in the continuing postcolonial environment in this country that 
those services, while now highly evolved from the early telegraph services, are now 
denied to many of the colonised descendents of the original inhabitants. These issues 
commence the journey through the Digital Empire, being the focus of the next 
chapter, ‘A History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal Service 
Obligation in Australia’. 
 
In 1993, Howard Rheingold’s The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier,48 from which this thesis partly derives its name, was first 
published. This book provided an early and optimistic overview of the potential of 
virtual communities enabled by the pre-web Internet. Its title alludes to the 
excitement and potential of the settler in the new land, on the edge of the known 
world. My research follows this discourse and metaphor through to its colonial 
consequences. The exploitation and dispossession inevitably follows the annexation 
of newly discovered ‘foreign lands.’ The consequences on original, analogue 
inhabitants call for a re-examination of the past and a new understanding of the 
present. Exploration and settlement and the excitement of the new must now give 
way to colder analyses of the effect of imperial expansion on the dispossessed. The 
digital subaltern, locked outside the gates and walls of the Invisible Empire will 
remain colonised and dispossessed, without intervention. This divide is different to 
what has transpired in the analogue world as it cuts both across and within national 
boundaries. The Nation State was the traditional site used to mobilise resistance to 
colonisation. The former tool of colonial oppression is reinterpreted by the colonised 
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as a space for resistance. The Invisible Empire creates a new type of colonial 
oppression, and it is possible that the Nation State, while in many ways threatened by 
the transnational nature of the Invisible Empire, can once again be used to facilitate 
resistance. Border protection in this context is twisted and inverted. Rather than 
focus on the borders of the state as a point at which the outside must be kept at bay, 
border protection on the electronic frontier must look inwards to address 
shortcomings in the matrix of access and literacy, in particular cultware and wetware 
to allow for citizens to cross through the gateways of Empire. In this context, the 
Nation State is mobilised to embrace rather than reject the influence of the core, and 
act as a space where translation can occur to facilitate access for the digital subaltern.   34
Chapter 1  
A History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal 
Service Obligation in Australia 
No Man is an Island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a 
part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as 
well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor or thy friends or of thine 
own were; any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind; 
And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee. 
    John  Donne,  Meditation  XVII. 
 
 
 
Figure 3  
Sam Boulding (1992-2002) 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/09/1057430258781.html 
[accessed 6.7.2005]   35
The ability for citizens to communicate with each other and the state is an enduring 
tenet of democracy. In a country such as Australia, with its relatively sparse and 
widely dispersed population, the ability to link the citizenship remotely though 
technology helped create a sense of the nation as a whole when the individual 
colonies united at the time of federation.1 The Universal Service Obligation is the 
mechanism and ideology that ensures every Australian is linked to every other 
through the telephone network. However the system is not without its flaws. There 
are serious implications for those who fall outside the ‘Universal’ ability to 
communicate.  
 
On the 6
th of February 2002, ten-year-old Sam Boulding died of an asthma attack 
that occurred at his home, an isolated property in Kergunya in northeast Victoria. His 
mother Rose Boulding who is blind was unable to call for help because her phone 
was not working despite having travelled to a public payphone to ask Telstra to 
repair it ten days previously.
2 Her partner ran to a neighbouring property to call for 
an ambulance, and they eventually drove to a nearby post office to again call for help 
and meet the ambulance after the child had collapsed. The mother in question, being 
blind, required more help than most, particularly in light of her son’s asthmatic 
condition. Telstra admitted that it had failed to fix her broken phone line in a timely 
manner despite her request that they do so (which she was only able to make with 
considerable effort by travelling to a public telephone in a nearby town).3  
 
                                                 
1 Australian became a single federal nation on January 1, 1901. 
2 ‘Fed: Switkowski promises on boy’s death are just “platitudes”: union’, AAP 14
th March 2002. 
3 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Report to Telstra Corporation Limited on improvements required to the 
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This case is a tragedy but it does highlight some important arguments about 
telecommunications service in Australia, and specifically what is considered a basic 
level of acceptable service. Access to essential services is made through the 
telephone. In this case the ‘essential’ service was not just an ambulance, although 
this was the most crucial, but also not without some sense of irony, a telephone was 
needed to report a fault in the telephone service. This access via the phone to these 
services is of greater importance in rural areas where there are fewer alternative 
forms of access to services that are provided through the telephone network,
4 and 
fewer alternate locations to source access to the telephone network, such as public 
telephones.5 Private telephone lines and public payphones provide access to the same 
network in different ways. Yet issues of access are qualitatively different in both 
locations and forms.  
 
The fact that the family eventually travelled to a post office to access a telephone and 
to meet the ambulance also serves to illustrate the role of the post office as both a 
point of access to public services, and also its historic link to telecommunications in 
Australia. Rose Boulding’s disability also highlights questions of access to the 
telephone network for those with disabilities and whose responsibility it is to provide 
these services. Finally, the perceived role of Telstra, a private company, albeit still 
half owned by the Australian Government, to provide telephone services to the 
Boulding family, and their failure to provide timely repairs raises the question of 
who bears social and economic responsibility for access to the telephone network in 
Australia and how services are delivered. There are a number of telecommunications 
                                                 
4 Examples include banking services, access government services and information. 
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Opinion. 21
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carriers within Australia who can provide voice telephony services. Yet Telstra’s 
place in this group gives it special responsibility. This doctoral research grants an 
expansive function to the role played by both government and private enterprise in 
providing these services and how is this regulated. 
 
This chapter examines the Universal Service Obligation: the mechanism through 
which the Australian Government requires telecommunications companies – 
primarily Telstra – to provide a minimum level of telephone service to all 
Australians. Exactly what that basic service consists of, and how, and at what level it 
is provided is a subject of debate that centres on how the words ‘universal’, ‘service’ 
and ‘obligation’ are interpreted and defined. This investigation of the Australian 
situation is complemented by an examination of overseas models, particularly the 
United States. However Australia’s situation is not reliably analogous with many of 
its OECD counterparts, not to mention significantly different from developing 
countries, which have comparatively immature economies, and less developed 
communications infrastructure. The relatively sparse population spread over a large 
geographic area is a particularly challenging environment for telecommunications 
service in Australia, especially with regard to maintaining services to remote and 
isolated small communities as opposed to the populous centres around the cities of 
the country’s eastern seaboard. Many of these communities would be difficult if not 
impossible to provide communications services to without some form of government 
intervention. There are insufficient economic drivers for services to be delivered 
profitably or affordably. 
   38
Through the Universal Service Obligation or USO, the federal government in 
Australia facilitates access to telephony services across the country, both in areas of 
geographic isolation and/or low population density, as well as those in a more 
economically attractive urban environment where there still may exist other 
impediments to access. Currently the Universal Service Obligation for a particular 
area is provided by a Universal Service Provider6 and the funding for this service 
comes from a levy charged to telecommunications companies providing profitable 
services in other areas in a form of government sponsored cross subsidisation.7 
Currently, Telstra is the company chosen to provide these services to all regions of 
Australia, however this is likely to change as more independent designated ‘USO 
areas’ are put out to tender.  
 
‘Telephony services,’ as defined through the current USO regime, consist of access 
to the ‘standard telephone service’ both through a private domestic or business 
connection, and access to public payphones. The standard telephone service is 
guaranteed through the Universal Service Obligation regardless of physical location, 
although the time taken to provide the service once a request is made will vary with 
the level of isolation of the location that requires the service. In the most favourable 
of circumstances, that is, set in an urban area where there is ready access to existing 
infrastructure, Telstra will install a new phone connection within five working days. 
Within the most difficult category of a remote area, without ready access to existing 
infrastructure, Telstra guarantees connection within six months, or 130 working 
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Australia, Australian Parliamentary Library, 26
th September 2000. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/SP/uso.htm [accessed 20.7.2005]. 
7 This levy is charged on all telecommunications services, rather than just long distance calls, as is the 
case in the United States.   39
days. These times are doubled when the service is a public payphone, rather than a 
private line.8 This guarantee is also dependent on whether a connection is for a home 
or at a place of work, both of which are tightly defined in Telstra’s policy documents 
that respond to its USO obligations.9 While this is the current legislated Universal 
Service Obligation in Australia, this definition has evolved dramatically over the 
century since federation. Technology has both a history and context.  Too often 
changes in law and organizational culture trail behind these social transformations. 
 
History of Telecommunications in Australia and the  
Universal Service Obligation 
The first telephone exchange in Australia was opened in Melbourne in 1880 with 23 
subscribers. This exchange was taken over by the Victorian Government in 1887, at 
which time it had more than 1000 subscribers.10 In 1901, the first year of federation, 
the new Australian Government passed the Post and Telegraph Bill 1901. In this 
Bill, telephony was made the responsibility of the Postmaster-General’s Department 
(PGD).11 Section 69 of the Australian Constitution deals specifically with the 
handover of telecommunications regulation and infrastructure from individual states, 
who were colonies until that point in time, to the federal government. At this time the 
                                                 
8 Telstra’s Universal Service Obligation Standard Marketing Plan. 
http://www.aca.gov.au/telcomm/universal_service_regime/mp.rtf [accessed 19.11.2003], p. 12. Note 
these times specifically preclude a number of unusual or exceptional circumstances that might modify 
these time lines including environmental impact, natural disasters, vandalism etc.  
9 Telstra’s Universal Service Obligation Standard Marketing Plan. 
http://www.aca.gov.au/telcomm/universal_service_regime/mp.rtf [accessed 19.11.2003]. 
10 ‘Sensis Company History’, 
http://www.sensis.com.au/Internet/about/company_history/about_companyhistory.jhtml [accessed 
21.10.2003]. 
11 The Federal Government is granted the power to make laws with respect to “Postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic, and other like services” in section 51 (v.) of the Australian Constitution.   40
national telephone system had a total of 33,000 subscribers.12 Today there are over 
10.2 million subscribers.13 While there was no mention of any form of Universal 
Service Obligation in the Bill, the formation of the PGD promoted debate on this 
issue. Specifically, the question of whether the department should run as a 
‘commercial concern’, as favoured by the Postmaster-General James Drake, or if the 
department should run at a loss – with the balance to be recovered from general 
revenue – in order to better provide ‘services to the bush’.14 While it was the 
Postmaster-General’s position which prevailed, the spread of telecommunications 
across the country – particularly to rural and remote areas, rather than just the more 
profitable urban areas of the eastern seaboard – does indicate that some form of 
geographical universal service, was seen as an implied mission of the PGD, as it 
related to telecommunications.
15 There was also cross subsidisation within the 
department from the postal service to the telephone service and then later on the 
reverse.16 Initially the PGD’s role in telecommunications focused primarily on the 
telegraph service, with the Pacific Cable linking Australia to North America coming 
online in 1902. The official handover to the new federal public service by former 
colonial administrations on 1 March 1901 was celebrated with the simultaneous 
singing of God Save the King by staff in the PGD offices in each state capital, which 
was coordinated through telegraph services. 
                                                 
12 Perth, the capital of Western Australia, would still not join the national network until the end of 
1930, ironically as John Forrest the first Australian Postmaster-General was a Western Australian and 
former premier of that state (although he only held the position for two month before moving to 
defence following the death of James Dickson just two weeks into the inaugural administration, which 
given Forrest’s strong views against the federalisation of communications services in the first place, 
may have aided the development of the PGD). 
13 Telstra’s Universal Service Obligation Standard Marketing Plan, p. 9. 
http://www.aca.gov.au/telcomm/universal_service_regime/mp.rtf [accessed 19.11.2003]. 
14 A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia: A History of Telecommunications.  Melbourne: Nelson, 1984. 
15 A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia: A History of Telecommunications.  Melbourne: Nelson, 1984. 
16 G. Goggin & I.R. Wilson, Reforming Universal Service. Redfern: Consumers Telecommunication 
Network 1993.   41
 
In 1946, responsibility for telecommunications was split between the Postmaster-
General’s Department and the newly established Overseas Telecommunications 
Commission. The OTC was made responsible for international telecommunications 
services in and out of Australia, while the PGD was responsible for 
telecommunications services within Australia, and consequently how access to 
domestic and international services would be distributed.17 In 1975, the PGD was 
disbanded and the Australian Telecommunications Commission – trading as 
Telecom – was formed with the Telecommunications Act 1975. Telecom was given 
responsibility for domestic telecommunications services. While there was no explicit 
obligation under the universal service banner placed on this new entity, the Act 
specified that Telecom would: 
Best meet the social, industrial, and commercial needs of the Australian people 
for telecommunications, and shall, so far as it is, in its opinion, reasonably and 
practicable to do so, make its telecommunications services available 
throughout Australia for all people who reasonably require those services 
(section 6 (1)). 
 
The special needs for telecommunications services for Australian people who 
reside or carry on business outside the cities (section 6 (2) (b) iii).18 
 
The newly independent statutory authority – taking over the role of 
telecommunications provider from the previous government department – was then 
free to determine its own priorities for providing access to telecommunications 
services to meet the needs of the Australian people. 
 
                                                 
17 While the two services were separated, access to the domestic network, controlled by the PGD was 
still required in order to access the international network. 
18 M. Bourk, Universal Service? Telecommunications Policy in Australia and People with 
Disabilities. http://www.tomw.net.au/uso/laws.html [accessed 31.12.2003].   42
A further development of telecommunications technologies in Australia occurred in 
November 1985 when AUSSAT Pty Ltd launched Australia’s first 
telecommunications satellite.19 AUSSAT was incorporated in 1981. Telecom held a 
25% stake and the remainder was owned by the federal government. While the 
company at that time was prohibited under legislation from competing with Telecom 
in the provision of public network services, AUSSAT did compete in the provision 
of international telecommunications infrastructure.
20 
 
In 1989 the Telecommunications Act 1989 and the Australian Telecommunications 
Corporations Act (ATC) 1989 obliged Telecom to provide ‘standard telephone 
service’ to all Australians on an equitable basis wherever they lived or carried on a 
business. While this was not a dramatic change to existing practice, the Act began 
the more specific codification of telecommunications obligations expected from the 
service provider. At the same time it potentially narrowed the level and scope of 
services that were necessary and essential to be provided and accessed by all people. 
While the obligation was now officially in place for all Australians to have this 
access, which had not previously been explicitly stated, the network was now more 
tightly defined. Previously the type of network had not been specified. It was now 
codified in terms of the standard telephone service. 
 
Universal Service within these changes now became part of Telecom’s Community 
Service Obligation. The CSO was to provide the ‘Standard Telephone Service’ 
                                                 
19 ‘The Lowdown: Australian Space Development in Focus’, 
http://www.lowdown.com.au/sat_assat.html [accessed 9.5.2005].  
20 H. Raiche, ‘The Policy Context’ in A. Grant (ed), Australian Telecommunications Regulation: The 
Communications Law Centre Guide. Sydney: Washington Press, 1997.   43
defined as the ‘public switched telephone service’ ‘as efficiently and economically as 
practicable’ 
a) in view of the social importance of the standard telephone service, the 
service is reasonable accessible to all persons in Australia, on an equitable 
basis, wherever they reside or carry on business; and 
b) that the performance standards for the service reasonably meet the social, 
industrial, and corporate needs of the Australian community21 
 
In 1990, the judiciary made its debut in the development of the USO in Australia. 
The plaintiff in the Yarmirr case resided upon by the Federal Court, was a group of 
individuals who asked the Court to enforce provisions of the Universal Service 
Obligation: Yarmirr et al v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1990). In 
the Yarmirr ruling, Justice Burchett found that Universal Service Obligation was a 
‘political duty’ of ‘general and indefinite character’ imposed by the Parliament, 
rather than a ‘right’ of the public, and as such the Court was unable to enforce them. 
Rather the mechanism for enforcement of these provisions should be ‘the remedy 
devised by Parliament of AUSTEL’, the telecommunications regulator at that stage.22 
This clearly placed any determination of prescribed levels of basic 
telecommunications access in the hands of Parliament. There was according to this 
ruling no ‘right’ to these services for individual citizens or organisations outside the 
legislated framework. 
 
The  Telecommunications Act 1991 introduced competition into the Australian 
telecommunications industry. A duopoly was created in the telecommunications 
                                                 
21 G. Goggin & I.R. Wilson, Reforming Universal Service. Redfern: Consumers Telecommunication 
Network 1993, p. 13. 
22 H. Raiche, ‘Universal Service In Australia’ in B. Langtry (ed). All Connected, Universal Service in 
Telecommunications. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1998, p. 11.   44
market with the introduction of Cable and Wireless, trading as Optus.23 At this time, 
the CSO was separated into the Universal Service Obligation24 – now defined 
specifically as access to standard telephone service25 – comprising both private lines 
and payphones.26 This Act placed the USO component of the CSO in the licence 
                                                 
23 At this point Optus also purchased AUSSAT. 
24 288. (1) The universal service obligation is the obligation: 
            (a)   to ensure that the standard telephone service is reasonably 
                  accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis, 
                  wherever they reside or carry on business; and 
            (b)   to supply the standard telephone service to people in 
                  Australia; and 
            (c)   to ensure that payphones are reasonably accessible to all 
                  people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they 
                  reside or carry on business; and 
            (d)   to supply, install and maintain payphones in Australia. 
       (2) The Minister may determine that it is part of the universal service 
obligation to supply, install and maintain payphones at specified locations in 
Australia. 
       (3) A determination under subsection (2) must be made by notice 
published in the Gazette. 
       (4) The regulations may prescribe, for the purposes of paragraph (1) 
            (c), what is, or is not, necessary to ensure that payphones are 
                  reasonably accessible as mentioned in that paragraph. 
       (5) Neither of subsections (2) and (4) limits the generality of the 
other. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1991 
http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/au/other/media.OLD/6786.html [accessed 29.10.2003]. 
25 "Standard telephone service" means: 
            (a)   unless paragraph (b) applies - a public switched telephone 
                  service that: 
                     (i)   is supplied by a carrier; and 
                    (ii)   is supplied by means of a telephone handset that does 
                           not have switching functions; or 
            (b)   if the regulations prescribe a telecommunications service, or 
                  telecommunications services, for the purposes of this 
                  definition - that telecommunications service or any of those 
                  telecommunications services; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1991  
http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/au/other/media.OLD/6786.html [accessed 29.10.2003]. 
26 "payphone" means a fixed telephone that: 
            (a)   is connected to a telecommunications network operated by a 
                  general carrier; and 
            (b)   when in normal working order, cannot be used to make a 
                  telephone call (other than a free call or a call made with 
                  operator assistance) unless, as payment for the call, or to 
                  enable payment for the call to be collected: 
                     (i)   money, or a token, card or other object, has been put 
                           into a device that forms part of, is attached to, or 
                           is located near, the telephone; or 
                    (ii)   an identification number, or a code or other 
                           information (in numerical or any other form), has 
                           been input into a device that forms part of, is   45
conditions of the telecommunications companies. The social welfare responsibilities 
of telecommunications, now separated out from the USO, were to be paid out of 
consolidated revenue.27 This moved the funding responsibility for the USO directly 
to the increasingly privatised telecommunications industry and once again tightened 
the definition of what the USO constituted and what it did not. 
 
In February 1992, the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 
(AOTC) was formed from the merger of the OTC and Telecom Australia as these 
two services were once again consolidated. The Telstra Corporation Ltd began 
trading internationally as the merged entity. On 1 July 1995 this became the domestic 
trading name of what had previously been Telecom.28 This was ostensibly done to 
prepare the industry for greater competition. It was argued that a new name would 
not cause confusion with other operators.29 The decision may also have been 
influenced by political factors. For example, distancing the organisation from the 
previous statutory authority – at least in name and public identity – would make it 
easier to later privatise the company. 
 
Prior to this name change in June 1995, there was an additional change to the way 
that the Universal Service Obligation was delivered. On this occasion rather than 
coming from legislation dealing specifically with telecommunications, it came from 
                                                                                                                                          
                           attached to, or is located near, the telephone; or 
                   (iii)   a prescribed act has been done; 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1991  
http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/au/other/media.OLD/6786.html [accessed 29.10.2003]. 
27 The proponents of this approach some 90 years earlier at the inception of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department finally having some of their proposed policy implemented. 
28 Senate Environment, Recreation, Communications and The Arts Reference Committee, Telstra, to 
Sell or Not to Sell. Canberra: Australian Government, 1996. 
29 ‘Telstra Investor Relations – Corporate History’, http://www.telstra.com.au/investor/corphis.htm 
[accessed 16.6.2002].   46
a Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) ruling on Telstra’s 
compliance with its USO responsibilities under the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992. The HREOC ruled in the case of Scott and Disabled People’s International 
(Australia) (DPI (A)) V Telstra that Telstra must provide teletypewriters to deaf 
people as part of its commitments under the Universal Service Obligation as outlined 
in the Telecommunications Act 1991. This was an important interpretation of the 
telecommunications legislation made in conjunction with the Disability 
Discrimination Act, 1992 which determined that Telstra’s responsibilities were 
broader than the corporation’s prior interpretation of standard telephone service 
provision. 
The stand taken by the respondent (Telstra) reflects a grave misunderstanding 
of its responsibilities under both the DDA (Disability Discrimination Act, 
1992) and the Telecommunications Act. I cannot think it would deliberately 
disregard the plainly expressed intensions of the Legislature30 
 
The courts, having determined earlier in the decade that there was no ‘right’ to 
Universal Service, now determined once again the primacy of the legislature in this 
area. This time, other laws were passed by the Parliament, as they applied to Telstra 
and its obligations under the USO. Under this ruling, the USO became more 
expansive, although ironically, and concurrently, more tightly defined. 
  
In July 1997, the telecommunications market was further deregulated when open 
competition was permitted in the sector. New providers were also subject to the 
regulation of the Australian Communications Authority and conditions of their 
operators licence. In November of this same year, the government sold 33.3% of its 
shareholding in Telstra through a public listing. These shares were then tradeable on 
                                                 
30 Scott and Disabled People’s International (Australia) (DPI (A)) V Telstra, (HREOC, 1995, 15-15). 
M. Bourk, Universal Service? Telecommunications Policy in Australia and People with Disabilities. 
http://www.tomw.net.au/uso/introduction.html [accessed 1.12.2003].   47
the Australian, New Zealand and New York stock exchanges. In September 1999 a 
further 16.6% of the Commonwealth’s initial ownership was also sold. The 
Commonwealth Government currently maintains a 50.1% majority share in Telstra, 
although the company has responsibilities under corporation’s law to all its 
shareholders. These sales, T1 and T2 as they were known respectively, attracted a 
large number of small investors who acquired shares for the first time. While T1 was 
a great success for those involved, T2 was less so.31 
 
The sale had a number of important implications. Firstly the corporation now had a 
fiducial duty to its shareholders to generate a return on investment that would now 
take precedence over its duty to serve the citizens of Australia who had previously 
been the sole owners. Therefore any social obligation the organisation might have 
previously had implied as its mission would now require legislation to enforce, as the 
company directors were bound by corporations law to give generation of return for 
investors priority. In addition to this, the sale of shares through T1 and T2 were 
specifically targeted to be sold as small parcels of shares to numerous investors who 
were first time share buyers. These shareholders now form a large group within the 
electorate who will be directly affected by any changes to government policy that 
would impact on Telstra’s share price. This reflected a change in the government’s 
conception of citizens and citizenship which was reflected on both sides of 
Australian politics. The conceptualisation of the ‘share-holding citizen,’ holding their 
stake in the nation’s wealth as individuals through share ownership in large 
institutions, came to replace the previous citizen who participated in collective 
                                                 
31 R. Webb, ‘T3: the $600M call’, The Age 30
th January 2005. 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/T3-the-600m-call/2005/01/29/1106850157986.html 
[accessed 1.7.2005].   48
management of government assets through public ownership and control. The 
potential under this model for excluding individuals from this view of ‘citizenship’ is 
obvious. This re-conception also serves to align the interests and wealth of these 
share-holding citizens, with the profitability of large public companies, and through 
them the wealth of the economic elite in Australian society. The balance shifted 
between rights and responsibilities. 
 
In 1999 while the sale of Telstra was proceeding, the Consumer Protection and 
Service Act 1999 was passed by Federal Parliament. This legislation once again 
defined the Universal Service Obligation and outlined how fees to meet this 
obligation would be paid by telecommunications providers in Australia which was 
authorised by the Telecommunications (Universal Service Levy) Act 1997). The new 
act outlined the plan to divide Australia into different areas for Universal Service 
provision. The delivery of services to these areas would be subject to tender from 
competing companies. The winner would then become eligible for the USO subsidy 
for that particular area. To date, Telstra has been designated as the sole Universal 
Service Provider for all of Australia, apart from some pilot programs run under the 
auspices of the legislation. The cost of servicing the USO is a point of disagreement 
between Telstra and the Australian Government. The costs allocated by Telstra to 
provide for the USO have risen dramatically over time.32 The new policy of putting 
different regions out to tender for their USO requirements is a further move towards 
government purchasing specified required services from private suppliers, and 
                                                 
32 ‘ACA: ACA Assessment Process of Telstra’s Universal Costs Claim for 1997-98 Financial Year’, 
M2 Presswire.  9
th November 1998.  
‘Rural telecommunications – USO costing’, M2 Presswire. 3
rd February 2000. 
‘Fed: Govt announces review into USO’ AAP 1
st December 2003.   49
further away from the provision of telecommunications services through the public 
sphere. 
 
Figure 4 
USO Extended Zones and Pilot Areas 
 http://www.aca.gov.au/images/extended%20zones%20+pilot%20areas.jpg  
[accessed 1.12.2003] 
 
Since competition was introduced into the Australia telecommunications sector in 
1991, the main basis for competition has been the delivery of services to the retail or 
consumer market. Telstra however has continued to be the primary provider of 
telecommunications hardware and the wholesale segment of the market, particularly 
outside the Melbourne-Sydney corridor on Australia’s eastern seaboard. While 
competition in this area has been promoted by the government,33 Telstra still owns 
the majority of infrastructure, which it then leases wholesale to the other industry 
                                                 
33 OECD studies have shown that following the introduction of competition into the 
telecommunications sector there is normally a positive effect on the cost and range of services offered 
to consumers. O. Boylaud and G. Nicoletti, Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in 
Telecommunications. Economic Department Working Paper No. 237. Paris: OECD, 2000.   50
operators. This arrangement has been at the centre of a number of disputes and 
allegations of anti-competitive behaviour by Telstra.34 By 2002, in response to this 
volatile context, Telstra was to be ‘virtually split’ into its wholesale and retail 
divisions for purposes of accounting and sale of services in the hope of reducing the 
impact of the flawed market on the retail sector. However recent calls by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commissioner Graeme Samuel for greater 
transparency in this separation indicates that this process may not have derived the 
hoped for benefits to this point in time.35 While it had been suggested that this 
wholesale area should be renationalised and the retail division completely 
privatised36 the recently appointed head of the company Solomon Trujillo has 
explicitly rejected any break-up of the company prior to its full privatisation in 
2006.37 Telstra’s domination of the wholesale market has placed the corporation in 
the commanding position to deliver the USO through traditional means38 across 
Australia. However the government is hoping to encourage the use of alternative 
technology, such as CDMA mobile telephony operating in conjunction with radio-
wave or coper network links, by competing providers to fulfil USO commitments in 
its trial areas.39  
 
The role of Telstra as Australia’s dominant telecommunications provider, 
particularly in providing service to regional and remote areas, is acknowledged in 
                                                 
34 ‘Fed: US trade report says Telstra uncompetitive’, AAP 4
th July 2002. 
35 A. Geoghean, ‘ACCC to watch Telstra movements closely’, PM. 23
rd June 2005. 
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2005/s1399342.htm [accessed 23.6.2005]. 
36 Most notably by Lindsay Tanner the Shadow Minister for Communications. L. Tanner, Reforming 
Telstra. Australian Telecommunications Users Group Limited, May 2002. 
http://www.atug.com.au/article.cfm?newsid=168&newstype=1 [accessed 9.7.2005]. 
37 ‘New chief of Australia’s Telstra backs privatisation, opposed to break up’, AFP. Sydney: 12
th 
June 2005. http://au.news.yahoo.com/050612/19/uofr.html [accessed 19.6.2005]. 
38 In this context, the traditional means refers to a terrestrial fibre optic cable network. 
39 Extended Zones and Pilot Areas. 
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government policy towards full privatisation of the corporation that explicitly ties 
this sale to an ‘adequate’ level of service provided in these areas. The government 
enquiry into the current level of service led by Dick Estens40 produced mixed results 
and responses from the government. 41 Plans for the full sale of Telstra were 
announced in the 2005 federal budget. 
 
Telecommunications began in Australia as a public utility. This seems appropriate 
due to the nature of the Australian environment of a widely dispersed and relatively 
small population that would require considerable investment, of limited return, to 
connect more remote communities to each other, and the rest of the country through 
a common network. This is a situation that is unlikely to have been expedited by 
private investment, given the marginal economic nature of providing service to 
remote, small and isolated communities. From this situation, the government-run 
department became a statutory authority, and then a government-owned corporation. 
This was then partially privatised, while at the same time losing its position as the 
monopoly operator in this sector in Australia. A certain level of competition within 
this sector has been shown to produce good outcomes for consumers in other OECD 
countries.42 The Howard government’s mobilisation of neo-liberal ideology also 
utilised the alternative revenue option through the sale of this large public asset. The 
privatisation of Telstra had the effect of changing the corporation’s focus to the ‘duty 
to shareholders’, which now replaces its previous ‘duty to the citizens’. Ultimately it 
                                                 
40 D. Estens, Connecting Regional Australia. The Report of the Estens Regional Telecommunications 
Inquiry. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002. 
http://www.telinquiry.gov.au/rti-report.html [accessed 21.7.2005]. 
41 Mr Estens is a Moree cotton grower who controversially is a member of the National Party of 
Australia, and is close to the former leader of that party and deputy prime minister, John Anderson. 
42 O. Boylaud & G Nicoletti, Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunications. 
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would seem that the debate in the PGD has been determined, with 
telecommunications in Australia operated as a business, rather than a public service. 
Thus the Universal Service Obligation, that was previously inherent in the role of the 
government department, is now enforced on private operators through an industry 
specific tax that funds the cross subsidisation from more profitable services to areas 
where the competitive market would not be able to provide this level of service.  
 
The transition in Australia of the telecommunications sector from a monopolised 
government department through to a competitive private industry was partly a 
product of the unique Australian environment at the time of federation. This has not 
mirrored the experience of other OECD nations, although contemporary USO 
policies in these countries have developed along not dissimilar lines to Australia. 
This generalised similarity, but with significant dissonance, can be illustrated by 
comparing the Australian experience with that of the United States. The Universal 
Service Obligation as a phrase, if not an identical concept to the one used in 
Australia can be traced back to the corporate policy of the US telecommunications 
company American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). Theodore Vale, the company 
president outlined the principle in 1910: 
The Bell system was founded on the broad lines of ‘One System, ‘One Policy’, 
‘Universal Service’, on the idea that no aggregation of isolated independent 
systems not under common control, however well built or equipped, could give 
the country the service. One system with a common policy, common purpose 
and common action; comprehensive, universal, interdependent, 
intercommunication like the highway system of the country, extending from 
every door to every other door affording electrical communication of every 
kind from everyone at every place to everyone at every other place. 43 
 
                                                 
43 AT&T’s Annual Report in 1910. http://www.ieeeusa.org/forum/POSITIONS/universalservice.html 
[accessed 1.12.2003].   53
AT&T, despite this rhetoric, actually tended to concentrate on the more lucrative 
urban markets, leaving the lower margin rural areas to other operators. By 1934 in 
the United States, the concept of Universal Service had moved from corporate policy 
to government policy as outlined by the US Communications Act of 1934. Although 
the exact phrase is not mentioned, the act does stipulate in its preamble: 
to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States, without 
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion, national origin, or sex a 
rapid, efficient, nationwide wire and radio communications service with 
adequate facilities at reasonable charges.44 
 
Having gone to this length, how these objectives were to be met was not explicitly 
determined or codified in the actual body of the legislation.45 
This to an extent follows the Australian position of a less 
defined or specified obligation, but within the context of a 
regime that would regulate private companies, rather than 
provide the service through a government department such 
as the PGD in Australia was doing at the time. 
 
State regulators, industry and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the United States began to promote 
the USO in the 1950s.46 The Universal Service Obligation was applied to low income 
and remote users by internal cost shifting between different customers and services 
within AT&T who provided services to 80% of the subscribers in the United States.47 
                                                 
44 Communications Act of 1934. http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf [accessed 1.12.2003]. 
45 G. Goggin & I.R. Wilson, Reforming Universal Service. Redfern: Consumers Telecommunication 
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46 Federal and State Universal Service Programs and Challenges to Funding, Government 
Accounting Office Report. 2
nd July 2002. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02187.pdf [accessed 
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In 1984, AT&T was broken up into eight smaller companies after an agreement was 
reached between the parent company and the Department of Justice in a lawsuit 
brought by the latter under US anti trust law. This put an end to the previous 
aspirations to universal service through one company articulated in 1910.48 The FCC 
then implemented Federal Access Charge fees. These fees were paid by long 
distance phone companies to originate or terminate long distance phone calls from a 
local network. They were then paid directly to the company that provided the local 
network and allowed for more expensive long distance calls to subsidise local calls. 
In addition to this, the FCC initiated charges to long distance telephone operators that 
were used to fund initiatives to provide access to telephone services for low-income 
customers, as well as those in rural or high-cost areas.49 The Telecommunications Act 
1996 both ratified and extended these programs so that they also provided services 
for services to schools, libraries and rural health care providers. Having started from 
quite different environments in the provision of telecommunications services both 
Australia and the United States have moved to forms of government sponsored 
telecommunications industry cross subsidisation to finance their respective positions 
on their Universal Service Obligations.   
 
While in Australia, telecommunications was a government owned and controlled 
monopoly, the United States policy was developed to break up a private monopoly to 
promote competition in the telecommunications market. The USO in both cases can 
be seen to move from what was initially seen for both The Postmaster-General’s 
Department, and the American Telegraph and Telephone Company as an implied, if 
                                                 
48 P. Temin and L. Galambos, The Fall of the Bell System: A Study in Prices and Politics. Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
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poorly defined mission to bring telecommunications to the masses, through to a 
situation where both governments now use the tightly defined USO as a mechanism 
to regulate the supply and distribution of telecommunications services, and more 
specifically voice telephony services, to those places that would otherwise miss out 
on being connected to that network. To understand how this process of change 
occurred, and what implications of this process of change still inform current 
understanding of policy, it is important to look at the impact of the residual 
ideologies that this process has left in its wake.  
 
Ideologies leave a residue in present institutions. Whatever is set in place at the 
origin of a discourse or framework is difficult to displace, particularly when 
institutions are formed on this foundation. Additionally when a discourse is 
established, at that point, the boundaries of that discourse will serve to limit the 
modes and types of expression that can be used within that discourse.50 Those who 
first establish the framework then determine the grammar or rules and limitations of 
the debate. In the case of the USO there are some added twists to this broader 
concept. This is due to the changing nature of the discourse, with different ideologies 
being introduced over time that are able to better stake out their position as the 
organisations in which they manifest change, or more accurately are replaced by new 
types of institution. Thus the Australian public service duty of providing access to 
the telecommunications system can trace its origins from the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, through to Telstra acknowledging that it had failed to provide a required 
level of service to the Boulding family. However there have been significant changes 
to this initial ‘residue’ along the way. The ruling against Telecom’s failed 
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understanding of its requirements under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, can 
be directly traced back to its move from a government department to a statutory 
authority in 1975, when it was charged to ‘meet the social, industrial, and 
commercial needs of the Australian people for telecommunications, and shall, so far 
as it is, in its opinion, reasonably and practicable to do so’. This type of residual 
ideology is quite out of place in a private company operating in an increasingly 
regulated USO environment. Thus while a trace of each incarnation of the 
telecommunications provider in Australia can be seen to have continuing influence, it 
has also been subject to greater change than might otherwise have been the case by 
the dramatic changes in the underlying administrative and chartered structure of the 
provider of this service from government department, through to competing private 
companies in the deregulated marketplace. This effect has been less marked in the 
United States, where the service providers have always been private companies, 
albeit with differing levels of government regulation, although one of the driving 
factors behind the decision to break up the AT&T Bell system into smaller 
independent companies in the 1980s was the company’s rigid internal structure, that 
can trace its origin or residual effect back to Theodore Vale and 1910.51  
 
Through the incremental shifts and reactive responses to technological obsolescence, 
the USO as public policy has developed over time. However there are other 
Universal Service discourses that developed outside of this context. British academic 
Nicholas Garnham identified two different views of Universal Service in 
telecommunications: 
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1) Politico-Philosophical: Sees universal service in telecommunications as a 
basic right of citizens essential for membership of a social community’ and for 
‘freedom of expression and communications’ the implications of this view are 
that questions of economic efficiency are overridden by the importance of the 
Universal Service concept, and that the only policy question is the revenue 
source from which it will be funded 
2) Economic: Access to telecommunications as an ‘economic’ good to be 
consumed in the ‘market’52  
 
Dividing arguments in to these two groups is useful to categorising much of the 
academic analysis that has been done to date. It is ultimately, however, a false 
dichotomy. The Politico-Philosophical analysis of Universal Service is that it is a 
self-evident necessity for people to interact, and participate in society as full 
members. It follows a not dissimilar view to that which inspired the unsuccessful 
Yarmirr Federal Court action, that access to the telecommunications network should 
be a right of every person. This view of Universal Service Obligation links the 
concept very much with that of citizenship, and the relationship of the citizen to the 
democracy and society through active participation.53 As Hills stated:  
Telecommunications has a social and political function. It allows the citizen 
not only within the local community but beyond, combating the dualistic 
tendencies of the Urban/Rural divide. In this sense telecommunications enable 
that free association which is fundamental to a democratic political system.54 
 
The role of universal access to telecommunications is seen as particularly important 
in Australia where the level of geographic isolation is higher than that experienced in 
many comparable countries. This Politico-Philosophical position has also been used 
to illustrate the lack of access to this ‘Universal Service’ for non-citizens, those who 
are unable to fully participate in society through having insufficient access to the 
means to do so including, but not necessarily limited to, telecommunications. This 
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would include groups such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, people 
with disabilities, women, and people with a first language other than English.55 The 
Politico-Philosophical view of Universal Service is also often used to translate this 
concept to discussions on Internet access. In this view, telecommunications is seen as 
fundamentally different from other goods and services as it relates directly to the 
rights of a citizen. Universal Service is qualitatively different to access to Pepsi or 
fast cars, in that it provides an avenue through which individuals are connected to the 
wider society. Access to information and communications through the 
telecommunications network is not just necessary to allow for citizens to play an 
active role in society, it provides access to the symbolic order. 
 
The economic view of Universal Service advocates the argument that access to 
telecommunications is in itself an economic good which should be determined 
through market forces that will operate most efficiently if not distorted through any 
government interference. Related to this notion is the understanding that the greater 
the penetration of access, the better the marketplace for buyers and sellers enabled 
through that medium, and the less potential for market distortions. Both these 
concepts align with the argument that to live in a consumer culture, the ability to 
consume is an important part of participation in society. Thus to be able to use the 
telecommunications system to allow for access to goods, and service, and indeed to 
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consume the access itself is necessary in order to be a ‘citizen’ of a consumer 
society. As Lee articulated, ‘Cultural capital must be seen through consumption’.56 
 
Garnham’s two perspectives are complementary rather than dichotomous. 
Citizenship is much more than consumerism, although there is a consumerist aspect 
to contemporary citizenship. Similarly, citizenship and economics are not separate 
when exploring telecommunications as might be first thought. As a network connects 
more people and thus has a greater value to each of those connected, the 
disadvantage to those not on the network is compounded both as a participatory 
member of a society, and as a consumer of economic goods and service.57 The 
greater the value of the network, due to its accumulated members, the greater the 
opportunity cost forgone by those who do not have access.  
 
Changing Definitions. Shifting Paradigms. 
There has been considerable debate within Australia about the changing nature of the 
USO. These debates have revolved around the major changes to the structure and 
regulation of the telecommunications environment in Australia over the past century. 
The definition and evolution of the terms ‘Universal’ and ‘Service’ are a point of 
discussion. Meanings will change over time.58 However it is important to also focus 
on the nature of Obligation. How the meaning and understanding of this word can be 
seen to change over time is central to an analysis of the USO in Australia.  
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The concept of the Universal Service Obligation is bound to change as technology 
develops, expectations of what services are expected by the public change, and the 
role of government in providing these services changes. While the existing USO 
situation has been outlined, arguments could be made to define the Universal Service 
Obligation as being met, on one hand, by each city having access to a single pay 
phone provided by a private company and unfettered market forces left to determine 
on the cost to users, or at the other end of the spectrum, by each person in the country 
having their own third generation mobile phone with universal coverage, high 
bandwidth Internet access, and operating with no charge, or more accurately the 
government paying as a public service from consolidated revenue. Within current 
definition of the USO, geography is the dominant factor of consideration. However 
there are other considerations that can also be seen as an impediment to telephone 
access, including economic and social factors, physical disabilities, such as blindness 
or deafness that may impede accessing a normal telephone and may require 
additional equipment, and finally what telephony is actually used for by its 
consumers/citizens. To illustrate these issues better it is useful to separate the 
analysis of the changing nature of each aspect of the USO. 
 
Service 
Of the three components of the USO, the changes that have occurred to the meaning 
of ‘service’ are the most obvious and easiest to track. As new technology develops 
and others are rendered obsolete, what people expect, and need from 
telecommunications services will change. Thus ‘Service’ may change from an initial   61
telegraph service to access to a dial tone and a limited quality voice line, through to 
high bandwidth data transmission. All can be viewed as service at some level. The 
minimum standard of service accessible to all will change as the demand for, and 
uses of, telephony service changes.  
 
These changes impact on two areas. As technology develops, previous systems 
become redundant and unsupported. There is no point in maintaining a national 
telegraph system when the technology has been superseded both in terms of 
sophistication of service and simplicity of use. More importantly, as that 
communication format is no longer supported throughout the world, such a network 
would be obsolete. At the other end of this spectrum, new technologies are 
developed. However not everything that is devised will necessarily be developed to 
the point where it is available to the public at large. New technologies may require 
government support or regulation before they are implemented. Within Australia 
both pay59 and digital television are examples of technology that was only available 
after development of, and changes in, government policy.  
 
When new services become available they are generally offered as an additional 
option for people with its distribution often limited by economics and geography.60 
Over time, some of these services come to be considered universally available, and 
access to them is assumed for people who participate as full members of society. At 
this point one medium may be used by government to communicate messages to all 
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their citizens, such as television and radio, with other technologies utilised for the 
citizens to communicate back, such as voice telephony. In addition, the government 
can be seen to have a responsibility to provide these services, or more specifically to 
ensure that all citizens have the ability to access this level of service so as to be able 
to fully participate in society. 
 
With broadcast systems such as TV and radio, the government actively regulates the 
organisations that are responsible for broadcast, ensuring that signals are available in 
remoter areas, and regulating the content that is available through those broadcasts.61 
The government does not provide access to the reception devices, television and 
radio sets. Within the voice telephone network however, partly because it is a 
network of individual nodes on a closed network rather than a radio wave broadcast 
system, the government legislation does allow for the provision of equipment to 
access the network, as well as the network itself.62 
 
Determining the level of communications technology needed to be a full participant 
in society, and thereby requiring government intervention, is necessarily a political 
decision influenced by a particular view of what equitable membership of society 
entails. If the government does not act to provide access to an appropriate level of 
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service then those who do not have this will become excluded from society, or non-
citizens, as they are unable to meet the minimum requirement for citizenship. The 
definition of access to what type of service is required for this requisite level of 
participation is one that by its very nature will change over time. These debates are 
not limited to telecommunications technology, as can be seen in health debates over 
the role of Medicare in Australia, as a ‘safety net’ or a ‘universal service’. 
 
The changing nature of the definition of service has become more tightly defined 
over time. The initial PGD had no explicit type of technology or line quality it was 
mandated to deliver. Rather it was charged with the overreaching responsibility for 
the postal, telegraph and telephone network. As telecommunications regulation and 
provision and the USO developed over time, this broad responsibility was narrowed 
further towards a standard voice line, either at a public payphone or at a place of 
residence or business. Parallel to this change in definition of what was an acceptable 
level of service was the change in the nature of the provision of the service from a 
broad obligation to be provided, through to a cost to be paid for other agencies to 
deliver a specific product. This has also paralleled the change in the language of the 
debate from one where there was a public service approach to users, or citizens, to 
one of a market of consumers for telecommunications products. 
 
This tighter definition has come into conflict with a broad range of new data and 
mobile telephony, both Internet mediated and other propriety networks. This is the 
friction point of when these new services may be seen as essential to participate in 
society, and thus create a role for and obligation on, government to act to ensure that 
access to these services is adequately distributed. This ’new wave’ of data and   64
mobile telephony is at odds with the trend to a tighter definition of what service 
should be. Recently this has been evident in the debate over the upgrade of the USO 
to reflect a requirement for greater data capacity. Currently the USO requirement of 
7600bps allows for fax transmissions, but does not provide quality sufficient for an 
Internet connection capable of viably accessing the World Wide Web. The 1999 
report of the National Bandwidth Enquiry into telecommunications in Australia63 and 
the more recent debates about Telstra’s role in providing broadband Internet access 
to rural Australia – particularly in light of its impending full privatisation – can be 
seen as signs of this friction.64 
 
The debate about ‘future proofing’ the level of service to regional Australia in the 
event of the sale of Telstra explicitly acknowledges both the changing nature of 
service and at what level it must be provided to enable full participation in society, 
and the difficulty in making this ‘upgrade’ in the services that are regulated through 
the USO given the trend to more tightly define, and thus limit what is available as 
opposed to broaden the services that might be deemed necessary to regulate in this 
manner. The change in what can be accessed through different telecommunications 
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media and the subsequent change in what is essential to participate in society are at 
the point of friction in terms of service, in the ongoing negotiation of the USO. 
 
The new technologies on offer mean that the telecommunications situation has 
fundamentally changed from the fixed line voice telephony service. This 
transformation applies not only to data, but also the various forms of mobile 
telephony. The type of access that may be essential for one person may be of no use 
to another. This is exacerbated by the rapidly changing nature of the 
telecommunications market. In this environment it is argued that it is simply 
impossible to prescribe one limited type of access as universally essential. Telstra 
noted in its submission to the senate enquiry on the part privatisation of Telstra in 
1997 that it disputed the idea that data services were “widely and socially significant’ 
and suggested that mobile phones and access to the mobile network should be seen 
as of at least equal significance.65  
 
Can the current communications policy discourse cope with the changing nature of 
service beyond voice telephony? The last ‘big shift’ in dominant telecommunication 
platforms from telegraph to telephone services happened prior to USO in an 
environment where the role of the PGD was widely interpreted. The government to 
date is treating the Internet similar to broadcast media. It regulates content, but not 
access. Is this an appropriate paradigm, and – if not – how could it be changed? 
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Universal 
The notion of what is ‘Universal’ in regard to the USO changes in the different 
contexts of both services and obligation. Within Australia, access to the standard 
telephone service is guaranteed regardless of location, however this guarantee is 
dependant on your ‘location’ being at home or at work, both of which are tightly 
defined in Telstra’s policy documents that respond to its Universal Service 
Obligations66 and in many cases will be satisfied by a single shared pay phone to 
service entire remote Indigenous communities.  
 
Prior to federation in 1901, one of the areas of close inter-colonial cooperation had 
been in the telecommunications sector. As early as 1856, Victoria, New South Wales 
and South Australia had agreed to cooperate on an inter-colonial telegraph system 
and from the 1890s there were bi-annual post and telegraph or P&T meetings 
attended by the relevant politicians and public servants from all the Australian 
colonies, and New Zealand.67 However while the delivery of telecommunications 
services was clearly an important priority in Australia after European colonisation 
the services provided would not meet any current definition of universal. Through 
these efforts, all the colonies were eventually linked through the telegraphy system 
both to each other and then to the international network. The fact that this could be 
considered a form of universal coverage for the colonies (albeit to only the major 
population centres), serves to illustrate how the term is subject to change over time. 
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It is fair to note that at the time of federation there was not what could be considered 
universal access to telecommunications service, as it is now understood. 
 
The Postmaster-General’s Department took over the role played by the separate 
colonial administrations and while it had no chartered obligation to provide universal 
service, it is clear that it became part of its implicit mission to broaden the reach of 
telecommunications services across the continent. In 1975, Telecom was given the 
more explicit mission to ‘make its telecommunications services available throughout 
Australia for all people who reasonably require those services’. In the 
Telecommunications Act 1989 this obligation became one where all Australians were 
to have equitable access to the standard telephone service, at least at their place of 
residence and business. This was essentially a ‘geographic’ guarantee to a phone 
connection, with little regard for other areas of exclusion. In 1991, new legislation 
determined that payment for this Universal coverage would come from the 
telecommunications companies as part of their licence conditions. In 1995 The 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ruling determined that there was 
more than just a geographic component to the Universal aspect of the USO with its 
ruling that special services for people with disabilities were also required to be 
delivered. The Telecommunications (Universal Service Levy) Act 1997 further 
defined how the now open telecommunications industry would fund the USO, and 
began the introduction of potential competition into the provision of these services. 
 
As the service component of the USO has become more tightly defined, so too has 
the notion of what is considered universal, along with who is responsible for the 
funding for, and actual provision of, this service. Universal within the Australian   68
USO context tends to focus on the geographic delivery of services to people, albeit 
with the inclusion of special access conditions for disabled telecommunications 
users. However not all people in Australia who want access to a phone line maintain 
this service. This is in part due to the USO being covered by the provision of public 
telephone, but also points to the fact that there is more to providing universal 
coverage than just the geographic aspect. While the historical perspective shows that 
for the PGD this may have been a major issue early on in the development of 
Australia’s telecommunications industry, it is not the only factor that will influence 
people’s ability to access the network. This is particularly important given the role 
that telecommunications plays in creating informed citizens.68 As technology 
becomes more sophisticated, and the ability to deliver this technology increases, then 
the demand for what is universally available will also change. What is Universal is 
ultimately inseparable from what is Service, however the level of sophistication of 
telecommunications delivered, how they are delivered, and by whom will depend on 
the changing understanding of Obligation. 
 
Obligation 
Service is becoming more narrowly defined, and provision of these services (who 
provides it, how much it costs) is being made more explicit. These are the trends in 
change to Service and Universal. They can be best understood through the changing 
nature of Obligation in the USO. In many analyses, this is omitted. Indeed, 
Obligation is often not even included in the label. 
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The trend in Australia is for the USO to become more tightly defined each time it is 
reinterpreted and reapplied. The role of the government has moved from one where it 
was the provider of these services to one where its role is to regulate these services as 
they are both provided and funded from the deregulated telecommunications 
industry. This can be understood as a change in the type of public good that 
government is using to inform its telecommunications policy. In 1739, Hume 
outlined the concept of public goods in his Treatise of Human Nature.69 A traditional 
public good should have the quality that it is both non-excludable and non-
exhaustible. An individual cannot be prevented from using a public good, and each 
additional individual accessing a public good will not add to the total cost of 
providing that good. Common examples of public goods are national defence and the 
environment, in both these cases the public good will effect all the people using it 
within the Nation State, either by having a military to ward off attack, or clean air to 
breathe, and by and large each additional individual partaking of the good will not 
add to its overall cost. In the case of the Internet, as noted through the network 
analysis, each additional user not only does not take away from the value of the 
public good, but in fact increases the total value of the network. 
 
Telecommunications was initially seen as a public good that was provided by 
government for the benefits of all. Such an open-ended deployment and definition 
reveals synergies with the defence of the country. The provision of services need not 
be tightly defined in this case, as the commitment is to an extent both open ended, 
and likely to change over time as technology develops. It also allows the government 
to regulate the provision of this type of ‘good’ in changing environments as it sees 
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fit, to serve the interests of the nation at large. Thus the navy can be used to turn back 
asylum seekers on the high seas, even though this is not the role for which it is 
constituted.70 Understanding telecommunications in this way also helps inform why 
the USO has been so geographically grounded. This is a reflection of the desire for 
everyone to have access to the network and fulfil the non-exclusion requirement of 
the public good. As it is provided by government this becomes a central feature of a 
successful outcome. Similarly the defence forces are designed to defend all 
Australian territory, not just the easily defended areas of mainland Australia.71 
 
Government policy in relation to telecommunications over time has shifted. Earlier 
understandings of a good to be provided by government has transformed into a 
public good that must be regulated by the government, more analogous to the 
environment. Within the United States, the USO was always considered this second 
type of public good as the earlier ‘roll out’ of services had been done through private 
investment, fuelled by the greater returns to be had in providing services to the less 
geographically dispersed population. Instead, the focus there has been on ensuring 
that the private provision of these services is done in the public interest, thus the 
regulations requiring the break-up of the monopolistic provision of service by 
AT&T. Within Australia this is a crucial shift in understanding the nature of the 
telephone service as a public good. This new understanding then relies upon a 
number of assumptions, the foremost of these is that these services are abundant or at 
least available everywhere. This premise is obviously not the case as the Boulding 
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family tragically illustrated. The USO is now used as the mechanism that is supposed 
to make up for these areas where the resource is not so abundant as to only require 
regulation rather than provision. The other problematic assumption with this 
understanding of the telecommunications industry is that the technology does not 
change and is like the environment, a relatively static resource for government 
regulation. The technology does change, and these changes can create different 
problems for access especially once they are established to the point where access 
can be seen to be essential to participate as an active member of society. In this 
aspect telecommunications services are still analogous to the changing nature of 
national defence as a public good both in terms of what technology in required and 
the changing environment in which it is applied. The failure of this understanding of 
telecommunications a ‘regulated’ public good is not immediately apparent, as it takes 
time for any technology to reach the point where universal access to the service will 
be essential for full participation in society, however once it does reach this point this 
understanding will make the process of change difficult to administer.  
 
This second type of regulated public good is much better suited to the neo-liberal 
small government ideology that informs the Howard Liberal/National government in 
Australia with its commitment to ‘small government’, than the previous 
understanding. Public goods that are government provided must be paid for out of 
consolidated revenues through taxation, whereas regulated public goods are largely 
revenue neutral, and may actually produce revenue through taxation and fines used 
as part of any regulatory regime. Once the obligation of government in relation to the 
USO is seen as one where it acts as a regulator, rather than provider, then there are 
obvious gaps that will appear in the areas that can be regulated, where no service   72
currently exists, or will exist. It then becomes the role of the USO to be the 
mechanism that ‘fills’ these gaps, where the government pays for the service to be 
provided where it would not otherwise appear. This is different from the government 
providing the service itself, as it now becomes a package of telecommunications 
products that must be purchased and paid for from private companies with no open 
ended commitment to the citizens that the government serves, thus the products 
provided must be tightly codified. 
 
Home, Hearth, and DSL? 
The significant issue to evaluate is at what point can the Internet is be said to be part 
of the USO. The understanding currently used to inform Internet regulation is more 
analogous to television and radio than it is to the telephone. The federal government 
acts to regulate content both on the Web, through the Australia Broadcasting 
Authority which has jurisdiction over television and radio and over email by trying 
to tackle the problems presented by Spam. With television, radio, voice 
communications and the Internet rapidly converging as digital media,72 how will a 
government’s regulatory regime and its underlying assumptions about each 
individual medium cope? Government in Australia seems committed to the position 
that these are different and distinct types of media. The weight of both history and 
the residue ideologies that come with it, not to mention the vested interests of the 
owners of media and distribution in each of these areas, will act for some time to 
prevent an analysis that treats these different media as converging on the same 
‘broadcast’ medium requiring a uniform regulatory understanding. Australia is a 
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formerly colonised nation with specific difficulties for universal service in 
telecommunication history. These difficulties have not always been handled well. 
The key is now – as digitisation and convergent media are rolled out – how this 
challenge is handled. Will it solve prior problems, repeat them or create new ones? 
 
This convergence of communication and media through the Internet is particularly 
significant in relation to the USO as a mechanism for ‘filling the gaps’ in an 
otherwise universally distributed resource that merely requires government 
regulation, rather than provision. The USO is also limited by the role of historic 
discourse and residual ideologies from understanding or embracing these convergent 
mediums or technologies. Thus the idea of ‘future proofing’ telecommunications in 
regional Australia73 is impeded by discourse that fails to understand the scope of the 
field it is dealing with currently, let alone into the future. As a mechanism designed 
to provide service to those who need it and would otherwise miss out, the USO as it 
is currently constituted, will be the only service that these people most at risk will 
receive. The more tightly defined USO means that as potential services (those that 
fall outside this tightly defined definition) increase, then those who rely on the USO 
for their telecommunications needs will necessarily be left behind. The more 
ambiguous the definition of the USO, the greater the reach it will have. The reverse 
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of this maxim is also true. Finding a way to expand this discourse to confront this 
convergence of services in the future thus takes on a priority. If every new form of 
media is legislated on the basis of the mistakes made in the previous media, as is 
most often the case, then this task is made more difficult. The last major upgrade to 
service from the public telegraph to the private telephone took place when both 
forms of telecommunications were public goods provided through government via 
the Postmaster-General’s Department. 
 
Can the USO inform any dialogue about providing access to the Internet throughout 
society? In its current state, there may prove to be too much ‘sunken ideology’ to be 
of effective use. However it is possible that a new discourse fashioned around the 
Internet may in turn inform debate and discourse that engage with the USO. This 
may come from co-opting debate around the regulation of radio and television, 
particularly the role out of digital television services, and more importantly the 
migration of television services to the Internet.74 The government, through the 
Australia Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), currently plays a role in ensuring access 
to television and radio, once again primarily geographically, across Australia. The 
ABC also provides a broad and effective Internet presence through ABC online.75 
The fact that all these areas fall under the domain of the Minister for 
Communications, Helen Coonan and her department may allow for the holistic 
nature of this portfolio to be better actualised through regulation, and via the 
provision of services to those who would otherwise miss out. 
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Current government expenditure in relation to access to broadband Internet 
infrastructure indicates a mixed response. The Higher Bandwidth Incentive Scheme 
(HiBIS)76 is a government program that provides a payment of between $1540 and 
$3300 per customer for Internet Service Providers to provide high bandwidth 
Internet access to rural users.77 While the government clearly sees a role to 
encourage the spread of this type of access, and is prepared to subsidise the initial 
expenditure that this may require, this is a significant step back from ensuring any 
sort of universal availability to this service. By contrast the Metropolitan Broadband 
Blackspots Program78 seeks to provide Internet access in urban areas where there are 
‘holes’ in the existing coverage.79 The latter program would appear to show a greater 
commitment to the universal geographic coverage, albeit only in urban areas. This 
urban regional disparity can be partly explained by the costs involved. While the 
Blackspots Program has been allocated $50 million over three years,80 HiBIS with its 
seemingly more modest aims has been allocated $107.8 million.81 The Networking 
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the Nation82 program was another, earlier, government initiative funded by the part 
sale Telstra to provide Internet access to regional areas. Funding from this program 
closed in 2003. Eighty percent of the programs initiated through this funding have 
since failed.83 
 
 
Figure 5 
 Networking the Nation Funded Internet Access Facilities 
http://sdndiscovery.dcita.gov.au/MIDiscovery/ 
[accessed 15.5.2005] 
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nation [accessed 15.5.2005]. 
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The discourse that currently surrounds the USO, and the trend to a tighter rather than 
a broad definition of the service provided, probably preclude access to the Internet 
being delivered with this framework. Having noted this trend, a debate is emerging 
around the sale of the remaining government-owned shares in Telstra.  It has started 
to adopt lines of debate around access to broadband Internet connections that has 
similar parameters to the USO. While lack of access to this level of service is seen as 
having negative social connotations, the primary consideration revolves around 
issues of geographic access, and this takes precedence over other social and 
economic factors that may prove to be larger barriers to access than geography for 
the majority of Australian citizens who do not yet enjoy these services.  
 
The point at which ensuring access to the Internet becomes a role for government is 
at the point that it is evident that in order to be a full participant in society and citizen 
of the country the ability to access the Internet is essential. As government and other 
essential service providers, such as banks, move more services online and reduce 
their off screen alternatives, this critical point approaches or has already past. The 
challenge is to ensure that people in society are not left behind or are at least in a 
position to ‘catch up’. To enact this project, a new discourse around this issue will 
need to be articulated. 
 
Those who then miss out on access to telecommunications service, and specifically 
those that are regulated through the USO but also those that are essential for an 
individual’s full participation in society, can be seen as those for whom this 
mechanism or bandaid provided through the USO is inadequate. The USO as a   78
‘safety net’ is primarily a geographic solution. This as noted above is due largely to 
the historic rollout of telecommunications services in Australia. While some of those 
without access still do suffer from geographic disadvantage, there are others for 
whom the problems are economic or cultural. 
 
In 1996, the Consumers Telecommunication Network produced Reforming Universal 
Service, a report that argued that a true policy of universal service would have to 
addresses five separate areas: Universal geographical availability; Universal 
accessibility; Universal affordability; Universal technology standards; Universal 
telecommunications and participation in society.84 The report argued that the USO 
policy currently in place, only deals with the first of these five areas. The concern 
was that the inequitable distribution of telecommunications services compounds 
existing social and economic inequality. This view of universal access sees it as a 
mechanism that must address all, or at least as many factors as practicable that would 
act as impediments to access the telecommunications network. What is the point in 
giving a pay phone to a community where no one can afford to use it? How useful is 
a phone connection at home to some one with a physical impairment that prevents 
them from making use of it, unless additional equipment is supplied to enable 
access? 
 
Beyond Australia, this broader interpretation of the USO has informed other regimes. 
Universal Service internationally includes both universal coverage of telephony 
service and some form of non-discriminatory access, including some form of 
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uniform or regulated pricing mechanisms. An example of this strategy can be seen in 
the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications (Ofcom) and their understanding 
of a USO that consists of: ‘special tariff schemes for low income customers; a 
connection to the fixed network, which includes functional internet access; 
reasonable geographic access to public call boxes; and a range of services for 
customers with disabilities including the text relay service’.85 The reforms to the 
United States telephone network in 1984 also followed this pattern of explicitly 
funding telephone services to economically disadvantaged areas.86 
 
The Basic Telecommunications Needs Project, published in 1990 by Balnaves and 
Richardson,87 also looked at five components: the site or situation; a person’s 
everyday life activities; the telecommunications purpose; technologies; and 
efficiencies gained. They contended that it is a much more complex task today (or at 
least in 1990) than previously to track people’s use of telecommunications 
technology, let alone to determine what is essential and what is not across all of 
society. Services vital for one citizen may be irrelevant to others. The project 
maintained that a more complex view of a customised or at least more targeted 
Universal Service can be developed that relates to the concept that 
telecommunications needs depend on social context. The service provided must be 
appropriate in a given environment.88 While this would initially seem to be 
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consistent with the continuation of the process of producing an ever more tightly 
defined definition of the USO over time, perhaps this is starting to look at concepts 
that cannot be regulated within a broad Universal Service Obligation regime, and 
require other regulatory and also more interventionist strategies, as well as funding 
options?  
 
Public Telephone Networks  
The USO can be met by the provision of both private telephone lines to a place of 
residence or work, as well as by the provision of a public payphone. However these 
provide different types of service to those who use them in different contexts. In 
Australia, where a person may need to wait on hold for thirty minutes to talk to 
Centrelink, while possibly at the same time looking after three children, these can be 
important distinctions.  
 
There were 33 778 payphones operated by Telstra across Australia in 2001-2002, 
and these are supplemented by another approximately 40 000 payphones that are 
operated by other providers89 (although this latter group bears no relation to Telstra’s 
USO service provision obligations). Between 1996-1997 and 2001-2002 there was a 
decrease of 12.3% in the total number of payphones (in 1996-1997 Telstra provided 
37 292 pay phone service). This drop in numbers was related to a fall in revenue and 
usage of payphones, possibly attributable in part to the growth in mobile phone 
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ownership and use over that period.90 Of these Telstra phones in 2001 an audit 
commissioned by the Australian Communications Authority found that 99% had at 
least one of their two payment mechanisms working (either a phone card or coins) 
although 13% had at least one faulty payment mechanism. 97% of calls could be 
successfully connected to the emergency 000 number (a very important statistic 
given that 200 000 calls were made to that number on payphones in the 2001-2002 
financial year).91 As of late 2003 there were approximately 190 of these pay phones 
modified to include a teletypewriter function for the hearing impaired.92  
 
There are two different types of users of public pay phones. For one group public 
payphones act as a supplement to private phone lines, to be used when outside the 
place of home or business for convenience. This is often how these utilities are 
portrayed in the media, as telecommunications to fit into leisure time: 
 
Figure 6 
1800 Reverse Web Advertising 
http://www.1800reverse.com.au/ 
[accessed 22.6.2005] 
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Increasingly, this user group consists primarily of those without the resources to 
make mobile phone calls. The growth in mobile phones is resulting in lower public 
phone revenue and a corresponding reduction in the number of public phones 
available across Australia.93 The second group who use public phones are those who 
do not have access to a private line. This may be for a number of reasons however 
primary amongst these will be economic factors. This is significant since it illustrates 
that the USO while explicitly serving a geographic function, has built into it a 
mechanism where a different level of service is available to those who suffer more 
than just geographic disadvantage. Public phones represent the ‘safety net’ for this 
second group that contrasts uncomfortably with the ‘Universal Service’ of private 
lines for the majority. 
 
The distribution of public phones with teletypewriters in 
Western Australia seems to suggest that either hearing-
impaired people within Western Australia are quite 
affluent, at least in their choice of residence, or that the 
distribution of these services is focused almost exclusively on this first group of 
users. In this case at least how these services can be seen to primarily serve a 
Universal Service Obligation, rather than merely a convenience role is somewhat 
questionable. 
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Teletypewriter modified public telephones in Western Australia 
Suburb/Town  Building  Location within Building  Street Address 
Burswood   Burswood Casino   Near Casino Reception Area  Level 1  Bolton Avenue 
Cloverdale   Belmont Forum Shopping Centre   Inside shopping Centre      227 Belmont 
Avenue 
Duncraig   Carine Glades Shopping Centre   Inside shopping Centre      473 Beach Road 
East Perth  Westrail East Perth City Railway 
Station 
Rail Terminal     40 West Parade 
Forrestfield   Forrestfield Forum Shopping Centre  Inside main entrance     15 Salix Way 
Fremantle  Fremantle Hospital   Outside Emergency  B3  2 Alma Street 
Hillarys   Whitford City Shopping Centre   Near Just Jeans      470 Whitfords 
Avenue 
Joondalup  Joondalup Shopping Centre  Outside Coles      420 Joondalup Drive
Karrinyup  Karrinyup Shopping Centre  Outside David Jones     200 Karrinyup Road
Leederville  Leederville College of Tafe  Outside E Block     43 Richmond Street 
Leederville  Deaf Society  Main Foyer     16 Brentham Street 
Mirrabooka  Mirrabooka Square Shopping 
Centre 
Outside Big W     34 Yirrigan Drive 
Mount Hawthorn  Mount Hawthorn Plaza Shopping 
Centre 
Inside Centre     148 Scarborough 
Beach Road 
Murdoch  Murdoch University  Outside Library Block     90 South Street 
Nedlands  Queen Elizabeth 2 Medical Centre  Centre Reception     2 Verdun Avenue 
Perth  Perth Airport   International Terminal East End  Ground 
Floor 
Horrie Miller Drive 
Perth  Royal Perth Hospital  Level 3 Lobby  Level 3  197 Wellington 
Street 
Perth   Westrail Perth City Railway Station  Station Main Entrance     450 Wellington 
Street 
Perth   Perth College of Tafe   Main Entrance  Level 2  12 Francis Street 
Perth   Perth Trinity Arcade  In Arcade      72 St Georges 
Terrace 
Perth   Perth Airport   Domestic Terminal QANTAS 
Departures  
Level 1  Brearley Avenue 
Perth   Perth Airport   Domestic Terminal Virgin Check In      Brearley Avenue 
Rockingham  Rockingham Shopping Centre   Near Post Office      Council Avenue 
Spearwood  Phoenix Park Shopping Centre  Inside Shopping Centre     254 Rockingham 
Road 
Subiaco   Princess Margaret Hospital   Near Emergency  Level 4  95 Roberts Road 
Subiaco   King Edward Hospital Ground Floor  Ground Floor  Ground 
Floor 
374 Bagot Road 
Subiaco   Subiaco Oval   Inside Gate 9     250 Roberts Road  
West Perth  Kings Park Tourist Kiosk        Fraser Avenue 
 
Figure 7 
Teletypewriter Locations: Perth 
http://www.telstra.com.au/disability/ttypayphones/wa.htm 
[accessed 14.11.2003] 
 
Suburb/Town  Building  Location within Building  Street Address 
Albany  Albany Plaza Shopping 
Centre 
Inside shopping Centre      38 Albany Highway 
Broome  Paspaley Shopping Centre  Near Ice cream kiosk      Carnarvon Street 
Bunbury  Bunbury Forum  Inside shopping Centre      Sand Ridge Road 
Bunbury  Bunbury Centrepoint 
Shopping Centre 
Inside shopping Centre      Blair Street 
Busselton  Port Geographe Marina   Outside Marina Office      21 Spinnaker Blv  
Carnarvon  Boulevard Shopping Centre  Inside entry     55 Robinson Street 
Esperance  Esperance Boulvard 
Shopping Centre 
Near Newsagency      Forrest Road 
Fremantle  Fremantle Railway Station  Platform     30 Phillimore Street   84
Geraldon  Northgate Shopping Centre   Inside side entry   Lot 17  Chapman Road 
Kalgoorlie  Kmart Shopping Centre   Inside Kmart     Brookman Street 
Karratha  Karratha Shopping Centre  Inside entry     Welcome Road 
Kununurra  Kununurra Hotel  Inside Hotel     Messmate Way 
Middle Swan  Swan District Hospital  Emergency     Eveline Road 
Northam  Boulevard Shopping Centre  Inside Shopping Centre     181 Fitzgerald Street 
South Hedland  South Hedland Shopping 
Centre  
Main Open entry area      Throssel Road 
Thornlie  Thornlie Square Shopping 
Centre 
North West Mall     330 Spencer Road 
 
 Figure 8  
Teletypewriter Locations: Regional Western Australia 
http://www.telstra.com.au/disability/ttypayphones/wa.htm 
[accessed 14.11.2003] 
 
Public phones have a number of features that distinguish them from private lines. 
They are primarily for outgoing calls rather than receiving calls, and this function has 
a number of implications. Firstly it means that the user must pay every time they 
access the telecommunications system (receiving calls on a private line is free). 
Secondly, those connected to the network via public payphones add to the value of 
the whole network less than those who can receive calls through a private line. A 
network’s value grows with each additional node, both because that node can access 
the whole network, but also because the whole network can now access that node.94 
In the case of public phones only the former is true. Public phones occur in a 
different type of social space to private lines, both business and domestic. This is 
further contrasted when mobile phones are also included in the discussion. 
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G. Gilder, ‘Metcalf’s Law and Legacy’, Forbes ASA, 13
th September 1993. 
This is examined further in Chapter Three’ Networks and Digitisation’   85
Argument Against the USO in Australia 
Australia’s existing USO focuses almost exclusively on the first of the five areas 
raised in Reforming Universal Service95 with some additional services for people 
with disabilities, primarily deafness, to access additional equipment. However there 
are arguments that rather than being too restrictive, this position is in fact too 
expansive and largely unnecessary. This is based on a number of assumptions. Firstly 
that deregulation will produce better consumer outcomes. This argument trusts 
market forces to distribute these services. By forcing telecommunications companies 
to pay a USO levy, the majority of consumers inefficiently pay more for services. 
This position assumes that it is not as expensive or difficult to provide access to 
remote communities as the current USO regime assumes. Furthermore, the current 
Universal Service Obligation’s prescriptive solution for the communications needs of 
remote and isolated communities may in fact be preventing other better alternatives 
being used or developed. While this position would seem to provide better consumer 
outcomes for the majority of users with the abolishment of the cross subsidisation for 
the USO, the faith of this position in market forces to deliver services to the 
geographically disadvantaged seems overly optimistic.  
 
One of the more prevalent positions against the Universal Service Obligation is that 
Universal Service has already been achieved. That is, the telephone service 
penetration is at a level where it is as high as it will ever be, regardless of the USO 
mechanisms in place. In a similar situation to ‘full employment’, there will always be 
a percentage of the population that for one reason or another does not have access to 
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the telephone system. Senator Alston – who went on to become the federal Minister 
for Communications – in a 1990 essay expressed his views that Universal Service 
had been accomplished: 
To many of those who use the term ‘Universal Service’ simply mean ‘the 
more, the better’. But with household penetration rates around 94% there is 
good reason to conclude that universal service has now been achieved. Whilst 
there may be some households which are not connected to the service for 
economic reasons it does not follow that economic assistance is necessarily 
appropriate. Some individuals may be nearly as accessible through a close 
neighbour’s phone, a pay phone down the hall, a phone at work or even the 
postal service.96 
 
The evidence does not support these statements. In a 1996 ABS survey, six years 
after Alston’s statement, 3.6% of households did not have a phone. Of these 22.2% 
said they did not want one thus 77.8% or 185,000 households (2.8% of the total 
households) therefore did not have one, but wanted one. Inability to pay for 
connection or operating costs remained the greatest barrier to this population. It 
would seem that a re-statement of Alton’s position would be that full or universal 
service has not been achieved, however that it is acceptable for a minority of the 
population to miss out or be disenfranchised. This position would seem to be in 
conflict with a democracy committed to universal and compulsory suffrage such as 
Australia. 
 
Related to this idea that the need for the USO has been fulfilled is the notion that 
there are individuals who simply do not want access to the ‘standard telephone 
service’. For some this lack of ‘access’ is due to the ready availability of alternative 
technologies to the standard telephone service such as mobile services, while for 
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others it is simply the lack of desire to have access to the participation in society that 
a phone line offers, due to the burden that comes from being readily contactable in 
the private space where they live or work. These people who do not need the bandaid 
of the USO are often used as a cover to say no one ‘needs’ the USO. However being 
too poor to get a phone connected is not the same as being happy just using a mobile 
for all calls. 
 
The final argument against the USO is that it developed out of the government run 
monopolies of the 1930s and is effectively a solution from that time for a more 
modern problem.97 This position states that the previous monopolies have evolved 
into the regulatory authorities of today’s private enterprise driven 
telecommunications environment, yet they continue to cling to the notion of 
Universal Service as one of their previous central tenets, but one that it is no longer 
appropriate. This position views the USO in terms of the historic development of the 
telecommunications industry through public telephone and telegraph authorities. 
Public Telephone and Telegraph Authorities were born of ‘the absolutist state’, or at 
least in an era of much greater public service involvement in the economy. They 
have by default then become industry regulators and attempted with varying levels of 
success to provide Universal Service98 or perhaps equal service, given there are often 
long waiting lists in that type of environment. The USO as a residual ideology from 
public monopolies seems to be a misunderstanding of how it has developed, 
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particularly in the Australian context in parallel to the developments in the former 
publicly owned monopoly that is now Telstra. 
 
No Service? 
A significant measure of the effectiveness and applicability of the USO in Australia, 
not only focuses attention on policy and access, but also monitors who – regardless 
of these initiatives – is still untouched or distanced from these services, despite the 
existing regulations. Who are the at risk groups, and what steps have been taken to 
alleviate their apparent disadvantage? In 2002, 97% of Australian households had at 
least one private telephone line (11% had more than one).99 While there will be those 
in the remaining 3% of households who chose not to have a domestic private 
connection, there will be a significant number for whom access to such a connection 
is beyond their reach. This may be the case for a number of reasons, including 
geographic, economic and social factors. It has also been shown that if this group 
then has the option to access the network through public payphones, they will have a 
lower quality of connection than those with access to a private line. This three 
percent of households is not evenly distributed throughout Australian society. Rather 
there are groups that are significantly more likely to fall into this group including 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the disabled, women, and people of 
non-English speaking backgrounds.100 In order to assemble methods and strategies to 
                                                 
99 National Office of the Information Economy, The Current State of Play: Australia’s Scorecard. 
Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia, April 2002. 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/Progress/ie_stats/CSOP_April2002/CSOP_April2002.pdf 
[accessed 3.12.2003]. 
100 G. Goggin, ‘Citizen and Beyond: Universal Service in the Twilight of the Nations State’ in B. 
Langtry (ed), All Connected, Universal Service in Telecommunications. Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1998, p. 103.   89
alleviate this disadvantage, it is also necessary to mark and assemble risk indicators 
and contextual explanations for this disadvantage. 
 
While there are different spheres of disadvantage and these have been broken down 
for this analysis, this does not mean that they do not multiply for individuals who 
often may inhabit two or more of these broad categories. In each case the risk 
indicators can be seen as representing different types of social and economic 
disadvantage compounded by a corresponding lack of access to telecommunications 
services. However, different causes of disadvantage for different groups may require 
different types of interventions. What might work for one will not work for another, 
or may have a different impact. This section focuses specifically on the 
circumstances of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; people with 
disabilities; and residents of rural and remote communities. 
 
When trying to create access to a service for neglected or marginalised groups, there 
are two complementary strategies to be undertaken. Demand generation activities are 
strategies focused on creating reasons for individuals to use a service that might be 
available but under-utilised. In the case of voice telephony, given the number of 
often essential services that the network supplies and its penetration into society, this 
is often the less effective of two available options. The second strategy involves 
supply generation, creating access to a service that was not previously accessible and 
addressing the reasons that this access was not present. Obviously the focus on one 
type of intervention over another has political dimensions. These can be seen to 
mirror understandings of telecommunications based on the type of public good that it 
represents. In Australia at the present time the preference for the former ‘self help’   90
strategies over the latter ‘government intervention’ model demonstrates once again 
the primacy of the regulated, rather than provided public good.101 
 
Access within Indigenous Communities 
In 1991, less than 10% of households in Aboriginal communities in Australia had 
telephones. In remote communities, this fell to less than one residential service per 
100 people. In 1996, the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) found:  
Little progress has been made towards identifying and meeting the 
telecommunications needs of rural and remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander. 102  
 
In 2001, a government report studied the 1 291 ‘discrete’ Indigenous communities in 
Australia,103 of which 1 210 were considered to be in remote locations with poor 
access to telecommunications services. Many of these communities did not have 
access to even a single public payphone. This report found: 
•  Indigenous people continue to be the most disadvantaged in the 
country, with significantly lower average incomes, lower standards of 
education, higher levels of unemployment, poor housing conditions and 
                                                 
101 ‘Jobwise Self Help Groups.’ https://ecsn.gov.au/jobwise/item.aspx?id=1074&txt=0&pmd=1  
‘Self Help for the Hard of Hearing.’ 
http://www.hearing.com.au/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=157&languageId=1&contentId=-1  
‘Specialised mental health service organisations – self help support groups service grants for non-
government organisations.’ http://meteor.aihw.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/296492  
‘Indigenous Self Employment Program (ISEP) – formerly the Self Help Program.’ 
http://www.workplace.gov.au/nr/exeres/7e1642ce-05a1-4552-88ae-bde26d7a8e4e.htm  
‘Self Help Landcare for New Farmers.’ 
http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/nrm/landcare/pub/guide/factsheets/ms930364.html  
‘Self Help Guide to Rebroadcasting.’ http://www.abc.net.au/reception/services/selfhelp.htm  
All these sites were accessed through the Australian Government web portal 
http://www.australia.gov.au/ on the 20
th July 2005.  
102 G. Goggin, ‘Voice Telephony and Beyond’ in B. Langtry (ed), All Connected, Universal Service 
in Telecommunications. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1998, p. 58. 
103 Comprising 109 994 individuals.   91
higher levels of ill-health than the non-Indigenous population. In many 
instances, remoteness contributes to widening these disparities; 
•  programs to improve telecommunications services outside metropolitan 
areas (such as Networking the Nation and the Untimed Local Calls 
(Extended Zones) Agreement), although significant and valuable, have 
not been fully effective in meeting the specific needs of many remote 
Indigenous communities; and 
•  government service sectors, such as education, health and justice, are 
embracing the use of the Internet or videoconferencing to improve their 
services, particularly to under-served rural communities. However, this 
approach has generally not yet been extended to the more remote 
Indigenous communities. 104  
 
There were a number of factors that the report noted that acted to impede access to 
telecommunications in these communities. There are a number of language barriers 
that exist in remote Aboriginal communities, with many people speaking a language 
other than English (LOTE) as their first language; and low levels of literacy in 
English.105 There are a number of social problems related to alcohol and substance 
abuse that are highly prevalent in many of these communities. Indigenous people in 
Australia have a greater proportional representation of those in the community who 
are unemployed or on low incomes, are in prison or similar institutional care, and are 
homeless or in substandard accommodation. Additionally, the Indigenous 
community in Australia has a statistically lower life span, and poorer health, as well 
as a lower standard of education.106 Many of the remote Indigenous communities 
have limited or no power supply. 
                                                 
104 Commonwealth Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 
Telecommunications Action Plan for Remote Indigenous Communities. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, May 2002, p. 5. http://www.dcita.gov.au/tel/indigenous_telecommunications/reports 
[accessed 4.7.2005]. 
105 In 1996 the ABS census found that greater than 69% of people who identified themselves as 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders speak a language other than English. 
106 Steering Committee for the review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous 
Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2005. Melbourne: Commonwealth of Australia, July 2005. 
http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/indigenous/keyindicators2005/keyindicators2005.pdf [accessed 
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Indigenous Discrete Communities 
Main Source of Electricity Supply, by Community Size – All Communities 
Type of electricity 
supply 
<20  20-
49 
50-
99 
100-
199 
200> Total 
(a) 
Reported 
Population 
State grid  44 61 50 60 66 281  4,408
Community generators  85 70 30 33 81 299  50,990
Domestic generators  241 89 12 - - 342  5,615
Solar 83 43 4 1 - 131  2,321
Solar hybrid  62 21 5 1 2 91  1,994
Other source  2 2 - 1 - 5  212
All communities with 
an electricity supply 
517 286 101 96 149 1,149 108,540
No electricity supply 
118 13 1 1 - 133 1,378
All communities107 644 299 102 97 149 1,291  109,994
Source: ABS Cat. 2710.0 108 
Figure 9 
Power Supply to Indigenous Communities in Australia 
http://www.dcita.gov.au/download/0,2118,4_104432,00.doc 
[accessed 1.12.2003] 
 
A lack of power makes telecommunications services problematic at best. 
Additionally despite the higher than average health problems amongst this 
population, a year 2000 senate inquiry found there was far more limited access to 
health care in remote communities, and there are a far higher proportion of health 
problems and related disabilities. In some communities, up to seventy percent of 
children had hearing difficulties. Not one community had a teletypewriter phone.109 
The combination of these problems acts to limit both the availability and 
accessibility of telecommunications services to this group in society, as well as any 
                                                 
107 includes ‘not stated’. 
108 Australian Bureau of Statistics; ABS Catalogue No.4710.0: Housing and Infrastructure in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia; 1999; pp 
16-17. as cited in http://www.dcita.gov.au/download/0,2118,4_104432,00.doc [accessed 1.12.2003]. 
109 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Health is Life: 
Report on the Inquiry into Indigenous Health. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, May 2000.   93
demand for these services. However, the report did note that access to these services 
did have the potential to help alleviate some of the disadvantage and disenfranchise 
suffered by this group. 
Overcoming the barriers to accessing telecommunications services in remote 
Indigenous communities presents a major challenge, and will require a 
commitment to action by all levels of government. The Commonwealth 
Government recognises that overcoming these barriers will not be possible 
simply by funding the installation of more telecommunications facilities in 
these communities. The limited take-up of USO telephone services in these 
communities demonstrates that guaranteeing supply, without addressing the 
significant demand-side issues, will not bring about higher take-up and 
effective use of telecommunications services.110 
 
The difficulties in providing better communications services to communities who do 
not have a source of electricity, let alone access to schools of healthcare, is at the 
same time both a daunting and vital task. The failure of the existing USO regime to 
deal with even the telecommunications aspect of this problem is a stark illustration of 
both the limitations of an exclusive focus on geography when trying to ensure access 
to telecommunications services and the conception of telecommunications services 
as requiring regulation (already present), rather than provision. There are a number 
of programs that have been implemented to address some of this disadvantage in 
both Indigenous communities and across rural Australia,111 including the Networking 
the Nations program, which provided funding for a variety of telecommunication 
access programs, albeit with limited success,112 and the Untimed Local Calls 
(Extended Zones) agreement, although these have a wider focus than just Indigenous 
                                                 
110 Telecommunications Action Plan for Remote Indigenous Communities. May 2002 
http://www.dcita.gov.au/download/0,2118,4_117045,00.doc [accessed 2.12.2003]. 
111 Telstra’s latest document on its universal service obligation specifically includes resources for 
specialised liaison officers to improve communication and management of Aboriginal communities. 
112 C. Morris & M. Meadows, ‘Digital Dreaming: Indigenous Intellectual Property and New 
Communication Technologies’, in G. Goggin (ed), Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia. Sydney 
UNSW Press, 2004. 
Networking the Nation home page at the Department of Communications, Information Technology 
and the Arts. 
http://www.dcita.gov.au/tel/role_of_the_telecommunications_division_and_contacts/networking_the_
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communities. The government action plan outlined in May 2002, committed the 
government to funding of $8.3 million dollars over three years,113 or less than one 
percent of the costs of the latest upgrade to the Australian Navy’s submarine fleet.114 
 
Figure 10  
Telstra Advertisement, 2003 
No home phone, no Internet, but the ‘right’ to paint pay phones. 
 
                                                 
113 Telecommunications Action Plan for Remote Indigenous Communities, May 2002 
http://www.dcita.gov.au/download/0,2118,4_117045,00.doc [accessed 2.12.2003]. 
114 ‘One year on – Collins Class submarines on road to recovery’, Department of Defence.  
http://www.defence.gov.au/media/2000/030800191.doc [accessed 3.8.2005].   95
Access by People with Disabilities 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated in 1998 that 19% of the Australian 
population had some form of disability.115 The largest group of these are those who 
suffer from hearing related disability. Other groups included those with a visual 
impairment, those with speech or communications problems, the intellectually 
disabled, and those with mobility, or dexterity related disabilities. 
 
The trend over time to more closely define the services provided as part of the 
Universal Service Obligation has worked against the interests of many people with 
disabilities in Australia who may require special equipment in order to effectively 
access the telephone network. The wide variety of additional services required by 
this group works against the imperative to tighten the definition of the services that 
are part of The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ruling in 1995.116 
This ruling did indicate that this group needed to be catered for as part of the USO, 
through the distribution of teletypewriter phones. Their proportion of the total 
indicates that access to these services is not at the same level as it is for the able 
bodied. A similar trend can be seen once again in the case of public payphones, with 
the relatively low number of wheelchair accessible payphones (although they are far 
greater in number than those equipped with a teletypewriter). The case of Sam 
Boulding was a stark illustration of the importance of access to the telephone 
                                                 
115 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability, Ageing and Carers, Australia, publication 4430.0, 
1998, as cited in Telstra’s Disability Services Unit, Telstra’s Third Disability Action Plan: 2002 – 
2004. http://www.telstra.com.au/disability/docs/dap0204.doc [accessed 2.12.2003]. 
116 Scott and Disabled People’s International (Australia) (DPI (A)) V Telstra, (HREOC, 1995, 15-
15).   96
network for people with disabilities who will have less access to alternative essential 
services to those that are provided through the telephone network.  
 
Telstra produced its first Disability Action Plan in 1996 to cover the years 1996-1998 
in response the HREOC ruling the previous year, and was registered with the 
commission and later audited for compliance. Since then there have been two 
subsequent plans, the 2002-2004 document was the first to introduce measures for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities.117 This plan explicitly acknowledged that it 
is more than just a response to the carrier’s USO obligations, and that Telstra is 
explicitly following a business strategy to facilitate the purchase of Telstra’s 
products by those potential customers with various disabilities. 
 
Access within Rural and Remote Communities 
In Australia, the geographic access of rural and regional areas to telecommunications 
service has been the main priority of the USO. Following the partial sale of Telstra, 
services to these areas have become the political focus of USO related debates. 
However it is notable that there are lower penetration rates for telephone services in 
these areas. While the number of rural and regional households that had access to a 
private phone line in 1997 was not a great deal lower than the national average. 5.2% 
of households in regional areas were without access, as opposed to the national 
average of 3.4%.118 There were a higher number of individuals without access at this 
                                                 
117 Telstra’s Disability Services Unit, Telstra’s Third Disability Action Plan: 2002 – 2004. 
http://www.telstra.com.au/disability/docs/dap0204.doc [accessed 2.12.2003]. 
118 Farmwide Pty Ltd, Unmet Demand for Online Services in Rural Australia. Rural Industries and 
Research Corporation, 2000. http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/HCC/00-177.pdf [accessed 2.12.2003].   97
time than these figures suggest as the households measured did not include the 
homeless people and remote Aboriginal communities.119 A proportion of this lower 
level of telephone penetration can be attributed to the higher costs of making calls, 
when the majority of the network is more than a local call distance away, and the 
corresponding reduction in network utility that comes with these increased costs. 
Telecommunications services in regional areas take on an added importance when 
the alternatives to essential services offered through the telephone are less accessible, 
due to both availability and distance to alternative sources. As noted above there are 
a number of government programs currently in place to help address disadvantage in 
relation to this group, and the attention brought to this area again by the Estens 
enquiry into telecommunications service may result in more of this type of program. 
 
While each of these at risk groups present their own unique challenge to public 
policy, the changing nature of the telecommunications industry in Australia, and the 
USO in particular, have impacted on the ability to access telecommunications 
throughout society. In the early 1990s Telstra was demanding security deposits from 
low income earners before providing them with a telephone, as it was concerned that 
they would be unable to meet their payment obligations, by contrast now the same 
group are targeted for access to a low cost telephone service that provides for 
incoming calls only.120  
 
                                                 
119 Farmwide Pty Ltd, Unmet Demand for Online Services in Rural Australia. Rural Industries and 
Research Corporation, 2000. http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/HCC/00-177.pdf [accessed 2.12.2003]. 
Why these communities were not seen as households is a bit of a mystery, but does reinforce the idea 
that this group falls outside of the citizenship of mainstream Australian society. 
120 Telstra makes money from these incoming calls, and increases the value of the network as a 
whole as the result of these connections.   98
The National Office of the Information Economy (NOIE), which was recently 
disbanded, compared Australia’s progress in telecommunications penetration with a 
number of other OECD countries. 
 
Figure 11 
Fixed Telephone Line Penetrations Rates 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/Progress/ie_stats/CSOP_April2002/CSOP_pages/fixed_t
elephone_line.htm  
[accessed 1.12.2003] 
 
The telecommunications network is a global construct, of which Australia is a 
relatively small subset. Up to this point this chapter has focused on the application   99
and provision of the Universal Service Obligation within Australia, and to a lesser 
extent the United States and the United Kingdom. While it is possible to compare 
USO provisions and telephone penetration rates with other relatively similar 
countries, there is a much wider distribution of service regimes throughout the world 
once less developed countries become part of the analysis. How have access to 
telecommunications been articulated as a global public good, and what of a global 
USO? 
 
Global Telephone Access 
In 1994, the then vice president of the United States, Al Gore delivered a speech on 
the Information Superhighway broadband network concept at an International 
Telecommunications Union Conference that discussed the gulf between the 
telecommunications rich and telecommunications poor countries. The US National 
Information Infrastructure (and ultimately the Global Information Infrastructure) was 
based on five principles:  
1)  to encourage private investment 
2) promote  competition 
3)  create a flexible regulatory framework that can keep pace with 
rapid technological and market changes 
4)  provide open access to the network for all information providers 
5)  ensure universal service.121 
 
                                                 
121 A. Gore, ‘Global Information Infrastructure’, Buenos Aires:  International Telecommunications 
Union, 21
st March 1994. http://www.digitalearth.cn/readingroom/basicreader/others/telunion.htm 
[accessed 2.8.2005]. 
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One year later at Telecom 95, then South African president Nelson Mandela set out a 
set of principles that he envisioned would enable the full participation of both 
developed and developing countries in building an information society:  
1)  we should strive towards global universal service in telephony and 
global access to the information superhighway 
2)  the expansion of global information infrastructure should be based 
on partnership and rules of fair competition and regulation, at both 
national and international level 
3)  the information revolution should be geared towards enhancing 
global citizenship and global economic prosperity 
4)  a diversity of paths towards the achievement of national 
information societies should be respected 
5)    the evolution of policy for the development of an equitable global 
information society should be coordinated internationally to ensure 
the sharing of information and resources  
6)  the education of young people with regard for the skills needed for     
living in an information society should be prioritised.122 
 
While Gore’s speech promoted the development of private enterprise, consistent with 
the ideology that informed the Information Superhighway concept, Mandela by 
contrast viewed global Universal Service as an extension of global social rights, and 
through that promoted the idea of transnational citizenship. If the 
telecommunications system and voice telephony in particular is to be seen as a kind 
of global public good, then the high level of disparity in access to this supposedly 
non-excludable entity will have to be addressed. Both Manhattan and Tokyo 
individually have more telephone lines than the entire African continent.123 This 
disparity in distribution and access is in part a result of pricing. In the case of 
telecommunications, the marginal costs of network goods in terms of data 
transportation and communications are close to zero, so pricing is based on the 
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recovery of the sunken costs to set up exchanges and lay cable, rather than reflecting 
the marginal cost of each call. As Habib Sy notes: 
the cost of these services is the result of a conscious distributive decision on 
how to share the burden of the initial investment. 124 
 
There are myriad sites on earth with limited telecommunications access. It is not so 
much that existing infrastructure is too expensive to use, rather that the infrastructure 
simply does not exist. Once again there is a tendency to see regulation as the solution 
when provision needs to take priority. 
 
In 2000, the OECD published E-Commerce for Development: Prospects and Policy 
Issues.125 This report noted the fear of a digital divide forming between countries. 
However it also noted the ability of advanced telecommunications services to move 
the benefits easily from areas of abundance to those of scarcity, giving it a great 
levelling potential. The report recommended that in the future telecentre networks 
may be the best option for providing telecommunications services to remote or poor 
areas in developing nations.126 The South African government runs a telecentres 
program, funded in a similar way to the USO in Australia by a tax on 
telecommunications companies.127 
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The voice telephone network is a key enabling technology for the Internet. The 
modem plugs into it. However this technical imperative initiates a relatively 
simplistic type of Internet access. There are numerous technologies that make it 
possible to bypass the traditional copper wire telephone network as the infrastructure 
for Internet access. A far greater issue for Internet access, or a far greater enabling 
technology, is the ability of an individual to read and write, and basic infrastructure 
such as running water and power. Without these, Internet access is of little value or 
consequence. The telephone system turns out to be at the edge of enabling 
technology, as it becomes crucial only at the point where the other fundamental 
enabling technologies or services are present. There are as yet no alternative delivery 
systems. In the Australian context, it is critical that at a remote cattle station the 
voice phone line has sufficient clarity to support data speeds that enable access to the 
Internet. While that station may find an alternative access through a satellite service, 
two hundred kilometres down the road at a remote Aboriginal community, with no 
regular electricity, limited access to health care and education, and where up to 70% 
of the children have hearing problems, the quality of the data service through the 
payphone (if one is present at all) is not the key missing link to Internet access. 
 
If the telephone system is not the key enabling technology for the Internet why then 
examine the USO? One of the key objectives of this thesis is to determine the type of 
language and discourse that can be employed to better enable public policy to ensure 
access to the Internet, and through that access the ability to participate in society as 
full citizens for all members of society, as well as the potential implications of lack 
of full citizenship for those that may be denied that access. From this perspective, it   103
is important to have an understanding of the type of language that has been employed 
and the outcomes produced when dealing with voice telephony. Attention must also 
be placed on access to that network for those who might otherwise miss out as 
enabled through the Universal Service Obligation. The USO effectively provides a 
historical model for the methodology and politics of supply and use of 
communications technology throughout society. While it may be the case that every 
new form of media is legislated on the basis of the mistakes made in the preceding 
media, that does not mean that the later cannot also be used to inform the former. All 
technology is transitory technology. All technology is liminal, and all liminal sites 
are ambiguous. It is a fallacious notion that any technology is an end point, or an end 
game for public policy. 
 
President Mandela’s speech in 1995 referred to the notions of transnational 
citizenship and global public goods.128 One decade later, these ideas are both 
consistent and at odds with understandings of the increasing global movement of 
capital, but also critically the global flow of information, whether it be through voice 
telephony or data transfer. Governments have always passed national laws on what 
legally can be said and published, often restricting access to pornography, giving 
recourse to those who are slandered, and regulating what government may consider 
subversive political speech. The Internet stretches across national borders with 
limited opportunity for regulation from the nations with which it interfaces. Relations 
with national legal systems are transformed in this transnational digital environment. 
Before the new relationship between citizenship and sovereignty that this 
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transformation entails is examined in detail through Part II, it is important to shift 
focus from the telecommunications network that informs the contemporary USO 
policy and focus on the construction of the Invisible Empire. The next chapter begins 
this exploration by looking at the point of interface between the digital and the 
analogue, the gateway to the Invisible Empire that manifests at the borders of 
Empire, the screen.   105
Chapter 2  
The Gates of Empire: Internet Access 
 
Figure 12 
The Damascus Gate of Jerusalem 
http://www.bibleplaces.com/oldcitygates.htm 
[accessed 29.3.2005] 
 
Between the idea        Between the desire 
And the reality        And the spasm 
Between the motion      Between the potency 
And  the  act      And  the  existence 
Falls the Shadow 
Between the conception      Between the essence  
And the creation        And the descent 
Between the emotion      Falls the Shadow 
And the response 
Falls  the  Shadow     From  The Hollow Men 
       B y   T . S .   E l i o t  
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The Screen 
‘The Gates of Empire’ as a chapter, motif and metaphor, occupies a distinct and 
important space and function in this doctoral research. While the preceding chapter 
tracks the relationship between the Australian Government and the development of 
the national telecommunications network, this chapter seeks to describe the point of 
access to the Internet. This moment of entry has a space, time, context, history and 
literacy. Within this chapter, this moment is stretched, interpreted and researched. 
Each person faces the screen alone when they access the Internet. The ideology of 
the solitary surfer has consequences. The screen is the point where the hardware and 
software that support the digital environment meet the wetware of the knowledge and 
literacy of the individual seeking access. It is the gateway to the Invisible Empire. 
The screen, for those online, is the point, space and surface at which a person’s off 
screen self interfaces with their extended digital identity. It facilitates an extension of 
their self, not just a specific screen, but many different screens, from their home or 
work computer, through to their mobile phone or personal desktop assistant (PDA), 
to Internet access points spread throughout the analogue world from public libraries 
to Internet cafes. 
 
The technology magazine MIS (Managing Information Systems) produces an annual 
ranking of Australia’s top 100 users of IT in Australia. Their key criteria is the 
number of screens at use in the organisation. While they note the potential flaws   107
inherent in this system of measurement,1 they assume that this will approximate to 
the number of users, or at least points of access that a company provides. The top 
twenty five of this list are:2  
1 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING (VIC): 187 000 screens 
2 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING (NSW): 175 000+ screens 
3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE: 126 300 screens  
4 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING (WA): 77 000 screens  
5 UNIVERSITY OF NSW: 45 600 screens  
6 NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: 45 000 screens 
7 COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA: 40 300 screens  
8 TELSTRA CORPORATION: 36 000 screens  
9 CENTRELINK: 35 600 screens 
10 ANZ BANKING GROUP: 31 000 screens  
11 WOOLWORTHS: 30 000 screens  
12 WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION: 28 500 screens  
13 COLES MYER: 27 765 screens  
14 AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE: 25 000 screens  
15 QUEENSLAND HEALTH: 22 000 screens 
16 BHP BILLITON: 20 000 screens 
17 AUSTRALIA POST: 19 550 screens 
18 UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND: 18 205 screens  
19 QANTAS: 18 000 screens  
20 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES (SOUTH AUSTRALIA): 16 169 screens  
21 IBM AUSTRALIA: 16 000screens  
22 UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY: 14 863 screens  
23 INTACT: 14 550 screens  
24 BUNNINGS BUILDING SUPPLIES: 14 000 screens  
24 MONASH UNIVERSITY: 14 000 screens  
 
As would be expected, this list is dominated by large organisations, with a heavy 
representation of public service departments, the four major banks, the two biggest 
retailers, three large Australian companies (Qantas, Telstra and BHP) and major 
universities. INTACT, the Canberra based telecommunications and utilities supplier, 
is a surprise inclusion, as is Bunnings, the hardware supplier that tied in 24
th position 
with Monash University. 
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For those without access, this multitude of screens represents a collective barrier. 
Without the literacy to enable a developed digital self, the screen is a closed gate, 
excluding access and even comprehension of what lies beyond. Similarly the absence 
of hardware or software to drive the screen will also render the gateway closed. 
There are three primary elements to access: hardware, software and wetware. Each 
invoke necessary literacies. Institutional attention, let alone corporate interests, 
stresses hardware and software. These three factors are influenced by the context in 
which they manifest both off screen and in the digital environment they enable. This 
fourth aspect of access then is the culture-ware or cultware. All four factors, when 
aligned, determine the threshold at which access becomes possible and also the size 
of the gateway available. The quality of the gateway is primarily determined by both 
the weakest link in these three components of access and the surrounding cultware in 
which they manifest. All four components interact and influence the utility of the 
other three. The quality of the gateway is an important factor in determining the 
utility of access. However there is an ‘event horizon’: a point at which messages no 
longer pass through the gateway and access is not available. At that stage, nothing 
traverses the gateway at the screen. At its most basic level, the digital world is a 
matrix of zeros and ones. In a 1948 issue of The Bell Systems Technical Journal, 
these small units of information were labelled ‘bits’ by Claude Shannon, an 
abbreviation of binary digits.3 These bits represented a gateway on an electronic 
circuit, one that was either opened or closed. Access to the Invisible Empire mirrors 
this technical specification.  
 
                                                 
3 C. E. Shannon, ‘A mathematical theory of communication’, Bell System Technical Journal. July and 
October, 1948, volume 27, pp. 379-423 and 623-656. http://cm.bell-
labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf [accessed 28.4.2005]. In this article Shannon 
attributed the origin of the word to J. W. Turkey.   109
Margaret Wertheim in The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace4 noted the similarity between 
the description of the heavenly paradise of the New Jerusalem presented in The 
Bible’s ‘Book of Revelation’ and the promised land configured in and through the 
Internet. Wertheim interrogates the association between the Internet and Christian 
ideology: 
Just like the early Christians, they promise a transcendent heaven – a utopian 
arena of equality, friendship and power.5 
 
The ideal of a perfectly ordered utopia both on earth and transcending the limits of 
the mundane has resonance for both the early adaptors of the Internet and the end of 
days. In The Bible the holy city is guarded by twelve gates, each made of a single 
pearl (from which her book partly takes its name).  
The twelve gates were twelve pearls, each gate made of a single pearl. The 
great street of the city was of pure gold, like transparent glass.6 
 
Through these gates, the good followers of God are given access and all others are 
excluded. Michel Foucault also constructed a model of utopia accessed by the 
projected self, in this case a mirror producing a projected self in the heterotopia it 
generates: 
The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see 
myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind 
the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives 
my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am 
absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as 
the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the 
position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence 
from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze 
that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that 
                                                 
4 M. Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the Internet. 
Sydney: Doubleday 1999. 
5 M. Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the Internet. 
Sydney: Doubleday 1999, p. 18. 
6 Revelations 21: 21. 
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Revelation%2021;&version=31; [accessed 
29.4.2005].   110
is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to 
direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The 
mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I 
occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely 
real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since 
in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over 
there.7 
 
Foucault uses the mirror as a metaphor for a placeless space, a mode of utopia. 
Equally, it makes a good metaphor for the projected digital self. Yet a mirror has a 
far lower threshold of literacy necessary to use it. The ability to recognise the self 
through the mirror is a trait shared by humans and many other animals, but not all 
have the level of intellectual development, expertise or experience, the literacy, to 
recognise their virtual projected selves in the mirror.8 Foucault noted of these places: 
Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both 
isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is not 
freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as in the 
case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to 
rites and purifications. To get in one must have a certain permission and make 
certain gestures.9 
 
While the quality of a specific individual’s access may vary, there is a threshold at 
which access is either on or off. Within this construction, there is no shared place 
where those with access and those without it share a manifestation – where the 
shadow falls there is no shared ‘in between’.10 Unlike the traditional gate in the wall 
                                                 
7 M. Foucault, ‘Of other Spaces’, Public Lecture 1967. Translated J. Miskowiec 
http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html [accessed 28.4.2005]. 
8 Gallop, Anderson and Shillito conducted a famous study in 1970 that determined that while 
Chimpanzees can learn to recognise a mirror as a reflection of themselves, a number of other species 
(in this case stumptailed, rhesus and cynomolgus) could not, leading them to speculate that this ability 
was limited to monkeys that closely resemble human, and specifically the great apes (family 
pongidae). G. Gallup, J. Anderson & D. Shillito ‘The Mirror Test.’ In M. Bekoff, C. Allen & G. 
Burghardt (eds). The Cognitive Animal. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT. Paperback edition, 2002. 
pp. 325-334. 
9 M. Foucault, ‘Of other Spaces’, Public Lecture 1967. Translated by J. Miskowiec 
http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html [accessed 28.4.2005]. 
10 While there is now shared space where both these groups manifest, that is not to say that there is 
no awareness of ‘the other’. The Internet is frequently represented in popular culture, through 
television, print and radio. The assumption that access to the Internet is part everyday life, as 
portrayed in the media highlights the disadvantage of those who are outside of access. Similarly those 
who have access are aware that there are those who do not have access. In practice however, off   111
that guards a physical core, these gates guard a non-corporeal Invisible Empire. 
While barbarians could storm the gates of Rome without the literacy to understand 
the workings of the Empire within, when an army masses to physically strike at these 
gates the only consequences are a broken monitor. While these screens are heavily 
distributed throughout myriad societies I have two within easy reach on my desk, my 
computer screen and my mobile phone, they do not appear as gates. They are 
disguised as a type of television set with a keyboard. Without the ability to identify 
and transverse these portals, the digital underclass – or those denied access – have no 
experience of what or who exists on the other side. Questions cannot be asked at the 
gate to Invisible Empire. There is no common space in which the digital subaltern 
and the digital citizen cohabitate. There is no space at which translation can occur. 
These gates to Invisible Empire are numerous. The walls cannot be breached, and the 
gates are only open for the citizenry with the required literacy. This literacy in the 
codes of access is an absolute requirement to pass the gates of Invisible Empire. The 
digital citizen transverses these gates alone. It is a point where the off screen self 
interfaces the digital self. Social interaction occurs on either side of the screen, but 
not at the gateway itself. Citizens access the Internet alone. This ideology of the 
individual has important consequences.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
screen these two groups are less likely to interact. Of the 24% of Americans who have never been 
online, 31% know few or no others that have ever been online.  
A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever Shifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, 2003, p. 25. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r
=88 [accessed 5.7.2005].   112
The Matrix of Access 
The screen – the gateway at the border of Invisible Empire – is the point or surface at 
which the hardware of the computer, the software it enables, and the wetware of the 
person seeking access all collide and interface, providing access. The suffix ‘ware’ 
comes from the old English word ‘waru’ meaning goods. In this case each of the 
three wares can be seen as a distinct type of good or commodity with their own 
discrete qualities. While access is an essentially atomising experience, with each 
person sitting alone at the screen, it also occurs in a broader context both in the 
analogue environment at which the site of access is positioned and also the digitised 
environment that is accessed through the screen. This context is a fourth ‘ware’ – 
cultware – and it is necessary to complete an understanding of Internet access.  
 
Hardware is a word appropriated by the information communications technologies 
(ICT) dialect. While originally used to refer to metal goods, it has been reinterpreted 
in the context of ICT to represent the physical equipment associated with computing. 
In relation to the Internet, this argument can be extended further to the physical 
infrastructure of a communications network. Hardware can be defined in this context 
as the physical equipment that is used to generate, transport, store and interpret 
digital data. Hardware, relative to the other aspects of access, represents a somewhat 
traditional type of commodity. To generate computer and communications hardware 
requires a constancy of production. Each unit, once developed, requires the same 
resources to produce.11  
                                                 
11 Chapters Three more closely examines the rapidly developing nature of hardware, and its 
implications in the context of the Internet.   113
 
Software is another term that is attributed to John W. Turkey, this time from 1957.12 
It refers specifically to the computer programs held in a computer’s memory. In this 
context and at its most basic, software describes the construction of the TCP/IP 
protocols and provides the matrix for bits to be translated by hardware. Typically, 
there are different layers of software running on a computer, at one level acting as an 
interface with hardware to enable the computer to operate, at the other acting as the 
interface with wetware, where it provides a platform of interaction with a computer 
user. Software in the context of this construction of Internet access also includes the 
digitised content held in computer memories. This context differs from the more 
traditional understanding of software as programs that manipulate content or operate 
hardware. Content does not necessarily make things happen, but rather from this new 
perspective it represents stored data. Software needs hardware to support its 
operation. Conversely, hardware needs software to activate its potential value.13  
 
Software, both as a program and digital content, is starkly different to a traditional 
analogue commodity. Computer hardware has a high component of its value 
determined by the initial development of the technology. Both the knowledge 
required to design and integrate that commodity as well as significant start-up costs 
                                                 
12 Given the importance of this label to computing and the Internet, I had hoped to provide an online 
reference for this article. Unfortunately, not only is the full text only available through propriety 
academic databases, there are very few references pointing to the location of the original publication 
in American Mathematical Monthly. There are no hard copies of this journal dating back prior to 2000 
in Western Australia. Fortunately it has been scanned and is available through JSTOR: The Scholarly 
Journal Archive. In this case accessed through the Murdoch University Library. http://0-
www.jstor.org.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/ [accessed 21.7.2005]. 
J. W. Turkey, ‘The Teaching of Concrete Mathematics’ The American Mathematical Monthly. 
January 1958, volume 65, number 1, pp. 1-9.  
13 Firmware is a variant of software that is sometimes identified, and refers to software that is locked 
into the operation of hardware and is not subject to change. It is stored in read only memory (ROM) as 
opposed to random access memory (RAM).   114
to any production in addition to research and development. Once this initial outlay 
and set-up is achieved, there is a constancy of production that requires the same 
value to be spent to produce each additional unit after the first. Software, however, 
manifests in a very different environment. Once a piece of content has been digitised 
– for example either the writing of a program or the digitisation of formerly analogue 
content, such as a musical recording – there is no additional cost to make a perfect 
copy, or a thousand copies of the original. This process requires the construction of 
no production facilities and the consumption of no extra resources to produce each 
unit.14 The distribution of these copies will similarly be limited only by the size of 
the individual set of data, how many bits it consists of and the bandwidth available 
for the transmission of the file. The value of software for its creator is maintained not 
by possessing and selling it as an analogue commodity, but rather by agreed 
understanding and implementation of their copyright.15  
 
                                                 
14 Obviously there will be a component of hardware system resources required to support each copy, 
but for all intents and purposes this cost is negligible. 
15 The conflict between the Internet as a shared public space and the ownership of digital information 
is more closely examined in Chapter Five, ‘Digital Sovereignty’.   115
 
Figure 13 
Wetware, The Novel 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0380701782/qid=1120797046/sr=8-
1/ref=pd_bbs_ur_1/102-3119511-3055356?v=glance&s=books&n=507846  
[accessed 7.7.2005] 
 
Wetware is a term less widely deployed or known than hardware or software. It 
traces its origins back to cyberpunk literature.16 Rudy Rucker’s book with this title 
                                                 
16 The notion of cyberspace is derived from science fiction, most famously from William Gibson’s 
1984 book Neuromancer and Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash published in 1992. Cyberspace in these 
books is a virtual world generated by computers where people go and virtually interact with electronic 
representations of society, its computer systems and other users. Individuals are projected into this 
world as avatars, where their digital ‘selves’ are represented and they experience this world through a 
virtual reality interface that to an extent mimics the real world. The 1982 movie Tron is an earlier, 
although less acknowledged predictor of cyberspace in popular fiction. The more recent the Matrix 
trilogy also shares this conception of fictional cyberspace. 
W. Gibson Neuromancer. New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1984.  
N. Stephenson, Snow Crash. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1992. 
The Matrix. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner Bros, 1999. 
The Matrix Reloaded. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner Bros, 
2003.  
The Matrix Revolutions. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner 
Bros, 2003. 
Tron. Written by Steven Lisberger & Bonnie MacBird, directed by Steven Lisberger, Walt Disney 
Productions, 1982. 
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won the Philip K. Dick Award for best science fiction paperback in 1989. Also 
known as liveware or meatware, wetware refers to a living organism and more 
specifically, the human operator of a computer. In this context, wetware refers to the 
knowledge and experience held in the brain of an individual seeking to access the 
Internet, their ability to operate the computer interface at the screen and their literacy 
within the digital environment on screen. Unlike both hardware and software, 
wetware manifests as an analogue rather than digital platform. Content from the 
screen and audio from the speakers are interpreted through the eyes and ears of the 
user, for analysis in their brain. In the context of Internet access, wetware manifests 
at the meeting of hardware and software, where the value of both these components 
can then be activated. 
 Image Removed 
 
Figure 14 
Cartoon by Randy Glasbergen, 2003 
http://www.glasbergen.com/ 
[accessed 23.5.2005]   117
 
Text in the analogue environment is little more than a curious decoration when one is 
without the literacy to read it. It is through literacy that the value of its message – the 
content, rather than just form – is activated.17 This evaluative matrix stretches from 
banal understandings, for example that Coca-Cola is refreshing, to critical literacies, 
such as a red light at an intersection means ‘stop’. Within Australia, this literacy 
requires an understanding of Latin script and the English language. Dibbell noted 
within the digital environment created by LambdaMOO that ‘the commands you 
type into a computer are a kind of speech that doesn't so much communicate as make 
things happen, directly and ineluctably’.18 This type of text is more powerful than a 
street sign in the analogue environment. It has a far greater value that can potentially 
be activated through a sufficient level of literacy. Rather than literacy being used 
only to interpret the text, in this environment the text can be used, with sufficient 
literacy, to initiate activity. Dibbell was reporting the purely text-based environment 
that existed in 1993 which consisted of written words. Early UNIX programmers19 
used to be referred to as wizards. They typed seemingly inexplicable lines of 
command into a computer, a type of magic language that only they understood 
making things happen in the digital world.  
                                                 
17 C. Lankshear, ‘Frameworks and workframes: Literacy policies and new orders’, Unicorn. 1998, 
volume 24, number 2. 
M. Macken-Horarik, ‘Exploring the requirements of critical school literacy: a view from two 
classrooms’, in F. Christie & R. Mission (eds), Literacy and Schooling. London: Routledge, 1998. 
L. Unsworth, ‘Changing dimensions of school literacies’, Teaching Multiliteracies Across the School 
Curriculum. Melbourne: Macmillan, 2001, pp. 7-20. 
18 J. Dibbell, ‘A Rape In Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database Into a Society’, The Village Voice. 23
rd December 1993. 
19 UNIX dates back to 1969, when Ken Thompson created a program called the Uniplexed Operating 
and Computing System (UNICS). The operating system subsequently changed but the name remained 
and was shortened to UNIX.   118
 
Figure 15  
Coca-Cola Advertising and Traffic Lights in Kings Cross, photograph by Paul Green. 
 http://www.sydneymedia.com.au/html/custom/2274-image-
details.asp?Keywords=Scenic%2Ccity%2Cnightlights&ImageID=4300 
[accessed 30.5.2005] 
 
Wetware is a distinct type of commodity. It is often compared to software, only on a 
different type of operating platform. While this might be true at a very superficial 
level, wetware has a constancy of production. Information and literacy is not simply 
downloaded into a person. It has to be taught, learned and embedded in a social 
environment. Each unit will require the same resources to produce as the one before. 
As the development of wetware will require analogue input to the brain where it is 
being developed, there is constancy in the time taken for this production. Hardware 
represents a material commodity. Software is commodified through the use of 
copyright laws. Wetware consists of myriad literacies, developed through both 
formal and informal learning and experience. Providers of wetware include the 
education sector from kindergarten through to universities. Wetware literacies are 
often built upon existing literacies. Being able to read and write (and ideally type) is 
a prerequisite in learning how to use email. There is a broader social good in 
developing the literacy of citizens of a Nation State which extends beyond 
commodification.    119
 
Some literacies are traded, often by the same producers of hardware and software. 
For example Cisco Certified Internetwork Experts20 and Microsoft Certified Systems 
Engineers21 are valuable certifications. In this context, Microsoft has managed to 
leverage control of the wetware required to operate its software, to increase the value 
of its software. Microsoft no longer provides support for the Microsoft Certified 
Systems Engineer Course that qualified an individual to work with their Microsoft 
Windows NT4 release and has withdrawn permission to use copyrighted material for 
this course from all certified training organisations. This qualification has been 
superseded by the equivalent certification for the Windows 2000 software system. 
Thus companies that do not upgrade to the new software are less able to find 
individuals with the required wetware to maintain their systems. 
 
Figure 16 
Windows NT 
                                                 
20 Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert. http://www.cisco.com/en/US/learning/le3/ccie/index.html 
[accessed 20.7.2005]. 
21 Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer. http://www.microsoft.com/learning/mcp/mcse/Default.asp 
[accessed 20.7.2005].   120
 
As well as being learned, literacy and wetware can also be borrowed. If someone 
does not have the skills required they can seek help. In some cases this may involve 
paying for a professional in the field, but often it will involve seeking an informal 
alternative source of wetware. Computer literacy within households is not evenly 
distributed. It is often separated by both age and gender.22 Men have a different 
perceived right to leisure than women and also have more time to become 
technologically literate.23  
Trinity: Hello Neo. 
Neo: How do you know that name? 
Trinity: I know a lot about you. 
Neo: Who are you? 
Trinity: My name is Trinity. 
Neo: Trinity…. The Trinity that cracked the IRS dbase? 
Trinity: That was a long time ago. 
Neo: Jesus! 
Trinity: What? 
Neo: I just thought um…. you were a guy. 
Trinity: Most guys do.24 
 
One or more relatively literate members rely on the expertise of those with more 
literacy to establish and maintain Internet access for them. Green, Holloway and 
Quinn note this distribution of literacy does not always reflect traditional family 
household power structures. There is a perceived fear that these literacies are skewed 
towards younger family members: 
Children are considered both to be ‘technically competent and at risk from 
their technical skills’.25 Anxiety is further exacerbated by the fear that parents 
                                                 
22 K. Keightley, ‘Low television, high fidelity:  taste and the gendering of home entertainment 
technologies’, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, June 2003, p. 236. 
D. Morley, Home Territories: Media Mobility and Identity. London: Routledge, 2000. 
23 K. Keightley, ‘Low television, high fidelity: taste and the gendering of home entertainment 
technologies’, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, June 2003, p. 236. 
D. Morley, Home Territories: Media Mobility and Identity. London: Routledge, 2000. 
24 The Matrix. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner Bros, 1999. 
25 G. Valentine, S. L. Holloway & N. Bingham, ‘Transforming Cyberspace: Children’s interventions 
in the new public sphere’, in G. Valentine & S. L. Holloway (eds), Children’s Geographies: Playing,   121
are losing control of their children’s Internet activities because of their own 
(the parents’) technical competencies being surpassed by those of their 
children.26 
 
Green et al noted the findings of a 2001 Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) 
survey of Australian households which found that this fear was not necessarily 
accurate. Most often the household Internet ‘expert’ was an adult. In the online 
surveys, 70% of parents and 58% of children and teenagers nominated one of the 
parents as the most likely to be asked for help with the Internet. In families where a 
child was the main resource, they mostly were the eldest child in the family and aged 
13 – 18 years. In a few homes, children aged 10 years and under were perceived to 
be the most skilled. 27 
 
In these instances, it is more appropriate to talk about a household, rather than 
individual wetware. The reliance on one member for access can however be 
hazardous. A person without the literacy to activate access – a digital subaltern, who 
relies on another source of wetware, an individual who activates access for them – is 
vulnerable to access being curtailed if access to that individual is lost. Children leave 
home, partners die. There is a difference in being taught skills and having someone 
‘do it for you’, through facilitated co-dependence.28 
                                                                                                                                          
Living Learning. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 157, as cited in L. Green, D. Holloway & R. Quinn 
‘@home Australian family life and the Internet’ in G. Goggin (ed), Virtual Nation: The Internet in 
Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004, p. 90. 
26 L. Green, D. Holloway & R. Quinn ‘@home Australian family life and the Internet’ in G. Goggin 
(ed), Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004, p. 90. 
27 K. Aisbett, The Internet at Home: A Report on Internet Use in the Home. Sydney: Australian 
Broadcast Authority, 2001, p. 4.  http://www.aba.gov.au/internet/research/home/ [accessed 
25.4.2005]. 
28 The 2003, Pew Internet and American Life Project, The Ever Shifting Internet Population: A New 
Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide In 2003 listed three different groups of individuals 
within the United States who do not use the Internet. ‘Net Dropouts’ comprise some 17% of the total 
population. This group consists of individuals who have previously been online, but due to a variety 
of normally technical, hardware reasons are no longer connected. The second group, including these   122
 
There are different types of access. While it may appear a binarised issue – literacy is 
present or absent – there are factors that effect the quality of access, or the size of the 
gate.29 These are the levels of access and understanding: a network of encoding and 
decoding skills. The greater the range and literacy level, the greater the access. The 
screen does not provide a democratic gateway. It provides different levels and modes 
of access. Once a person is within the digital realm, they choose to develop distinct 
translations and modes. In the first instance though, there is also a threshold of 
literacy required to achieve access to the gates of Invisible Empire. Without this 
threshold literacy, no others can be developed. There is a dangerous difference 
between someone who can’t swim and a weak swimmer who falls into a swimming 
pool. An infrastructure must exist. There must be an actual telecommunications 
network and a way to access it. Secondly, content must be present along with other 
people to communicate with. Finally, there must be a literacy with the mode of 
communication. While the first two of these factors draw the most attention from 
politicians and activists as the most important enablers, it is the third requirement of 
literacy that takes a second place, yet is of primary importance in this area. Without 
                                                                                                                                          
mentioned in the text, ‘Net Evaders’, comprise 20% of the population. This group consists of 
individuals who are able to use the Internet through ‘borrowed literacy’, using other people to access 
through the screen on their behalf. The final group, the ‘Truly Disconnected’ make up nearly a quarter 
of the population in the United States at 24%. These individuals have no access to the Internet and 
very little contact with anyone who does. This group, the ‘Digital Subalterns’, are the focus of 
Chapter Eight. 
A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever Shifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r
=88 [accessed 5.7.2005]. 
29 L. Unsworth, ‘Changing dimensions of school literacies’, Teaching Multiliteracies Across the 
School Curriculum. Melbourne: Macmillan, 2001, pp. 7-20.  
C. Lankshear, ‘Frameworks and workframes: Literacy policies and new orders’, Unicorn. 1998, 
volume 24, number 2.  
M. Macken-Horarik, ‘Exploring the requirements of critical school literacy: a view from two 
classrooms’, in F. Christie & R. Mission (eds), Literacy and Schooling. London: Routledge, 1998 
B. Street, Literacy in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.   123
the literacy to use the Internet, the content and technology to deliver that content is of 
little worth. As Julia Thomas notes: 
It is vital that as many people as possible not only ‘have access’ to the Net in 
one way or another, but actually are using it. For those considering more 
challenging innovations in electronic democracy, this issue is even more 
critical.30 
 
The three components of access – hardware, software and wetware – intersect and 
dialogue. All three components form a matrix of access. However, the ability to 
attain hardware, software and wetware are distinct. An awareness of how and where 
to attain these literacies requires the activation of cultware. Without an intersection, 
then access is not possible. 
 
                                                 
30 J. Thomas, ‘Horizons of expectation: Imaginary trajectories of electronic government’, in G. 
Goggin (ed), Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004, p. 265.   124
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
The Matrix of Access 
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As can be seen in the diagram above, the size of the overlap determines the size of 
the gateway and the value of access. It is also evident from this illustration that there 
is an interaction between each of these components which can alter both the value of 
the access obtained and the point at which the gateway becomes a viable point of 
access. A highly proficient user with developed wetware is able to extract more from 
hardware and software. They have expert knowledge in the use of this more than a 
novice user. 
 
This knowledge can be used to create barriers, to keep the less knowledgeable out. 
As Bailey noted: 
The Net nation deploys shared knowledge and language to unite against 
outsiders: Net jargon extends beyond technical language to acronyms both 
benign (BTW, 'By the way') and snippy (RTFM, 'Read the fucking manual'). It 
includes neologisms, text-graphical hybrids called emoticons, and a 
thoroughgoing anti-'newbie' snobbery. Like any other community, it uses 
language to erect barriers to membership.31 
 
While there are many places online where the highly literate gather to interact and 
exchange ideas, these places tend to be segregated by the type of expert knowledge 
being exchanged. Conversely, many digital spaces are created specifically to allow 
for interaction and transfer of knowledge between the expert user and the novice. 
These spaces tend to be more general in their application of expertise. The ABC 
actively promotes its online Tech Talk web site, where the less experienced or literate 
can seek advice on digital matters in non digital media, such as its radio broadcasts. 
                                                 
31 C. Bailey, ‘Virtual skin: Articulating race in cyberspace’, In M. A. Moser, (ed), Immersed in 
Technology: Art and Virtual Environments. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 29-49.   126
 
Figure 18 
ABC Online Tech Talk Forum 
http://www2b.abc.net.au/science/techtalk/  
[accessed 10.7.2005] 
 
A high bandwidth Internet connection is able to deliver a faster service to a user with 
outdated software or less experience. Well designed software can overcome some of 
the limitations of hardware and alleviate the requirement for a high level of wetware 
in a user. Originally Web pages were created by HTML programmers with basic text 
editors such as Notepad. The development of WYSIWYG (what you see is what you 
get) web authoring software such as Dreamweaver, enabled people to focus their 
literacy on web page design and content, rather than the code.  
 
An individual highly trained in the use of Internet mediated technology has an 
aligned and highly complementary level of wetware. Using this skill base they are 
better able to make use of a given set of hardware and software than a user with less   127
developed wetware. They are also able to expand the point at which access is 
available – the Internet event horizon – by making better use of any marginal levels 
of software and hardware that are available. The types of wetware required to 
facilitate these two functions are not the same. Wetware, like hardware and software, 
is not homogenous and varies in suitability to different tasks.  
 
The development of the World Wide Web software by Tim Berners-Lee in the early 
1990s provided the foundations for the enormous growth in the population of people 
using the Internet. At its most basic level, the World Wide Web enabled a greater 
potential for access by eliminating one mode of literacy a user needed to access 
content on the Internet. Not only was the content organised in a way that facilitated 
easier access,32 but the level of wetware, or training required to use a web browser 
was much lower than the preceding Internet enabling software. Software could be 
used to stretch the space for access, limited until that point by the requirements of 
wetware. 
 
Aidworld – http://www.aidworld.org/Wiki.jsp – is a not for profit organisation 
whose motto is ‘taking the World Wide Web world-wide’.33 In order to overcome the 
hardware restrictions experienced in less developed countries, both in terms of 
processing power and bandwidth, this organisation has developed Loband 
http://www.loband.org/loband/main, an online software tool that strips back the data 
from Web pages so that they can be more easily displayed through a low bandwidth 
connection and on less powerful computers, while maintaining the textual 
                                                 
32 This was further enhanced by the development of various web based search engines. 
33 Aidworld Homepage. http://www.aidworld.org/Wiki.jsp?page=Home [accessed 9.5.2005].   128
information. The web site of the Australian Rules Football League, (AFL) is 
sponsored by Telstra Broadband and is designed to promote the take-up of high 
bandwidth, Internet access. The AFL site is normally displayed in this form: 
 
 
Figure 19 
Australian Football League Web Site 
http://afl.com.au/ 
[accessed 22.4.2005] 
 
It requires 258kb or 258 000 individual bits of information to be downloaded in order 
to display. Once it has been translated by loband it displays without the same depth 
of imagery, but with the same functionality: 
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Figure 20 
Australian Football League Web Site: translated by Loband 
http://www.loband.org/loband/page?_ab_url=http%3A%2F%2Fafl.com.au&_ab_request=Go 
[accessed 22.4.2005] 
 
This form requires less than half the bandwidth to display in the same time at a total 
size of 113.7kb. The use of software in this case expands the access available by 
reducing the potential limitations of hardware. 
 
Each person at the screen faces the gates of the Invisible Empire alone. Like the pearl 
gates of the New Jerusalem, the faithful gain entry and the rest are excluded. 
However the atomised nature of access means that this passage, or more critically 
exclusion, is not performed in the view of others. There is no ‘between’ for the 
shadow to fall. Those within the digital environment have no perception of those 
excluded, the digital underclass does not manifest on the screen. Similarly the digital   130
underclass has no knowledge of the environment from which they are excluded. Off 
screen there are no obvious markers of gender, class or race to highlight membership 
of the digital underclass or digital citizenship respectively. Notions of development 
and evolution are critiqued. 
Image Removed 
 
 Figure 21 
Evolution of the Digital Citizen 
http://lifewithalacrity.blogs.com/photos/uncategorized/evolution.jpg 
[accessed 1.6.2005] 
 
Cultware 
While the act of accessing the Internet is a solitary and atomising experience for the 
user, it occurs in a wider context. In order to interrogate an understanding of Internet 
access, the on and off screen context of the potential user must be monitored. This 
requires the evaluation of a fourth component: cultware. If the terms hard, soft and 
wet demand a sexual metaphor, it is cultware that gives them context and reclaims 
the romance from pornography. This is the point of this thesis where the    131
interdisciplinary approach becomes significant. The insight of Cultural Studies 
theorists and their imperatives requires a great contextual understanding of how and 
why access emerges. Therefore, an original contribution to knowledge in this thesis 
is the tethering of software, hardware and wetware to their attendant cultware.  
 
At the turn of the century, the OECD34 broke down the factors that act to inhibit or 
enable Internet access across a given society – or more specifically in their case the 
factors that influenced the emergence of the Information Economy. These three 
categories are readiness, intensity and impact. Readiness refers to the level of 
infrastructure that exists to support Internet Access. While this includes 
technological infrastructure, it also refers to a broader social and commercial 
infrastructure. The report measures the take up of Internet based-technology within 
houses and businesses. This take up measure consists of the public infrastructure to 
support this such as telephony and power supply, as well as social infrastructure, 
such as education and literacy. Literacy here includes both the conventional 
understanding and a broader computer literacy. The OECD also included in this area 
commercial infrastructure to enable and facilitate electronic commerce. Intensity 
monitors the level of Internet use: how much time people are online and what they 
do once they are there. Impact refers to the effect of that Internet access on an 
individual and, the impact of the information economy on society. The Internet 
affects people’s recreation, the way they interact with each other, work and shop. 
 
                                                 
34 OECD discussion paper, ‘defining and measuring electronic commerce’, Paris: OECD, 10
th 
February, 2000.    132
These three factors are not only understood in terms of the atomised individual at the 
screen accessing the Internet. The context of that access in relation to the rest of 
society should also be investigated. This is the fourth ‘ware’ involved with Internet 
access culture-ware or cultware. Unlike the other three components of access, 
cultware is a commodity that is hard to define and value. Pierre Bourdieu in his 
innovative article ‘The Forms of Capital’35 touched on the concept of cultware when 
detailing his theories of cultural and social capital. Bourdieu criticised traditional 
economic theory as being too focused on economic capital, or the capital that is most 
easily converted into tender. He argued that a wider understanding of economic 
practice required an investigation that encompassed more than just a mercantile 
focus. This narrow understanding that Bourdieu criticised is replicated in the analysis 
of information technology in general and the Internet in particular, with the primary 
focus on hardware and software. Both comprise commodities that can be easily 
understood in terms of economic capital. Similarly wetware, knowledge and literacy 
is an increasingly commodified entity with a cost to obtain and a value to be 
realised.36 Cultware comprises an equal if not more important field of understanding 
within the digital environment which is often overlooked for want of an appropriate 
label for the discussion. 
                                                 
35 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, translated by R. Nice, http://www.viet-
studies.org/Bourdieu_capital.htm [accessed 15.9.2004]. Originally published as "Ökonomisches 
Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital." in Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), 
edited by Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983. pp. 183-98. [accessed 15.9.2004]. 
36 K. Robins & F. Webster (eds), The Virtual University? Knowledge Markets and Management. 
London: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
R. Zelmsky, G. Wegner & W. Massy, Remaking The American University: Market Smart and Mission 
Centered. New York: Rutgers University Press, 2005.  
J. Tiffin & L. Rajasingham, The Global Virtual University. London: Routledge Falmer, 2003. 
A. Potts, Civic Leaders and the University: State and Municipal Politicians’ Perspectives on Higher 
Education in Australia. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2003. 
F. Newman, L. Couturier & J. Scurry, The Future of Higher Education: Rhetoric Reality and the 
Risks of the Market. San Francisco: Jossey – Bass, 2004. 
P. Teixeira, B. Jongbloed, D. Hill & A. Amaral (eds), Markets in Higher Education: Rhetoric or 
Reality. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004.   133
 
Bourdieu divided cultural capital into the embodied state, the objectified state and 
the institutionalised state. The embodied state represented what an individual knows, 
the ‘long lasting dispositions of the mind and body’37 that can only be acquired 
through a process of learning and is not easily transferred to another, as with other 
forms of capital. This is clearly analogous to wetware. In the objectified state, capital 
takes the form of cultural goods, machines, works of art, books, dictionaries and the 
knowledge of how to use them. In the digitised environment, these become types of 
software and the wetware to utilise that software. Finally, cultural capital in an 
institutionalised state refers to the markings that denote and guarantee different types 
of cultural capital, such as a university degree or medical qualifications. In these 
circumstances, cultural capital starts to inhabit the space bordered by both wetware 
and cultware. 
 
Social capital for Bourdieu represented a personal asset that is developed through 
families, groups and individuals being ‘connected’, and providing these individuals 
with an advantage over others with less social capital: 
the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition – in other words to membership in a group38 
 
                                                 
37 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, translated by R. Nice, http://www.viet-
studies.org/Bourdieu_capital.htm [accessed 15.9.2004]. Originally published as "Ökonomisches 
Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital." in Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), 
edited by Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983. pp. 183-98.  
38 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, translated by R. Nice, http://www.viet-
studies.org/Bourdieu_capital.htm [accessed 15.9.2004]. Originally published as "Ökonomisches 
Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital." in Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), 
edited by Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983. pp. 183-98.   134
This view was in contrast to other theories of social capital, notable in the works of 
Putman, Coleman and Fukuyama. For these writers, social capital was a community 
asset consisting of social networks of trust solidarity and reciprocity.39 The 
difference in access to the shared added value of social capital needs to be 
understood in terms of cultural literacy, the specific knowledge or wetware, which 
allows access to the capital accessible through cultware. 
 
Cultware is therefore the context in which hardware, software and wetware manifest 
to allow for Internet access. It consists of both the digital environment in which the 
multiple users of the Internet’s Invisible Empire reside and the analogue environment 
in which those users find themselves off screen. The Canadian theorist Harold Innis 
famously linked the concepts of space and time to transport and communication in 
The Bias of Communication.40 Cultware links literacy to identity and then back to 
space and time. 
                                                 
39 D. Schugurensky, History of Education: Selected Moments of the 20th Century, Department of 
Adult Education, Community Development and Counselling Psychology. The Ontario Institute for 
Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE/UT). 
http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_schugurensky/assignment1/1986bourdieu.html [accessed 
15.9.2004]. 
40 H. Innis, The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951.   135
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Figure 22 
Cultware 
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While the development of the World Wide Web increased access to the Internet by 
making it easier to use and navigate, thereby reducing the wetware requirements, this 
development can be tracked as the driver behind the subsequent massive growth in 
Internet penetration rates. That growth in population itself caused the total value of 
the Internet to increase. Each additional user on the network increased the total value 
of the network in accordance with Metcalf’s Law.41 This growth in the value of the 
network is understood as a function of cultware. The implications and drivers of this 
growth are explored in the next chapter. The online environment was enriched with 
more participants and the value of its cultware increased. The Web reduced the level 
of literacy required to access the Internet. It also generated a far more complex 
online environment that requires its own specialised literacies to activate. 
 
The digitised environment represented by the Internet is a vast store of potential 
social and cultural capital, manifest in the wetware of other users and the software or 
content that is available through the network. It represents the activated value of the 
totality of hardware that supports the network. This grouping of resources, and the 
synergy within that group of different resources, is made available as a function of 
cultware. To access this capital requires a variety of literacies relating to all four 
components of Internet access. Cultware often becomes embedded in social practice 
to the point where individuals forget their literacy. This has the potential to create 
confidence, arrogance and social amnesia. The political consequences are potentially 
dire. 
 
                                                 
41 G. Gilder, ‘Metcalf’s Law and Legacy’, Forbes ASA, 13
th September 1993. This is explored in 
more detail in Chapter Three, ‘Networks and Digitisation’.   137
All literacies are wetware. To develop, they require time and capital to be invested in 
each individual. For those who possess a high degree of Bourdieu’s social capital, 
these literacies develop in a more conducive environment, as the individual’s social 
positioning facilitates the development of their embodied capital. For those who do 
not have a situation that fosters the development of these literacies, access to the 
potential capital available through the Internet is limited, or non-existent. Bourdieu 
notes that those from different class backgrounds produce different academic 
achievement within the same learning environment. The role of differing levels of 
domestic transmission of social capital plays in this disparity.42 As Anderson and 
Irvine noted ‘people are not poor because they’re illiterate: they are illiterate because 
they’re poor’.43 The presence of an ‘expert’ with Internet literacy in a given 
household will impact on the level of access of other members of that household. In 
the digital environment, this layer of class disadvantage is both replicated and 
compounded by those who had long left the family home of their parents before the 
Internet became available, and for whom the Internet has played no prior role in their 
network of social capital. 
 
Cultware is a function of the analogue off screen world in which access has the 
potential to occur. There is a different distribution of wetware across households in 
Australia. The level of cultware – in this case measured by access to surrounding 
literacies – is a measure of the access to technology and infrastructure off screen. 
                                                 
42 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, translated by R. Nice, http://www.viet-
studies.org/Bourdieu_capital.htm [accessed 15.9.2004]. Originally published as "Ökonomisches 
Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital." in Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2), 
edited by Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co., 1983. pp. 183-98. 
43 G. Anderson & P. Irvine, Critical Literacy: Political Praxis and the Postmodern. Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1993.     138
The off screen cultware environment of Manhattan Island is significantly different to 
that of sub-Saharan Africa. Having a notebook computer with wireless access 
capability would have very different utility for the average resident in each place, 
although in each instance an individual brings their unique circumstances, of literacy, 
economic resources and social networks that will influence their prevailing level of 
cultware. 
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Figure 23 
Cartoon by Fran 
http://www.cartoonstock.com/search.asp?x=a&keyword=mobile+phones&Category=Not+Selected&
Boolean=Or&Artist=Fran&submit=Search 
[accessed 12.7.2005] 
 
Off screen, the digital underclass and the digital citizen share space. While there are 
no obvious markings setting these two groups apart, the level of cultware in that 
environment affects the potential for translation and communication to occur 
between these two groups. Conversely, the greater the level of cultware, the more 
apparent and profound the disadvantage of those without access becomes. Race,   139
 class and gender manifest at the analogue side of the screen and it is there that the 
context of these markings becomes important. 
 
Within Australia, there are three separate tiers of government: federal, state and 
local. At each level there have been interventions attempted to provide for greater 
access to the Internet. These strategies have varied greatly in their scope, form and 
the ideology that inform them.44 All these programs have existed in an environment 
of rapid growth in Internet penetration. As the growth starts to taper off – with those 
that were predisposed to gaining access finding that access – people left outside the 
gates of Empire become a more definite and disadvantaged group, albeit distributed 
invisibly though the population. The early adaptors, the technicians, did not concern 
themselves about those who were left off screen. This is an important consequence of 
their status as a minority online and that the border between empowered and 
disempowered would soon begin rapidly admitting new people. When the 
disempowered are a small minority, moving ‘up’ to empowered status is arduous, or 
not an option. With the screen acting as a type of event horizon for those without 
access, messages cannot pass back from the other side. The digital underclass is 
invisible, having no manifestation within the walls of Invisible Empire. The 
consequences of this invisibility are dire. 
 
                                                 
44 The success of these activities has been mixed. As noted in Chapter One, of the funding made 
available to Networking the Nation rural telecommunications projects by the Commonwealth 
Government through the partial sale of Telstra, it is estimated that 80% have stalled or failed. 
C. Morris & M. Meadows, ‘Digital Dreaming: Indigenous Intellectual Property and New 
Communication Technologies’, in G. Goggin (ed), Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia. Sydney 
UNSW Press, 2004.    140
 
Figure 24 
St Stephens Gate of Jerusalem 
http://www.bibleplaces.com/oldcitygates.htm 
[accessed 29.3.2005] 
 
The gateway to the Invisible Empire is traversed by each individual alone. Others are 
encountered either within the walls of Empire on the screen, or off screen in the 
analogue world. Derrida theorised that resistance to colonial oppression could be 
instigated from the existing system of unequal power relations.45 However, in the 
construction of the Invisible Empire there is no shared space where the digital 
citizens and the digital subaltern share space in the context of those identities. At the 
interface of Invisible Empire, these spaces between the centre and the margin are no 
longer apparent. There is no shared space of leeway for resistance to develop. It is 
within this environment that the impact of digital colonisation will begin to manifest 
and it is this phenomenon that will require the intervention of public policy if the 
resulting disadvantage is to be alleviated. 
 
                                                 
45 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference. Translated by A. Bass, London: Routledge, 1976.   141
There is actual shared space between the subaltern and the digital citizen.46 They 
exist off screen side by side, even though there are not necessarily any obvious 
markings to separate or identify them. Off screen, this lack of markings is what 
renders the Empire invisible. Conversely on screen for the citizen, the subaltern is 
entirely absent. They have no manifestation and leave no space unfilled by their 
absences. In the Invisible Empire, the empowered never meet the disempowered. 
 
The gateways of the Invisible Empire do not just sort the citizen from the subaltern. 
Through the gateway, on screen the Invisible Empire transforms many traditional 
understandings of identity, economics and political power. Part II of this thesis turns 
its focus to the ‘on screen’ construction of the Invisible Empire. The foundations of 
this analysis, what occurs when traversing the gateways of the Invisible Empire, the 
transformations that occur through digitisation, and the consequences for the 
construction of self are the focus of the next chapter, ‘Networks and Digitisation’. 
 
The screen acting as a gateway creates an edge, a hard line through the grey and 
amorphous interface of traditional core-periphery relationship and power structures. 
This sets the Invisible Empire aside from what has gone before and requires new 
theories and understandings to enable and actualise any resistance to what is 
increasingly becoming a perpetuated structure of inequality, enabled by the Empire. 
These questions become the focus of Part III of this dissertation. 
                                                 
46 The use of the term of subaltern, transformed in this new digital context, is used with full 
recognition of the history of the cultural studies conceptualisation: the disempowered without 
consciousness.  This concept is more fully explored in Chapter Eight, ‘The Digital Subaltern’.   142
Chapter 3 
Networks and Digitisation  
 
Figure 25 
Missile Tracks Across the Net 
http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/geographic.html 
[accessed 22.5.2005] 
 
 
I like to think (and       past  computers 
the sooner the better!)         as if they were flowers 
of a cybernetic meadow        with spinning blossoms. 
where mammals and computers      I like to think 
live together in mutually        (it has to be!) 
programming harmony        of a cybernetic ecology 
like pure water            where we are free of our labors 
touching clear sky.           and joined back to nature, 
I like to think            returned to our mammal 
(right  now,  please!)      brothers  and  sisters, 
of a cybernetic forest          and all watched over 
filled with pines and electronics      by machines of loving grace. 
where deer stroll peacefully 
  
 
 All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace 
Richard Brautigan 1967   143
Introduction 
At a technical level, the Internet can be narrowly defined as the transmission of data 
using two codes, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol or TCP/IP. 
Transmission Control Protocol is responsible for breaking data up into individual 
packets for transmission through the network and then reassembling those packets 
into their original form after transmission. Internet Protocol is a ‘lower layer’ of code 
that ensures that each packet is addressed properly for transmission so that it arrives 
at the correct location within the network. The system operates using dynamic 
routing so that if one section of the network is unavailable or removed, the packets 
find an alternate route. While these protocols represent the Internet at its most 
fundamental technical level, an understanding of the Invisible Empire they enable 
requires a more expansive interpretation. This analysis can be best illustrated by 
breaking down the understanding of the Internet into four separate components used 
to investigate access, hardware, software, wetware and cultware.  
 
This chapter sets the stage for the analysis that follows by interrogating the 
characteristics of the digital environment that these four ‘wares create. This 
investigation illustrates some of the variables, histories and environments that have 
lead to the rapid growth of the network over the past decade and what factors might 
lead to the tapering of this growth. The focus then shifts to the interface between the 
Invisible Empire and the market place and how the transformation to the digital 
environment effects the construction of capitalism and the structure of the digital 
economy. The analysis then turns to how the individual manifests in this digital 
environment, what is the digital self, how is it constructed and what does it look like?   144
The nature of this construction will inform the discussion in Part II of this 
dissertation which examines the politics of the Invisible Empire, and then Part III 
that focuses on the consequences of the interface between the Invisible Empire and 
the off screen world.  
 
The Internet has no central control, no identifiable or accountable manufacturer or 
broadcast mechanism. This tendency makes the Internet quite different to other, 
more traditional, channels of communication. As Paul Virilio notes:  
Cyberspace is a new form of perspective. It does not coincide with the audio-
visual perspective which we already know. It is a fully new perspective, free of 
any previous reference: it is a tactile perspective. To see at a distance, to hear 
at a distance: that was the essence of the audio-visual perspective of old. But to 
reach at a distance, to feel at a distance, that amounts to shifting the perspective 
towards a domain it did not yet encompass: that of contact, of contact-at-a-
distance: tele-contact.1 
 
Networks are by their nature difficult to find the centre of, the Internet is no 
exception to this,2 and the fragmentation of the concepts of core and periphery has 
far reaching implications. The nature of the Internet means that it is in many ways 
more open in terms of access than many other forms of more controlled media. On 
the other hand, the lack of an established system for organising and resolving 
disputes might lead to technological and policy incompatibilities that limit the 
network’s utility. With no agency exercising responsibility or sovereignty over the 
                                                 
1 P. Virilio, ‘Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm’, Le Monde Diplomatique. August 1995. 
Translated by P. Riemens, University of Amsterdam. 
http://www.humanities.uci.edu/mposter/syllabi/readings/alarm.html [accessed 7.6.2005]. 
2 While this is true to a certain extent, it is not as true as the popular belief. There is currently one 
main domain name server that acts as a master directory for the Internet. Each twelve hours it 
generates a master file that is sent out to twelve mirror servers telling them what Internet domains 
exist and where to find them. The system is currently designed so that at least eight of these thirteen 
servers must fail before an ordinary Internet user would notice any effect. On October 21, 2002 a 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack through the Internet managed to put three or four of these 
servers out of action. D. McGuire & B. Krebs, ‘Attack On Internet Called Largest Ever’, The 
Washington Post. 22
nd October 2002.   145
Invisible Empire, its ability to exercise responsibility for its digital citizens is limited. 
The Internet operates by providing the opportunity for a diverse array of info-
communications opportunities at a relatively low price, rather than just enabling the 
broadcasting of a single expensive signal to a passive audience, as traditional forms 
of mass communication tended to. The Internet allows for the possibility of many-to-
many communications.  
 
Networks 
The Internet is a telecommunications network. As a network, both within Australia 
and across the world, each individual member that joins that network makes the 
Internet more valuable. Thus when a new connection and user is added,3 not only 
does it provide that connection and user access to the rest of the network, but it also 
provides access from the rest of the network to that connection and user. This 
connection may add a whole new base of data to the network, such as when a library 
puts it catalogue online, or it may just be one more point with the potential to access 
what content is already there and thus increasing the previous reach of the network 
by one, such as when an individual signs up for an Internet connection on their home 
computer. This effect is known within traditional economics as externalities.
4 
                                                 
3 The distinction between ‘user’ and ‘connection’ is quite a bit more complex than it might at first 
seem. The two concepts can be seen to be concurrent, since to have one without the other, especially 
when looking at the value of a network, is of little use. They also conflate. At what point is something 
a connection, and something else a user. While this is pretty easy to determine for certain aspects, 
such as a modem, or computer literate university student, there is a large grey area between, such as to 
which of these two concepts would an email address be ascribed. To have one without the other is 
however of little value, how can you be a user without a connection, and what use or value is a 
connection if there is no user? 
4 Telecommunications Pricing Theory and Practice P.1 and Telecommunications Demand in Theory 
and Practice p. 231. As cited in G. Goggin, ‘Voice Telephony and Beyond’ in B. Langtry (ed), All 
Connected, Universal Service in Telecommunications. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1998, p. 
54.   146
 
Robert Metcalf is known for having devised the initial version of the Ethernet 
network system that became one of the major sources of network protocols when 
linking individual computers across a network. He devised Metcalf’s law as a way of 
describing the growth in potential value that comes from linking computers in a 
network.5 Connect any number, ‘n’ of machines – whether computers, phones or 
even cars – and you get ‘n’ squared potential in value.
6 That is to say, there is an 
exponential growth in power that comes from each additional node on a network.7 
Following this law, each additional connection to the Internet, while it does not 
significantly add to the cost of the network, will greatly increases the total value of 
the network. This increase can be graphed like this: 
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Figure 26 
Growth in Network Value 
                                                 
5 Metcalf did not actually dub this theory a law when he first promoted it in 1980, but that it was later 
‘elevated’ to that status by the author George Gilder. B. Metcalfe, ‘There Oughta Be a Law’, New 
York Times. 15
th July 1996. http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0715laws.html [accessed 
17.5.2005]. 
6 G. Gilder, ‘Metcalf’s Law and Legacy’, Forbes ASA. 13
th September 1993. 
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~gaj1/metgg.html [accessed 26.6.2005]. 
7 The actual equation is N*(N-1) where N is the number of connections. The –1 represents the fact 
that you already have access to yourself, or your node in the network. D. Weinberger, Small Pieces 
Loosely Joined: A Unified Theory of the Web. Cambridge MA: Perseus Books Group, 2003.   147
 
Metcalf’s law applies to all networks. A useful example is the road system and cars.8 
Utilising this analogy will, to a point, help explain the potential limitations on the 
exponential growth promised by Metcalf’s law. In a road network, the value of that 
network will be greatly increased by each additional car that is able to use it. At early 
stages this growth may be exponential. Over time as traffic congestion builds up the 
added utility of each car will begin to decline. While it might be beneficial for the 
new car owner able to properly access the network for the first time the additional 
traffic will reduce the utility of the road network to other road users, the effect of 
cumulative pollution and possible negative impacts on society may also come into 
play. Thus after a point, each additional user will have a diminishing marginal return 
to the growth of the network. It is possible to conceive that there will be a point 
where an additional user might in fact reduce the total value of the network as they 
spread the network’s resources to the point where it was more valuable without that 
additional user as a whole. However the individual user will probably still be better 
off than before, at least until the point where the network’s value is reduced to zero 
as it comes to a halt under the weight (or perhaps wait) of users, a bit like a large city 
road system during rush hour. This drop off in growth can be illustrated by 
continuing the previous graph. 
                                                 
8 G. Gilder, Telecosm: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolutionize Our World. New York: Free Press, 
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Figure 27 
Effects of Limited Network Utility 
 
The critical issue to be addressed here is the concept of network utility. While 
Metcalf’s Law can determine the potential value of a network, the network utility 
will determine how much of that potential can be achieved. The area at which this 
diminishing marginal return starts to occur and their impact can be ‘put off’ to occur 
at a greater number of users by increasing the level of network utility. Thus 
continuing the road network example, the streets could be widened, better traffic 
controls installed, drivers better trained and cars better built. Each of these measures 
increases the network’s utility, and thus allow for more users before this slowed rate 
of growth of value (and later decline of value) with each additional user would start 
to apply.  
 
Network utility for the Internet can be broken down into the separate components of 
hardware, software, wetware and cultware. Network utility and the gateway to access 
are intimately linked. The size of the gateway is a metaphor, and social indicator, for   149
the level of network utility available through that point of access. While questions of 
access focus on the individual passing through the gateway to empire, the network 
utility describes the condition of the Invisible Empire so accessed. Like access there 
is an overlap between all four components, the characteristics of any one component 
can act to inhibit or enhance the other three. In relation to the hardware, network 
utility might be seen initially as Internet protocols were first implemented. Gordon E. 
Moore, who would later be one of the co-founders of Intel Corporation, articulated 
what would become known as Moore’s law in Electronics magazine in 1965: 
The complexity for minimum component costs has increased at a rate of 
roughly a factor of two per year ... Certainly over the short term this rate can be 
expected to continue, if not to increase. Over the longer term, the rate of 
increase is a bit more uncertain, although there is no reason to believe it will 
not remain nearly constant for at least 10 years. That means by 1975, the 
number of components per integrated circuit for minimum cost will be 65,000. 
I believe that such a large circuit can be built on a single wafer.9 
 
This idea that the speed of processors would double every year, while not 
particularly accurate,10 Moore himself revised it to once every two years in 1975,11 
has acted as a driver for the industry as integrated chip producers seek to keep up 
with the perceived requirements of Moore’s law so as not to be overtaken by their 
rivals.  
                                                 
9 G. Moore, Electronics. 19
th April 1965, volume 38, number 8. 
www.cs.ucsb.edu/~arch/cs254/papers/moorepaper.pdf [accessed 23.4.2005]. 
10 I. Tuomi, ‘The Lives and Death of Moore's Law’, First Monday. November 2002, volume 7, 
number 11. http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_11/tuomi/index.html [accessed 28.4.2005]. 
11 ‘Moore’s Law at 40: Happy Birthday’, The Economist. 23
rd March 2005. 
http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3798505 [accessed 29.4.2005].   150
 
Growth of transistor counts for Intel processors (dots) and Moore's Law (upper line=18 months; lower 
line=24 months). 
Figure 28 
Moore’s Law 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_Law 
[accessed 28.4.2005] 
 
While Moore’s law referred specifically to processing power, it has also been 
coopted to explain the corresponding rapid growth in computer memory and other 
aspects of computing hardware. This has resulted in an environment of rapid growth 
both in the volume of data that can be stored and transmitted and the speed with 
which it can be translated and analysed. The concept of computing power as a 
commodity is thus one with a built in used by date, by which any particular purchase 
will be ‘out of date’ and too slow and thus in need of replacing with a newer 
version.12 Similarly as the power to interpret and store bits of information has 
                                                 
12 J. Twist, ‘Law that has driven digital life’, BBC News, World Edition. 18
th April 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4449711.stm [accessed 29.4.2005].   151
improved, so has the ability to transport that data. Modems13 are used to carry a 
digital signal across an analogue medium, normally a traditional copper telephone 
line.  
 
Figure 29 
1989 Maestro Modem 
This is my first modem from the early 1990s. It had a baud rate of 2400,
14 or 600 bits a second and 
was very slow for its time. At this speed the Internet is largely limited to ASCII
15 based text. 
 
The first commercial modem was manufactured in 1962 and could transfer data at 
300 bits16 per second, the current v90 standard, potentially allowing for data transfer 
rates of 56k or 56 000 bits per second, was first developed in 1996.17 These devices 
remain the method by which the majority of people access the Internet both in 
Australia and across the world, and their speed, like processors, up until the current 
standard has regularly doubled. More recently, the roll out of broadband access has 
enabled transmission speeds over xDSL services and cable modems to increase 
tenfold. In Australia the first ADSL services were available through Telstra in 2000, 
and currently provide access to 32% of households.18 
                                                 
13 Modems are named after their function of modulator – demodulator of electronic signals. 
14 ‘Baud rate’ is named after Emile Baudot, who invented the Baudot Code for telegraphy in 1874. 
15 American Standard Code for Information Interchange. Each letter or character is conveyed by 7 
‘bits’ of information. 
16 Each bit represents a single piece of data, a zero or one of binary information. 
17 V90 Modem Standard.Com http://www.v90.com/index32.html [accessed 9.7.2005]. 
18 P. McIntyre, ‘TV loses its edge as broadband access multiplies’, The Sydney Morning Herald. 6
th 
May 2005. http://businessnetwork.smh.com.au/articles/2005/05/05/2203.html [accessed 9.7.2005].   152
 
 
Figure 30 
2004 Billion ADSL Router 
This is my current ADSL modem it transfers 512 000 bits per second and at this rate can access 
streaming video images. 
 
The better hardware is able to transport, store and analyse digital information the 
more complex the structure that can be created by allocation of 0s and 1s, thus the 
potential size and complexity of programs and information that the hardware can 
accommodate increases. This has lead to the mode of content that can be accessed 
from the web expanding from the ASCII text that my first modem made accessible, 
to web pages with still picture and sound files, and limited moving graphics, through 
to the video that is now available through my ADSL service. This process is limited 
to the speed of the weakest hardware component in the transport and interpretation of 
the digital signal, an ADSL modem still needs both a telephone line capable of 
supporting its signal and to be connecting computers capable of both encoding and 
interpreting complex content for it to be assessable. 
 
The ability to rapidly transport and decode the stream of 0s and 1s that enable the 
digital world, as well as allowing for more complex structures to be supported in a 
computer mediated environment is also driving the process of convergence. 
Formerly analogue mediums from pictures, to voice telephony, to sound and video,   153
can now be easily converted to a digital format, with all the advantages of the ability 
to transport and easily copy that this mode of information embraces. This digitisation 
then leads to a breakdown in our former understanding of how these different media 
are produced and consumed. The same decoding device can be used to access and 
store any type of digital content limited only by processing power and memory.  
 
Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) allows the transmission of a telephone 
conversation as a digital signal over the Internet. Until recently, the bandwidth 
required for this transmission had been outside of the reach of most potential users, 
however the rollout of residential broadband access has now brought this within 
reach. However while the signal will still travel along a phone line, it does so in this 
format as part of a continuous Internet connection, with nothing to differentiate it 
from any other digital information. As such it bypasses traditional pricing 
mechanisms for this service, both domestically and internationally. In March 2005, 
Telstra began to trial the commercial delivery of this service to its Internet 
customers.19 The delivery of both telephony and the Internet have up until now been 
seen as two different types of service, while Telstra has delivered both this 
convergence has meant that Internet services are now potentially providing both.20 A 
more obvious example is perhaps the recent roll out of technology to provide Internet 
                                                 
19 ‘Telstra VoIP trial kicks off’, The Age. 3
rd March 2005. 
http://theage.com.au/news/Breaking/Telstra-VoIP-trial-kicks-off/2005/03/03/1109700589479.html 
[accessed 7.6.2005]. 
20 S. Bartholomeusz, ‘Trujillo’s vision might put all Telstra’s eggs in IP basket’, The Age. 14
th June, 
2005. http://www.theage.com.au/news/Stephen-Bartholomeusz/Trujillos-vision-might-put-all-
Telstras-eggs-in-IP-basket/2005/06/13/1118645745836.html [accessed 20.6.2005].   154
Protocol Television (IPTV).21 Telecommunications service providers and media 
companies are inexorably being draw into each other’s businesses. 
 
While it can be seen that the rapid development of hardware technology is a driving 
force behind the Internet’s level of network utility, the software that is enabled by 
hardware will also play a role in determining these limits. The original aim of the 
ARPRA net, the precursor to the modern Internet was designed to facilitate 
computers at different research institutions to communicate with each other despite 
otherwise having incompatible operating systems. In 1971 Ray Tomlinson first 
introduced the ‘@’ symbol into email addresses in his early email programs in this 
network. By 1973, three quarters of all traffic on that network consisted of emails, 
communication between people, rather than computers, was the driving application.22 
Email continues to be the most popular online activity.23 Another ‘killer application’ 
that drove the growth of the Internet network came in 1991 when Tim Berners-Lee 
developed the World Wide Web. 
                                                 
21 D. Kitney & M. Jones, ‘Telstra’s plan for internet TV revolution’, The Australian Financial 
Review. 30
th May 2005, p. 1. 
22 T. Jordan, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet. London: 
Routledge, 1999. 
23 M. Madden & L Rainie, America’s Online Pursuits: The Changing Picture of Who’s Online and 
What They Do. Pew Internet & American Life Project 22
nd February 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=106&Section=ReportLevel1&Field=Level1I
D&ID=463 [accessed 29.4.2004].   155
 
Figure 31 
First Page of the World Wide Web, 6th August 1991 
http://www.w3.org/History/19921103-hypertext/hypertext/WWW/News/9201.html  
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
 
In both these examples, the potential enabled by the software drove growth in the 
network and increased the network utility. The Web in particular made the Internet 
more accessible to individuals without training in computer science, as Berners-Lee 
noted prior to the World Wide Web the Internet was ‘too much of a hassle for a non 
computer expert’.24 Similarly, the development of web based search engines such as 
Yahoo and Google, allowed individuals to access more of the information on the 
Web more quickly, with less expert knowledge. In these examples software helped 
reduce the level of wetware that was required to utilise a greater proportion of the 
network, and through that increase its utility value for an individual user. Wetware 
however is still a fundamental element of network utility. The greater an individual’s 
                                                 
24 T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide 
Web. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999, p. 20.   156
knowledge of the construction and workings of the Internet, the higher the potential 
value it represents. The level of education and technical expertise of a user will also 
play a role in determining the network utility of the Internet, both for the individual 
user, and as a measure of the total value of the network for other users. The 
environment the Internet manifests in will also influence its utility value. This is in 
part a function of determining the number of users or nodes on the whole network, 
but also the goods and services that are available through the network. Cultware 
determines the circumstances of the interface between the on screen Invisible 
Empire, and the off screen analogue world that the individual user inhabits. Cultware 
will influence the impact and availability of the other three elements of network 
utility. 
 
The growth in processing power and the development of the World Wide Web have 
both served to drive the levels of network Utility derived from hardware and 
software. This can be seen reflected in the rapid growth of the Internet, particularly 
in the past decade since the development and adoption of the World Wide Web. 
However as outlined in Chapter Two ‘Internet Access’ both network utility and 
access are limited by the weakest factor in the matrix of access. The growth in the 
penetration of the network has begun to taper off in mature markets, particularly the 
United States as illustrated by the Pew Internet and American Life project research   157
 
Figure 32 
Slowing of Internet Growth in the United States 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=106&Section=ReportLevel1&Field=Level1I
D&ID=463 
[accessed 29.4.2004] 
 
This slow in growth now needs to be understood in terms of the limits placed on the 
network, and through those limitations the point at which the event horizon of access 
is reached, by cultware and wetware, by the limits of cultural capital and literacy that 
are required for access. The Internet can be seen to have now reached the majority of 
the population who meet these requirements and has hit the border of those who do 
not. 
 
These factors will limit both access to the network and the utility of the network once 
access has been achieved. The value of the Internet, related to all four elements of   158
this network utility, needs to be understood in terms of what is actually available 
through the medium. The utility value of connection to the Internet for any individual 
will be determined by what type of network value can be extracted through that 
connection in terms of both its physical characteristics and also an individual’s 
capacity to make use of that connection. The total value of the network and all the 
connected users is of little consequence if a person can only access a relatively small 
area of the Internet.
25 The level of information, goods and services that can 
potentially be accessed through the Internet will determine what type of connection 
an individual will need to access the Internet at its fullest utility, and this can thus be 
seen as an important determinant for the ability to extract maximum value from the 
whole network. The delivery of these goods and services is also limited by a user’s 
geographic location and this will impact ability to access the full network value, for 
that individual.  
 
Utilisation of the network is also limited and enhanced through a user’s 
understanding of the cultware, the context in which the Invisible Empire interfaces 
with the analogue world. There are many artefacts and literacies that can influence 
the value of this interface. A colleague of mine managed to keep themselves 
employed for six months by being a full time Internet Gambler. Far from a some 
digital version of the Maverick brothers, they exploited the fact that most online 
casinos provide new players with a starting ‘stake’ in order to encourage them to join 
up. Once they have the credit card details necessary to create an account, they 
provide their client with some money already in their account. My colleague would 
                                                 
25 I have four computers networked within my apartment. Only two people live there. The ability to 
make effective use of the fourth connection was limited to a point where it made very little impact on 
the total value of the network.   159
use this money and cash out any winnings, taking advantage of a wallet full of credit 
cards, and the large volume of different online venues offering this similar service to 
make up for the fact that he did not always win anything with this initial money at 
any one casino. Eventually having reached the end of the online casino strip with 
each of his credit cards26 he was forced to return to the more conventional workforce. 
In this case he was able to exploit his high level of literacy in this particular area to 
generate a reasonable income, albeit a non-sustainable one.  
 
Figure 33 
Maverick 
http://www.tvtome.com/tvtome/servlet/ShowMainServlet/showid-1020/ 
[accessed 18.1.2005] 
 
In this case, the importance of credit cards in enabling online transactions is 
confirmed. While the hardware of the credit card itself is little more than a piece of 
plastic and the software it contains is little more than a person’s name and a set of 
numbers, the cultware required to enable its role in financial transactions is where the 
majority of its utility is stored. Without the cultware environment provided by access 
to a credit card, areas of the network move outside of access to a particular gateway, 
and the network utility that can be utilised is reduced. 
                                                 
26 For the casinos each credit card represents a different virtual gambler.   160
 
Changing Conditions 
There are different measures of Internet growth that have been used over time. The 
measures used reflect the changing nature of the way that the Internet is thought of 
and understood. While some commentators have measured the actual flow of data,
27 
most of these measures of growth have focused on the interface between the Internet 
and the people who use it. One of the original measures of the growth and size of the 
Internet focused on the number of host computers connected. As the Internet moved 
out of the exclusive realm of academia and government and into more general use, 
measures of the Internet moved to focus on the number of people who had used, or 
had connection to the Internet. Then, with an increased focus on commercialisation 
of the Internet much attention focused on the growing amount of economic activity 
online, both between businesses and between businesses and consumers. These 
changes over time in measures can be illustrated in the following statements:  
The number of host computers on the Internet has been increasing tenfold 
every three or four years since 1982.
28  
 
Within Australia, Internet access was at 1.6 million households or 23% of all 
households as of August 1999, and expected to be at one third of all 
households by the end of 2000.
29  
 
                                                 
27 Mike O’Dell estimated the number of ‘bytes in flight’ or information in transit through cables at 
any point as being between five and ten gigabytes. D. Weinberger, Small Pieces Loosely Joined: A 
Unified Theory of the Web. Cambridge USA: Perseus Publishing, 2002, p. 19. 
http://www.smallpieces.com/content/chapter1.html [accessed 13.7.2004]. 
28 A. Colecchia, & A. Wyckoff, The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce.  
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1999, p. 9. 
29 ‘One Third of Australia Online by Xmas 2000’, Press release, Senator The Hon Ian Campbell 24
th 
December 1999. http://www.dcita.gov.au/nsapi-graphics/?Mival=dca_dispdoc&ID=4742 [accessed 
21.6.2004]. As it turns out by November 2000 37% of Australian Households had access to the 
Internet, however there were significant regional variations. The Current State of Play May 2001. 
National Office of the Information Economy. 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/progress/ie%5Fstats/csop%5Fjune2001/readiness/readine
ss1.htm [accessed 31.3.2003].   161
Internet-based electronic commerce was valued worldwide at AU$55-80 
billion in 1998, and is expected to rise to between AU$1.4 and AU$3.2 trillion 
by 2003.
30  
 
All these measures are valid. They serve to illustrate the change from ‘how many 
computers?’ to ‘how many people?’ to ‘how much money?’ Questions of ‘why’ and 
modes of exclusion that are masked by languages of progress, development and 
growth are more difficult to reveal.  
 
This growth in the size of the network tracks growth in both the total value of the 
network and the amount of that value that can be easily accessed by an individual. 
The development of the World Wide Web, by reducing the level of wetware required 
to access the Internet made it accessible to a greater number of users. This in turn 
increased the value of the total network, attracting still more users. While this was 
occurring the continued rapid development of hardware, and the capacity to support 
more complex software further increased both the total network value and the ability 
of users to access that value and correspondingly attracted more users. However the 
rapid growth in the proportion of the population online is starting to taper off.31 Up 
until this point the network has been able to attract users who have the prerequisite 
wetware and cultware to enable them to access sufficient network utility, a 
population that grew as a result of the lower literacy requirement allowed for by the 
development of the World Wide Web. This drop in the growth of Internet penetration 
indicates the end of expansion throughout this population. This raises questions 
                                                 
30 Ernst & Young and Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Removing Barriers: Creating the Environment of 
Trust, Confidence and Acceptance of Online Services: Draft Report for Comment. Perth: Department 
of Commerce and Trade. 1999, p. 5. 
31 M. Madden & L Rainie, America’s Online Pursuits: The Changing Picture of Who’s Online and 
What They Do Pew Internet & American Life Project. 22
nd February 2003. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=106&Section=ReportLevel1&Field=Level1I
D&ID=463 [accessed 29.4.2004].   162
about the consequences for those left outside the gates of the Invisible Empire. New 
measures are needed. The focus must now turn from the rapid growth of those with 
access, to the conditions of those that are excluded and the consequence of that 
exclusion. 
 
While it is possible to talk of the network’s total value, for each node, or each user, 
there will be different constraints on the network utility, a greater or lesser value that 
can be potentially obtained from the network. The Invisible Empire needs to be 
understood in the context of all these variables. It is not just the protocols and 
communicative capacity of the Internet as a network, but the information, goods and 
services that are available through the Internet that make up this Digital Empire. The 
environment in which it manifests, the level of cultware at a given manifestation of 
Empire determines the value of the network as much as the bandwidth available. 
Crucially there will be a point at which the network utility is reduced to zero by a 
failure in any one of the four aspects of this value, an event horizon, or point at 
which no network utility can be accessed, exists potentially in hardware, software, 
wetware and cultware. 
 
The Invisible Empire does not exist within an isolated space on the screen. It 
interfaces with the analogue world through a number of different mechanisms. While 
the network was originally conceived a space to support academic and military 
research, the growth of the Internet outside this community and into wider society 
led to the adoption of the medium as a space for commercial activity. However the 
traditional exchange of commodities through commerce is transformed in the digital 
environment. The consequences of this transformation, like the value and growth of   163
the network, form the foundations of an investigation into the nature of the Invisible 
Empire. 
 
Welcome to the Digital Economy 
 
Figure 34 
The Marketplace at Pontoise by Ludovic Piette, (1826-77) 
http://www.arthistory.cc/auth/piette/  
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
 
The feudal marketplace was an area set aside for the exchange of goods and produce. 
Buyers and sellers could meet at a specified place, often on specified days, to come 
together and engage in commerce. Over time the terminology has come to represent 
a more abstracted principle of the exchange of goods and services. As capitalism has 
colonised the Internet, the notion of the marketplace has increasingly become an 
essential part of the discussion. This has paralleled the rise of electronic commerce as 
a focus of Internet related analysis and the broader tendency to view the world in 
primarily economic terms. While the traditional marketplace was the common area 
set aside for the exchange of produce in small communities, it has come to represent   164
the ‘space’ in which goods and services are exchanged in the economy. While the 
Internet can act in a way that is analogous to traditional markets and to some extent 
merely tracks the increasing abstraction of these institutions from their village square 
roots through to the complex and abstracted modern electronically mediated financial 
markets, increasingly removed from any actual goods or services, the process of 
digitisation transforms the construction of commodities. The way that economic 
resources are generated and stored in a digital environment is a significant departure 
from the analogue world. 
 
Figure 35 
ASX 
http://abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1285061.htm  
[accessed 18.5.2005] 
 
The digital economy is distinct from its counterpart off screen, yet there are 
similarities and links between the digital and analogue environments that form an 
essential part of any analysis. Jean Baudrillard, in Simulacra and Simulations, stated: 
No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept; no more 
imaginary coextensivity: rather, genetic miniaturization is the dimension of 
simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, 
memory banks and command models – and with these it can be reproduced an 
indefinite number of times. It no longer has to be rational, since it is no longer 
measured against some ideal or negative instance. It is nothing more than 
operational. In fact, since it is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no   165
longer real at all. It is a hyperreal: the product of an irradiating synthesis of 
combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere.
 32 
 
While Baudrillard was concerned with the ‘real’ being removed from the real world 
and replaced with the Simulacra that did not represent (even) images of the real, in 
the digital political economy the concern is more with how notions of the ‘real’ 
impact on the digital world consisting entirely of simulations and simulacra.
33 The 
digital economy in the context of this discussion encases the goods and services 
produced and consumed through the Internet. As such, the focus is on information, 
what it consists of, who owns it, and how it is manipulated. The Internet produces 
both goods and services, and has property, and in so far as that is true, it can be seen 
to be analogous to the off screen economy. Similarly much of the struggle between 
different factions of the digital world, is a struggle over how the goods, service and 
property, the wealth of the economy, are distributed, who controls the information 
and how the digital economy is constructed. 
 
This discussion focuses on the role of goods and services and the nature of the 
software or more accurately information, of which they all consist, as these are what 
are produced ‘in cyberspace’. The features of digital property are discussed in the 
following chapter on digital sovereignty. However at the core of the discussion is 
how wealth is distributed and maintained throughout the digital economy. Marx 
observed in Capital: 
                                                 
32 M. Poster (ed), Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 
pp.166-184. accessed at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html 
[4.9.2003]. 
33 The representation, as a middling translator between the real and the simulacra is no longer present 
in the digital environment.   166
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. 
Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.
 34 
 
In the context of the digital economy, these metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties are transformed and amplified from their analogue contemporaries in Marx’s 
analysis. When goods are produced for the Internet, what is actually occurring is that 
new pieces of software, and/or content are being produced. In this case, software is 
distinguished from content in that it is designed to manipulate content or hardware in 
some way, as opposed to content, which is generated primarily as information. This 
makes them quite different from the Marxist conceptualisation of goods or 
commodities, ideas are different to factories; they can be easily copied, at no cost. In 
addition many of the secondary costs of production do not occur online, there is no 
pollution, the workforce does not need to be housed and fed, these costs will 
manifest off screen. The costs to the Internet associated with the production of goods 
are the storage to host them, the bandwidth to transport them and the maintenance of 
the network. When you make a movie the sets, staff and actors are all off screen, yet 
once it is digitised and online it becomes a new object of value on the Internet. A 
similar situation emerges with services. 
 
While the construction of software is the most obvious transformation within the 
digital economy, this cannot be taken out of the context of hardware, wetware and 
cultware. It is a common mistake to view wetware as being analogous to software, 
viewing both as operating systems. However software is quite separate in its 
characteristics from wetware, which is in turn more akin to hardware. Software, once 
                                                 
34 K. Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production Volume 1, 4th Edition, USA: 
International Publishers Co, 1947, p. 41. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-
c1/ch01.htm [accessed 14.6.2005].   167
devised, can be replicated an infinite number of times at effectively no cost. By 
contrast wetware takes a long time to develop and can only be replicated by 
following the same process of production from scratch, similarly hardware, while 
rapidly growing in capacity needs to be manufactured for each application it is 
required to fill, both share a constant cost of production.
35 It takes wetware to 
produce software, but software can also facilitate wetware development. Cultware is 
the social and technological environment, the access to other wetware at the end of 
any network of hardware and software. A telephone network is only as useful as the 
sum of the others that can be contacted on it. Cultware encompasses the literacy and 
adoption of technology by a particular population. Cultware is the context in which 
the other three elements come together.  
 
A useful analogy is the work of a carpenter making a house. The carpenter’s tools 
and equipment represent the hardware, the software is represented in the building 
plans and the wetware is the knowledge and experience built up in the brain of the 
carpenter. While the plans could be photocopied and used by many carpenters at the 
same time, the individual carpenter can only do one job at once, whether it be 
building a house, teaching an apprentice, or working on new designs. The apprentice 
is taught both by the wetware of the carpenter and through looking at existing 
designs and buildings, or software. The context of this construction, where the house 
is located, the availability of resources, the social world in which the carpenter and 
apprentice exist, are all functions of cultware.  
 
                                                 
35 P. LaBarre, ‘Not your Father’s Economist’, Industry Week. 2
nd May, 1996.   168
The digitised environment represented by the Internet is a vast store of potential 
social and cultural capital manifest in the wetware of other users and the software or 
content that is available through the network. This grouping of resources and the 
synergy within that grouping of different resources is made available as a function of 
cultware. To access this capital requires a variety of literacies, an understanding the 
technology, the hardware and software of the Internet, also literacy in interaction 
with others through the medium and finally an understanding of how the 
environment operates and where the resources can be found. All literacies are 
wetware. They require time and capital to be invested in each individual to develop.  
 
The constancy of production of both hardware and wetware, and the ability of 
software, including in this context pretty much any form of digitised content, to be 
copied, an infinite number of times at relatively low cost, but only once the initial 
effort to produce it has been undertaken, were two of the major features of this type 
of economy. In the context of the digital political economy, there are a number of 
additional features that set this digitised area apart from the more traditional ideas of 
economic production, ownership and wealth off screen.  
 
When copying digital information, there is no deprivation to the original owner. This 
is different to stealing a car, in which case while the thief now has access to it, this 
access is at the expense and exclusion of the previous owner. Additionally, whenever 
a viewing of digitised information takes place, a copy is made of it. Off screen, a 
person can attend an art gallery and enjoy the artwork while they leave with the 
knowledge of having seen the artwork, they do not leave with a copy. When 
someone takes a virtual tour through the same gallery on their computer, they are   169
necessarily downloading copies of those images, at very least on to their screen, but 
most likely also on to some static memory in the device that they are using to take 
the virtual tour. Similarly, the difference between Internet radio stations and their off 
screen counterparts is that a copy of the music played by an Internet based radio 
station is sent to the listener’s computer and then interpreted and played, rather than 
a radio receiver providing access to a transitory radio signal, which while it could be 
copied, does not have to be in order to listen. In the digital world online the very act 
of observation creates a new copy of what is observed. Without the Internet, some 
listeners would never hear the Australian national youth station Triple J’s top 100 
songs, voted by their listeners, on Australia day each year. The extra distribution of a 
radio signal over the Internet potentially adds value to any advertising. However 
advertising revenue goes to the station, rather than to the copyright holders of the 
songs, who require a measurable, geographic area, ideally within a single political 
jurisdiction, to allow for the extraction of their royalty payments from the radio 
stations, and through them the advertisers. This is further complicated by this 
specific situation where Triple J, part of the public broadcasting network in Australia 
gains no commercial benefit from advertising. 
 
Once ideas are ‘out’ on the net, they are hard to destroy, shield, hide or ‘bring back’. 
This is a function of the nature of digitisation – there is no discernable ‘original’. 
Once an idea has a wide circulation it cannot be unlearned from society. Thus if one 
copy of a digitised movie is available on the Internet and if there is interest in it, that 
copy will rapidly multiply. Trying to regain exclusive ownership of that idea will 
become virtually impossible. Similarly digital property is of limited point in 
destroying for the same reason. It may be possible to blow up someone’s house, but   170
in the digital political economy where a copy can be made of the house next door for 
no cost or production time, this has a great deal less effect.
36 Within the Internet, and 
in particular when talking about the digital economy, there is a conflict between the 
notions of information exchange as a way of communicating, such as might be found 
in a conversation between two people off screen, and information as a copyrighted 
product, such as an off screen artist’s painting. 
 
Information plays multiple roles on the Internet, in the digital political economy, it is 
simultaneously a currency and an interface.
37 As a currency, it holds the value of the 
digital economy. The value of this economy however rests in the notion of copyright. 
That is the right of the author of any piece of work to control the right to copy it. 
Thus they can charge others for the right to have a copy of their work; they can also 
sell or rent this right to others (such as a publisher, or record company). However in 
the digital world, the act of observation is also the act of copying.  
 
The first laws relating to copyright come from England in the Statute of Anne of 
1710 (the 1709 Copyright Act),38 which gave the holder of the rights to a printed 
work exclusive rights for fourteen years with a further extension of fourteen years if 
the author was still alive. The length of copyright protection has subsequently grown. 
The Bern convention of 1928 on International Copyright grants copyright protection 
                                                 
36 It is however possible to deny access to ‘property’, at least in the short term, such as through a 
denial of service attack on a web site. 
37 While the idea of information as a literacy is also a popular understanding of the term, within the 
framework of wetware, software, and hardware, the development and understanding of a literacy falls 
more into the realm of wetware, as it will have a constancy of production for each additional unit 
(individual) that develops that literacy. 
38 L. Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity. New York: Penguin, 2004, p. 86.   171
to a publication for the lifetime of the author and fifty years after their death.
39 After 
this time the work will be considered to have no restriction for its copy and 
distribution.
40  
 
The United States congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 
1998. This law increased the length of copyright in that country by a further twenty 
years to a total of seventy years following the death of the author, and between 
seventy five and ninety five years for the productions of a corporation.
41 The recent 
‘free trade’ agreement between Australia and the United States will see Australian 
copyright law similarly extended to ‘harmonise’ the intellectual property laws 
between the two countries. As the musical group Negativeland noted of the impact of 
this extension: 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act's extension of copyright to 75 
years plus the life of the creator means that NOTHING created in our lifetime 
will ever reach the public domain.
 42 
 
Copyright is an entirely socially constructed value. It only has value if people 
(consumers) give it that value. If everyone just ignored to ‘rights’ of the producers 
then those producers would cease to derive value from their creations. Owning ideas 
is not like owing apples. While both an apple and an idea can be locked in a box and 
no one can access them, in this case both are deprived of the realisation of their 
value. The value of the apple is the eating. The value of the idea in a copyrighted 
world is that it can be sold (or denied) to others. Once the apple is eaten, it is gone, 
                                                 
39 The Rome Copyright Convention. 1928, Article 6 (1). 
40 Long-lived authors get more value for their work, than those who die early. 
41 S. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it 
Threatens Creativity. New York: NYU Press, 2001. 
42 Negativeland, ‘Negativeland Statement in Support of Peer to Peer File Sharing’, 
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20020121_negativland_essay.html [accessed 
21.6.2004].   172
however once a copyright, for one copy is sold, then it relies on the social 
construction, a law agreed to by society and individual citizens, to prevent that idea 
simply being endlessly recopied with no return to the copyright holder. On the 
Internet, where communication necessarily creates copies of what is being said to all 
participants and observers, these laws of copyright conflict with other socially 
constructed laws allowing free communication between members of a society. The 
struggle on the Internet then becomes one of who controls the law and process of 
copying and distributing that software and content (ideas) which are ultimately just 
patterns of 0s and 1s. 
 
These consumers of the digital economy’s products face the dilemma that they 
maximise their individual return if all information is freely distributed, while at the 
same time they benefit from the production of new information, which might be 
hampered if the producers did not receive a return for this production. These 
different groups of producers and consumers of the wealth of the digital political 
economy often have an overlapping membership. An individual digital citizen may 
belong to a variety of these groups. They each have a different ideal position on how 
free or proprietous information should be in the digital political economy, and 
different levels of access to, and influence over, political power to try to enforce their 
own discourse of digital citizenship. How the struggle for control of information, in 
terms of how it is understood as either a good that you own, or as a place where 
communication occurs, is resolved, will determine economic relations within the 
digital political economy. In the traditional Marxist analysis, the control of the means 
of production was the basis of power and domination. In the digital economy it is 
who defines how information and communications is commodified in each instance.   173
This information is both the means of communication as well as the currency of 
digital value. The control of the digital political economy sits enmeshed with the 
Internet as a mode of communications and neither analysis can be extracted from the 
other. In the flow of information, communication and content, cannot be separated.  
 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon famously argued in his 1840 treaties What is Property? that 
‘property is theft’,
43 that owning property deprived others of its use and therefore 
was akin to stealing.
44 This argument could be far more forcefully made about 
copyright. Traditionally governments have tried to balance the incentive to create 
ideas, especially the wide ranging and expensive ones that make up large software 
platforms and applications as well as many entertainment products and the return to 
authors and artists (and their publicists and publishers) against the value to society of 
the free exchange of ideas and information. As Paul Romer noted: 
We produce goods by rearranging physical objects, but so do other animals, 
often with remarkable precision. Birds build nests, bees build hives, and we 
build guns and cars…. Where people excel as economic animals is in their 
ability to produce ideas, not just physical goods. An ant will go through its life 
without ever coming up with even a slightly different idea about how to gather 
food. But people are almost incapable of this kind of rote adherence to 
instruction. We are incurable experimenters and problem solvers. 45  
 
The idea kept in a box to protect it from others copying has no value, yet all 
members of society are richer for good ideas that are distributed freely. Also as the 
cost of access to information increases the inequalities caused by those who are 
                                                 
43 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is property? Edited and translated by D. R. Kelley and B. G. Smith, 
Cambridge, England and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id=ProProp.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&p
art=1&division=div2 [accessed 14.6.2005]. 
44 Although this was part of his argument, it was not, as is often believed, his conclusion. Instead 
Proudhon viewed private property ultimately as the foundation of liberty. 
45 P. Romer, ‘Ideas and Things’, The Economist, 11
th September 1993. As cited in R. Florida, The 
Rise of the Creative Class. North Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia, 2003.   174
excluded from the information on economic grounds expand. These two conflicting 
notions of the value of the free flow and distribution of ideas to society at large, and 
the importance of the property rights of the creators, or more accurately owners of 
ideas is at the centre of the debate between competing discourses of citizenship on 
the Internet.
46 A second feature of the dichotomy of the free flow of ideas and 
content as opposed to the reward for the creators of those ideas is that many ideas 
rely on the foundation of other previous intellectual constructions. Isaac Newton 
famously said of his work in physics that ‘If I have seen further it is by standing on 
the shoulders of giants.’47 Intellectual property is often built on the foundation laid 
by other intellectual work.  
 
William Shakespeare based his famous play Romeo and Juliet, written around 1594, 
upon a poem by Arthur Brooke The Traicall Historye of Romeus and Juliet written in 
1562. 
 
Figure 36 
The Introduction to Brooke’s Poem  
http://www.chatham-nj.org/coin/English9/Patel/Arthur%20Brooke%20web.htm  
[accessed 5.5.2005] 
                                                 
46 The BBC’s use of the Internet to distribute the content it has created demonstrates how valuable 
the Internet can be as a vehicle to distribute information throughout society, especially when the 
exploitation of the value of copyright was not the purpose of, or funding for, the information’s 
development in the first place. 
47 In a letter to fellow scientist Robert Hooke on the 5
th February 1676, although the quote has also 
been attributed to Benjamin Franklin and Bernard of Chartes.   175
 
The tale of Brooke’s poem can trace its origin back to the writings of Xenophon in 
the second century AD. Xenophon’s story was modified in 1476 by Massusccio 
Salernitano added the names of the Montague and Capulet Families whose feud is at 
the heart of the story. In 1530 Luigi Da Porta introduced the setting of the story as 
fair Verona, and it was the retelling of the story again by Matteo Bandello in 1554 
that seems to have been the inspiration for Brooke’s poem.48 Brooke notes the 
derivative nature of his work in his introduction the reader.  
Though I saw the same argument lately set forth on stage with more 
commendation than I can look for – being there much better set forth than I 
have or can do – yet the same matter penned as it is may serve to like good 
effect, if the readers do bring with them like good minds to consider it, which 
hath the more encouraged me to publish it, such as it is. 49 
 
More recently the story was retold as the West Side Story in 1957 by Leonard 
Bernstein and again in 1996 in the Baz Lurman produced film, William 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.50 
                                                 
48 J. K Andrews, ‘Romeo and Juliet: Out of Old Cloth’, The Shakespeare Theatre. 
http://www.shakespearedc.org/pastprod/romessay.html [accessed 10.7.2005]. 
49 A. Brooke, The Traicall Historye of Romeus and Juliet.  
http://www.clicknotes.com/romeo/brooke/Bttr.html [accessed 5.5.2005]. 
50 Other film versions of the story were released in 1936, 1954, 1966, and twice in 1968. 
http://www.romeoandjuliet.com/author/films.html [accessed 6.5.2005].   176
 
 
 
Figure 37 
William Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, 1996 
http://www.romeoandjuliet.com/ 
[accessed 3.2.2005] 
 
Plays and stories derived and reinterpreted from others sources are not always 
subject to copyright, although Shakespeare’s plays would often be poached and 
republished as ‘Bad Quartos’. However the generation of digital content is often 
based on the use of other digital content. To write this thesis required the use of a 
word processor and computer operating system. Patent and copyright law is designed 
to find a balance between the reward to the generator of the content and the value of 
the idea to be both freely distributed through society and used as a building block for 
new creations.  
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Ironically, as the social structures undergo what Paul Virilio has termed acceleration 
of culture,51 and the production and transmission of ideas grows, the ability to use 
other’s ideas as building blocks of new constructions is reduced. As both patents and 
copyright laws more generally extend the exclusive use of ideas to the person who 
creates them, and exclude all derivative use. This process is accelerated and 
exacerbated online. The entire structure of the World Wide Web came into being 
only in 1991. All copyrighted content in that medium will therefore be subject to 
complete control of the producer until 2066. How much of this material will be a 
valuable addition to the public domain, given the continued rapid development of 
technology is questionable. In this context the value of Tim Berners-Lee’s decision 
to release the World Wide Web directly into the public domain, with no copyright 
restrictions can be seen in its appropriate context.52  
 
The Digital Self 
Sherry Turkle’s famous book Life on The Screen: Identity in The Age of The 
Internet53 was first published in 1995, a time when the World Wide Web was still a 
relatively new development, particularly in terms of popular cultural awareness. The 
Internet, while rapidly growing, had still not yet reached a 30% household 
penetration rate in the United States. In this context Turkle’s work looked at the 
construction of identity and how the computers and the Internet mediated and 
transformed this construction. Turkle did not see context in terms that require 
                                                 
51 P. Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. Translated by M. Polizzotti, New York: 
Columbia University, 1986. 
52 T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide 
Web. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999. 
53 S. Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in The Age of The Internet, New York: Simon & Schuster 
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intervention, regulation and change to emerge, the focus was on the screen and those 
with access, rather than the broader construction of the Invisible Empire. While, at 
the time, the disabled having cybersex online may have seemed empowering, the 
failure to intervene on behalf of Rose Boulding points to more important issues that 
need to be addressed in the contemporary information and telecommunication 
environment, particularly at the level of policy. 
 
The Invisible Empire while manifesting on screen through the gates of empire, also 
reaches through to influence the off screen world. So too an individual user of the 
Internet will have different aspects of their self manifest off and on screen. On 
screen, the self is fragmented into many discrete digital identities that together 
construct the digital self. 
Neo: Right now we’re inside a computer program? 
Morpheus: Is it really so hard to believe? Your clothes are different, the plugs 
in your arms and head are gone, your hair has changed. Your appearance now 
is what we call residual self-image; it is the mental projection of your digital 
self.54  
 
Rather than the Avatar representing a single and complete digital self through 
cyberspace the individual presents a variety of digital identities through different 
applications on the Internet. In each case, these identities represent separate 
politicised selves. At its most simple level, this is what happens when typing ‘I’ in an 
email; the act of writing creates a projected self. It is the collection of all these digital 
identities that comprises the digital self.  
                                                 
54 The Matrix. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner Bros, 1999.   179
 
Figure 38 
Nokia Advertisement
55 
 
Some of these digital identities are closely aligned to an individual off screen and 
easily attached or attributed to that individual, such as when an email or SMS is sent 
from one person to another with whom they have an existing off screen/analogue 
relationship. Other digital identities are more distant and the link less strong, such as 
when a web page is customised based on a user’s history of visits. Still others will be 
quite distantly related to the off screen self, such as when posting messages 
anonymously on a bulletin board, or entering Internet chat rooms using an alias. In 
                                                 
55 This advertisement appeared in Ralf Magazine, Sydney: ACP Publishing, February 2004.   180
these cases, much of the link between the digital identity and individual are left 
behind, or substantially hidden, including notions or class, race and even gender.
56 
While the increasing convergence of technology is leading to a greater use, both in 
terms of frequency and potency, of the digital self, there will continue to be a 
variance in the level of divergence between the different aspects of the digital and off 
screen self. 
 
It is possible to map out an individual’s digital self, monitoring the collection of their 
various digital identities displaced through time and space, with differing 
implications and association with the off screen identity of the digital self. When a 
landline call is made either to or from the person, their identity can be mapped both 
in the projected location where the call is received and where it originates. This 
mapping produces a different signature, depending on whether the call was outgoing 
or incoming; it may be further dispersed in space if it is a conference call. The link to 
the individual’s off screen identity will be quite a strong one. In time this type of 
digital identity interaction would have a definite and concurrent start and end.
57 
When a call is made to a mobile phone, the interaction may move through space at 
one or both ends of the connection. Once again, there will be a discrete and parallel 
                                                 
56 Operation Innocent Images was a FBI sting operation launched in 1995 designed to catch 
paedophiles, by having agents pretend to be young teenage girls in Internet chat rooms. The problem 
was that the FBI agents, both male and female were unfamiliar with the popular culture and unique 
communication style of that demographic. However after bringing in a number of girls in that age 
group from a local high school to train them, they were able to successfully adapt these identities. The 
program has lead to the arrest of 2200 people across the United States for swapping child 
pornography, and arranging to meet minors for sex. This illustrates that new identities, unrelated to a 
person off screen, can be adopted, but they may require training to achieve. ‘What about Justin 
Timberlake? Is he still hot, or is that so two years ago?’  
P. Ly, ‘Girls teach teen cyber gab to FBI Agents’, The Washington Post 4
th June 2003.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A10052-
2003Jun3&notFound=true [accessed 20.6.2005]. 
57 Although in the case of a voice mail message it would be similar to an email, with a time sent and 
a time received.   181
existence in time of the connection at both ends. Each application that acts to project 
a digital identity produces a different type of signature on this digital identity map, 
and differing appearances in time. When an email is sent, it ‘interfaces’ with off 
screen and creates a mapped signature at the time it is sent, and then again later each 
time it is received. A short message service creates two related signatures separated 
in time. It is sent, and then received. A web page creates a signature at the point in 
time and space when it is first uploaded, and then each time it is viewed. In this latter 
case, the relationship to the person who first created the page may become quite 
distant. 
 
To develop a complete map of an individual’s digital self, it is necessary to map the 
various discrete identities through time and space, as well as by application. When 
mapping an individual’s digital self in space, there is a small signal for each point in 
space. Through all these applications, there are different effects on those creating 
content and those receiving it (the audience). There will be distinct impacts on 
resources, space, time, the level of activity involved and identity to both these 
entities depending on the application.   182
 
Content Creator 
  Resources Space Time  Active/Passive  Address/Identity 
Application          
Face to face  None  Present in space  Present in time 
Active involvement 
at time 
Yes, Audience will 
have a physical 
identification with 
Content Creator 
Landline-Voice 
telephony 
Phone line (mobile or 
landline), phone number of 
Audience 
Present in remote 
space 
Present in time, 
unless accessing 
voice mail 
Active involvement 
at time 
Sometimes, 
depending on caller 
ID, and type of 
content (what the 
Content Creator tells 
the Audience on the 
phone) 
Mobile Phone-
Voice telephony 
Phone line (mobile or 
landline), phone number of 
Audience 
Present in remote 
space 
Present in time, 
unless accessing 
voice mail 
Active involvement 
at time 
Sometimes, 
depending on caller 
ID, and type of 
content (what the 
Content Creator tells 
the Audience on the 
phone) 
Short Message 
Service 
SMS transmitter, normally 
a mobile phone, but it can 
be through a computer and 
Internet gateway, Phone 
number of recipient 
Present in remote 
space 
Not present at 
time  Active in sending 
Not necessarily, can 
be blocked 
Email 
Email address and some 
way to send from it. 
Address of recipient(s)  Not present 
Present to send, 
but not at the 
time or reception Active in sending 
Normally, can be 
blocked with difficulty 
Web Page – Static 
Simple skills with web page 
design and posting  Not present 
not present in 
time (only had to 
be present to 
post it) 
Passive once 
posted 
The web page will 
require an address, 
the content producer 
is anonymous 
Web Page - Real 
Time Event 
Real time Internet feed, 
data casting technology 
Present at location of 
information transition  Present in time  Active in sending 
The web page will 
require an address, 
the content producer 
is anonymous 
Web Page - Mass 
Customisation 
Complex data system, 
customer analysis and 
memory Not  present 
Creator not 
present in time 
Passive once 
created 
The web page will 
require an address, 
the content producer 
is anonymous 
TV/Radio 
Transmission device and 
content to transmit 
Present at remote 
space  Present in time  Active 
Frequency of 
transmission 
becomes the address
Figure 39 
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Audience 
  Resources Space Time  Active/Passive  Address/Identity 
Application          
Face to face  None  Present in Space  Present in time 
Active involvement 
at time 
Yes, Content Creator 
will have a physical 
identification with the 
Audience 
Landline-Voice 
telephony  Landline phone line  Present at phone 
Present in time, 
unless accessing 
voice mail 
Active involvement 
at time 
The address is only 
for the location, not 
the person 
Mobile Phone-
Voice telephony  Mobile Phone 
Present at 'any' 
location 
Present in time, 
unless accessing 
voice mail 
Active involvement 
at time 
Address is the phone 
number, but much 
more associated with 
the person than the 
landline 
Short Message 
Service  Mobile Phone 
No necessarily 
present, can be at 
'any' location when 
message is received 
Not present at 
time  Passive reception 
Address is the phone 
number, but again 
associated with the 
person  
Email 
Email address and some 
way to access it 
Any location (although 
the location will need 
some way to receive 
emails) 
Not present at 
time Passive  reception 
Will require email 
address 
Web Page – Static 
Address of site, computer 
with Internet and web 
Access 
Any location (although 
the location will need 
some way to receive 
web pages)  At their leisure 
Active, must seek 
out content  None 
Web Page - Real 
Time Event 
Address of site, computer 
with Internet and web 
Access 
Any location (although 
the location will need 
some way to receive 
web pages)  Present in time 
Active, must seek 
out content  None 
Web Page - Mass 
Customisation 
Address of site, computer 
with Internet and web 
Access 
Any location (although 
the location will need 
some way to receive 
web pages)  Present in time 
Active, must seek 
out content 
Yes, their identity is 
determined by the 
system in order to 
create customised 
content 
TV/Radio  A reception device  Any location  Present in time  Passive  None 
Figure 40 
Audience and Different Applications 
 
Applications on the Internet interface with off screen identities and ideologies. A 
small signature for each person viewing a web page that the ‘mapped’ individual had 
authored, a slightly different signal indicating where an email he or she had 
previously sent is being received and another again where that individual actually 
sends an email. A different signature also for each time an SMS is sent or received, 
and again for phone calls. Imaging this digital-signature spatial map moves it 
forward through time, so that these signatures appear and disappear, as they are 
engaged and disengaged. A hacker sending a worm out onto the Internet creates a 
wave of signatures, as each computer became infected and passed the worm along to   184
others. While many of the map’s features centre on the person being mapped, others 
will be widely dispersed through space. Similarly the effect on, and potency of, each 
of these signatures in relation to the mapped individual’s identity, both digital and off 
screen, will vary widely. For some individuals, such a map is highly complex. Each 
separate application is integrated with others, with multiple Web, email and phone 
signatures appearing and disappearing. By contrast, a map of another person’s digital 
self might reveal a few telephone calls isolated in time and moving little through 
space.  
 
A complete digital self exists only for the person that it represents. Other individuals 
on the screen encounter fragments of digital identities, only discrete parts of a whole 
identity. When others encounter this self, rather than as experience it as a whole, they 
will come into contact with it through interfacing with discrete digital identities.58 
Digital selves, other than your own, can only be experienced at the narrow interface 
of these identities. Two digital identity maps can be overlaid on each other to reveal 
where two on screen individuals come into contact with each other and at what point 
in both time and space the interface of their discrete and varied digital identities 
occurs and what type of association exists between these identities and the individual 
off screen. 
 
Mapping an individual’s digital identity through space and time in its entirety, once a 
digital identity reaches a certain level of sophistication, becomes virtually 
impossible. There are digital identities that become quite detached from the off 
                                                 
58 As noted above, for the digital gambler each credit card number represents a distinct identity.   185
screen self. It is impossible to track the location of every person who accesses a Web 
site, or reads a posting on a bulletin board. Reasonable approximation can be made.  
 
 
Figure 41 
Mapping Digital Identity. The Terrorism Information Awareness Program 
http://vilimpoc.org/research/datavis-tia/ 
[accessed 29.9.2003] 
This image represents the electronic transactions of an individual mapped in 
space as part of an illustration of what the Terrorism Information Awareness 
Program (formerly the Total Information Awareness Program) might be able to 
‘map’ about an individual.
59 
                                                 
59 http://vilimpoc.org/research/datavis-tia/ [accessed 22.9.2003].   186
 
Different individuals hold diverse levels of sophistication and control of their digital 
identity and distinct levels of awareness of each identity’s relationship to the 
individual off screen. Some individuals are better able to manipulate their digital 
identities and be more aware of the links between a particular digital identity and 
themselves off screen and how these can be manipulated. Similarly, the size or 
potency of the digital self, the size of their digital fingerprint, varies between 
individuals depending on their level of connectivity and digital literacy. 
 
While the digital self, through its various digital identities, is quite independent of 
the individual off screen, the digital self and an individual share a number of 
attributes. They generally have the same bank account, both will fear sanction from 
that state, such as fines or being sent to prison, and they will share personal 
relationships.
60 When an individual is googled
61 information is being gained about 
that person, by examining the aspects of their digital self that are more closely linked 
to their off screen identity. When a person is googled the search engine tries to link 
their name with their collection of digital identities associated with the person’s off 
screen name. While these may have been generated by the named individual others 
will not.
62  
                                                                                                                                          
 The Terrorist Information Awareness program is funded by DARPA, just like the early Internet. 
http://www.darpa.mil/iao/TIASystems.htm [accessed 13.6.2005]. 
60 A recent survey shows that just over half of respondents to a recent Internet survey thought that 
engaging in cybersex was being unfaithful to their partner. M. Benns, ‘Sex in cyberspace boom’ The 
Sydney Morning Herald. 27
th July 2003. 
61 Being ‘googled’ refers to searching for someone’s name on the Internet through the Google search 
engine. 
62 It is sometimes recommended that people Google themselves to keep track of their various digital 
signature.    187
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Figure 42 
Cartoon by Charles Barsotti, 28
th October 2002 
http://www.cartoonbank.com/ 
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
 
The digital self as well as the individual off screen can become the victim of a crime. 
These crimes can occur to both aspects of the identity, or independently to just the 
digital self or just the analogue off screen individual. Thus when a crime is 
committed against some property that both these ‘selves’ share, such as a bank 
account in the case of a digital theft or fraud, both will be affected. However crimes 
can also be committed against one aspect of the self, or one digital identity shard. If 
there can be a crime against this digital self then there is a sovereign citizen because 
criminals attack a regulated self. The next chapter takes up this argument and 
examines the role of the digital citizen in the construction of the digital deviant. 
                                                                                                                                          
D. Dasey, ‘A quick self-Google once a day to guard your reputation’, The Sun-Herald. 23
rd May 2004. 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/22/1085176043551.html [accessed 24.5.2004].   188
 
This section has provided a foundation for the construction of the Digital Empire. 
Chapter One, ‘History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal Service 
Obligation in Australia’ provided the history and context for the telecommunications 
environment in Australia. ‘The Gates of Empire’ then turned to the Invisible Empire 
and the understanding of access and exclusion that is manifest at the screen, the 
gateway to access. Finally this chapter has illustrated the effects of digitisation and 
the network that constructs the Invisible Empire. The next section turns to the 
Invisible Empire on the screen, how the self and sovereignty manifests and how 
power is exercised and distributed.   189
Chapter 4 
The Digital Citizen 
 
Figure 43 
Photography by Grant V. Faint1 
 
In the early 1990s, when the Internet was yet to make its full transition from the 
research and university community and into the wider population and popular 
cultural currency, there was a focus on the creation and study of behaviour inside 
MUDs and MOOs. MUD is an acronym that stood originally for Multi User 
Dungeon and then later Multi User Dimension, as they moved away from their role 
playing game roots. They originated as multi player games, in a text based 
environment where players could virtually interact with both the world and each 
                                                 
1 From the Cover of D. Petre & D. Harrington, The Clever Country: Australia’s Digital Future. 
Sydney: Pan Macmillian, 1996.   190
other. If a player in the game gave the command to swing their sword at the troll, 
other players would read a text description ‘Mike swings his sword at the troll’. 
While this was the origin, these environments soon became a place more for social 
(and sexual) activity for their participants. MOO stood for MUD Object Oriented 
where players could use programming language present that allowed players to better 
customise or alter and interact with parts of the virtual world.
2 
 
In March of 1993, there was an incident in LambdaMOO 
http://www.lambdamoo.info/, one of the most famous of these early environments, 
which was hosted on a computer at Xerox Corporation in the United States. In a 
common area of the virtual world (the Lounge), one of the characters present, named 
Mr_Bungle, took control of the description of the actions of another character 
present, Exu, and proceeded to describe them (the character Exu in this case was not 
gendered, although Mr_Bungle was gendered as a man) performing a variety of sex 
acts on his character. Soon after Mr_Bungle was expelled from the room. He then 
took control of a second character Moondreamer and proceeded to describe the two 
‘controlled’ characters performing a variety of unsavoury sex acts on each other and 
themselves. Eventually this came to an end when a senior player was able to lock 
Mr_Bungle in a virtual cage that ended his control over the description of the two 
character’s actions. Following this event, the whole MOO community was involved 
in a debate as to what should be done following this on screen digital ‘rape’ although 
only the controllers of the MOO (known as wizards) could in reality actually take 
                                                 
2 These type of games and places have now evolved and exist in a more multimedia focused 
environment on the Internet. Massively Multiplayer Online Role-playing Games (MMORPGs) such 
as Sony’s Everquest, and Lineage have hundreds of thousands of players, although many text based 
MUDs and MOOs still operate. The construction of MMORPGs is the focus of analysis in Chapter 
Six, ‘Core and Periphery: The Invisible Empire’.   191
any action. After a meeting called specifically to debate the issue, one of the game 
wizards made the unilateral decision to erase the Mr_Bungle account.3 
 
This now famous case revealed important questions about digital society – the 
notions of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, sovereignty and even economics 
that still have resonance in the current Internet environment. The characters involved 
illustrate a number of aspects of the digital self. The avatars of the players that 
existed in these environments were strongly related to a player’s off screen identity, 
yet only an individual fragment of the actual player’s identity. There are conflicting 
profiles of the characters involved, since the players of both Exu and Moondreamer 
more commonly appeared as the characters Legba and Starsinger.
4 Legba was off 
screen, a politically active female university student in Washington State, 
Moondreamer was a woman in Haverford Pennsylvania and Mr_Bungle was played 
by another university student, from New York. He returned to LambdaMOO soon 
after as a new character called Dr Jest, who, while not well liked was never expelled 
from the MOO. The device he used to take control of their characters, a program 
called a ‘Voodoo Doll’, was not uncommon in the MOO. No one was physically 
harmed, although the two people whose characters were attacked were upset by the 
incident. Mr_Bungle appeared virtually at the hostile meeting where his punishment 
was being discussed. The fact that the virtual representation of the New York student 
as Mr_Bungle could appear at this hostile meeting – where he was obviously in no 
physical danger – confirms the ambivalence, confusion and concerns raised by this 
                                                 
3 J. Dibbell, ‘A Rape In Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database Into a Society’, The Village Voice. 23
rd December 1993. 
3 R. Burnet & P. D. Marshall, Web Theory: An Introduction. London & New York: Routledge 2003 
4 Both these players possessed a large ‘wardrobe’ of these different digital identities.   192
incident. Each character was an individual digital identity of the people involved, an 
aspect of their total digital self, both on LambdaMOO and through the rest of their 
digital existence. The attack had been entirely on their digital self. The two women in 
question were given the email address of the player of Mr_Bungle in case they 
wanted to make a formal complaint to his university’s systems administrator. Neither 
did, but this event illustrates that the incident did have the potential to spill out of the 
digital world and have off screen consequences on Mr_Bungle’s player – his off 
screen self. 
 
To conclude this ambiguous and disturbing moment of transgression, a higher 
authority in the form of a wizard (or systems administrator) unilaterally decided to 
remove the offending party from the system. This event followed a previous 
statement from ‘the wizards’ that they would no longer play a policing role on the 
system and would only handle technical issues. The digital democracy became a 
digital dictatorship. This event sparked a more formalised type of online governance 
of the players. The wizards later began to again play a more active role, as it became 
apparent that in this type of environment technical decisions are necessarily political 
decisions.
5 The notions of the digital citizenry and a digital sovereign in a position of 
authority began to be formalised. Julian Dibbell explored the consequences of this 
episode in 1993: 
I have come to believe that they announce the final stages of our decades-long 
passage into the Information Age, a paradigm shift that the classic liberal 
firewall between word and deed (itself a product of an earlier paradigm shift 
commonly known as the Enlightenment) is not likely to survive intact. After 
                                                 
5 T. L. Taylor, ‘The Social Design of Virtual Worlds: Constructing the User and Community Through 
Code’, in M. Consalvo, N. Baym, J. Hunsinger, K. Jensen, J. Logie, M. Murero, & L. Shade (eds), 
Internet Research Annual, Volume 1: Selected Papers from the Association of Internet Researchers 
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all, anyone the least bit familiar with the workings of the new era's definitive 
technology, the computer, knows that it operates on a principle impracticably 
difficult to distinguish from the pre-Enlightenment principle of the magic 
word: the commands you type into a computer are a kind of speech that doesn't 
so much communicate as make things happen, directly and ineluctably, the 
same way pulling a trigger does.
6 
 
Dibble was writing twelve years ago (in 1993) when the World Wide Web was still 
in its infancy. This chapter explores what has happened since then as the on screen 
environment has developed and grown. The Invisible Empire stretches its influence 
both off screen and online. While Burnett and Marshall accurately note that ‘All too 
many researchers have allowed themselves to be trapped by a false real/virtual world 
dichotomy’,7 Part II of this dissertation focuses specifically on how the foundations 
of this Empire are constructed on screen. This analysis is then used to inform Part III 
where the analysis shifts to the interface between the Invisible Empire and the off 
screen analogue world. This chapter looks at this construction from the perspective 
of the digital citizen; what is required to fulfil this role; and the consequences for 
those who fall outside of the digital society. Ten years ago much of the early work on 
the Internet’s identity, community and economy were focused on MUD and MOO 
communities.
8 While of historical interest, it is dangerous to routinely apply these 
early studies to the wider Internet that has evolved. These environments were a 
complete and sealed totality – and there was someone in charge with both the 
                                                 
6 J. Dibbell, ‘A Rape In Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database Into a Society’, The Village Voice. 23
rd December 1993. 
7 R. Burnet & P. D. Marshall, Web Theory: An Introduction. London & New York: Routledge 2003, 
p. 70. 
8 J. Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World. New York: Henry Holt, 1998. 
L. Kendall, ‘MUDder? I Hardly Know Er! Adventures of a Feminist MUDder’, in L. Cherney & E. R 
Weise (eds), wired_women: Gender and New Realities in Cyberspace. Seattle: Seal Press, 1996. 
L. Nakamura, ‘Race In/For Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the Internet’, Works 
and Days. 1995, volume 13, numbers 1-2. 
E. Reid, ‘Communication and Community on Internet Relay Chat: Constructing Communities’, in P. 
Ludlow (ed), High Noon on the Electronic Frontier. Cambridge M.A.: MIT Press, 1996. 
S. Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
D. Gauntlett, Web.Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 6.   194
authority and capacity to control the environment: a digital sovereign. This is 
strikingly different from the wider Internet where no one is ‘in charge’. The notion of 
digital identity, where everyone is dealing with characters created within the same 
framework, managing similar limitations and parameters, is strikingly different from 
the Internet, where an individual’s digital identity is spread across a number of 
different applications and states of connectivity. When sharing a text-based world, it 
does not perform the scale of bandwidth differences.  
 
Dibbell’s words are prescient in that they acknowledge there is a fundamental shift in 
the digital world in traditional notions of the relationship between what is said, or 
typed (ideas), and how they are communicated and recorded. Property and action are 
also transformed concepts in this environment. This chapter explores the digital 
citizen, which is closely linked to an exploration of digital sovereignty. The 
transition from off screen goods and services to ideas online has a fundamental 
impact on the economic and societal relations of the digital society which is formed 
by the digital political economy. As Trevor Barr has observed, ‘Every society is an 
information society.’
9 The ability of citizens to communicate both with each other 
and with the state has been integral to the concept of citizenship since the time of the 
Athenian democracy in ancient Greece. With the growth of telecommunications and 
the Internet in particular, what are the implications for the concept of citizenship? An 
answer to this question informs the constitution of a non-citizen. The key is to 
monitor mechanisms for exclusion and how this status is rationalised 
 
                                                 
9 T. Barr, ‘Forces for Change: Communications as Catalyst’, New.media.com.au: The Changing Face 
of Australia’s Media and Communications. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003, pp.20-39.   195
What is Citizenship? 
Once someone asked me if I knew the difference between a citizen and a 
civilian. I can tell you now; a citizen has the courage to make the safety of the 
human race their personal responsibility. 
                                                 – Johnny Rico
10 
 
Traditionally citizenship has described the codified relationships of certain 
stakeholders in a society, between both themselves and the state. These relationships 
are seen in terms of rights and responsibilities.
11 The rights of the citizen are the 
privileges provided to them by virtue of their status as citizens of that society. These 
rights include a role in deciding how the society is run, and are embodied in the 
notion of free citizens voting for their rulers and laws in ancient Greece and Rome. 
Bundled in this notion is also the right of citizens to meet and communicate with 
each other. The second defining feature of traditional citizenship is responsibilities – 
the obligations that come with the status of citizenship. Some of these are codified, 
such as periods of compulsory military service or the requirement to pay taxes. But 
they also include some less codified obligations, such as obeying societal norms and 
laws.  
 
As an Australian citizen, there is a network of rights and responsibilities with all 
other Australian citizens:  
The right to vote to help elect Australia's governments;  
The right to apply for any public office or to nominate for election to 
Parliament (subject to s44 (i) of the Australian Constitution);  
The right to apply for an Australian passport and to leave and re-enter the 
country without a resident return visa;  
                                                 
10 Starship Troopers. Written by Ed Neumeier, directed by Paul Verhoeven, Columbia Tristar, 1997. 
11 D. Held, ‘Citizenship and Autonomy’, Political Theory and The Modern State: Essays on State, 
Power and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press 1993, p. 190.   196
The right to seek assistance from Australian diplomatic representatives while 
overseas;  
The right to apply to enlist in the defence forces and for government jobs 
requiring Australian citizenship; and  
The right to register your child (under 25 years of age born overseas) as an 
Australian citizen by descent. 12  
 
With citizenship, there are also certain responsibilities expected of all Australians. 
They include the following requirements: 
Obey the laws and fulfil your duties as an Australian citizen;  
Enrol on the Electoral Register and vote at federal and state/territory elections 
and referenda; 13 
Serve on a jury, if called on;  
Defend Australia, should the need arise.14 
 
Socrates in ancient Athens was forced to drink poison not for failing to perform his 
military service,
15 but for corrupting youth and interfering with the religious order of 
the city. 
 
The dichotomy between rights and responsibilities, and the correlation with ideas of 
an individual’s responsibility, and the protection provided to that individual by the 
state, by virtue of their rights as a citizen, is one of the fault lines of western politics. 
Defining how the notion of citizenship operates in any given society is an inherently 
political process. The use of the idea of ‘mutual obligation’ in the provision of social 
services to the disadvantaged in society by the both the conservative Howard Liberal 
                                                 
12 ‘Australian Citizenship’, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous affairs. 
http://www.citizenship.gov.au/why.htm#rights [accessed 4.9.2003]. 
13 In the context of Australian citizenship, it is a responsibility to vote, not a choice. A citizen is 
forced to participate in democracy. While it is possible to cast an informal vote, a polling both must be 
attended to perform this task, the citizen must opt out, rather than in. 
14 ‘Australian Citizenship’, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous affairs. 
http://www.citizenship.gov.au/why.htm#rights [accessed 4.9.2003]. 
15 Socrates served at both Delium and Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War.   197
Government and the Blair Labour government is a particularly evocative case 
study.16  
 
The third important aspect of citizenship which is often overlooked is the 
requirements that must be met to be a citizen. Not everyone in a particular society 
will be an equal citizen with the rights from – and responsibilities to – that society. In 
some cases this exclusion is codified. In Ancient Greece women could not vote, own 
property, or sue for divorce they were clearly not citizens in the mode of men. 
Amongst men, it was still only those who were born as citizens, rather than those 
born slaves, who met the requirements of citizenship. The proportion of those who 
were citizens was relatively low, as opposed to the underclass of non-citizens. In 
western style democracies such as Australia, which claims to have universal suffrage 
amongst its adult population,17 there would be an expectation that this underclass 
would not be present. Within contemporary Australia there is universal suffrage for 
voting both a right and an obligation under Australia’s system of compulsory 
participation in the electoral process. However there are also people who, while 
eligible to carry an Australian passport, clearly do not have the same access to a 
number of ‘rights’ in terms of health care, education, political enfranchisement and 
communication between themselves and the state that others do. The circumstances 
of the majority of Indigenous Australians discussed in Chapter One is an obvious 
                                                 
16 S. Schooneveldt, ‘Do mutual obligation breach penalties coerce compliance with government 
expectation’, Australian Journal of Social Issues. May 2004, volume 39, issue 2, p. 155. 
R. Goodwin, ‘Structures of mutual obligation’, Journal of Social Policy. October 2002, volume 31, 
issue 4, p. 579. 
A. McClelland, ‘Mutual obligation and the welfare responsibilities of government’, Australian 
Journal of Social Issues, August 2002, volume 37, issue 3, p. 209. 
S. Wilson & N. Turnbull, ‘Wedge Politics and Welfare Reform in Australia’, The Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, September 2001, volume 47, issue 3, p. 384. 
17 Through the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 and amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral 
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illustration of this. As noted in that chapter, citizenship is more than just a status that 
can be conferred on paper. It must be reflected in the opportunities for full 
participation in society by each member (citizen) of that society. In addition, those 
who fail to live up to their ‘responsibilities’ of the Australian notion of citizenship – 
those seen as criminal or deviant – will forfeit their ‘rights’ as a result and join these 
non-citizens outside the mainstream. Just as with rights and responsibilities, society 
or more specifically the government, has a role to ensure that all members of a 
society with universal suffrage, are sufficiently empowered to meet these 
requirements. At what point this can be said to have occurred, is again a major fault 
line within western politics, intimately integrated into the debate over rights and 
responsibilities.  
 
Earlier in this thesis, I cited Lury’s position that in a consumer culture an 
individual’s ability to consume, as well as how the consumed goods and services are 
provided, defines their social position.
18 The citizen as a consumer with rights, and 
responsibilities, must meet the requirement to be able to engage at the required level 
and mode of consumption. In a neo-liberal, post fordist environment, the right to 
consume frequently supplants the right to work and the right to leisure. In this 
analysis, the ability to participate in society and the ability to consume are 
convergent. The notion of the citizen as consumer first developed as part of the 
1950s post war reconstruction when there was seen to be a need to lift the rate and 
scale of consumption.19 As the workplace and workplace identity became 
increasingly unstable, the role of consumption as an essential way to participate in 
                                                 
18 C. Lury, Consumer Culture. Oxford: Polity Press, 1996, p. 43. 
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society became more important. There exists a discourse of citizenship where 
citizens are defined primarily as consumers, with governments existing to service 
these ‘customers’. While this dissertation’s analysis of citizenship includes as a 
component the right to consume, and the relationship that this consumption has to an 
individual’s social position, it also looks at broader definitions of rights, 
responsibilities and requirements. 
 
While the traditional notion of citizenship works well for those areas where it is 
codified, increasingly the notion of citizenship is transforming from a noun to a verb. 
In this case citizenship refers to a mode of communication within society, both 
between the governed and government, but also between members of society. In this 
context, the citizen is seen as actively negotiating rival discourses as they ‘do’ 
citizenship. These rival discourses are increasingly being recognised by various 
Nations States: Australia recently repealed laws from 1948 designed to ensure that 
formal Australian citizenship remained exclusive to that nation, in as many cases as 
possible. Australian citizenship law
20 now allows for people to more easily become 
dual citizens, recognising that those who do so are negotiating their citizenship with 
rival sovereign states.
21 
 
Citizenship is increasingly a mode of communication. The ability for citizens to 
occupy their place in society has always been linked to their capacity to 
                                                 
20 Australian Citizenship Act 1948. 
21 In 2002 The Australian Parliament repealed of section 17 of the Australian Citizenship Act. (In 
place since 1948), making it possible for people who became citizens of another country to not have 
to surrender their Australian passport and citizenship. Finland similarly also replaced its 1968 
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communicate between themselves and with the state. The notion that citizens should 
enjoy the rights of free assembly and free speech is an expression of this function. 
This idea’s history can be traced back to the Acropolis of Ancient Athens, and then 
later The Forum of Ancient Rome. In both these environments citizens could gather 
to communicate with each other, and with the state. In doing so they were accessing 
the prevailing level of communication technology at the time, in face-to-face 
discussion. 
 
This understanding of the citizen, being activated by communication, changes over 
time as different technologies are adopted and become prevalent in society. The 
Constitution of the United States of America, adopted on 17 September 1787, gave 
the government responsibility for the Postal Service.
22 ‘Section 8: Congress shall 
have Power to…. establish post office and post roads.’ Later in 1791, the Bill of 
Rights, which was the first amendment to that constitution, dealt specifically with the 
right of citizens to freedom of expression and assembly. 
Article the third… Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or the press, or the right of people to peacefully assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.23  
 
The Australian Constitution, adopted on 1 January 1901, illustrated the effect of the 
changes to the prevailing technology. Added to the postal service is the responsibility 
of the federal government for laws relating to telegraphs and telephone systems in 
Section 51 (V): Postal, telegraphic telephonic and other like services. Section 69 
                                                 
22 While the Greeks and Romans also used letters and writing, the city-state allowed for all the 
citizens to gather in one place, where as the United States represented a nation of continental 
proportion, and thus the letter became a necessary form of communication for democracy and 
citizenship in that environment. 
23 The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787. 
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goes on to deal with the handover of existing public services in this area from the 
colonies to the federal bureaucracy. As was the case in the United States with the 
postal service, this power was used by the government at the time to not just 
regulate, but also to provide and develop this service through the Postmaster General. 
 
The level of access required depends on the level of technology available. If 
citizenship can be seen to include a ‘right’ to communicate with each other and the 
state, then what does this say about the role of non-citizens and the duty of the state 
to citizens? Those who ‘miss out’ on the ability to communicate are unable to 
participate in society as full citizens. In a society with supposed universal suffrage, 
this must be seen as a failure on the part of government. A representative democracy, 
especially one such as Australia that makes voting a responsibility not just a right for 
all its citizens, has a responsibility to inform voters to maintain an honest, open and 
accountable government. This availability is even more significant in the case of a 
Westminster system of ministerial responsibility as exists within Australia’s federal 
and state governments. 
 
Possession of a sufficiently developed digital self is a prerequisite for being 
considered a digital citizen. There is a level of literacy that is required to control and 
manipulation of that digital self, to use an individual’s various digital identities, 
before one can be said to have been elevated out of the digital underclass. This level 
of literacy will change over time as the dominant applications in use on the Internet 
change. Just having a Hotmail account
24 does not automatically elevate an individual 
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out of the digital underclass to become a digital citizen. It is the ability to use the 
Internet in a way that the dominant discourse accepts and codifies. The nature (and 
application) of this dominant discourse is not as definitive or precise as it might 
seem. 
 
The Digital Citizen 
Citizenship operates as both a noun and a verb, particularly as applied to the digital 
context. This transformation occurs due to the more complex nature of sovereignty, 
both in the increasingly globalised off screen world, but also and more markedly, on 
the screen where there are different digital sovereigns acting within, between, and 
outside the jurisdiction of the traditional analogue national sovereigns. As a noun, 
citizenship refers to the relationship between citizens and each other, and citizens 
and the state. It is the codification of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and 
the requirements that must be met in order to be recognised as a citizen. In Ancient 
Greece this was clearly stated without much room for deviation or interpretation. 
There was clearly only one sovereign entity to which the citizens owed their 
allegiance, and the rights, responsibilities, and requirements of citizenship were 
clearly laid out in law.  
 
However this simple conceptualisation of citizenship (and sovereignty) has been 
replaced by a variety of different and often competing understandings of digital 
citizenship. In this environment, as each individual citizen seeks to act as a ‘good 
                                                                                                                                          
indicate the absence of a ‘real’ (credible or financed) email address of some type. They also provide 
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citizen’ they have to actively interpret the discourses. This can lead to citizens acting 
in a way that when viewed through one understanding represents the correct and 
right course of action, whereas viewed through another can be seen to be engaged in 
deviant and even criminal behaviour, for example the downloading and distribution 
of pirated material. In this environment it is the active role of the individual digital 
citizen to ‘do’ citizenship, the word now a verb. Citizenship, the noun, is the 
grammar of society. If all societies were information societies, then the grammar of 
that information, its language and laws, are what defines the society. Citizenship the 
verb, then describes how an individual negotiates this.  
 
In a pre-modern, pre-enlightenment context, the authority to maintain society 
(sovereignty) was exercised externally by the state. The public punishment of 
deviants and criminals from stocks in the market, to public hangings were used to 
reinforce both the social and political order. While the stocks gave way to prisons 
and hospitals, the use of public spectacle to punish threats to the political order, 
treason had a longer existence. As Michel Foucault noted,  
The extreme point of penal justice under the Ancien Régime was the infinite 
segmentation of the body of the regicide: a manifestation of the strongest 
power over the body of the greatest criminal, whose total destruction made the 
crime explode into its truth.25  
 
The residue of this can still be found in the Hight Court of Australia, where Room 
Three has space set aside for a jury which may only be used for public trials of 
treason against the state. 
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Foucault contrasted this external enforcement of the individual with the regulation of 
the integrated post-enlightenment self. Using the theoretical construction of the 
Panopticon by Jeremy Bentham,26 as a site where everyone in society is potentially 
observed, Foucault explained how this formerly external control becomes 
internalised. The good citizen is monitored and their behaviour confirmed as such 
both by themselves and by those around them in society, just as that citizen monitors 
others.27 Antonio Gramsci similarly theorised how control of society would move 
from political control supported by a physical military presence through to civil 
control, where the authority of the state is internalised by the members of society.28 
 
The digital citizen represents the digital self’s connection to, and participation in, 
digital society. The digital self is fragmented into discrete digital identities. These 
identities can be difficult to observe and monitor, and they are not always easily 
connected to each other or the off screen self of the individual user. In this context 
any kind of physical sanction would be difficult to bring to bear off screen, a 
problem further complicated by the cross jurisdictional nature of the Invisible 
Empire. This then sets digital citizenship aside from what has gone before. No longer 
subject to the Panopticon, and out of reach of the rigid and public persecution of the 
state, the digital citizen is a construction of post-civil control.  
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27 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books 
Australia 1977. 
28 A. Gramsci, ‘State and Civil Society’, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: 
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The digital citizen is potentially subject to digital sovereignty, but unlike analogue 
sovereignty, this sovereignty is laid down by the often competing understandings of 
the laws of digital society. Rather than an absolute authority from which others are 
derived, different actors try to influence the discourse of digital sovereignty. As 
Foucault noted ‘It is in the discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together.’29 This discourse of digital sovereignty is then fluid and changing. 
Citizenship is interpreted and reinterpreted at each instance by the digital citizen. The 
interpretation of citizenship is an active and changing process, a verb rather than a 
noun. In this post-civil control, each digital sovereign will attempt to persuade the 
digital citizen that they are advocating the ‘right’ path. With limited recourse to 
observation and coercion, this is how control must be exercised. This discourse is 
then one of citizenship as each individual interprets their understanding. On the other 
hand, a discourse of sovereignty exists when an agent is trying to impose their 
understanding or spin of the discourse on others. In many cases an individual can be 
seen to engage with both modes of discourse simultaneously.30 
 
While those seeking to be good members of digital society will actively engage with 
the citizenship discourse of the Invisible Empire, there are those who do not fall 
within the bounds of digital citizenship. They are either actively excluded because 
they do not meet the requirements of citizenship, or they actively choose to stay 
outside the bounds of digital society. 
 
                                                 
29 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume One: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley, 
London: Allen Lane 1978, p. 100. 
30 Digital Sovereignty forms the topic of analysis for Chapter Five.   206
Digital Deviants 
Agent Smith: As you can see we have had our eye on you for some time now 
Mr. Anderson. It seems that you have been leading two lives. In one life you’re 
Thomas A. Anderson program writer for a respectable software company, you 
have a social security number, you pay your taxes, and you……. help your 
landlady carry out her garbage. The other life is lived in computers where you 
go by the hacker alias Neo and are guilty of virtually every computer crime we 
have a law for. One of these lives has a future and one of them does not.31 
 
Those who are not part of the discourses of digital citizenship are pivotal to the 
discussion of access deployed in this thesis. One of the key defining characteristics 
of citizenship has always been specifying those who are outside it. The non-citizen 
informs the configuration of the citizen. Off screen citizens experience a 
convergence between the underclass – those people who do not meet the 
requirements of citizenship – and the deviant, those who do not live up to their 
responsibilities as citizens. Individuals who are criminals or are disadvantaged, are 
often conflated ideologically. Within the Invisible Empire, on the screen, they are in 
contrast, they are divergent concepts, and this is significant.  
Rights                        Responsibilities 
     
  Digital  Deviants 
 
Digital Citizen 
             
Digital Underclass 
 
Requirements 
Figure 44 
The Digital Citizen 
                                                 
31 The Matrix. Written and directed by Andy Wachowski & Larry Wachowski, Warner Bros, 1999.   207
 
Digital deviants are those who have met the requirements of digital citizenship and 
choose not to conform with their responsibilities as digital citizens. They break the 
laws of the digital world, threatening the digital self, digital property and the digital 
state. The deviant is not seen. Rather, they are experienced through different aspects 
of the digital self as individual digital identities come into contact with them. The 
digital underclass by contrast do not meet the requirements for digital citizenship and 
will not be experienced by or have their existence acknowledged by digital citizens.32 
They do not exist for the digital citizen. If they cannot be experienced then it is much 
more difficult to mark differences. Class in a consumerist framework is read on 
appearance. Similarly, the digital underclass will in most cases have little or no 
experience of the area from which they have been excluded. 
  
Digital deviants are those who have a sufficiently developed digital self to have met 
the requirements for digital citizenship, and yet do not then fulfil the responsibilities 
of that potential citizenship. Just as there are competing discourses of digital 
citizenship, there are corresponding different versions of the digital deviant. 
Following one discourse can, in some instances, necessarily make you a criminal in 
the view of another. This notion is explored further in the discussion of 
digital sovereignty. As a generalisation, digital deviants on the Internet have 
a level of hyper-literacy (certainly the ones that are any good at it do), as 
they can manipulate their various digital identities so as not to be apprehended or 
suffer retribution for their actions. Off screen the deviant and the underclass are often 
                                                 
32 As is demonstrated by the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. J. Barlow, A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html 
[accessed 26.8.2003].   208
perceived as the convergent, however the perception of the digital deviant on the 
Internet is a much more complex concept. The digital self on the Internet interacts 
and exists through its discrete and independent digital identities. So rather than 
speaking of the ‘digital self’ coming into contact with the digital deviant, the deviant 
is rather, encountered through different digital identities manifesting through 
different applications.  
 
On the 23
rd of September 2003 Joseph McNicol appeared in the Western Australian 
District Court. He was facing a civil suit from T3-Direct, an Internet marketing 
company. T3-Direct was claiming damages from Mr McNicol after he had posted 
their Internet address on the Web, where it was found by SPEWS (Spam Prevention 
Early Warning System). SPEWS is a group that gather the addresses of Spam 
companies that then allows this list to be used by organisations to block emails from 
those addresses. The case was eventually thrown out on the basis that there was no 
way to prove that Mr McNicol had contacted SPEWS directly. SPEWS themselves 
are an anonymous US based group, so taking legal action against them presumably 
was not an option for T3-Direct. The only way to get off one of their lists is to post a 
message to the net-abuse news group apologising and agreeing to not send Spam. 
T3-Direct had chosen instead to set up again at a new address, the costs associated 
with which were the cause of their action.33 Another company, LaneChange.Net, 
who have found themselves on SPEWS list, have described them: 
The SPEWS guys are a bunch of propeller-headed cowboys who think they 
have the spam thing all figured out. "Lets cut off all the ISP's IP address for 
                                                 
33 K. Griggs, ‘Aussie Gets Into Pickle With Spam’, Wired. 11
th June 2002. 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,53102,00.html [accessed 5.8.2005].   209
any IP that's related to a domain name, and then cut off their suppliers and that 
should do it!" – Morons!
34 
 
The boundaries of digital deviance and good citizenship are heavily patrolled. T3-
Direct, SPEWS and Joseph McNicol would all argue that they were acting as a ‘good 
digital citizen’, albeit using some mutually exclusive interpretation of the discourse 
of citizenship.  
 
In addition to those who may fall outside of various interpretations of citizenship, 
there are also those who choose not to engage in any notion of the responsibilities of 
citizenship: actively breaking the social norms and laws of the digital society. These 
people might be influenced by greed, and are prepared to steal from others over the 
Internet or actively pursue the place of the outsider or hacker that much of the early 
fiction of the Internet glorified. This history, may view these hackers as individuals 
following a particularly extreme discourse of the good digital citizen, a kind of 
romantic Ned Kelly of the network. 
Image Removed 
 
Figure 45 
Cartoon by Matthew Diffee 29
th May 2000 
http://www.cartoonbank.com/ 
accessed 24.6.2005 
                                                 
34 ‘Spews is not a domain name filter’, LaneChange.Net. 
http://www.lanechange.net/html/spews.shtml [accessed 25.8.2003].   210
 
 
As with off screen crimes, crimes activated through the Internet can be divided into 
attacks on the person, on property and against the state. These crimes are 
transformed by a new context. There are also more minor breaches of social norms, 
or netiquette. These in themselves do not necessarily mark one as a digital criminal. 
For example when certain versions of the Real Player audio and video player were 
downloaded from the Internet, it automatically reset the computers web browsers 
home page to the Real Player site. Additionally, when the software was uninstalled, 
it would leave behind its ‘spyware’ on the computer, which would try and secretly 
gather the music play list from that computer to relay back to the company. Not 
criminal (perhaps), but certainly not good netiquette. There is a difference between 
being impolite, and stepping outside of society by committing a crime.  
 
The earlier case study of the digital rape in LambdaMOO is an example, if somewhat 
dated, of a crime against the digital self delivered through the Internet. In contrast, 
when a criminal steals money through the Internet, often through some kind of credit 
card fraud, it is an attack on an area of the self that is shared by the off screen and 
digital self. Paedophiles that use Internet chat rooms to stalk victims – the targets of 
Operation Innocent Image by the FBI,35 use the Internet (and their digital selves) to 
organise crimes against children. These are examples of crimes against the person.  
 
By contrast, the design and release of harmful viruses and Internet worms is a crime 
against digital property. As are activities such as distributed denial of service attacks 
                                                 
35 P. Ly, ‘Girls teach teen cyber gab to FBI Agents’, The Washington Post 4
th June 2003.   211
that shut down Internet servers and Web sites, or the ‘theft’ of data where 
unauthorised copies of information are taken (generally the original will be left 
behind). A recent study released by the Internet security vendor Sophos found that an 
unprotected computer running Windows has a fifty percent chance of being 
highjacked within the first twelve minutes of being connected to the Internet.36 On 
the 29
th of August 2003 Derek Boon Leon became the first person in Australia to be 
charged with using a computer as a weapon, or more specifically with seven counts 
of causing unauthorised impairment of an electronic communication. It has been 
alleged that Mr Leon used his home computer to launch a denial of service attack on 
his former employer’s web site, an attack on their digital property. He had previously 
been dismissed as that company’s Webmaster. If found guilty, he could face a fine of 
$13 200 Australian dollars, and up to two years in prison.
37 The analogue law in this 
case is being used to prosecute alleged crimes performed in the digital environment.  
 
The final area of deviant activity is the attack on the sovereign: digital treason. In the 
world of competing notions of sovereignty that digital citizens inhabit this can be 
hard to determine, following one discourse often involves a certain level of ‘treason’ 
against another. However, there is a clear concern from many analogue sovereigns 
about threats to the state. The People’s Republic of China goes to great lengths to 
regulate and censor the Internet, to protect the perceived threat to the state that 
activity in that sphere might represent.38 In Burma the penalty for ‘unauthorised use 
                                                 
36 R. LeMay, ‘The 12-Minute Windows heist’, ZD Net Australia. 1
st July 2005. 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/0,2000061744,39200021,00.htm [accessed 1.7.2005]. 
37 S. Butcher, ‘Computer sabotage charge a first for Australia’, The Age. 29
th August 2003. 
38 M. Geist, ‘Face to Face with the Great Firewall of China’, Ottawa Citizen.5
th May 2005. 
http://www.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/technology/story.html?id=6aabb570-9f4d-491c-b915-
a5cbb1842292 [accessed 20.6.2005].   212
of a modem’ is up to 15 years in prison.39 The United States, following the 11 
September terrorist attacks, has also passed a number of laws that aim to minimise 
the threat to the state posed by deviants on the Internet.40 
 
 
Figure 46 
Sherman Austin 
http://www.raisethefist.com/  
[accessed 15.5.2005] 
 
On 4
th August 2003 Sherman Austin – the Web master of RaisetheFist.com – was 
sentenced to one year’s jail and three years’ supervised release for content that was 
posted on his anti-government web site. His site had links to another site that gave 
information about making explosives. Mr Austin had originally planned to fight the 
charges, but with the potential for a twenty year jail sentence under new anti-
terrorism laws in the United States, he agreed to a plea bargain of four months in jail. 
It was then overruled by the judge in the case who sentenced him to one year in jail, 
with a three year probation period during which amongst other restrictions he cannot 
use a computer without his parole officer’s permission, or associate with any person 
                                                                                                                                          
O. Ruffin, ‘Great firewall of China: A gang of Internet police states is emerging from the developing 
world say Oxblood Ruffin. And they’re using Western Technology’, New Scientist. 9
th November 
2002, volume 176, issue 2368. 
39 D. Holmes, eGov: Ebusisness Strategies for Government. London: Nicholas Brearley Publishing, 
2001, p. 253. 
40 O. S. Kerr, ‘Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't’ . 
Northwestern University Law Review. 2003, Volume. 97.   213
or group who wants to change the United States government in any way. Mr Austin 
has become a minor celebrity as a result of his sentence. The implications for the 
government’s involvement in answering this perceived threat to the state were 
considerable. Once again, analogue law enforcement is brought to bear this time on 
alleged digital treason. That Mr Sherman went to jail for linking his site to another 
that contained contraband information, with presumably safely anonymous owners 
illustrates some of the limitations of the jurisdiction of laws. 
 
Despite the Chinese government’s concerns about Internet use by its citizens, or 
perhaps a driver of government attention, is the heavy use of the Internet and the 
World Wide Web in particular, by supporters of independence for Tibet from China. 
A search for the word Tibet on any of the major search engines reveals the number 
one site returned as The Tibet Government in Exile. The first pro-China web site 
does not appear until the fourth or fifth page of results.
41 In a more overt, or at least 
violent case of trying to overthrow the government, the rebels in Chechnya have 
made extensive use of the Internet to provide information and propaganda on their 
separatist war against the Russian Federation. Their main website 
http://www.amina.com/ provides their views on the ongoing conflict in that region.  
 
A computer virus that arrives via an email reflects a particular digital identity that is 
a projection of the ‘deviant’. The recent prosecution of the underage developer of the 
Sasser Internet worm shows that in some cases this identity is not as far removed 
                                                 
41 Yahoo, Google and AltaVista, 5
th September 2003. The official government in exile web site is 
http://www.tibet.com/.    214
from the off screen identity as the hacker might wish.42 Similarly, when a digital 
deviant hacks into a web site and defaces it, both by the deviant and subsequent 
viewer who see their work, will be manifesting their digital identities associated with 
the World Wide Web and those applications used to access it. This will influence 
how the deviant is perceived. In another example of the digital deviant being 
represented through different discrete digital identities, my computer has a static IP 
address, and as a result is the target of numerous attempts to install software that 
would allow distant users (digital deviants) to take control of it. Normally deviants 
would use the computer to run a denial of service attack, but the machine could also 
be used as a Spam mail resender. Alternately the hacker’s objective might be to 
access the content stored on the computer. When these attacks occur, my firewall 
software stops them, and logs the IP address from which the attack came. As shown 
in figure 47, a tracking device can be used to find where that computer is located, 
although those making the attack usually mask this. Thus the digital deviant 
‘appears’ to my digital identity, in this case projected through my firewall software, 
as a series of numbers that make up an IP address, and a pop-up warning from my 
security software on my computer screen. Their identity and location in space is 
(often) projected through these attempted attacks. Without the firewall, the impact on 
some of my various digital identities could be considerably more significant. 
                                                 
42 J. Krim, ‘German Teen Avoids jail Time for Sasser Worm’, Washington Post. 9
th July 2005. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/08/AR2005070801802.html 
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Figure 47 
Norton Internet Security 
 
This relative invisibility of the ‘whole’ digital deviant as it is interfaced through its 
discrete digital identities, combined with a hyper-literacy that lets them have greater 
control than an average digital citizen, makes the image of the deviant in some ways 
scarier, or at least more mysterious than off screen. The deviants are the faceless 
boogiemen of the World Wide Web.43 
                                                 
43 H. Meredith, ‘Sniffing out the cyber Hannibals’, The Age. 12
th October 2004. 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/10/11/1097406487106.html?from=storylhs [accessed 
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The Digital Underclass 
Image Removed 
 
Figure 48 
Cartoon by Harley Schwadron 
http://www.cartoonstock.com/search.asp?x=a&keyword=Parking+only+government&Category=Not+
Selected&Boolean=Or&Artist=Not+Selected&submit=Search  
[accessed 12.7.2005] 
 
While the digital deviant fails to live up to their responsibilities as a digital citizen, 
the digital underclass does not meet the requirements for digital citizenship. Their 
digital selves are either too rudimentary or, more often, non-existent. In order to have 
the potential to become a digital citizen an individual needs to develop a sufficiently 
sophisticated digital self. To do this at the very least requires a sufficient level of 
access to the Internet. However this will involve having access to a 
telecommunications network,
44 and possibly a credit card, not to mention the  
                                                 
44 People still often quote Greg LeVert’s assertion at the Telecom ’94 conference that ‘half the 
worlds population, an astounding three billion people, has never made a phone call’ as reported in the 
Toronto Sun 13
th October 1994. Clay Shirky notes since that time the number of fixed phone lines has 
grown by 50%, and there has been an enormous growth in the number of mobile phones. Shirky 
estimates that there is still about one third of the world’s population that has not made a phone call 
(this is still shrinking).  
C. Sharkey, ‘Half the World’ Shirky.Com http://shirky.com/writings/half_the_world.html [accessed 
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requisite ability to read, write and ideally to type, in most cases in English. They lack 
the access to the sufficient levels of hardware, software, wetware and cultware to 
overcome the access event horizon. Perhaps race is a better metaphor, with this 
group not so much an underclass, but rather an under-race, the Epsilons of the digital 
brave new world – the victims of a digital apartheid where those being most 
disadvantaged do not even know or experience what they are being denied. There is 
no need to worry about them breaking out, because they cannot see the world they 
would escape to. No one has to ‘keep them down’ because they do not know what 
they are missing out on. The digital underclass is without a voice in the digital 
environment. Without consciousness of their disadvantage, they are in effect, 
rendered as digital subaltern. The digital underclass cannot see or interact with the 
digital citizens. The digital citizen in turn has very little or no interaction with the 
underclass in cyberspace. 
 
The invisible or non-existent state of the digital underclass in cyberspace is critical to 
an analysis and understanding of the consequences and proliferation of the Internet. 
If the underclass don’t exist virtually, then there is no danger that they will develop 
any sort of rights, particularly rights that might enable access to the requirements of 
citizenship. Thus they are locked out of any interaction with the discourse of digital 
citizenship. While there is a non-citizen underclass off screen, particularly in a 
western style democracy with supposed universal suffrage, there is a perception that 
there is a role for government, to assist these individuals to reach full citizenship. It 
is seen as a basic right to meet all the requirements of citizenship, and while this may 
not be the case for deviants in a society, taking into account the convergence   218
between these groups, it is still seen as a failure by the analogue sovereign state that 
an underclass exists. 
 
In Australia, Indigenous people are eligible to vote, albeit relatively recently.45 
However as a group they still do not have decent access to health care, education and 
telecommunications, when compared to the population at large.46 In this case, the 
right to vote is almost irrelevant, leading to a state where whole constituencies can be 
lead to believe they are enfranchised members of society, yet never have an actual 
effect on the political process, or impact on their own well being in society. To be 
eligible for an Australian passport is not enough to be considered a full citizen of the 
country. 
  
Once an analogue sovereign starts interfacing their citizenry through both the 
analogue self and on the screen, then they develop a responsibility to treat all citizens 
as equals, and facilitate the development of the digital self in all their citizens. If a 
government utilises the Internet to facilitate communication between citizens, and 
between the citizens and the state, then the Internet becomes a mode of 
communication that the state has a responsibility to make available to all members of 
their society, in order to enable them to participate as full citizens of that society. If 
they fail to do this, then those left behind will fall further into the abyss of off screen 
underclass, as they become disenfranchised non-citizens.  
                                                 
45 The 1967 referendum that gave Aboriginal people the right to vote federally in Australia, formally 
brought Western Australia and Queensland in line with the rest of the nation. South Australia gave 
both its Aboriginal citizens and women the right to vote in 1894. 
46 Steering Committee for the review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous 
Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2005. Melbourne: Commonwealth of Australia, July 2005. 
http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/indigenous/keyindicators2005/keyindicators2005.pdf [accessed 
2.8.2005].   219
 
While members of the digital underclass have the potential to become digital 
citizens, there are some people on earth for whom digital citizenship is a lot more 
accessible in terms of economic factors, infrastructure and literacy. Generally 
speaking, access will be closer for Australians than in Africans, although not in all 
instances. The digital underclass also represents the pool of potential digital citizens 
that, should they join the network, would enhance the value of the network to all 
users, within the limits of its network utility. This might also lead to a reduction in 
the power, or at least advantage that digital citizenship gives those who have it over 
those who do not. While the underclass exists without the requirement to become a 
full citizen has been a given since the idea of citizenship was first articulated, the 
digital underclass, and their invisibility to, and complete absence from, the digital 
society is a new and disturbing trend. That there exists a digital underclass, which is 
denied the rights of digital citizenship is wrong. It will damage Australian society 
and democracy if it is perpetuated. Spivak wrote of the subaltern, noting that ‘if you 
are poor black and female you get it three ways’.
47 For the digital subaltern these 
markings are absent, yet these groups would seem to conflate with those who already 
miss out on access to telecommunications in Australia, as illustrated in Chapter One. 
 
This chapter opened with the example from the ‘rape in cyberspace’.48 While it is 
appropriate for raising some of the questions that this chapter addresses, ideologies 
and arguments quickly become more complex once you start to deal with the much 
larger, macro space of the Internet. A MOO was a relatively closed environment, a 
                                                 
47 G. C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’, in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (ed), Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture. London: Macmillan Education, 1988. 
48 J. Dibbell, ‘A Rape In Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, 
and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database Into a Society’, The Village Voice. 23
rd December 1993.   220
finite world, where everyone inside had agreed to the rules (or more precisely could 
be made to conform). There were individuals in positions of authority who could 
exercise their sovereign power over the virtual world and its inhabitants.
49 The 
digital identities of people on LambdaMOO conformed to a similar template, and 
were relatively concrete and related to the individual of whom they were a 
projection. The wider Internet does not recreate this environment. The Internet is not 
a finite easily defined space. Identity and digital projection of the self is not uniform 
or homogeneous. To the extent that it is possible to discuss and locate those in 
power, or those who are able to exercise sovereign power, there is no consensus 
amongst the rival discourses of digital citizenship as to whom this could, or indeed 
should, be.  
 
While it is clear that governments in general, and Australian governments in 
particular have not at this point found it necessary to ensure that all citizens have 
access to the Internet sufficient for them to be able to exercise a sense of their digital 
citizenship, there has for many years been a broad acceptance that access to 
telecommunications in the form of a telephone service plays an essential role in 
Australian citizenship. To this end, the federal government has maintained the 
Universal Service Obligation for telephony in Australia, stipulating the requirements 
for both private landline telephones and access to a public telephone network. The 
development and maintenance of this guarantee serves as a significant illustration of 
how the government activates and actualises this responsibility and how this might in 
future begin to apply to the Internet. 
                                                 
49 The sovereign power of wizards, who were not tempered by a constitution, and were dealing with a 
weak, digital civil society in LambdaMOO were able to exercise near absolute power, as could be 
seen by the summary ‘execution’ of Mr_Bungle.   221
 
The next chapter examines the mirror of digital citizenship, digital sovereignty. How 
the discourse of citizenship is constructed and contested by digital sovereigns. The 
focus of this dissertation in Part III will then turn to the implications of the Invisible 
Empire as its influence stretches off screen and creates its own colonial relations 
between digital citizens at the core and the digital subaltern at the periphery.    222
Chapter 5 
Digital Sovereignty 
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Figure 49 
Cartoons by Garry Trudeau, 21
st – 25
th January 2003  
http://www.doonesbury.com/ 
[accessed 25.1.2003]   223
 
 
The Internet inhabits a space that reveals differences from the ideologies encircling 
the twentieth century Nation State. It exists outside the mechanism in which 
sovereignty has been held, perpetuated and exercised. The early adaptors who first 
established the grammar of the Internet explicitly rejected the notion of sovereignty, 
preferring to establish the grammar of a civil society free of the threat of violence 
that the state represented. However civil society requires violence – or the potential 
threat of state-sanctioned violence – as a protective mechanism. As the Internet 
moved from primarily a place of social capital, envisaged by these early adaptors, 
and instead through the sway of capitalism, became home also to private capital, this 
initial vision of civil society began to fracture. This chapter examines the resulting 
complex and fluid nature of sovereignty as it has evolved in a digitised environment.  
 
In Part I of this thesis, the foundations of the Invisible Empire were probed and 
investigated. Up until this point in Part II, the emphasis has been the examination of 
the individual on the screen. How the online community is enabled through a shared 
construction of digital citizenship. This chapter introduced some of the implications 
for those who fall outside of digital citizenship, those unable to negotiate the 
gateways of Empire and project an identity on the screen. This chapter maintains 
attention on the on screen digital environment, looking at how the political 
environment inhabited by the digital citizen manifests and how it came to be. As 
with digital citizenship, this investigation requires an understanding of how 
sovereignty has developed over time, how authority has been determined and 
exercised. This journey will track discourses of sovereignty through Europe, 
determining authority, from to God and the Catholic Church, and then moving to the   224
secular control of separate Nation States. This history then illuminates the 
fragmented and fluid formation of Digital Sovereignty. This chapter is a necessary 
connector, leading into the third part of this thesis. 
 
The History of the Sovereign: God, Church, and Nation State. 
 
Figure 50 
The Coronation of HM Queen Elizabeth II, 2
nd June 1953 
http://www.debretts.co.uk/royal_connections/js_international_library.html  
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
 
To contextualize and frame the role of the digital sovereign, it is important to track 
the metaphor through its analogue trajectory. History, at its most simple and 
undergraduate, relies on a cycle of continuity and change. By investigating the 
movements and relationships between the analogue and the digital, a more complex 
theory of negotiation, ambivalence and malleability can be established. The term 
evolved originally from the Latin superanus, with super meaning above. The nature   225
of sovereignty in an analogue environment is varied, and has changed much over 
time. This analysis focuses on the history of sovereignty through Europe, and the 
changing nature of the sovereign through its relationship to space, time and identity. 
This history forms the basis for the understanding of the concept within Australia, 
and across the Internet.  
 
The Crown: the Sovereign Identity 
The crown, as a representation of the authority of the ruler, is the traditional symbol 
of the sovereign, passing from one monarch to their successor. This rule was based 
on an authority of religious significance, whether it be the god-king pharaohs of 
ancient Egypt where the ruler themselves were considered to be divine, or the King 
of the grail quest in Arthurian tradition where the health of the King is analogous to 
the health of the land. Within the history that informs the Westminster system of 
government, this is manifest in the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. The 
greatest exponent of this ideology was King James I of England (1566-1625). This 
doctrine ruled that certain monarchs (although interestingly not all), were set in place 
by the will of God, and therefore their rule was part of a divine order, and could not 
be questioned. King James was the first King of the House of Stuart taking on this 
role after Queen Elizabeth I died with no child, thus ending the reign of the house of 
Tudor. The House of Tudor itself was formed by the marriage of King Henry VII and 
Elizabeth of York that ended the thirty years of the War of the Roses, where the 
houses of York and Lancaster contested the crown. During this time the sovereignty 
of the Kingdom was in question and the war was fought largely by competing noble 
factions. This previous period of instability informed King James’s devotion to this 
doctrine.   226
 
Figure 51 
The Tudor Rose 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tudor_rose  
[accessed 12.6.2005] 
The Tudor Rose depicted the unification of the houses of York and Lancaster 
with the ascension to the English throne of Henry Tudor  
 
The doctrine derives its foundation from the Great War in heaven between God’s 
armies, lead by the Archangel Michael, and Lucifer and his followers. Lucifer had 
questioned God’s order and challenged the throne in heaven, for this he was cast into 
the pits of hell for eternity, stating famously in Milton’s Paradise Lost ‘Better to 
Reign in Hell than serve in Heav’n’.1 The Divine Right of Kings extrapolates this 
precedent so that to challenge the King is to challenge God. Those who commit 
treason are in fact analogous to Satan. St Paul in his letter to the Romans outlined 
this position in Romans 13: 
Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no 
authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have 
been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is 
rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring 
judgment on themselves.2  
 
                                                 
1 J. Milton, Paradise Lost. London: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 9. 
http://www.literature.org/authors/milton-john/paradise-lost/chapter-01.html [accessed 16.3.2004]. 
2 Romans 13 1:3 http://bible.gospelcom.net/cgi-
bin/bible?language=english&passage=Romans+13&version=NIV [accessed 7.6.2004].   227
In Dante’s Divine Comedy, the 9
th and lowest layer of hell, Cocytus, is reserved for 
traitors and oath breakers. Lucifer, the first and greatest traitor, sits frozen in ice at its 
centre. 3 
 
Figure 52 
Dante’s Hell 
http://www.angelfire.com/ak/Nyquil/Dante/images/hell.jpg  
[accessed 15.3.2004] 
                                                 
3 D. Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. London: Oxford University Press, 1921. 
http://www.everypoet.com/archive/poetry/dante/dante_contents.htm [accessed 21.6.2004].   228
 
The residue of this ideology is found in the preamble to the Australian Constitution, 
where God and then the Crown are both acknowledged as forces ‘above’ the 
constitution.  
Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty 
God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under 
the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under 
the Constitution hereby established: 4 
 
God legitimises the crown and that power is manifest in the sovereign, who agrees to 
be bound by this constitution. The constitution then embodies the institutionalised 
potential violence of the state, to maintain order and enforce laws, and then refers its 
authority back to the crown, where this monopoly on legitimate violence is resident. 
 
 
Figure 53 
The Australian Army Rising Sun Badge 
http://www.army.gov.au/  
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
The ‘Rising Sun’ badge of the Australian Army shows the rising sun in front of 
the crown it defends. In 1969 the badge was changed and the crown replaced 
with the Federation Star representing the states of Australia, however, perhaps 
predicting the prominence of monarchism under the Howard Government, it 
reverted to the crown in 1991, on the 75
th anniversary of the landings at 
Gallipoli. Strangely recalling an event where so many lives were futilely lost in 
service of the absent crown, the King of England, by Australian citizens. 
                                                 
4 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/general/constitution/preamble.htm [accessed 15.3.2004].   229
 
Thomas Hobbes provided a critique of the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings in 
Leviathan.5 In this work Hobbes outlines the argument that the sovereign exists, and 
is legitimated, by virtue of their ability to enforce their laws and will. The sovereign 
has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence so as to create order and save their 
subjects from the state of nature, which he famously described as being one where: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is 
enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live 
without other security than what their own strength and their own invention 
shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; 
no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no 
commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as 
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.6 
 
For Hobbes, any form of divine ordination was immaterial, a social contract of 
absolute obedience between ruled and ruler was required to generate the political 
order necessary to avoid the state of nature. The requirement to be the sovereign was 
met by the ability to enforce any laws decreed.  
                                                 
5 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and 
Civil. New York: Collier Books, 1962. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-
contents.html [accessed 16.3.2004]. 
6 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and 
Civil. New York: Collier Books, New York 1962, p. 100. 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html#CHAPTERXIII [accessed 
16.3.2004].   230
 
Figure 54 
 Charles I, King of England, Scotland and Ireland 
Painting by Sir Anthony Van Dyck 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/Page76.asp 
[accessed 28.4.2004] 
 
Leviathan was published in 1651, two years after the execution of Charles I (1600-
1649), the son and heir of James I, after a rebellion against the crown lead by Oliver 
Cromwell.7 It would seem that King Charles had relied on his divine right over his 
ability to enforce his will, and that he was either incorrect in his assumptions, or was 
let down by God.8 As Hobbes noted, ‘covenants without the sword, are but words, 
and of no strength to secure a man at all.’9 Legal positivism maintains that it is a 
                                                 
7 This man was famous for, amongst other things, actually cancelling Christmas in 1645. 
8 Milton’s Epic poem Paradise Lost uses the War in Heaven as a metaphor for this rebellion in 
England with Lucifer playing the part of Cromwell. 
9 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and 
Civil. New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 129. 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html [accessed 16.3.2004].   231
crime to attempt rebellion, or to try to overthrow the state, unless the attempt is 
successful, in which case it is legitimate and lawful. Cromwell’s rebellion seems to 
vindicate this approach, and that of Hobbes over the doctrine of the Divine Right of 
Kings. 
 
A second place in Judeo-Christian religious history where God’s will was famously 
transgressed is the Garden of Eden, where Adam, against the instruction of God 
takes a bite from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and thus loses his innocence. 
This moment is captured by the logo of Apple Computer Inc that represents the 
forbidden fruit, the first bite missing. 
 
Figure 55 
Apple Computer Inc. logo. 
 
Within this story, the position of blame for the transgression is ambiguous. It seems 
that Adam was convinced to take the first bite by Eve, who was in turn influenced by 
the advice of the serpent. In any case all three suffered God’s wrath, with Adam and   232
Eve exiled from The Garden, and the snake condemned to crawl on the ground. 
While there is an obvious link between the crown and religion embodied in the 
Divine Right of Kings, the interpretation, and distribution of information, and 
particularly the interpretation of the Word (and Will) of God, was also central to the 
control and legitimisation of sovereignty at this pre-reformation period in European 
history. 
 
Figure 56 
The Snake and Angels Wings by Hugo Simberg, Tampere Cathedral 
Photo by Juhani Riekkola 
This painting The Snake and Angels Wings is from the centre of roof of the 
Tampere Cathedral in Finland. In Satan’s mouth is the forbidden fruit from the 
tree in the Garden of Eden, he, and his implied temptation, are kept from the 
congregation below by the massed wings of angels. 
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In this context, the Bible is a text of sovereignty. Who ever controlled the reading 
and production of this text effectively was able to control the interpretation of God’s 
will, and thus control over sovereigns in terms of both who they were and how their 
power was interpreted and constrained. The Bible was originally produced in the 
Latin language by St Jerome at the request of Pope Damascus I in 382 AD. The 
translation was completed in 405 AD. as The Vulgate bible, and became the official 
bible of the Catholic Church. The contents of the Bible (in Hebrew) were determined 
at the Synod of Hippo in 393 AD., and then confirmed at the Synod of Carthage in 
397AD. 
 
In 1392, John Wycliffe’s translation of this version of the Bible into English was 
completed. He was, as a result, expelled from his teaching post at Oxford University, 
his works condemned at the Council of Florence in 1415, and his followers 
persecuted. In 1408 translations of the Bible to the vernacular were forbidden by the 
Council of Oxford. Forty-four years after his death in 1428 and the behest of the 
church Wycliffe’s body was disinterred and burned, and the ashes scattered in the 
river Swift. What had been his sin? 
   234
 
Figure 57 
The Trial of Wycliffe, Manchester Town Hall, by Ford Maddox  
http://www.wycliffe.org/history/JWycliff.htm 
[accessed 13.3.2004] 
 
In Europe at this time, the Catholic Church controlled the storage and flow of 
information through its dominance of literacy of Latin. The church controlled the 
production of the Bible, each copy hand written, and the reading of the text was 
limited to those who were able to read in Latin. Wycliffe’s translation represented a 
threat to this control. In 1454 Johannes Gutenberg produced approximately 180 
copies of the Bible (in Latin) using his revolutionary new printing press, 48 copies 
still survive today and a scanned copy can be accessed online at 
http://prodigi.bl.uk/gutenbg/default.asp. While this process took the production of 
texts out of the hands of the religious authorities, the content was still strictly 
regulated by the church, as was the readership restricted to the Latin-literate elite of 
Europe. 
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The significance that church authorities placed on this control can be seen in the later 
reaction to William Tyndale. Tyndale produced an English translation of the Bible in 
1525 from original Hebrew and Greek texts, rather than translating The Vulgate as 
Wycliffe had done. He was put to death by being strangled and burned outside 
Brussels in 1536 for this transgression.  
 
Figure 58 
Tyndale’s Bible10 
http://www.bl.uk/collections/treasures/tyndale.html  
[accessed 16.3.2004] 
                                                 
10 As can be seen from this scanned image of one of the surviving copies of Tyndale’s work, his 
translation begins, ‘In the beginning was that word and that word was with God and God was that 
word’. The importance and the power of language was not lost on Tyndale.    236
 
This control of the text by the Catholic Church began to weaken. In 1534, Luther 
translated the Bible to German, while still subject to persecution, he died of natural 
causes in 1546. By 1539 the Great Bible, or Cromwell’s Bible became the first 
English translation to be authorised for public use in churches.  
 
Latin was the transnational language of the European intelligentsia. While it was, at 
the time, a dead language, it was the vocabulary and syntax of the church and used to 
uphold its power as a supernational sovereign. Benedict Anderson, in his famous 
work  Imagined Communities notes that Latin was not unique in this respect 
illustrating the similar role played by classical Arabic in relation to the sacred text of 
the Koran, and the place of Chinese characters in also transcending spoken language. 
In each case, the aim is to create a community out of this ability to communicate 
through a language of characters, rather than sounds. As Anderson notes: 
In fact the deader the written language – the further it was from speech – the 
better: In principle everyone had access to the pure world of signs.11 
 
English is the transnational language of the Internet, and also the primary language 
of the United States. Language has frequently been used by the core to control the 
periphery. Swedish was the language of the Swedish Kingdom, and thus the 
language of academia and commerce in peripheral Finland, although the majority of 
the population spoke Finnish, similarly Russian was the language of the civil service 
and military in the Soviet Union, despite being a native tongue only in Russia. The 
British Empire was founded on both the lanes of the sea, and on the English 
                                                 
11 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Revised Edition. London & New York: Verso, 1991, p. 13.   237
Language. The language of American English can be seen now to occupy a similar 
place now along with the lanes of information. 
 
By the Sixteenth Century the Roman Catholic Church’s control of the text of the 
Bible, and its interpretation, began to collapse in the face of the rival discourse 
presented by the reformist church. The Bible’s translation into secular language also 
reduced the importance of the place of the Latin speaking elite, who lost their 
monopoly on the ability to access the text directly. This elite, previously having 
communicated in Latin, were relatively mobile across Europe, creating a pan 
European intelligentsia that communicated in the same language (albeit only with 
each other). The rise of the use of secular language in the production of texts now 
bound these individuals more tightly within their country of origin. The printing 
press allowed for more efficient production of any Biblical translation thus making it 
viable to produce a translation, and distribute it in one language, or to just one 
country. Victor Hugo astutely noted these changes in The Hunchback of Notre 
Dame: 
The archdeacon gazed at the gigantic edifice for some time in silence, then 
extending his right hand, with a sigh, towards the printed book which lay open 
on the table, and his left towards Notre-Dame, and turning a sad glance from 
the book to the church, – “Alas,” he said, “this will kill that.”12 
 
There were between three and six thousand copies of Tyndale’s contraband text, an 
unlikely achievement had each copy been required to be written out by hand.13 While 
                                                 
12 V. Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame. Paris, 1831. 
 http://www.online-literature.com/view.php/hunchback_notre_dame/23?term=printed%20book 
[accessed 14.3.2005]. The book Web Theory: An Introduction, by R. Burnet & P. D. Marshall uses a 
very similar passage as an introduction to one of its chapters. Significantly in the context of this 
analysis we have chosen different translations of the original French by Hugo, and thus present 
different versions of what is the same passage. R. Burnet & P. D. Marshall Web Theory: An 
Introduction. Routledge, London & New York 2003, p. 152. 
13 The copying of these bibles by hand would have been made even more difficult by their relatively 
small size.   238
the distribution and authorisation of the Bible’s text had moved from the exclusive 
hand of one church, the value in controlling this text, and its effect on sovereignty 
was still significant. In 1604 King James I commissioned a new English translation 
of the Bible, stating:  
Could never yet see a Bible well translated in English; but I think that, of all, 
that of Geneva is the worst. I wish some special pains were taken for an 
uniform translation, which should be done by the best learned men in both 
Universities, then reviewed by the Bishops, presented to the Privy Council, 
lastly ratified by the Royal authority, to be read in the whole Church, and none 
other.14 
 
The Geneva Bible was originally translated by William Wittingham, the brother in 
law of John Calvin.15 James I disliked both its Calvinist tendencies, and what were 
seen as the seditious marginal notes on some political texts, which conflicted with his 
doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings specifically two passages, Exodus 1:9 where a 
margin note stated that it was right in some circumstances to disobey the King and 2 
Chronicles 15:16, which had notes to the effect that the King was not infallible.16 
While control of the text as a purely Latin script was no longer an issue at this time 
the control of the text, now in the secular local language, is still clearly understood as 
important.17 In King James’ statement, the importance of using the Bible, as decried 
by ‘royal authority’ to enhance to sovereign power of that authority, and the casting 
of aspersions on other attempts to do the same, particularly those that presented a 
                                                 
14 L. M. Vance, A Brief History of English Bible Translations. USA: Vance Publications 1993. 
http://www.av1611.org/kjv/kjvhist.html [accessed 15.3.2004]. 
15 Wittingham was one of a number of Protestants driven from England who took refuge in Geneva 
during the reign of Mary I (1516-1558), some fifty years before the reign of James I. The differing 
interpretations of this Queen’s legacy can still be found on the Internet between Protestant and 
Catholic-affiliated sites. Good examples being G. DeMar, ‘The Geneva Bible: The Forgotten 
Translation’, http://www.reformed.org/documents/geneva/Geneva.html [accessed 16.3.2004] for the 
Protestant interpretation and  H. Thurston, ‘Mary Tudor’, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09766a.htm [accessed 16.3.2004] for the Catholic.  
16 G. DeMar, ‘The Geneva Bible: The Forgotten Translation’, 
http://www.reformed.org/documents/geneva/Geneva.html [accessed 16.3.2004].  
17 Interestingly much of this translation, the King James Bible, was based on the earlier Tyndale Bible 
(for which he was seventy years earlier, put to death), meaning that much of the syntax used was 
already dated at the time of publication.   239
discourse that might undermine the authority of the local sovereign, is clearly 
evident. 
 
The advent of rival discourses of religion, and the Bible being translated into secular 
language created a number of strains on the European ruling order, resulting in wars 
between rival sovereigns, supporting rival interpretations of the ‘Word of God’. 
Following the Thirty Year War 1618-1648 over this issue (during which some early 
estimates put the death toll at up to 75% of the population of Germany)18 the Peace 
of Westphalia of 1648 between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France 
bound both the text of religion and sovereignty into space in the form of the Nation 
State. 
                                                 
18 This has been more recently revise to the much lower, but still shockingly high 15-20%.  
G. Parker, The Thirty Years War. London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.  
General Mertaigne in Nassau said of the aftermath of the war, ‘I would not have believed a land so 
despoiled had I not seen it with my own eyes’. C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War. London: J. 
Capre, 1938.   240
The Nation State: the Sovereign in Space 
 
Figure 59 
Europe in 1648, Peace of Westphalia 
http://www.reisenett.no/map_collection/historical/Europe_1648_Westphal_1884.jpg  
[accessed 29.5.2004] 
 
The Peace of Westphalia is also known as the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, the 
two cities where the treaty was determined (two were needed since the leaders of the 
Protestant and Catholic forces refused to meet each directly). Prior to this Treaty the 
Thirty Year War had been driven by a contest between rival trans-national discourses 
of religion. The decline in authority of the church over the state had been going on 
for some time, but with this Treaty the primacy of the state was explicitly laid down, 
and power ceded from the church to the state. Anderson describes the implications of 
this Treaty: 
in Western Europe the eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of 
nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought.19  
                                                 
19 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Revised Edition. London & New York: Verso, 1991, p. 11.   241
 
The most important aspect of the Peace was that it made the state sovereign within 
its territory, providing the basis for the Nation State as it is currently understood. 
This sovereign state’s authority was bound within its physical territory which would 
end at the border of the next sovereign state or at the coast. In this case the limits of 
identity, being defined by what one is not, in a very concrete manner. Within each 
state, the sovereign had the sole monopoly of legitimate violence. The Treaty also 
bound the rival religious discourse within space. Each prince or sovereign had to 
choose the religion or discourse that they would adopt. If at any point this was to 
change, then under the terms of the Peace they would no longer be considered the 
legitimate ruler of that nation. Thus the ability of one discourse to encroach on the 
physical territory occupied by another was greatly diminished.  
 
Nearly three hundred years later in 1945, the Charter of the United Nations, 1
st 
chapter Article II, further reinforced this notion of the sovereignty of the nation, even 
though international matters between member states are to be within its domain, the 
individual member nations retain absolute authority within their domestic (and 
sovereign) territory. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.20 
 
The transnational nature of the Internet comes into conflict with this understanding 
of the Nation State’s sovereignty in space. The transition to this new form of secular 
authority also changed the way individual citizens would identify with the state. One 
                                                 
20 The Charter of the United Nations.  http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ [accessed 9.7.2005].   242
of the implications of this can be seen in the enlightenment interest in the study of 
folk history, national mythology and poetry as the nation sort to define itself as an 
entity outside the understanding provided through religious discourse. The 
development and interest in the national epic, such as the Kalevala in Finland, and 
the wider interest in folk poetry and song arising out of the National Romantic 
Movement of the late Eighteenth Century can be seen as developing out of this 
project. 
Image Removed 
 
Figure 60 
Time by Dave McKean 
http://www.dreamline.nu/theparticletarot/ 
[accessed 7.6.2005] 
 
The Evolution of the Citizen and the State: the Sovereign in Time 
The sovereign Nation State is not only bound to space, but in time. The most obvious 
manifestation of this occurs when the power of sovereign authority transfers from   243
 one ruler or ruling group to another, whether this be through the ascension to the 
throne of the new hereditary ruler, the transfer of power following parliamentary 
elections, or the passing of power from one president to their successor. These 
occasions are usually infused with a high degree of ceremony. They both legitimise 
the new ruler in the eyes of the population, and cement and codify the transfer of 
authority over legitimate violence. The manner of the sovereign coming to power 
defines the legitimacy of their rule. If there is no acknowledged legitimacy, then the 
potential for rival power structures and a break in the monopoly of legitimate 
violence become a threat to the state.  
 
For physics, time is a function of the gravitational field, however in different social 
frameworks time will manifest in different ways. In a feudal framework, time is 
seasonal, following the seasons of each year, and being a measure of when to sow 
and when to harvest. In a capitalist or modern framework time is linear. It measures 
the working day, and productive efficiency. In a post-modernist framework time is 
cyclical, it bends, loops and repeats. Marx described the development of production 
through Feudal, Capitalist, and Post Capitalist modes. However time can also be 
used to track the changes in the modes of citizenship as the understanding of 
sovereignty has evolved. 
 
Prior to the sovereign being bound in space, citizenship was less tightly defined 
ideologically and varied widely in its definition, application and mobilisation. For 
many of the less advantaged in society, this meant that they were bound to a smaller 
area within the nation, such as medieval peasants bound to service in the lands of one 
noble, or the residents of one town. For others, this situation allowed relative   244
freedom to travel under the jurisdiction of supernational sovereigns such as the 
Latin-speaking elite of pre-reformation Europe. This can also be seen in earlier 
formations such as the Roman Empire. St Paul, a Roman citizen was able to travel 
the Empire proselytising his then subversive discourse of Christianity. When he fell 
on the wrong side of Roman troops in Jerusalem and they went to flog him they 
found themselves unable to take such actions against a Roman citizen.21 
 
Figure 61 
St Paul Preaching in Athens, painting by Raphael. 
http://www.artofeurope.com/raphael/rap15.htm 
[accessed 21.6.2004] 
 
Once the Nation State is given pre-eminence in relation to sovereignty over its 
territory each citizen becomes enmeshed in the order created by the sovereign’s 
monopoly on legitimate violence within that national territory. While it is possible to 
                                                 
21 Acts 22: 24-29. http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Acts%2022;&version=31; 
[accessed 14.6.2005].   245
travel from one sovereign’s territory to another (and indeed the sovereign can choose 
to banish individuals from their territory) generally the sovereign and the individual 
citizen will remain within the same territorial space, the individual bound by the laws 
of the state, and the state having responsibility for the citizens with in its territory.  
 
Figure 62 
Mahatma Ghandi attending the Round Table Conference in London, 1931 
http://www.mahatma.org.in/pictures/showpics.jsp?picture=piccat0006&link=ph&id=46&cat=pictures 
[accessed 21.6.2004] 
 
Mahatma Ghandi was born in the periphery of the British Empire as a citizen of 
India in 1869. He was sent by his family to London to study law. While Ghandi was 
able to travel to London, the core of Empire, where the Emperor of India resided, he 
did so as a citizen of a Nation State on the periphery, and took that layer of 
disadvantage with him manifest in his passport. Later in life, after time in South 
Africa, another Nation State at the periphery of Empire, Ghandi returned to India. He 
was then able to mobilise the Nation State as a site of resistance to British rule. What 
he did was turn the formation that had previously been used by Britain as a method   246
of domination into the site of resistance to this rule, crossing through ethnic and 
religious lines that might otherwise divide the Indian citizenry. 
 
The digital citizen is enabled through the digital self and its multiple digital 
identities. While the off screen self is still resident within a Nation State, and in the 
world constructed by the Treaty of Westphalia, these projected identities reach 
outside of this construct through the Internet, and may interact across the jurisdiction 
of multiple Nation States simultaneously. These identities are not subject to the 
monopoly of legitimate violence expressed by any one state, but rather engage with 
the discourse of digital citizenship and sovereignty when constraining their actions to 
interact and exist alongside others within this environment.  
 
 
Figure 63 
David Cake 
http://www.orkut.com/ 
[accessed 5.8.2004] 
David Cake works for a sound production studio in New York maintaining their 
computer system He does so through reaching out with his projected digital self 
through the Internet from his home in Perth, Western Australia. When doing so, he 
utilises other online resources housed within yet other Nation States. His work’s 
relationship to the laws of any one of these nations as they apply to occupational   247
health and safety, workers compensation insurance and even taxation is ambiguous. 
Were any of these states in which he ‘resides’ while at work to try to regulate his 
activity, their ability to firstly identify who he is through his various digital identities 
on the one hand, and then take any coercive action to enforce their will on him, on 
the other, would be highly constricted. As well as being an active digital citizen, 
Cake is actively involved in influencing the discourse of sovereignty as a member of 
the board of Electronic Frontiers Australia.22 
 
Sovereignty and the Invisible Empire 
Historically, the sovereign has been represented by a head of state, symbolic of the 
legitimisation of the potential violence that they represent, they can take the form of 
a King, a Governor General, a Parliament, or a President. They have control of the 
monopoly of legitimate violence within the territory that the state is bound. For 
Hobbes this serves to save the residents of that territory from the state of nature, for 
those who drafted the Treaty of Westphalia it served to end the struggle between 
rival religious discourses over territory that lead to the Thirty Year War.23 
 
The digital self, while sharing characteristics with the off screen self, is not the same, 
the transformation to the digitised environment of the Internet has implications for 
the understanding and manifestation of space, time and identity. Importantly also for 
the individual, and for understanding sovereignty, violence is activated differently. 
                                                 
22 ‘EFA Board Members 2004/05’, http://www.efa.org.au/AboutEFA/board.html [accessed 
14.6.2005]. 
23 While the Nation State as conceived in this Treaty did end this period of war, the most destructive 
wars in human history have all been fought subsequent to this time. As Anderson put it ‘The century 
of enlightenment, of rationalist secularism brought with it its own modern darkness’ B. Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition. 
London & New York: Verso, 1991, p. 11.   248
This is critical when talking about legitimate violence. This is normally physical or 
economic violence against the self. This is the type of violence that works least well, 
or not at all, in the digital environment. Economic violence; fines, confiscation of 
assets, and taxation, is itself reliant on the ability to apply physical violence for 
enforcement. This is not an option in the digital environment. Additionally 
identifying, and locating the analogue off screen individual behind an individual 
digital identity, and then a broader digital self, can also create problems. Thus it is 
not just a matter of not being able to exert physical force on an individual, but also 
identifying any particular individual to direct any sanction at. Without the violence 
that is the foundation of the analogue sovereign, new methods of determining the 
rules that let citizens live side by side, and thus save them from some digitised state 
of nature, must be negotiated. 
 
The Internet exists in a mode of space not conceptualised or permitted by the Peace 
of Westphalia. As a result, it falls outside of the world order that was determined by 
that Treaty, and which is separate from the conception of space that the modern 
Nation State relies upon for its foundation. While it is true that there are areas that 
exist outside the sovereign state as defined in the Treaty (international waters of the 
sea are controlled under the law of the sea, amongst others), these spaces are bound 
up in the worldview determined by that Treaty. The Treaty of Westphalia ended a 
bloody period in European history, while officially ending the Thirty Year War there 
had been a number of preceding bloody and protracted conflicts. This instability 
occurred as sovereignty was being renegotiated as the power of the Roman Catholic 
Church, itself resting on the residue of the Roman Empire, had its previous   249
monopoly of the religious discourse challenged. This type of world is profoundly 
unstable destructive of structures, literature and culture.  
 
While other spaces exist outside the Nation State, the Internet is unique because it 
also exists within multiple Nations States, the Internet manifests, through its myriad 
gateways, in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. Within each of these 
jurisdictions, there is a sovereign with a monopoly of legitimate violence. This has 
two effects. Firstly any Internet sovereign operating outside the Nation State system 
would violate this monopoly of violence (only one can exist at a time in any one 
place). Similarly the second impact of this is that no individual analogue sovereign 
can attempt to exercise their monopoly of legitimate violence on the Internet, as they 
would then be violating the sovereignty of other Nation States where the Internet 
manifests simultaneously. Thus nations make laws relating to Internet content 
hosted, and in some cases accessed, within their jurisdiction, but these laws must 
necessarily act on the ‘user side of the screen’. If the nation deems content unlawful 
it has limited recourse, it can make it illegal to access within its territory, and attempt 
to block the content through its domestic telecommunications system, but it could 
not go out onto the Internet and destroy the content in some other Nation State 
without violating that second state’s sovereignty. This is particularly interesting as 
the Internet, through its domain name system is segregated into individual national 
domains such as .au, and .uk. Yet any action by a Nation State to exercise 
sovereignty in regard to these domains would infringe on content hosted in the 
territory of other Nations States. This has, up until now, prevented any nation from 
testing the limits of national sovereignty in this area.  
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As a consequence of this overlapping space of sovereignty through the Internet there 
can, in effect, be no Internet sovereign as the term is understood in the analogue 
environment.  The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace in 1996 did not 
envisage a situation where there would be an armed struggle to overcome the 
existing sovereignty of the analogue world, rather it rejected the analogue worlds 
sovereignty in the digital environment and indeed any sovereign power at all. 
However civil society needs to be supported through the potential violence of the 
state. When such theories are applied to the Internet, the results are unstable. 
 
If the Internet manifests in a space outside that which the Nation State inhabits, then 
who or what is the Internet’s sovereign power? Where, and who, is the Digital King? 
Gandhi observed ‘all reforms owe their origin to the initiation of minorities in 
opposition to majorities’.24 The dominant discourse relies on the fresh ideas and 
agitation of subordinate discourses to maintain itself, and to periodically be 
‘freshened up’ and maintain its dominant position. However when looking at the 
power structures on the Internet, this is not the situation at all. Rather there are 
competing forces trying to exercise or influence sovereignty, the laws of how things 
are determined in the online environment. Like rival nobles during the War of the 
Roses, each has different levels and types of influence or sovereign power, and they 
are all competing for influence. Rather than a dominant discourse with subordinate 
rivals, there are different groups supporting rival discourses, with no clear 
domination of any one group. William Gibson in Neuromancer25 imagined such a 
situation occurring in the off screen world as well as in cyberspace. In such a 
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situation there is no king, no symbol of the legitimate and exclusive power of the 
sovereign. While not quite the Hobbesian state of nature, it is clear that rather than 
form the foundation of order, digital sovereignty is in a constant state of flux and 
change.  
 
Why then is there no Digital King? The first place to look for the answer to this 
question is to the early users who set the foundations of the grammar or foundation 
discourse of Internet governance. At first, it seems their understanding of the 
sovereign has either failed or been overthrown, however closer examination shows 
that this is not the case. Rather the discourse put in place by this group was one of a 
civil society with no state or sovereignty structure. Indeed the sovereign state is 
explicitly rejected. The declaration of independence of Cyberspace, rather than an 
invitation to war to win sovereignty from any nation, rejects the notion of any form 
of sovereignty in cyberspace. 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I 
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather. 
 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address 
you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. 
I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of 
the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor 
do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.26 
 
Why was this determination the case? Violence against the person is a complicated 
proposition in the digitised environment. If there is no threat of violence, then why 
would civil society need to be underpinned by a sovereign with the recourse to 
legitimate violence for the protection of all? Unfortunately there is violence, in terms 
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of crimes against self, property and state, however violence in a digitised context is 
different to that off screen. The potential threat for physical harm to the person for 
example is highly unlikely, where as economic loss is more likely.27 While it is easy 
to destroy a simple copy of something online, is not like destroying something off 
screen, digitised content does not have a constancy of production, this does not mean 
that there are not losses and damage that can occur on screen. Civil society requires 
the potential of violence to maintain its power, so as not to break down. This is the 
inherent flaw in this initial discourse of the governance of the Internet.  
 
The case study of Mr_Bungle and LambdaMOO provides an example of the 
complexity of the problems faced. LambdaMOO represented a far more controlled 
environment than the wider Internet. As with the early adaptors to the Internet, the 
players viewed that there was no possibility of violence against the person, and thus 
could see no reason for a sovereign to exercise violence to maintain their civil 
society. However Mr_Bungle demonstrated that there could be criminal behaviour in 
this environment. In this case there was a digital sovereign with ultimate authority, 
and the monopoly on ‘digital’ violence in the form of the games wizards or systems 
operators. However even when this violence was exercised and Mr_Bungle was put 
to his digital death, the limits of this sovereignty soon became obvious as the player 
existed off screen beyond the reach of the LambdaMOO sovereign, and rejoined the 
game as another character from a different email address. 
 
This rejection of the monopoly of legitimate violence as represented by the state is 
further complicated by the fact that the users of the Internet exist off screen in the 
                                                 
27 This however does not mean that the Internet cannot be used as a means of distributing the produce 
of physical violence off screen, such as child pornography or terrorist executions.   253
world of the analogue sovereign. Ultimately, they live in the jurisdiction of a Nation 
State. This is also true of the data that comprises the digital world. However data’s 
ability to relocate, and be remotely copied through different jurisdictions, the 
fundamental benefit of digitisation, makes this much more problematic in terms of 
interaction with the analogue sovereign, and the ability of this entity to bring its 
monopoly of violence to bare on this type of creature. How then is authority 
constructed in the Invisible Empire and what, if any, is the place of the analogue 
Nation State in this process? 
 
Jock Given labels Barlow’s position as revolutionary lawlessness, or digital 
libertarianism. This is contrasted with two positions he labels revolutionary 
constitutionalism  and  evolutionary constitutionalism.28  Lawrence Lessig, an 
advocate of the revolutionary constitutionalism position as outlined by Given, 
explains:  
Liberty in cyberspace, will come not from the absence of the state. Liberty 
there, as anywhere, will come from a state of a certain kind29 
 
Lessig’s position seeks to create a new political structure on the screen, utilising a 
new relationship between the state and the citizen. By contrast the evolutionary 
constitutionalism position, as outlined by Given involves the modest modification of 
existing laws and relationships to allow their smooth application on the screen.  
 
Analogue sovereigns may choose to frame their laws in relation to the digital 
environment on the basis of these three categories. However, as argued throughout 
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this thesis, each individual accesses the Internet alone at the screen. It is at the point 
of access that the digital citizen interprets the discourse of digital sovereignty that 
will determine their activation of citizenship. There will be a number of different 
forces influencing that discourse at any point in time, with different histories and 
agendas. 
 
Digital Sovereignty 
 
Figure 64 
Crown Pictures 
http://www.crownintlpictures.com/  
[accessed 18.3.2004] 
 
One cannot be the Digital Sovereign. Instead it is possible only to exercise digital 
sovereignty. Not a noun – a verb – doing not being. Therefore, it cannot be an 
identity – but only facilitate an identity. To the extent that there is violence on the 
Internet, and reaching out from there off screen, this violence is by no means a 
monopoly, and its legitimacy is subject to contest. As with citizenship, sovereignty 
moves from being a noun when referring to an analogue sovereign to a verb as 
sovereignty is exercised actively and competitively online. For the Internet there is 
no crown, no symbol of authority. Ultimately off screen the sovereign is always a 
symbol rather than an individual, or a government. This is embodies in the transfer of   255
power at the death of the monarch. ‘The King is dead, long live the King!’ However 
the symbol represents the foundation of power of the Nation State, its monopoly of 
violence. When conceptualising the sovereign, or the exercise of sovereignty, the 
signifier of the discourse is underpinned by the signified of this recourse to violence 
to enforce the analogue sovereign’s laws. Once online however the discourse of 
sovereignty represents signifiers, the form of a discourse that is not underpinned by 
the signified or content of the recourse to violence. 
 
This digital sovereignty has no signified foundation, no determination of a fixed 
content from an ambiguous signifier, specifically the crown, and the monopoly of 
legitimate violence that it represents. Rather there are only signifiers, different 
discursive arguments about legitimacy, with no content of enforcement to fall back 
on. Charles I relied on the discourse of the Divine Right of Kings as the signifier to 
underpin his reign. There was insufficient military force to act as the signified 
content to support his discourse, and as a consequence of inhabiting the off screen 
world where physical violence is a real option, he lost his throne, and his head. 
However on the Internet there is no physical violence against the individual that 
could act this type of signified content. Thus there can be no signified threat of 
violence to underwrite the signifier of the sovereign, rather only signifiers of 
sovereignty that dance together to produce the discourse of sovereignty. The colonial 
administration of the Internet that sets its standards and distributes its virtual real 
estate was set-up with this empty centre in mind, the civil service without a state. 
 
Those who initially set the grammar of the digital civil society viewed the lack of 
defined central authority as a positive attribute. There was no need for protection   256
from violence. No violence was possible. This must be seen in the context of the 
economic position of that group and their understanding of the distribution of 
resources in this environment. For them, the Internet was a repository of social 
capital. Everything produced and stored on it added to this social capital, which 
benefited all (or more accurately, all who could access it). Significantly they did not 
make their own wealth online, rather as academics and researchers employed by 
industry and universities, they made and stored their personal wealth off screen. 
While they could add content to the Internet, and assumed it would be available 
freely, at the same time, it did not cost them anything as their income was derived 
and stored externally to this environment. In many cases, this shared information 
made their work more efficient, a classic effect of social capital, but once again their 
income and wealth, while related to this, was not derived from it. One of the most 
famous examples of this group is Linus Torvolds, who released the open source 
Linux operating system in 1991. He wrote the code while a computer science student 
at the University of Helsinki. 
 
Figure 65 
Tux the Penguin, the official Linux Mascot 
http://www.isc.tamu.edu/%7Elewing/linux/ 
[accessed 8.6.2005] 
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The increasing commercialisation of the Internet as it spreads beyond the community 
of these early adaptors resulted in the Internet evolving into a place where private 
capital was stored and generated. Once this colonisation by capitalism occurred, the 
original discourse of the on screen civil society with no need for a sovereign to 
underpin and provide the signified content of a recourse to violence to enforce laws 
began to crumble. The need for the protection of private goods, rather than just the 
mutual distribution and storage of social goods, meant that the space envisaged by 
these early adaptors was unable to provide the foundation for the regulation and 
protection of this new private capital. Adding to this fracturing process was the 
properties of the digital private capital now being traded. Without a constancy of 
production the investment in digital goods occurs in the creation or development 
phase, rather than in the reproduction of the goods themselves, which can easily be 
copied at virtually no cost. To view digital property necessarily creates of copy of it. 
This generates a fundamental conflict between the generation of digital goods, and 
their distribution. 
 
This period of commercialisation tracked massive growth in the online population. 
Following this change in the total number of Internet users was a corresponding 
change in the demographic and political activity of this new group. Those who had 
previously been excluded by wetware or cultware, were now able to take advantage 
of the relative ease of access provided through the World Wide Web, and the greater 
distribution of the hardware and infrastructure to gain access. While still engaged in 
political decisions as digital citizens this new population did not necessarily share the 
activist ideology of the early adaptors. The Internet as an empowered literacy is 
integral to the aspirational class and their children, a skill to be obtained. While the   258
Internet is an important enabling literacy for this group, they are perhaps less devoted 
to the ideology of the technology more prevalent in the early adaptors. A recent 
study of connectivity found that it only took an average of five to six emails to 
connect any two people on the Internet, which at first might suggest that it is quite 
easy to communicate with the online population, however the study initiated 24 000 
email chains of which only 400 were completed due to the people involved lacking 
interest.30 As the online population grew, the nominated sign moved from the elite 
signification of the few online, to the disadvantage of those who continued to be 
excluded. 
 
Off screen entities that perform different roles in the economy are only in 
competition with similar entities. When they are not in competition, they are not a 
threat to each other. Two bakeries on the same street will compete for customers for 
their bread, but will not be in competition with the clothing store located between 
them. This is partly a function of the constancy of production of off screen goods. 
However on the Internet, entities can be at economic odds with each other over their 
different and competing interpretations of the discourse or modes of capitalism. Thus 
one company can generate content, and be at odds with another company that 
distributes content. With no central authority to decide who is correct, both must 
struggle for control of the discourse and the dominant interpretation of digital 
citizenship. 
 
The struggle for the discourse can be distilled into the struggle within an 
understanding of private capital between rewarding different entities who develop 
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distribute content and information, and balancing this struggle against the benefit to 
society of the free flow of information, and the generation of social capital. The 
hacker’s creed ‘Freedom of Information’ explicitly rejects the ownership of 
information, but at the same time the majority of those who subscribe to this creed 
did not generate their income on the Internet, but rather off screen. To take a paid 
position generating private capital online would be seen, within this understanding, 
as a sell out.  
 
Wealth is now both generated and stored on the Internet. There is virtual property, 
production, goods, services, and currency. All these ‘things’, objects of private 
capital, exist and importantly, they can be taken away. Off screen, the Nation State 
has control of wealth within its jurisdiction, how it is generated, distributed, taxed 
and transferred. Political power and economics cannot be separated. The conflict 
between the residue ideology of the pre-commercialised Internet generating 
primarily social capital and these new ‘land owners’ of private capital on the Internet 
and the struggles that occur within this group of new capitalists over the legitimate 
discourse of commerce on the Internet is at the heart of the struggle for control of the 
discourse of sovereignty. Because physical violence does not occur on screen it is 
very hard to exercise violence to achieve desired outcomes, a state cannot just invade 
cyberspace. Because the crown is explicitly absent, and violence is not an option, the 
struggle becomes a unique and very complex one.  
 
Physical violence can be utilised off screen to leverage activities in the digitised 
world, however success is far from guaranteed. Once again the monopoly of 
legitimate violence only exists within one jurisdiction, and moving from one   260
jurisdiction to another through the Internet is relatively easy. While this may be 
overcome to an extent with sufficient corporate resources, such as the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA), the discourse of the early adaptors has the 
advantage as the foundation grammar. This gives them an inherent edge when 
arguing in an analogue court, as they can point to ‘the way things have always 
operated’. While this may aid one side of a debate when social and private capital 
come into conflict on the Internet, these conflicts are most often driven in the first 
instance by competing understandings of private capital that then inadvertently 
impinge on the social capital that is still found in this realm.  
 
Within this complex environment some of these competing digital sovereigns are 
highly literate. The RIAA has launched litigation against the file sharing software 
KaZaA in multiple jurisdictions in North America, and Europe, and most recently the 
company’s head office in Sydney was raided by Australian authorities. The majority 
of cases in the northern hemisphere have so far ended in KaZaA’s favour, although 
this has not deterred the RIAA from pursuing the organisation in the territory of 
other analogue sovereigns. KaZaA however also makes use of the multiple 
jurisdictions available in the off screen environment.  
 
Figure 66 
KaZaA 
http://www.kazaa.com/us/index.htm  
[accessed 15.6.2005] 
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KaZaA is a file sharing system. It allows individual users to search for files on other 
individual’s computers and then download a copy, or ‘share’ them. This was a 
similar system to that used by Napster to allow individuals to share music MP3 files, 
although KaZaA does not focus specifically on music. Peer to peer file sharing or 
P2P represents one paradigm or discourse of information on the Internet. This 
discourse assumes that users will ‘share’ information that they ‘own’ by virtue of it 
being digitised on their computer systems. This assumes that the information being 
shared is free from copyright, or that copyright laws do not apply/matter in these 
cases. By contrast, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the 
Recording Industry Association of America have been active in trying to shut down, 
and have declared illegal, this paradigm and these companies in particular, with 
famous success in the case of Napster. They represent strongly the alternate 
discourse that people using this system are stealing theirs, and others, copyright in 
these instances. 
 
Figure 67 
Motion Picture Association of America 
http://www.mpaa.org/home.htm  
[accessed 14.6.2005] 
 
KaZaA makes an interesting case study in itself in the trouble with applying 
traditional analogue sovereignty to the Internet based digital environment. A Dutch 
company, FastTrack consisting of a Dutch and Danish partner, first formed the   262
company to operate KaZaA. They then subcontracted writing the code to a group of 
three young Estonians. They originally, in 2001, were distributing their software 
through three organisations based in Tennessee, in the United States, the 
Netherlands, and the West Indies. The pair ran into legal trouble, first with the music 
industry in The Netherlands, who they eventually successfully defeated in the courts, 
and then in the United States. Soon after this ruling, KaZaA was sold to a Sydney 
based businesswoman, Nikki Hemming, who bought the business in 2002.31 Since 
then its United States based arm has closed down, the controlling company has been 
registered in Vanuatu (apparently for tax reasons), and it may or may not have a 
central server on the Caribbean Island of Nevis, depending on whose version of how 
the software operates you believe (the company will not release any details as they 
are considered commercially confidential). The main web site distributing the 
software operates out of Denmark. The program is used extensively in the United 
States, where it faces legal action from the RIAA and MPAA amongst others, but the 
company’s international distribution through space and jurisdiction has greatly 
hampered this process.
32 
 
Many of the conflicts that occur in relation to the Internet mirror existing struggles 
that have already been fought off screen, such as the courts approving the use of 
video cassette recorders to copy TV content, and the inability of the content 
producers in this case to sue the manufacturers of these devices. The significant 
difference is that once the digitised version has been created, it can be copied, many 
times, and virtually no cost. Similarly this provides for physical violence to be a 
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much weaker remedy for the courts, as unless all copies are confiscated or destroyed 
then the program/product can easily be replaced, and it is easily moved from one 
sovereign territory to another. 
 
A copy of KaZaA is simply that, a copy. Replication costs nothing (as opposed to a 
VCR or even a VCR tape). The expenses have been paid in development. It can 
move, or more accurately, be copied into a new sovereign territory off screen should 
the one it currently inhabits become hostile. Of course the fact that all the cost was in 
development, means that if the developer is to receive any reward then their 
copyright must be rewarded in some way, and for these very same reasons that can 
become problematic. 
 
One model to theorise and track the early adaptors is found within the history of the 
Catholic Church in pre-reformist Europe. For both their discourses provided a stable 
environment within the context of their situation. However this initial structure was 
unable to cope with the influence of rival and incompatible discourses. For the 
Catholic Church, this came in the form of the reformist movement. For the discourse 
set in place by the early adaptors on the Internet it was private capital, and 
capitalism. As Gerry Blackwell states of this new struggle over control of 
information ‘I’m thinking this is the next Hundred Years War.’33 However the 
transformations that occur when dealing with the digital environment and the digital 
citizens circulating within it, make this struggle fundamentally different to those that 
have gone before. Whereas the religious discourses were able to mobilise their 
struggle around the Bible as a text of sovereignty, interpreting the ‘Word of God’, 
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this occurred when texts were bound, like the fruit of knowledge from the Garden of 
Eden, in off screen space, as were the citizens the discourses sought to constrain and 
control. This allowed for texts to be found and destroyed, and the struggle to play out 
as an armed conflict, with much resulting death and destruction. However it also 
allowed for the solution to the struggle as the discourses became even more firmly 
imbedded in the analogue world, as they were bound in space at the Peace of 
Westphalia. In the digital environment the absence of the off screen physical 
presence of the individual digital citizens results in a situation where on the one hand 
a bloody and protracted armed conflict is unlikely, but also that a concrete solution 
based on a monopoly of legitimate violence, represented by the Nation State is also 
no longer an appropriate option. It creates a space where sovereignty is necessarily 
unstable and subject to continuous negotiation. 
 
Digital sovereignty then is the intimately linked to the discourse of digital 
citizenship. Both describe the active process of engaging with the discourse that 
informs the correct and proprietous way to act in this digital environment. The 
discourse of digital sovereignty and digital citizenship conflate, the label is 
dependent on what action is taking place, actively influencing the discourse of digital 
sovereignty, or interpreting the discourse of digital citizenship. Rival sovereigns 
pressing their agenda inform the discourse through ongoing engagement. Individual 
digital citizens then interpret the result of this at any point in time separately as they 
too engage with the discourse to activate their digital citizenship. The ability of the 
rival forces of digital sovereignty to connect with the digital citizen then becomes the 
signified foundation for their exercise of sovereignty. The weak and transitory nature   265
of this connection then creates a radically different environment to the analogue 
capitalist civil society founded on the sovereign’s police force. 
 
Control of the discourse of sovereignty and citizenship becomes critical for the 
success of rival capitalist ventures in the digital environment. This is the reason that 
some actors seem to focus on areas that otherwise seem trivial, thus record 
companies in the United States suing children and pensioners who have copied one 
of their songs. For them they must cast their rivals as the treasonous Lucifer, and 
themselves as the legitimate throne in heaven. Is the light of the laser in the CD 
burner the proud but damned morning star Lucifer cast out of heaven, or is it the 
light of the world come to shed enlightenment and love from God? In an 
environment with limited recourse to physical violence Hobbes’ theory is turned on 
its head and legitimacy becomes the primary concern, rather than the ability to 
exercise force, covenants can no longer be enforced by the sword. Yet the absence of 
physical violence also leads to a far less threatening digital state of nature, as the 
discourse that underpins the digital society is constantly in flux, it is the control and 
distribution of capital that is at stake, rather than the ‘continual fear, and danger of 
violent death’ that Hobbes predicted off screen. Physical violence is a quality of the 
off screen world. It has been taken out of the foundation of the digital civil society, 
or rather, by definition, could never have been there. 
 
Sovereignty is always exercised at the edges or borders, creating a stable place in 
between for civil society, and the commerce it enables. When a person goes to the 
shop to buy bananas the exchange of goods for money occurs. While ultimately it 
could be argued that this transaction occurs due to the inherent threat of violence   266
from the state to enforce laws against theft, the purchase rarely takes place in an 
atmosphere of fear. The obedience to the law is internalised, the transaction subject 
to Gramsci’s civil rather than political control. Rather the exercise of sovereignty on 
the edge, or at the border where civil society might otherwise break down facilitates 
an exchange that is based on convention and accepted procedure rather than fear of 
arrest. The fluid nature of digital sovereignty creates an environment where the 
‘edges’ are subject to far more movement and negotiation than might be found in the 
analogue Nation State. However the more limited recourse to physical violence on 
the Internet facilitates an environment that is much better suited to withstand the 
strains of this movement. A person is trapped in the middle of a riot, on the wrong 
side of the edges of a stable civil society, experiences physical danger, not the least 
of which is from the state as it attempts to reassert its authority. By contrast, a digital 
citizen is actively involved in negotiating the positioning of the edges and borders of 
the digital civil society. While negotiating the edge or border different digital 
sovereigns will be trying to have their understanding of the borders and regulation 
accepted, this necessarily creates a blurring of those lines under negotiation. While a 
digital citizen might find themselves on the ‘other side’ as defined by some digital 
sovereigns, this is unlikely to place them in any physical danger. The digital self, is 
the projection of the off screen self, whose safety is determined by the space they 
inhabit within the civil society of the Nation State. The stable civil society provided 
by the analogue Nation State provides a safe environment for the off screen 
individual, that are then able to project themselves on screen out through the Internet 
as digital citizens. This effectively underwrites the inherently unstable digital civil 
society on the Internet, by providing a place for the potential violence of the state to   267
serve to protect an off screen individual from violence, and thus allow the freedom of 
the on screen digital citizen to constantly renegotiate the space they inhabit.34  
 
This protection provided by the screen has started to break down as some groups 
attempting to influence the discourse of digital sovereignty, owners of copyrighted 
material, most notoriously the recording industry, both in the United States and in 
Australia, have been actively trying to leverage analogue laws through the screen to 
support their understanding of the discourse of digital citizenship and sovereignty. 
As bandwidth has increased the size of the files that can be easily transferred, the 
recording industry has been joined by the motion picture production industry. This 
then begs the question, who are those trying to influence the discourse? Who are the 
digital sovereigns? 
Image Removed 
 
Figure 68 
The Tower by Dave McKean 
http://www.dreamline.nu/theparticletarot/ 
[accessed 13.6.2005] 
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Who are the Digital Sovereigns? 
Like the rival noble factions in the War of The Roses, with absolute sovereignty 
fractured, the rival digital sovereigns have different levels of power and influence, 
shifting allegiance. With different groups and organisations realigning in relation to 
different issues or different parts of the discourse of sovereignty. There are numerous 
individual digital sovereigns acting to influence the discourse of digital sovereignty. 
There are, however, a number of groups of these entities that act with similar 
motivation and ideology. Both the exercise of sovereignty and the interpretation of 
citizenship are fickle and fluid. The same individual can embody more than one 
discourse, and rapidly move and renegotiate their position. 
 
There is a group that represent the aims and objectives informed by the residue 
ideology of the utopian early adaptors. As Katie Hafner describes them: 
Go back to the beginnings of Arpanet and you find a handful of people with 
roots in academe who embedded their quirks and idiosyncrasies in that culture, 
quirks that will always be there, no matter how many people come later.35 
 
These ideologies can be found represented in organisations such as the Electronic 
Frontiers Foundation, and Electronic Frontiers Australia. These groups lobby for the 
continued use of the Internet as a medium for social capital, and while not 
necessarily hostile to private capital, they oppose actions that effect the distribution 
and generation of social capital in order to protect the vested interests of different 
modes of private capital. This group can be seen as analogous to the Catholic Church 
                                                 
35 K. Hafner, ‘The Epic Saga of the Well’, Wired Magazine. May 1997. 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/ff_well_pr.html [accessed 16.6.2004].   269
in pre-reformist Europe. While they originally held power, that power has been 
fractured. Whereas for the church this was due to a loss in the absolute control of the 
interpretation of the ‘Word of God’, in this case it is the advent of private capital 
tearing at the fabric of a digital civil society conceptualised only to support social 
capital. 
 
Image Removed 
 
Figure 69 
User Friendly by Illiad 
http://www.userfriendly.org/  
[accessed 24.6.2005] 
 
As the early innovators, these individuals and groups had the opportunity to develop 
the grammar of the space where their rival discourses now compete. As such, the 
ideas that they espoused are resistant to change. The importance of getting this 
grammar in place early before the Internet had become commercialised and the 
population of those online, and of digital citizens grow can best be illustrated by the 
difficulty experienced by alternative discourses as they try to alter this early 
grammar. If someone is in a room of one thousand people and they can shout and be 
heard by nine hundred, then their ability to influence the whole room is quite high. If 
the population of the room grows to ten thousand and they can now shout to four 
thousand their absolute reach has grown by some three thousand, but their ability to    270
influence the behaviour of everyone in the room is greatly diminished. Knowledge in 
this context does not lose credibility, but it does lose its applicability. 
 
The analogue sovereigns, the off screen Nation States also act to influence the 
discourse. They exert this influence through leveraging their off screen sovereignty, 
passing laws that while limited to a single sovereign territory, still will have 
influence over those who reside in, or wish to do business with, that territory. Their 
influence can be seen in any number of laws to regulate Spam, gambling, and 
pornography. The level of influence wielded varies widely, from the huge influence 
of the United States, through to countries with virtually no presence in the digital 
environment. Within the United States an example of this type of legislation was the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) 1998,36 was passed to increase legal 
protections of copyright holders of digital content. In Australia the Broadcast 
Services Amendment Bill (Online Services) Bill 1999,37 gave the Australian 
Communications Authority power to issue takedown notices to web sites hosting 
offensive material. 
 
 
Figure 70 
Australian Communications Authority 
http://internet.aca.gov.au/ACAINTER/ 
[accessed 9.6.2005] 
 
                                                 
36 DCMA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act), October 20
th 1998. 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/hr2281_dmca_law_19981020_pl105-304.html [accessed 21.6.2005]. 
37 Broadcast Services Amendment (Online Services) Bill 1999. http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:S-
KACc1wK9sJ:www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet/99077.pdf+broadcast+services+amendment+act&hl
=en [accessed 8.6.2005].   271
The Nation State also has a role in interpreting the discourse. The Norwegian 
government has announced that it was changing the use of computer software in the 
public service, so that propriety formats would no longer be used and that all 
information produced by the government would be available in, and generated by, 
open source software formats. Digital interaction with the Norwegian government, 
unlike many other national governments no longer requires a citizen to pay for a 
software licence from Microsoft.38 
 
A third broad group that influences the discourse comes from the various branches of 
the Internet public service, or more appropriately colonial administration, such as the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and The World 
Wide Web Consortium (WC3). While these bodies often argue that they make 
technical rather than political decisions,39 in this type of environment the two are 
intrinsically linked. Control of this administration is currently in dispute. The attempt 
to usurp control of ICANN by Nation States at the recent World Summit on the 
Information Society, coupled with disputes over control of that domain name registry 
by both the International Telecommunications Union (a transnational organisation 
operating through the United Nations) and VeriSign (a private company that controls 
the distribution of the .net domain name suffix, based in the United States)40 
                                                 
38 ‘Norwegian Minister: Propriety Formats No Longer Acceptable in Communication with 
Government’, Tatle. 27
th June 2005. 
http://www.andwest.com/blojsom/blog/tatle/agenda/2005/06/27/Norwegian_Minister_Proprietary_Sta
ndards_No_Longer_Acceptable_in_Communication_with_Government.html 
39 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media 
International Australia, Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106. 
40 D. McCullagh, ‘ICANN “Disappointed” in VeriSign’, News.Com. 27
th February 2004. 
http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-5166818.html [accessed 2.6.2004].   272
illustrates some of the many different types of organisations are seeking to influence 
this colonial administration, and its ‘technical’ decisions.41  
 
 
Figure 71 
World Wide Web Consortium 
http://www.w3.org/ 
[accessed 21.6.2005] 
 
A fourth group of note are the entities that are promoting their different 
interpretations of how the private capital of the Internet should be regulated. These 
are the digital equivalent of the rival discourse of the reformist church trying to usurp 
the existing order, and lay down their structure, discourses and ideologies. They are 
motivated by the need for a civil society capable of supporting their various 
understandings of capitalism and commerce. While this sometimes involves working 
against the interests of social capital, more often this group of digital sovereigns will 
compete within itself trying to produce an understanding of commerce that supports 
a particular version of ‘legitimate’ commerce. The conflict around the KaZaA file 
sharing network is a potent example of the activities of members of this group. 
 
Digital sovereignty, as expressed through the Internet, is the control, modification 
and management of the discourse of citizenship which enables the digital civil 
society. It determines the relationship between that civil society (and the discourse of 
citizenship) and the individual monopolies of legitimate violence (law enforcement) 
                                                 
41 N. Thomas, Colonialisms Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994. 
E. Said, Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus, 1993.   273
as expressed through multiple Nation States in which the Internet exists. The 
problem therefore is that the definition of the discourse of digital sovereignty is 
necessarily going to be unstable because it is reliant on a series of systems that are 
themselves unstable and up for negotiation. A series of competing institutions and 
organisations are not only debating about digital sovereignty, but the very definition 
of a digital sovereign.  
 
Who Controls the Grammar of the Internet? 
Prior to the Guttenberg press books in Europe were hand written, most often by 
religious scholars in Latin. The flow of information was small, and the readership of 
those who could access the information was also limited, the Catholic Church 
exerted its sovereignty to control this information, as can be seen in the earlier 
example of the persecution of Wycliffe. In the pre-secular print environment, where 
books were hand written, the majority of the population when confronted with a 
forbidden text were unlikely to have had the literacy to interpret any subversive 
message that it might contain. In these situations the text was largely symbolic,42 and 
the content was only accessible by the elites. If a book was deemed too subversive it 
could be physically found and destroyed, or locked up (as many were, and are, in the 
Vatican’s library).43 
 
The advent of the printing press allowed for a far greater range of information to be 
produced and transmitted. While the church maintained control to an extent (the 
                                                 
42 Similarly the Catholic Church services were recited in Latin and could therefore not be understood 
by the majority of those who attended. 
43 The Vatican Library can be found online at http://bav.vatican.va/en/v_home_bav/home_bav.shtml 
[accessed 20.7.2005].    274
Gutenberg Bible was church approved and in Latin) the rise of the power of the 
multiple Nation States started erode this level of control. Tyndale had his English 
translation of the Bible printed in Germany for distribution in England. However the 
Nation State was still able to utilise its recourse to physical force to control this 
information, only two copies of Tyndale’s work remain, out of the print run of 
between three and six thousand. The authorities in England at the time sought out 
these texts and punished those who had possession of them, copies were burned at 
special ceremonies in London. 
 
To be able to publish texts off screen requires a certain level of economic resources 
and occurs within the regulated legal framework of a Nation State. The Nation State 
has established laws for dealing with forbidden texts that exist within its off screen 
jurisdiction. The Internet ‘sovereignty’ of any one Nation State has been problematic 
to both define and enforce laws within. Additionally the implications for space, time 
and identity of this environment make finding ‘where’ a text is located, as well as the 
identity of the author and publisher much harder to determine, let alone locate off 
screen, and if it can be said to be forbidden in this context, then also punish. Once a 
message or text is released on the Internet, it is very difficult to regain control of, as 
the easily copied attributes of digital information, and its ability to move quickly and 
easily through space make such a task nearly impossible. These characteristics draw 
those who deal in, and produce forbidden texts to this medium. These groups can 
then utilise this medium to get their message across, or trade in these texts. The early 
adoption and continued use of the Internet by the far right on one hand, and 
paedophiles and child pornographers on the other, both being examples of these 
discourses.   275
 
Forbidden Texts 
Walters Diaries were stored in the pornography section of the British Museum. The 
museum’s regulations stipulate that anyone who wishes to read them must do so in 
the company of a museum attendant. They are deemed too subversive for people to 
read alone. These same texts can also be found on the Internet http://www.my-secret-
life.info/index.htm, where the choice of how many people are present with the reader 
is less regulated. Similarly the book Mein Kamph, by Adolf Hitler is banned in 
Germany44 yet can be accessed online at 
http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/. The Nazi propaganda film Triumph of 
the Will is also outlawed in Germany.45 A text description of each shot in the film 
can be found at http://www.geocities.com/emruf4/triumph.html and it is available for 
online purchase at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-
/B00004WLXZ/002-3470941-4924032?v=glance (which is only one example of a 
number of sites that sell copies of this production and can be easily located through a 
simple Google search at the Google Germany website http://www.google.de/).46  
 
There are also more active subversive texts at work through the Internet. At the point 
of access both the human user and the computing device that they are projected 
through can interpret text. A text can speak to one or both of these entities. This has 
                                                 
44 The copyright to the book is owned by the German state of Bavaria which does not permit any 
publication of the book. However selling the book would also be against German laws that prohibit 
books espousing Nazi philosophy from display or sale, with a penalty of up to five years in prison. 
‘Online Sale of Hitler Book Stopped’ The Associated Press. 21
st August 1999. 
45 The film is banned under the same laws that outlaw Mein Kamph. 
46 Within Australia digitisation through the Internet has potentially confused the understanding of 
forbidden texts, as content from television such as Australia’s Funniest Home Videos while legal and 
approved in that context potentially becomes illegal once available online. An individual can 
potentially face ten years jail for downloading such programs, given their depiction of naked children. 
C. Abood, ‘Tackling Child Pornography on the Internet’, Online Opinion 23
rd March 2005. 
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3275 [accessed 14.6.2005].   276
given rise to a new type of outlawed text, the computer virus. In this case the text’s 
subversive message is relayed directly to the computer, often bypassing the operator 
altogether. While some of these are purely destructive pieces of code designed to 
damage networks and delete data, others have a more guided purpose. This can be 
criminal, such as to take control of a machine to send unsolicited email, but also 
political, such as Internet worms designed to launch a denial of service attack on 
Microsoft’s Web site. In this case the text is literally used to attack a specific digital 
sovereign, and limit their ability to communicate their understanding of the discourse 
of digital sovereignty. 
 
While the discourse of digital sovereignty is subject to change there are some areas 
where it has largely been determined. Child pornographers are drawn to the Internet 
as a space that is accommodating to forbidden texts. Within the discourse of digital 
sovereignty, there is wide acceptance that this type of content should be considered 
outlawed.47 Thus many analogue sovereigns work within their own jurisdiction and 
in cooperation with each other to utilise their off screen legitimate violence to 
prevent this type of content being produced, distributed, and procured, through the 
Internet. Similarly many of the other organisations competing for control of the 
discourse of digital sovereignty exercise what power they have to aid this exercise. 
However the fact that such content is still available, albeit in as a widely agreed 
outlawed text, demonstrates the limits of power of digital sovereignty to enforce its 
                                                 
47 M. Ferraro & E. Casey, Investigating Child Exploitation and Pornography: The Internet, The Law 
and Forensic Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier/Academic Press, 2004. 
Australian Parliament: Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Cybercrime Australian 
Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission. Canberra: The Committee, 2004. 
M. Talor & E. Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime. London: Brunner-Routledge, 2003. 
P. Jenkins, Beyond Tolerances: Child Pornography Online. New York: New York University Press, 
2001. 
S. Anderson, ‘Internet child pornography: raids and research’, Youth Studies Australia. December 
2004, volume 23, issue 4, p. 3.   277
dictates. Digital sovereignty is determined at the point of interpretation, at the screen, 
by each individual digital citizen. 
 
The Catholic Church has embraced the Internet. The Vatican library, repository of 
many forbidden texts has its own Web page 
http://bav.vatican.va/en/v_home_bav/home_bav.shtml as does the Vatican Secret 
Archives at http://www.vatican.va/library_archives/vat_secret_archives/index.htm. 
Pope John Paul II had the first papal email address john-paul-ii@vatican.va, although 
it was only turned on for special occasions.48 Speaking in January 2002, The Pope 
said of the Internet: 
The Internet causes billions of images to appear on millions of computer 
monitors around the planet. From this galaxy of sight and sound will the face 
of Christ emerge and the voice of Christ be heard? For it is only when His face 
is seen and His voice is heard that the world will know the glad tidings of our 
redemption…. Therefore… I dare to summon the whole church bravely to 
cross this new threshold, to put out into the deep of the net, so that now as in 
the past the great engagement of the Gospel and culture may show to the world 
“the glory of God on the face of Christ”49 
 
Although he also cautioned: 
The essence of the Internet in fact is that it provides an almost unending flood 
of information, much of which passes in a moment. In a culture which feeds on 
the ephemeral there can easily be a risk of believing that it is facts that matter 
rather than values. 
 
John Paul II’s successor, Benedict XVI can now be contacted at 
benedictxvi@vatican.va.The Holy See first went online on Christmas Day 1995. The 
                                                 
48 Although given that he received 180 000 emails in one day, on the 25th anniversary of his election 
to office perhaps this is understandable. 
49 J. Crampton, The Political Mapping of Cyberspace. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003, 
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server room, located in the Apostolic Palace houses the three main servers named 
after the archangels Michael, Raphael and Gabriel.50 
 
Figure 72 
Saint Isidore of Seville 
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/sainti04.htm  
[accessed 31.12.2004] 
 
There is currently no patron saint assigned to the Internet, however St Isidore of 
Seville 560-636AD.51 known for his writings including an encyclopaedia and 
dictionary, became a candidate for the position in 1999.52 
 
The Catholic Church lost its monopoly on the interpretation of religious discourse, 
the ‘Word of God’, in the face of the reformations challenge to its sovereignty in this 
area. The Treaty of Westphalia attempted to end the bloodshed corresponding to this 
challenge by binding the power of sovereignty in space to the Nation State. However 
just as the Church wielded authority across national borders prior to the Treaty, and 
                                                 
50 DPA, ‘Pope Goes Online’, Sydney Morning Herald. 21
st December 2004. 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/Technology/Pope-goes-online/2004/12/20/1103391704016.html 
[accessed 15.6.2005]. 
51 St Isidore’s symbol is a bee and his memorial is the 4
th of April. 
52 Isidore of Seville. http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/sainti04.htm [accessed 14.6.2005].   279
to a reduced extent following the signing of the Treaty, there has been a long history 
of constructions that have both reached across notational borders and subsumed 
entire nations within their dominion, the empire. One of the signatories of the Treaty 
of Westphalia still bore the title of Holy Roman Empire, harking back to the Empire 
of Rome from nearly a millennia before that time. It was through the expansion of 
the British Empire, and its peers, that the rest of the world came to be ordered under 
the Treaty as discrete Nation States. 
 
While digital sovereignty manifests online, the discourse also interfaces with the off 
screen world of these analogue sovereign Nation State. Similarly the digital citizen 
comes from the projected digital self, itself a projection of a person’s off screen self. 
It is at the point of access that these off screen and on screen formations conflate. It 
is at that point that the race, gender, social position and national residence of a 
person interfaces with their digital identity. It is also at that point that the discourse 
of digital sovereignty interfaces with the analogue Nation State, at the edge of the 
Invisible Empire.   280
Chapter 6  
Core and Periphery: The Invisible Empire 
 
Figure 73 
Where does my loyalty lie if not here?1 
http://www.lordoftherings.net/legend/gallery/ 
[accessed 14.3.2005] 
 
Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, 
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat; 
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, 
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the 
earth! 
– Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West.2 
 
In The Lord of The Rings, Faramir is torn between loyalty to his Nation State of 
Gondor, and his responsibility to the wider empire of men of the west, in its war on 
Sauron. He ultimately chooses to serve his national sovereign, in this case his father 
                                                 
1 The Lord of The Rings: The Return of the King. Written by Peter Jackson, Frances Walsh, and 
Philippa Boyens, directed by Peter Jackson, New Line Cinema, 2003. 
2 Rudyard Kipling Poems. 
http://www.everypoet.com/archive/poetry/Rudyard_Kipling/kipling_the_ballad_of_east_and_west.ht
m [accessed 14.3.2005].   281
the Steward, rather than the best interests of the broader empire. Empires serve to 
break down the understanding of responsibility and citizenship that is contained 
within the borders of the Nation State, and replace it with a more complex 
construction. 
 
When analysing digital sovereignty, the emphasis is placed on how people and 
groups on the screen or ‘through’ the Internet are competing for control. When 
discussing Invisible Empire, the focus of the analysis turns to how this construction 
interfaces with the analogue or off screen world. The digital realm of the Internet 
extends into the territory of many separate analogue sovereigns. This is not a unique 
structure in global political history. Rather, the role of the empire in influencing and 
controlling many separate Nation States is a recurring theme since humans cultivated 
land and lived in permanent settlements. While it is correct that the Invisible Empire 
does not perfectly mirror, track or perpetuate what has gone before, and there are 
many substantial differences, these should be seen in light of changing modes of 
citizenship, and the discursive nature of sovereignty as expressed in the digitised 
environment. The consequential linkage of the analogue sovereign and the discourse 
of digital sovereignty is the Invisible Empire. 
 
The Invisible Empire weakens the sovereignty of the individual Nation State by 
creating trans-national power structures and transcending borders. It exhibits 
expansionist behaviours, spilling outwards in both space and population, and it 
sweeps across the domain of multiple Nation States. The discursive nature of digital 
sovereignty – and digital citizenship – alongside the differences imposed on notions 
of time space and identity in a digitised environment, ensures the Invisible Empire is   282
a different manifestation to its analogue predecessors. Theorizing this cultural 
formation is further complicated by its coexistence in time – and space – with a 
period of American dominion in the world that often causes the Digital and 
American Empires to conflate in people’s minds. This however is not necessarily the 
case, although they do dialogue. In order to better illustrate how the current state of 
play came to be, it is necessary to examine what has gone before, by tracking the 
history of empire, alongside modes of citizenship through time. 
 
The History of the Analogue Empire 
While there have been many empires throughout history and across the globe, this 
analysis provides a focus on Europe and western culture as this provides much of the 
cultural and political landscape from which the Internet has evolved. The concept of 
empire, as distinct from that of the Nation State, describes an entity that holds control 
over a number of territories. Empires involve a projection of power: military, 
economic, and social. An empire also implies an unequal relationship between the 
authority and power at the core and the colonised and disempowered territories at the 
periphery. As Polybius conveys, 
Formerly the things which happen in the world have no connection amongst 
themselves. But since then all events have a common bundle (sic.)3 
          
 
Polybius was writing of the rise of the Roman Republic in 200 BC. The Empire of 
Rome existed prior to the modern understanding of the Nation State by more than 
1500 years. However the concept of citizenship was central to the Empire, stemming 
from the time of the Roman Republic, when such citizens were able to determine 
                                                 
3 Polybius, Universal History. as cited in R. Roberson, ‘Mapping the Global Condition: Globalisation 
as a Central Concept’, M. Featherstone (ed), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and 
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who ruled them via election. Within the Empire, citizenship was either Roman or no 
consequence. The Empire had readily borrowed from the previous Greek and 
Athenian culture that had been dominant in the Mediterranean region, but evolved its 
citizenship to be much more widely interpreted across Empire than the Greek city-
state. The Roman Empire brought with it its technology, learning and language to the 
areas it conquered and colonised. Over time, implanted on these peripheral colonies 
is the imprint of the core, of Roman culture. The transformation of the Greek papyrus 
scrolls in the Library of Alexandria to parchment codices of Latin is perhaps one of 
the earliest examples of changing both hardware and software platforms.  
 
Figure 74 
The Roads of the Roman Empire 
http://college.hmco.com/history/west/mosaic/chapter3/mckay184_map_large.html 
 [accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
While Roman language and culture provided those colonised with education, 
learning and libraries, the foundation of the Empire was the military and trade. The 
Empire was centred on the Mediterranean Sea, yet much of this trade was based on   284
the road network. Similarly this network was used to move troops rapidly around the 
Empire. The military camps that guarded the edges of the Roman Empire were 
designed to be rapidly deployed and reinforced by road should crisis arise.4 
 
Civis Romanus sum – I am a Roman Citizen. 
Initially Roman citizenship was a privilege reserved for those born in the city of 
Rome itself. As the power of the city grew it conquered all of Italy, the people of the 
newly conquered lands were not citizens of Rome, but rather referred to as Latin 
Communities. In 91 BC. this group revolted and part of the settlement of that revolt 
was the granting of citizenship to these people. As the Empire grew, Rome set up 
colonies of Roman Citizens in lands it acquired, often consisting of ex-soldiers who 
were granted land as reward for their service.5 This served to spread Roman custom 
and culture to these areas. In 14 AD., the Roman census under Augustus recorded 
4,937,000 Roman citizens throughout the Empire,6 of which less than one million 
lived in the capital, with majority spread throughout the Empire. From time to time 
Emperors would grant citizenship to specific individuals, and sometimes entire 
communities. In AD. 212 the Emperor Caraculla granted citizenship to the freeborn 
population of the whole Empire.  
 
                                                 
4 ‘The Next American Empire’, The Economist. 18
th March 2004. 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2517421 [accessed 9.4.2004]. 
5 The word colony comes from the Latin colonus, meaning farmer. 
6 W. S. Davis (ed), Readings in Ancient History: Illustrative Extracts from the Sources. Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon, 1912-13, Vol. II: Rome and the West, pp. 166-172. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/14resgestae.html [accessed 21.6.2005].   285
 
Figure 75 
The Roman Empire at its height 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2517421 
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
The Roman Empire contained a pre-Nation State mode of citizenship, one that was 
not bound in space. Roman citizens were free to travel throughout the Empire, 
enjoying the privileges that citizenship brought with it. Citizenship was tied to the 
whole Empire, rather than any nation that made up a part. While Rome encountered 
other city-states with their own understanding of citizenship, notably in Greece, the 
‘other’ by which Roman citizenship defined itself was to be a non-citizen, rather than 
a citizen of another place.   286
 
Figure 76 
Roman Legionnaires 
http://www.vroma.org/~bmcmanus/romanarmy2.html 
[accessed 17.1.2005] 
 
The early empires were geographically continuous7 and made colonies of their 
neighbours so that one could walk from the edge of empire to the core and pass only 
through the imperial territories. This was a necessary function of the place of a well 
equipped and ordered mass of soldiers in asserting the military power of these 
empires. The space occupied by the empire was continuous. The periphery and core 
were spatially determined by literally the distance from the seat of power to the 
frontier borders. There was a lag in time between communication and action, as 
written correspondence would have to be carried from sender to recipient across the 
territory that separated them.8 Within the empire, information moved as fast as all 
other commodities and literally passed through the intervening territory between 
                                                 
7 R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 
15. 
8 For Innis this spatial bias of communications technology explained the expansion of empires from 
Rome through to Britain. H. Innis, Empire and Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1950.   287
sender and recipient. The spatial continuity of empire meant that the identity of the 
core was relatively unproblematic. The centre of power and the ruling elite were at 
the core of empire, and while it was unlikely that each citizen of empire would have 
been able to have access to the emperor, or even know what they looked like, the 
extent of their authority and location of their court were easily established.  
 
While the Roman Empire had its own pantheon of gods and goddesses over time it 
came increasingly under the influence of Christianity. Emperor Constantine became 
the first Christian emperor in 324 AD. Constantine was able to transform Christianity 
from a subversive discourse potentially critical of the Empire into a discourse bound 
into the ruling structures of Empire.9 In 40AD there were 1000 Christians (0.0017% 
of the population of the Roman Empire), by 350AD there were 34 million (56.6% of 
the population of the Roman Empire).10 The residue of the Empire, and the influence 
of Christian religion, and more specifically Catholicism, had a profound effect on 
Western Europe, with the majority of the countries ex-colonies of Rome, or those 
that existed at its borders. One of the signatories to the Peace of Westphalia still bore 
the title of the Holy Roman Emperor, although by that time the Empire had long 
since ceased to be. All empires leave a trace, framework and history for the next 
empire. This residue is also evident in technology. Each new structure is described 
and informed by that which preceded it.  
                                                 
9 G. P. Baker, Constantine the Great: And the Christian Revolution. New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1967. 
R. M. Grant, Augustus to Constantine: The Thrust of the Christian Movement into the Roman World. 
London: Collins, 1971. 
A. Jones, Constantine and the Conversion of Europe. London: English University Press, 1949. 
10 R. Stark, The Rise of Christianity: How the Obscure, Marginal Jesus Movement Became the 
Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a few Centuries. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1997 as cited in J. Meacham, ‘From Jesus to Christ: How did a Jewish prophet come to be seen as the 
Christian saviour? The Epic story of the empty tomb, the early battles and the making of a great faith’, 
Newsweek. March 28
th 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7244999/site/newsweek/ [accessed 
24.3.2005].   288
 
The fracture of the dominance of the Catholic Church in Europe in the face of the 
reformation in the sixteenth century lead to a period of war and instability that 
resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia and the birth of the modern 
understanding of the Nation State, and with it a new mode of citizenship. While this 
Treaty dealt specifically with European countries, in the following 250 years the 
concept would be exported to the rest of the world through European colonialism, as 
one of Rome’s former colonies went on to become an empire in its own right more 
than one thousand years later. 
 
Figure 77 
British Imperial Bases, 1898 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2517421 
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
It was said – quite accurately – that the sun never set on the British Empire. Its 
possessions spanned the globe. In 1909, the Empire encompassed 20% of the world   289
land area, and 23% of its population.11 While in absolute terms the Empire far 
exceeded the power and size of Rome before it, in relative terms, it did not have the 
unrivalled power of Rome. Britain was the first industrial power, but by 1900, it was 
rivalled economically by both Germany and the United States, however the strength 
of the British Empire was in shipping and finance. 
 
Like Rome before it, the British Empire sent citizens from its core to administer and 
in some cases populate the periphery in the colonies. This population then served as 
an example of the culture and indoctrinated the ‘natives’ in what it meant to be 
British and a part of Empire, much as the Romans had spread Roman culture though 
their colonies. The Empire spread its understanding of culture, government and sport 
throughout its colonies. Critically, like the Romans before them, the British Empire 
spread the language of the colonisers throughout the colonies by using it as the 
vocabulary of administration. As with the Roman Empire, this spread of language 
was to prove one of the critical residues that the British Empire would leave in its 
wake.12 
 
                                                 
11 K. L. Ross, ‘The Sun Never Set on the British Empire “Dominion over Palm and Pine”’, 
Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series. http://www.friesian.com/british.htm [accessed 
9.4.2004]. 
12 It is estimated by the British Council that within ten years thee billion people will speak English. 
The dominance of English as a global language has resulted in a situation where currently non-native 
speakers outnumber native speakers by a three to one ratio. C. Power, ‘Not the Queens English’, 
Newsweek International. March 7
th 2005 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7038031/site/newsweek 
[accessed 13.3.2005].   290
 
Figure 78 
The Spread of English 
http://www.sterlingtimes.org/memorable_images36.htm 
[accessed 2.5.2004] 
 
The British Empire substituted Rome’s roads with its shipping lanes, and Rome’s 
Armies with the British Navy, consisting of long range, powerful ships Each empire 
builds on the structures of the former empire. The Nation State as it developed out of 
the Treaty of Westphalia, required that the world be divided up along these lines, 
barriers and divides had to be defined in order to determine the new Nation State 
based mode of citizenship. When a place is colonised or ‘discovered’, the act of 
naming is an act of control. Britain understood this process and used it skilfully. 
Identity is determined and finds its borders by what it is not.13 The Nation State, and 
the mode of citizenship, it embodies requires the development of borders for 
‘otherness’. The relatively large number of nations that still display the Union Jack 
on their flags is testament to the spread of the Nation State under this Empire. By the 
                                                 
13 E. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene. London & New York: Verso, 2002.          
H. K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. London & New York: Routledge, 1994.   291
outbreak of hostilities in the First World War, European powers occupied or 
controlled nine tenths of the land on Earth.14 As Lenin noted in 1916, ‘For the first 
time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is 
possible’.15 Presumably those subject to being ‘divided’ in the periphery might not 
have concurred. 
  
The British Empire was able to use the relatively new political formation of the 
Nation State as an administrative vehicle and a way of limiting liability to its 
colonies. Thus while the Empire would mine away all the natural resources, it was 
then the responsibility of the Nation State to provide for its citizens. Rather than 
grant the Indians British Citizenship, Queen Victoria, the Queen of England was 
made the Empress of India. While India might have been an integral part of Empire, 
there was no corresponding ‘Roman’ citizenship. This concept was now tied to the 
nation, and this mode of citizenship came to dominate the world’s political structure. 
                                                 
14 R. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 2. 
15 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works. London: Lawrence and Wishheart, 1968, p 223, as cited in R. Young 
Postcolonialism, An Historical Introduction Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 2.   292
 
Figure 79 
Peter Pett and the 'Sovereign of the Seas’ by Sir Peter Lely 
http://www.nmm.ac.uk/mag/pages/mnuExplore/PaintingDetail.cfm?letter=P&ID=BHC2949  
[accessed 17.1.2005] 
 
The British Empire consisted of both colonies that were formally controlled from the 
core of Empire, such as Australia, and also countries on the periphery of Empire 
where such formal political control was not present but that were none the less bound 
to the Empire economically. Argentina is a good example of this latter type of 
informal colony. These economies (bound within their own Nation State formations), 
like those under formal colonial rule, were geared to both provide raw materials for 
the Empirial core in Britain, and also as markets for the export of the value added 
manufactured goods that came from those raw materials. In the analogue 
environment, the periphery is always present in the core through trade. Raw produce 
is exported from the periphery to the core, processed, and then re-exported, value   293
added, back to where it came at greater cost, further extracting wealth from the 
periphery and towards the core. 
  
Figure 80 
Advertising Posters from the Empire Marketing Board, May 1928 
 
The British Empire and its contemporary European colonial powers represented a 
new type of empire, the development of naval power meant that colonies were no 
longer required to border on the core. While the sun never set on the British Empire, 
this was the case due to the dispersed nature of that empire throughout the globe 
rather than it spanning a totally of the worlds circumference. In the initial phases of 
the European colonial period communication was limited to the speed at which these 
ships could physically carry word between the empires dislocated territory, however 
at the height of the British Empire, binary information transported through the 
telegraph via Morse Code revolutionised both the speed and corporeality of   294
communication. Information no longer had to traverse the distance between its origin 
and point of delivery like any other commodity, it began to transcend the analogue 
world. Messages could be rapidly relayed between the periphery and core, and all 
nodes in between. As the dislocation of both the possession of territory and 
communication between those spaces becomes greater, the construction of what is 
the core, and what is the periphery becomes further abstracted. While the identity of 
the core remained well established and enforced through colonial settlement and 
administration, its physical presence and marking existed now only at the core. For 
the periphery the core was across the sea and out of sight or experience, except 
through the obvious locally situated colonial apparatus, the institutions and political 
concepts of the coloniser for those subjects. The British colonies, without 
independent access to the technology of transport and communication derived from 
the core, could travel to the seat of empire only through the utilisation of the 
technology of their colonial masters. A place can be claimed and named, but creating 
a meaning and mode of communication is much more difficult. 
 
Within the British Empire, the identity of the occupying coloniser and the colonised 
became further problematised and fragmented as the local governing structures 
became staffed by local people, using the colonial language of governance, in this 
case English, but mirroring Latin and Greek before it. Similarly the periphery starts 
to reinterpret the core within the periphery through not just accepting the colonisers 
sport, religion and education, but actively reinterpreting it.    295
 
Figure 81 
Maori Christ walking on the water of Lake Rotorua – lakeside Anglican Church 
http://www.hnlc.org.au/rensford/current_issues.htm 
[accessed 15.3.2005] 
 
In Aotearoa/New Zealand, Christ is depicted in the Lakeside Anglican Church 
dressed in the fashion of a Maori chieftain in an etching on the church window 
that produces the image of Jesus walking across the waters of Lake Rotorua. 
Maoritanga – Maori culture – translates and negotiates a relationship between 
imposed religion and the indigenous landscape. 
 
This complexity is then further enhanced when different areas of the periphery 
started to interface. Troops used to enforce the power of the core at the periphery of 
empire begin to derive their origin from other areas of the periphery. In some cases 
these troops were derived from colonial settlers, such as the Australian troops 
fighting in the Boer War, but they also derived from indigenous colonised people. 
The Maori battalion at Gallipoli during World War I entered into battle for the ridge   296
at Sari Bair with the traditional war cry ‘Ka mate, ka mate! Ka ora, ka ora.’16 This 
time employed fighting as a contingent of, rather than against, the armies of the 
British Empire. Fighting in the same conflict, but from another place in the periphery 
of empire Gurkha soldiers from India fought alongside Lawrence of Arabia. The 
British army maintains this colonial tradition today with the more than 3000 
Nepalese Gurkhas still serving in the former colonial power’s military. 
 
Figure 82 
Gurkha Soldiers, 1896 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghurka 
[accessed 22.3.2005] 
 
The power of the colonisers is washed from the coloniser’s identity, as the colonised 
begin to fill the role of administrators of colonial power and provide the military 
power required to maintain that authority. The sovereign can only be physically 
present to a small number of their subjects at any one time, this was true for the 
Emperor of Rome as it was for Queen Victoria. As the periphery is removed further 
from the core, and the sovereign becomes an absent crown, the King or Queen’s 
authority resides in the symbols of empire, from the Union Jack on the flag to the 
                                                 
16 W. Gardner, Te Mura O Te Ahi: The Story of the Maori Battalion. Aukland: Reed Books, 1992.   297
regimental crest. The understanding of the colonial process and its agents are 
difficult to discern, with the colonised themselves undertaking the administration and 
enforcement of the process under the supervision of a picture of some distant 
monarch on the wall of the post office and the garrison.  
 
These structures, reinterpreted and appropriated by the locals, then formed the basis 
of resistance to colonisation. Following the decolonisation process that occurred 
following World War II the newly postcolonial states were then left locked into those 
same structures.17 This state Spivak labelled catachresis, a space that the 
postcolonial does not want and yet still must inhabit.18  
A situation of the postcolonial subject is that he of she has to inhabit the 
conceptual cultural and ideological legacy of the colonisation inherent in the 
very structures and institutions that formed the condition of decolonisation.19   
 
While the decolonising process provided a certain level of emancipation for those 
formerly colonised, it can also be seen as a process of merely replacing the portrait of 
King George V of England with that of the new president, and in the many former 
colonies that retained the British monarchy, even the King’s portrait remained in 
place. Postcolonial theorists argue that while the formal end to colonial possession 
may have made a country nominally independent, it is still subject to external 
domination, an instance of being neo-colonial, rather than postcolonial. Dag 
Herbjørnsrud noted that the speed with which European colonial rule collapsed left 
many former colonies ill prepared for their new found independence. Having 
dominated India for 200 years the British Empire removed itself from the continent 
                                                 
17 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 1978. 
P. Chatterjee, National Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. London: Zed 
Books, 1986. 
18 G. C. Spivak, Outside in The Teaching Machine. London: Routledge, 1993. 
19 G. C. Spivak, Outside in The Teaching Machine. London: Routledge, 1993.    298
in seventy two days during 1947. As he astutely notes the former European empires 
are now as a result ‘the black man’s burden.’20 
 
While the British and Roman Empires serve to illustrate the role of empire, and its 
relationship to different modes of citizenship, the current world hegemony of the 
United States, is also often referred to as the American Empire,21 despite 
protestations from the United States that this is not the case.22 As illustrated President 
George Bush in the Graduation Address to the West Point Academy June 2002: 
America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. We wish for others 
only what we wish for ourselves – safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, 
and the hope for a better life.23  
 
While the sun never set on the British Empire, the American Empire operates 24/7. 
Many date this empire building back to the end of the Second World War,24 although 
America ‘inherited’ Spain’s former overseas colonies following the Spanish-
American War in 1898. However there has been a change in the behaviour and 
activities of the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 that 
point to a changing approach to citizenship and empire within this structure. While it 
is true that subsequent to World War II the United States had a global reach and 
domination, at this time, and throughout the Cold War, its power was challenged by 
the Soviet Union. The threat of nuclear war during this period bound both of these 
                                                 
20 D. Herbjørnsrud, ‘Original axis of Evil: Colonial Empires’, Aljazeera.net 5
th April 2005. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/972FFE74-F7DE-44F0-AB5E-92B47BBDADE7.htm [accessed 
6.4.2005]. 
21 ‘The Next American Empire’, The Economist 18
th March 2004. 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2517421 [accessed 24.4.2004]. 
22 ‘The existence of an American empire is no secret. It is widely, even universally, recognised in 
most parts of the world, though traditionally denied by the powers that be in the United States’, J. B. 
Foster, ‘Imperial America and war’, Monthly Review. May 2003, volume 55, number 1. 
http://www.monthlyreview.org/0503jbf.htm [accessed 25.5.2004]. 
23 J. Marcus, ‘America: An empire to rival Rome?’, Age of Empires. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3430199.stm [accessed 2.5.2004]. 
24 ‘US Military Bases and Empire’, Monthly Review. March 2002, volume 53, number 10. 
http://monthlyreview.org/0302editr.htm [accessed  25.5.2004]. 
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powers to a mutual understanding of the sovereign Nation State, and the mode of 
citizenship it embodies. Each side acknowledged the other’s sphere of influence in 
the world consisting of groups of client Nation States, brinkmanship created 
limitations and boundaries. 
 
Subsequent to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a rival 
hegemon, the United States continued to embrace this understanding of sovereignty. 
The first Gulf War being fought specifically in defence of the sovereign Nation State, 
as manifest by the State of Kuwait. Subsequent to this any military involvement by 
this power most often involved the use of air power in preference to all other 
measures, continuing the development from the Roman Army, through to the British 
Navy, with the United States Air Force.25 With each manifestation, the speed, 
distance, and magnitude at which force can be applied is multiplied, while the threat 
to the assets of the empire, in terms of lives and economic resources is reduced. This 
acceleration is also evident in communications and transportation generally, as Paul 
Virilio described it, the ‘acceleration of culture’.26 The fact that this acceleration, and 
the development of the American global hegemony, track each other through time 
from World War Two further serves to conflate the Digital and American Empires in 
people’s understanding. 
 
                                                 
25 This can be seen in Serbia in 1999, the original attacks on Al Quaida bases in Afghanistan in 1998, 
and once again in Iraq during this period. 
26 S. Redhead, ‘Accelerated culture: Paul Virilio and the history of the present’, Video Recording of 
Pub Talk forum, Murdoch University School of Media Communications and Culture, 30
th May 2002.   300
 
Figure 83 
F18 Hornets of The United States Air Force 
http://www.a4project.org/graphics/f18.jpg 
[accessed 5.4.2005] 
 
Subsequent to September 11 2001, possibly in response to a perceived threat that 
exists outside of the Nation State framework, the United States has begun to embrace 
a more Roman understanding of sovereignty and citizenship, where its own is 
recognised, but those that fall outside of this Empire are not. This would be 
consistent with its position alongside Rome as the unchallenged hegemonic power of 
its day. While unlike Britain and Rome, the United States does not hold many 
nations as formal colonies. The reach of the United States economy, and its impact 
on global society, means that it does in effect act as an empire. As Eric Hobsbawm 
notes: 
One might even say that in its assertion of total US supremacy over the western 
hemisphere it was too ambitious to be confined to colonial administration over 
bits of it.27 
 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States had worked as a dominant 
force within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, these organisations 
are grounded on the principles of sovereignty of the Nation State, tracing back to The 
                                                 
27 E. Hobsbawm, ‘Preface’, in V.G. Kiernan, America: The New Imperialism: From White Settlement 
to World Hegemony. New York: Verso, 2005.   301
Peace of Westphalia. As the United States moves further from this understanding of 
sovereignty, the position of these institutions becomes sidelined.  
 
 
Figure 84 
United States Military Deployment 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2517421 
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
The US takes the British model for the Nation State as a site of colonial exploitation 
further. Rather than having the responsibility of being a colonial power, those at the 
periphery are merely exploited economically, and other than that left to their own 
devices. As Michael Ignatieff, Professor of Human Rights Policy at Harvard 
University, has stated: 
America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest 
and the white man's burden... The 21st century imperium is a new invention in 
the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace 
notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most 
awesome military power the world has ever known. 28 
 
While the American Empire’s domination of media, finance and culture within its 
periphery is sizeable,29 this system still requires that the threat of violence be 
maintained, hence the global reach and dominance of the United States Military. 
Civil society as a mechanism for control is, in some cases, proving to be insufficient 
                                                 
28 M. Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, New York Times Magazine. 5
th January 2003. 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/burden.htm [accessed 15.6.2005]. 
29 Z. Sardar & M. Davis, Why do People Hate America? Cambridge: Icon, 2004.   302
in some peripheral areas of Empire, and as this control mechanism breaks down, the 
military is increasingly stepping in to maintain hegemonic dominance. 
 
 
 
Figure 85 
Location of United States Military Bases 
http://www.monthlyreview.org/0302map1.pdf  
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
Colonialism is a term most associated with the political rule and material conditions 
generated by European colonial powers. This is contrasted with imperialism, which 
is more closely identified with the ideology and system of economic domination 
identified more recently with the United States.30 While the two terms are often used 
almost interchangeably, there are subtle differences. Colonialism takes place at the 
                                                 
30 R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 
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periphery out of sight, and under only limited control of the core. Imperialism on the 
other hand is a process that is driven from an ideology of the core. It has been argued 
that while it is possible to talk of the postcolonial, it has been argued that history is 
yet to reach the post-imperial.31 There is a complex and often overlapping border 
between these different conditions reinterpreted through different prisms of time 
space and identity. 
 
The Empire of the United States of America maintains few formal colonies, although 
formerly it has been a major colonial power, having inherited many of the Spanish 
colonial ‘possessions’ after the Spanish-American war in 1898, including the 
Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico. This put the United States in a unique position 
relative to its fellow European colonial powers in that it was both a former colony, 
and a colonial power of its own. However the temporal United States maintains only 
a small number of formal colonies.32 Rather its rule, which often manifests to replace 
the former domination of European colonial powers, takes the form of neo-
colonialism.  
 
The dominion of the United States breaks down the former understanding of identity 
and space that were associated with colonial rule. Rather than sustaining control of a 
country through a garrisoned military force and its own administration it rather 
dominates the politics and economy of its many colonial possessions through the use 
of global trade and information exchange. As Kwame Nkrumah describes it: 
                                                 
31 D. Becker & R. Sklar (eds), Postimperialism and World Politics. Westport: CT Praeger, 1999. 
D. Becker, J. Frieden, S. P. Scharts, & R. L. Sklar, Postimperialism: International Capitalism and 
Development in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 
32 The afore mentioned Puerto Rico remains as a United States ruled commonwealth along with a 
handful of other colonial possessions formerly held as such by the United States in the Pacific.   304
neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice 
it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it 
means exploitation without redress.33 
 
 
Figure 86 
World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?sID=ch&rID=49&aID=49 
[accessed 5.4.2005] 
 
Without the formal military and administrative control of a colony by a coloniser it 
becomes more problematic to form resistance against the resulting exploitation, one 
of the key features associated with neocolonialism. As Naomi Klein describes the 
contemporary neo-colonial condition:  
Few ideologues can resist the allure of a blank slate--that was colonialism's 
seductive promise: ‘discovering’ wide-open new lands where utopia seemed 
possible. But colonialism is dead, or so we are told; there are no new places to 
discover, no terra nullius (there never was), no more blank pages on which, as 
Mao once said, ‘the newest and most beautiful words can be written.’ There is, 
however, plenty of destruction--countries smashed to rubble, whether by so-
called Acts of God or by Acts of Bush (on orders from God). And where there 
is destruction there is reconstruction, a chance to grab hold of ‘the terrible 
barrenness,’ as a UN official recently described the devastation in Aceh, and 
fill it with the most perfect, beautiful plans.  
 
‘We used to have vulgar colonialism,’ says Shalmali Guttal, a Bangalore-based 
researcher with Focus on the Global South. ‘Now we have sophisticated 
colonialism, and they call it 'reconstruction.’34 
 
                                                 
33 K. Nkrumah, Neo Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons 
Ltd, 1965, p. xi. 
34 N. Klein, ‘The Rise of Disaster Capitalism’, The Nation. 2
nd May 2005. 
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0415-30.htm [accessed 4.5.2005].   305
Both Afghanistan and Iraq-based incursions have demonstrated the United States is 
increasingly also prepared to engage in military domination, with garrisons of troops 
and US appointed administration.35  
 
One of the Roman Emperor Caligula’s favourite sayings was Oderint dum metuant – 
let them hate as long as they still fear.36 Rome maintained control over its colonies 
through force of arms, by the garrisoning of troops to enforce the will of the centrally 
appointed local governor. The British used local people to maintain the peripheral 
empirical structure that shared no physical border with the core. The neo-imperialism 
of the American Empire follows this trajectory and takes a far more subtle approach 
to domination, which is both less obvious and at the same time harder to resist. 
Antonio Gramsci describes this development as the move from political control to 
one of civil control, where the colonised internalise their situation to the point where 
it is no longer necessary to enforce the acceptance of the exploitation of empire, it 
becomes an enshrined practice within individuals, and within a nation’s laws and 
practice.37  
 
The Roman Empire took generations to contract. By contrast, the British Empire 
vanished over a relatively brief period, following the Second World War. Each new 
empire has a half-life of success and survival proportionate to the time it takes to 
                                                 
35 The Administration of L. Paul Bremmer III in Iraq in 2002-2003 while very much in the mode of 
colonial governors from empires of the past, was also significantly different, if only in frame of time 
in that it passed formal government, if not power, back to the local people. 
36 The quote is originally from the Latin play Atreus by Lucius Accius. John Bradly Kiesling 
famously used the phrase to question the direction of the foreign policy of the United States in his 
resignation letter to then secretary of State, Colin Powell on March 7
th 2003, asking if it too had 
become the motto of American foreign policy.  
P. Krugman, ‘Let Them Hate us as Long as they Fear’, New York Times. 27
th February 2003. 
37 A. Gramsci, ‘State and Civil Society’, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: 
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reach full expansion. This is a function of the effective shrinking nature of space as 
communications and transportation technology develops. 
 
In each of these manifestations of the colonial process, the trend is for the core of 
empire to move further away, both in space and perception, and for its identity to 
become further abstracted. A provincial citizen of Rome had direct walking contact, 
and a geographic relationship to the coloniser, or at least to the neighbouring colony. 
Within the British Empire the colonisers would normally arrive by sea from a core 
unseen and unexperienced by the colonised. In the context of the United States 
manifestation of neo imperialism it is not at first obvious that the imperial agent is 
present at all. An individual may indirectly own shares through their superannuation 
in a company causing pollution that adversely effects their health and environment, 
they can be both exploited and exploiter, the colonised and the coloniser, and not 
aware of their place in the process. Within this structure there is little room for 
actualising resistance, the individual is implicated in the injustice, but with no 
mechanism for resistance. The colonised subjects of Europe reinterpreted the 
structure of the Nation State that had been enforced on them by their colonial 
oppressors as a site of resistance. Within the current globalised capitalist neo-
imperialist environment the power of the Nation State is being eroded, as is its 
potential to provide a vessel for resistance to this process. Bauman notes that the 
Nation State as a formation is: 
In a state that is no longer a secure bridge leading beyond the confinement of 
individual mortality, a call to sacrifice individual well being, let alone 
individual life, for the preservation or the undying glory of the state sounds 
vacuous and increasingly bizarre, if not amusing. The centuries-long romance 
of nation with state is drawing to an end; not so much a divorce as a ‘living 
together’ grounded in unconditional loyalty. Partners are now free to look   307
elsewhere and enter other alliances; their partnership is no longer the binding 
pattern for proper and acceptable conduct.38 
 
In this context the Invisible Empire manifests as a structure that is markedly 
different from what has gone before, yet at the same time can also be seen as an 
extension of the increasingly fragmented and abstracted core, periphery and the 
space that manifests between the two in current (post) colonial relations. 
 
The Invisible Empire 
The rise of the Invisible Empire is often seen as synonymous with the rise of the 
American Empire, this is however an erroneous linkage. While the Internet was 
developed in the United States, as Rushkoff notes, so was the commercial use of 
electricity.  
The Internet is no more American than electricity. It may have been invented 
here, but electrons have no national allegiance.39 
 
That is not to say the United States does not have a great influence on the content 
and operation of the Internet. The American Government was able to turn off the 
Internet domain suffix for Iraq, .iq, before the recent invasion of that country, and 
could potentially do the same to any other counties domain including Australia’s 
.au.40 While all countries have one of these domain name suffix, the United States 
has none, just as British postage stamps alone did not have a name placed for the 
country of origin, so to the US as a place of origin is the unmarked sign of the 
                                                 
38 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 185. 
39 D. Rushkoff, ‘Americaphobia and the Engineered Fear of Progress’, paper presented at The 
Conference on the Internet and Society. Harvard University, 28-31 May 1996. 
http://www.aec.at/meme/symp/panel/msg00091.html [accessed 9.4.2004]. 
40 The United States Government recently announced that it would not be handing over control of the 
domain name system to ICANN, which had previously been planed to occur in September 2006, due 
to national security concerns.  
D. Morgenstern, ‘Feds Won’t Let Go of Internet DNS’, EWeek.Com. 1
st July 2005. 
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Invisible Empire.41 The United States Empire has left its residue of vocabulary, 
ideology and grammar for the Invisible Empire, if for no other reason than it was the 
environment inhabited by almost all of the early adaptors, when the codes and 
interfaces were first delivered. The US economy was still responsible for 47% of all 
electronic commerce in 2004,42 and while the language of the Internet is changing, 
English still makes up more of the online population than any other language by a 
significant margin – the code maintains its bias towards Latin script written left to 
right.  
 
The Invisible Empire, like all empires, builds on the strengths and weaknesses of that 
which preceded them. All empires provide a template of that which follows. It was 
during the British Empire that the telegraph (also first commercialised in the United 
States) was developed, and then followed the trade routes of empire to span the globe 
as a way of transporting digital messages. The Interface of the Invisible Empire with 
the off screen world also mirrors much of the old empires, with the Internet used to 
extract value from India, this time for the use of firms at the digital core of empire. 
The financial hub of London outsourcers its accounting and other work to India 
through the Internet, as does the United States.43 Within Australia there is an 
                                                 
41 The .us domain does exist, but it was reserved for government bodies below the federal level 
(Federal government bodies were reserved the .gov, with no national signifier) and higher education 
institutions offering less that an four year degree (once again those offering four year degrees utilised 
the unmarked .edu domain name suffix, similarly the .mil refers exclusively to the United States 
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Internet domain name registries of Pitcairn and Nui’, New Media and Society. March 2003, volume 5, 
number 1. 
42 Global Reach, ‘Forrester projects 6.8 Trillion for 2004 ($B)’. 
http://glreach.com/eng/ed/art/2004.ecommerce.php3 [accessed 1.12.2004]. 
43 I. Basu, ‘Feature: India changes world IT outsourcing’, United Press International. 2
nd December 
2002. 
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increasingly rapid move to outsource call centre work for large companies off shore 
to the periphery. There is something both romantic and gothic about the Invisible 
Empire built on the shipping lanes of the empires that went before it. As Gayatri 
Spivak notes: 
The idea of the Pax Electronica, coming from the Pax Romana, the Pax 
Britannica, and the Pax Americana is a very welcome notion when one is not 
aware of the worm in the rose.44 
 
The Internet can even be mapped in a way that is analogous to the earlier empires. 
 
Figure 87 
The Internet, July 1999 
http://www.mids.org/mapsale/world/ 
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
                                                                                                                                          
J. Puliyenthuruthel, ‘Biff! Zap! Game Coding Comes to India; Software makers are working overtime 
to turn out games for cell phones’, Business Week. 6
th June 2005. 
S. Rai, ‘World Business Briefing Asia: India: Outsourcing Said to Rise 34%’, New York Times.  3
rd 
June 2005. 
44 G. C. Spivak, ‘Pax Electronica: Against Crisis-Driven Global Telecommunications’, in G Lovink, 
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As well as just physical connections, this type of spatial map of Invisible Empire can 
also be used to track literacy. The Internet journal First Monday tracks its readership 
across the globe through space in this map: 
 
 
Figure 88 
First Monday Readership 
http://www.firstmonday.org/guidelines.html  
[accessed 24.4.2004] 
 
This mode of spatial mapping, with its focus on the off screen environment merely 
imposes the understanding of analogue empire inappropriately on a digital 
environment.  
 
Richard Muir described the role of mapping for the traditional analogue empire. 
Located at the interface between adjacent state territories, international 
boundaries have a special significance in determining the limits of sovereign 
authority and defining spatial form of the contained political 
regions…Boundaries occur where the vertical interfaces between sovereign   311
state sovereignties intersect the surface of the earth… As Vertical interfaces 
boundaries have no horizontal extent.45 
 
The Invisible Empire transcends these vertical interfaces. A map more closely 
representing the Invisible Empire looks more like this: 
 
 
Figure 89 
Internet Mapping Project 
 http://research.lumeta.com/ches/map/gallery/wired.gif  
[accessed 8.4.2004] 
 
Another method of tracking and mapping this empire continues the spider web of 
hubs and clusters.   
                                                 
45 R. Muir, Modern Political Geography. New York: Macmillan 1975, p. 199. As cited in B. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities. London: Verso: 1991, p. 172.   312
 
  
Figure 90 
World Wide Web around Wikipedia 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:WorldWideWebAroundWikipedia.png  
[accessed 21.4.2005] 
 
Whereas traditional empire, and more specifically traditional colonisation, mobilises 
the mode of citizenship bound to the Nation State, the Invisible Empire interfaces 
with the new mode of citizenship, the digital citizen consisting of the projected 
digital self. The Invisible Empire does not occupy off screen space. This means it has 
no borders to find itself adjacent to a rival empire. Additionally there are no special 
markings to indicate the core and periphery of empire. The Invisible Empire has no 
military force that it can use to enforce its will. Whereas the previous empires have 
existed in the off screen environment and developed the projection of their military 
strength from army, to navy to air force, the Invisible Empire exists on the screen, 
and as such has no recourse to physical violence in the on screen environment. There 
is no emperor who is able to clearly express a will to act or initiate action. As might   313
be expected in this new type of environment, attempts at resistance to the type of 
colonisation that the Invisible Empire embodies require very different strategies than 
resistance to a tradition colonisation with its understanding centred in the off screen 
environment. Rather than trying to throw out the colonising influence of the core, the 
struggle instead focuses on providing the literacy required to ‘move’ from the 
periphery to the core. Resistance becomes a resistance to the periphery. Surprisingly 
the site at which this resistance is best engaged turns out to be the Nation State, and 
the analogue sovereign. 
 
Digital Colonialism 
In 1996 Kroker warned of the consequences of the colonial process transformed on 
the screen: 
Virtual colonialism is the endgame of postcapitalism. Just when we thought 
that the age of European colonialism had finally come to an end, suddenly we 
are copied into the second age of virtual colonisation: a reinvigorated 
recolonization of planetary reality that reduces human and nonhuman matter to 
a spreading wake of a cosmic dust trail in the deepest space of the blazing 
comet of virtual capitalism.46 
 
The Invisible Empire has no borders that need a military presence to protect, or 
unruly colonies that require an exercise of violence to keep in place. Rather, the 
colonisation in which the Invisible Empire engages is economic and social and the 
borders are determined by the literacy, the wetware and the context in which those 
individuals exist, the cultware, that separates the digital citizen from the digital 
underclass and it is these that determine an individual’s position at either the core or 
periphery of empire. When probing the nature of digital sovereignty, the expected 
                                                 
46 A. Kroker, ‘Virtual Capitalism’, in S. Aronowitz,  B. Martinsons & M. Menser  (eds), Techno 
Science and Cyber Culture. New York: Routledge, 1996.   314
process of the core being refreshed from the periphery, Gandhi’s minority driven 
reform,47 was missing. While the discourse of digital sovereignty, and the ensuing 
power structures are constantly in a state of flux, they do not interface with the 
periphery as part of this discourse, the periphery is not on screen. However within 
the broader understanding of the Invisible Empire, this expected core and periphery 
exchange does occur, it is within this framework of the interface through access of 
the digital and analogue environments, that the core and periphery of the Internet can 
be found. 
 
The Invisible Empire and digitisation transforms analogue relations. As Edward Said 
questioned: 
What will happen to [the theory or idea] when, in different circumstances and 
for new reasons it is used again and, in more different circumstances, again?48 
 
The colonial experience is differently experienced in each manifestation. Each place 
colonised has its own history and identity that influences the process, as does each 
separate act of colonial domination. This is also true of digital colonisation, where 
the fragmentation of core and periphery that occurs as part of the off screen 
postcolonial structures are even more pronounced, and will manifest differently in 
each incarnation.  
 
The Invisible Empire, shadowing its analogue predecessors, uses the products and 
ideas of the periphery to refresh the core. This can be tracked in the arrival of new 
structures and ideas within the core. The early innovators conceptualised the Internet 
as a place of social capital, and a civil society without the need for the threat of 
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violence inherent in the sovereign to be maintained. As individuals and organisations 
started to make money, or more accurately generate private, rather than social capital 
on the Internet, one of the early and most influential concepts to migrate to the core 
of Invisible Empire was capitalism. At this point, it was in fact the Invisible Empire 
itself that was colonised by the capitalist system. This was an important change to 
the environment. Capitalism required the ability of the sovereign to determine, and 
enforce through the threat of violence, laws that act to underpin the civil society that 
it requires in order to operate effectively, and this was not present in this new 
environment. This inherent problem with capitalism on, in and through the Internet 
can be seen in the attempts of rival digital sovereigns to influence the discourse of 
digital sovereignty to support their particular understanding of how capitalism 
manifests in this environment, whether it be the production and protection of digital 
content, or the services provided to distribute others’ digital content (the two 
paradigms most often in conflict). This inherent flaw then leads to the fractured 
nature of sovereignty in the Invisible Empire and the fluid and changing nature of the 
discourse of digital sovereignty and citizenship. 
 
The Invisible Empire still exists in the ‘off screen’ world. It lays down an added 
layer of exclusion and disadvantage as well as privilege and advantage on that which 
is already present off screen. While wetware, and cultware may create conditions of 
exclusion from the Invisible Empire, the off screen provision of telecommunications 
service, hardware and software, absent in many places, accentuate these differences. 
In this case, places on the periphery of the off screen world are doubly 
disadvantaged. In much of Africa, there is a dearth of telecommunications access. 
This acts to heighten the disadvantage that comes from a widespread lack of literacy   316
to make use of bandwidth and ‘physical’ access to the Invisible Empire even if it was 
present. 
 
The core of Invisible Empire refreshes itself from the periphery. It absorbs new 
functions and skills from outside the Internet. This is how the capitalism got in to the 
core in the first place. When looking for this phenomenon as part of the analysis of 
digital sovereignty, it was not present, this is due to the focus of that analysis being 
contained on screen, within the digital environment. The periphery does not manifest 
until this environment interfaces with the off screen world. Thus what we would 
expect to find occurring in the analysis of sovereignty occurs instead only at the level 
of empire. This is due to the construction of the digital self and the digital underclass. 
Once on screen an individual moves towards the digital core, the relative core-
periphery positioning of that individual is determined primarily through their literacy 
or wetware, and the context in which they find themselves, the prevailing level of 
cultware. It is only at this point of on screen activity that digital sovereignty is 
negotiated. The periphery exists off screen, and so it is only at this interface that this 
interaction between the core and periphery can occur. 
 
In the digitised environment of the Internet, the digital underclass cannot be seen or 
encountered by the digital citizen, and there is nothing to mark difference between 
those at the core and those at the periphery. Space and markings of class are removed 
from the relationship, causing these two notions of class and colonisation to conflate, 
and leaving the relationship between the empowered, and the disempowered one 
enacted through both economics, and exclusion. Social and spatial markers still exist, 
but within the dominant and disempowered populations of the Invisible Empire,   317
rather than between them. The absence of the traditional markers of exploitation 
through distance and social relations makes any kind of resistance against this order 
highly problematic. How can the colonised learn and reinterpret the language of the 
coloniser in such an environment? 
 
The Invisible Empire is ruled by the discursive structure of digital sovereignty. As a 
discursive structure, it does not have desires or active motivation. There is causality, 
but there is no intent. Thus while the Invisible Empire might be exploiting those at 
the periphery to the advantage of those at the core, this is a function of the way that 
those two spaces are structured and interact, rather than the function of an active 
decision by the Digital Crown that such exploitation should occur. This is not to say 
that such exploitation might not be the deliberate strategy of one or more digital 
sovereigns, but rather that the discourse of digital sovereignty will reflect a position 
negotiated by rival sovereigns and digital citizens at any given point in time, it is an 
amalgam of competing discourses and interpretations, and as such acts with no 
predetermined causality. This makes the Invisible Empire significantly different from 
what has gone before, where there has been a premeditated decision by the sovereign 
power at the core to enhance wealth through the exploitation of the colonised. While 
individual digital sovereigns attempt to exercise their influence over the discourse of 
digital sovereignty, this is focused at the off screen environment, whereas this 
structural inequality is a function of the interface of the Invisible Empire between on 
and off screen, the digital and the analogue. This is not an argument for technological 
determinism, rather looking at the role for ‘human’ agents, and where this manifests. 
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Figure 91 
Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, January 1927 
 
Class has many definitions. It invokes an interaction between groups in society based 
on social and economic relations. The core-periphery relationship between colonised 
and coloniser is a relationship involving economics and space, or distance from the 
core, and cultural construction. In the words of Homi Bhabha: 
Subjects are always disproportionately placed in opposition or domination 
through the symbolic decentring of multiple power-relations that play the role 
of support as well as target or adversary.49 
 
It may be postulated that digital colonisation would merely represent an extension of 
the pre-existing neo-imperial condition, as Edward Said quoted Anthony Smith in 
Culture and Imperialism: 
The threat to independence in the late 20th century from the new electronics, 
could be greater than was colonialism itself. We are beginning to learn that 
decolonisation was not the termination of imperial relationships but merely the 
extending of a geopolitical web, which has been spinning since the 
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Renaissance. The new media have the power to penetrate more deeply into a 
'receiving' culture than any previous manifestation of western technology. The 
result could be immense havoc, an intensification of the social contradictions 
within developing societies today.50 
 
Digital colonisation differs from its off screen manifestation in three distinct areas. 
The first two areas relating to the identity and construction of both, the Empire and 
the self, are consistent with Smith’s position. The increased abstraction of both core 
and periphery can be seen as a continuation of the trend starting with the formal 
garrisoning of Roman troops to control a colonised region, through to the far more 
subtle, and thus harder to resist neo-imperialism of the globalisation of capital 
associated with the American Empire. The Internet potentially provides for the 
greater penetration predicted by Smith and the potential for inequitable distributions 
of access to the technology can and will increase social contradictions within society. 
However it is the inequitable distribution of access that sets digital colonisation apart 
from its analogue counterpart. This third area concerns the nature of access to the 
Internet, the individual alone at the screen. The gates of Invisible Empire do no 
provide any common ground for colonised and coloniser. This creates a break from 
what has gone before as the colonisers and the subaltern no longer share a space in 
which a discourse between the two can occur, and creates a very different 
environment for the colonial discourse to inhabit. 
 
The construction of the Invisible Empire and discourse of control of citizenship and 
sovereignty in the digitised environment create a decentralised seat of power. There 
are many separate participants taking part in the discourse, both exerting and 
interpreting sovereignty and the role of the good digital citizen. The crown has been 
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moved from the head of the Emperor in the centre of a geographically continuous 
ancient empire, through the hands of the King or Queen projecting their  power to 
colonies located over seas and beyond the horizons of those they colonise to the 
more fragmented scalp of the global capitalist system. In each case, the relation of 
the sovereign to physical space, or land occupied, has been becoming more distant 
and less corporeal. Within the Invisible Empire the connection to physical space is 
abandoned entirely, occurring only at the interface with the off screen elements of 
the empire in which the digital self’s physical body resides. The identity of the 
sovereign becomes further fragmented and disjointed, as it is interpreted and 
reinterpreted at each instance of access. 
 
The individual is similarly fragmented, the digital self consists of many separate 
digital identities and exists as a coherent whole only for the individual each identity 
represents, and even within this understanding there will be areas of identity that are 
only distantly accessible by the individuals that they represent, or in the case of 
identity theft are only a simulacrum or false representations of an individual. The 
digital citizen cannot be seen in their entirety by the sovereign, just as the sovereign 
as an entity is splintered and hard to define. The relationship between the sovereign 
and the ruled is thus highly complicated and subject to change as multiple, 
fragmented identities and relationships are constantly negotiated. 
 
While the imperial rulers at the core of the Invisible Empire and the identity of self at 
the periphery are fragmented and mobile, the point of access provides a solid barrier 
to those without the literacy and cultware to activate access. This sets the impact of 
digital colonisation aside from what has gone before. Those without access have no   321
direct experience of the Internet, it is invisible to them. Conversely those same 
excluded individuals have no digital identity to project, to manifest on screen. They 
are invisible in that environment. This makes resistance even more problematic for 
the disadvantaged. As Verbal Kint in The Usual Suspects paraphrased C.S. Lewis, 
‘The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist’.51 
In this context, the invisible reach of the Invisible Empire into and between the 
population of an individual Nation State makes consciousness of the process, and 
thus resistance, all the harder to generate, and the ability of the Nation State to react 
to the process similarly problematic.  
 
So how does this Invisible Empire, and the resulting process of colonisation manifest 
in the off screen world? Where would one search for the digital proletariat? If the 
core and periphery are not marked by space, then how do they interface with the 
existing core-periphery structures off screen, in an environment where status is 
determined by literacy rather than space? The world’s largest online bookstore serves 
as a strong example of these on screen digital core-periphery relationships as they 
manifest at the off screen core, in the United States. 
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Figure 92 
Digital Photomontage by Gregory Heisler for Time Magazine, 27
th December 1999 
 
Amazon.com is one of the most famous brands of all Internet based companies. It 
began selling to the public in 1995 and listed as a public company in 1997.52 The 
company’s CEO and founder Jeff Bezos, was one of the celebrities of the dot com 
stock market boom of the late 1990s and Time Magazine’s person of the year in 
1999. Naomi Klein notes of Amazon.com:  
It is online that the purest brands are being built: liberated from the real world 
burdens of stores and product manufacturing these brands are free to soar, less 
the disseminators of goods and services than as collective hallucinations.53  
 
The company’s head office is in located in Seattle, and is a place clearly at the core 
of the Invisible Empire. The staff that would be expected to be found there are highly 
literate and well paid, and while there is less wealth present than before the collapse 
of the ‘dot com bubble’ in stock investment, this is still where the ‘wealth’ of the 
enterprise resides in terms of both the physical housing of the companies computers, 
Web pages, and data bases, and also in terms of the understanding and development 
of the business model, and crucially the brand. 
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Figure 93 
Photograph by David Burnett, Time Magazine, 27
th December 1999 
 
Amazon also runs a series of large warehouses where inventory is stored and shipped 
to its customers. These spaces exist closer to the periphery, as Time Magazine noted 
in 1999 ‘It’s the blue collar work of the Internet. Neon hair, body piercing and non-
Caucasian skin tones are generously represented.’54 It is here that the labour is done 
to physically drive the organisation and add value to the enterprise ‘housed’ at the 
head office.  
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Figure 94 
Photograph by David Burnett, Time Magazine, 27
th December 1999  
 
Just as the labourers picking tea in Ceylon (the Amazon warehouse staff are also 
known as pickers) added value to the London based East India Company the labour  
 
Figure 95 
Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, April 1927   325
 
 
of these groups on the digital periphery is exploited by those at the core. While they 
are in separate places, they could all be located in the same building. Core-periphery 
exploitation is no longer activated through picking tea, rubber or bananas. It is now 
off screen labour in the service industries that is exploited in a new form of clean 
capitalism, where those in the core cannot even perceive those who are exploited to 
produce the fruits of the digital economy. Within the Amazon supply chain, this 
continuity can be manifested in the UPS driver who delivers the goods from the 
warehouse to the customer, as once again the use and value adding of off screen 
peripheral labour serves the creation of wealth at the core. 
 
While Amazon is an example of how the Invisible Empire allows for core and 
periphery to inhabit the same off screen space, separated by the literacy of those 
involved, this is only one example and does not necessarily show the full impact of 
the Invisible Empire on economic relations in the off screen environment. The older 
templates of empire still exist off screen and have not been superseded by the 
Invisible Empire, rather their focus is on an older mode of citizenship that now 
coexists with that of the digital citizen. The core-periphery relationships established 
by the Invisible Empire, rather than existing in isolation to the off screen world, 
instead lay down their own layer of advantage and disadvantage, of core and 
periphery, over the existing off screen world. The online economic activity driven by 
Massively Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) provides a 
fascinating example of how this digital/virtual capitalism occurs. 
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MMORPGs and the Virtual Sweatshops of the Invisible Empire 
Civilisation is, in its earliest phases, played. It does not come from play like a 
babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises in and as play and never leaves it 
–Johan Huizinga55  
 
In the late 1980s, multi user dungeons such as LambdaMOO were text-based 
environments. These computer mediated online spaces drew considerable academic 
interest.56 The more recent online interactive games are considerably more complex 
thanks to advances in computing power and bandwidth. Encompassing larger and 
more detailed worlds, they also enclose a much larger population of players. The first 
game in the new category of Massively Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Games 
(MMORPG) was Ultima Online http://www.uo.com/, which went online in 
September 1997. While tracing their origins to the more humble MOO these are very 
different environments. There are currently more than 350 different game worlds. 
EverQuest http://EverQuest.station.sony.com/ is the industry leader in America, and 
operated by Sony Online. It has approximately 430,000 players,57 of which more 
than 118 000 have been simultaneously online at peak periods.58 
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Figure 96 
MMORPG Subscriptions, July 2005 
http://www.mmogchart.com/ 
[accessed 21.6.2005] 
 
The largest game by population, Lineage http://www.lineage2.com/, is operated from 
South Korea and has been reported as having a population of more than four million 
player accounts59 of which more than one hundred and fifty thousand may be active 
online at any one time.60 
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Figure 97 
Lineage II 
http://www.l2treasures.com/ 
[accessed 28.4.2004] 
 
Each of these games renders a distinct virtual world with different themes, activities 
and objectives for players. Normally players will pay to initially purchase the games 
software, and then a monthly access fee. Within the game world players are 
projected as their avatars, digital representations of the characters they play, which 
are able to gain virtual skills, equipment, and wealth. This type of environment is 
significantly different from other spaces in the broader Invisible Empire. Each world 
is limited; it has a scarcity of resources, and abilities. A player’s avatar, and the 
virtual goods they might come to make or own, share a constancy of production that 
mirrors off screen goods, as opposed to other ‘normal’ digital artefacts on the 
Internet that can be easily copied and distributed at minimal cost. While it might be 
possible to make a digital copy of a character’s magic armour and sword, it would 
not be possible to do so in the context of the game where the item’s value is 
activated, without going through a similar process of production, whether it be 
fighting a virtual dragon, or time spent behind the bellows in the virtual smithy. 
Throughout history, the view of the best possible world has been one of abundance   329
and ease, yet conversely it is the constraints and limitations of the MMORPG worlds 
that provide the challenge and appeal to players, as Edward Castronova, Economics 
Professor at California State University notes ‘people seem to prefer a world of 
constraints to a world without them’,61 Juul also noted in relation to these limitations 
that rules ‘offer affordance as well as limitations’62 as quite simple rules can create a 
variety of potentially complex outcomes’.63  
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 Figure 98 
Invuln Plate Mail $49 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set= 
[accessed 28.4.2004] 
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The Game of Chess, with its relatively simple rules, yet extremely complex play is a good illustration 
of this principle.   330
 
This leads to a situation in some games where simple commodities, that might 
otherwise have little value to players, take on a much higher economic value, as time 
and effort must both be spent to produce them. Similarly, characters or avatars that 
develop virtual skills and abilities over time become more valuable than those that 
have only just been created. It takes time and effort to ‘grow’ them. This involves not 
just an expenditure of off screen capital to pay for game subscriptions and Internet 
access, but also an investment of the player’s time and effectively their labour within 
these virtual worlds. 
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 Figure 99 
Bundle of Hay $16 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set=  
[accessed 28.4.2004] 
 
As well as goods and avatars that require skill and dedication to build, the 
MMORPG worlds also contain commodities that hold value not by their production 
costs but rather their scarcity. There are some virtual items of which there are a 
limited number, either through the game’s design, or their production having been 
discontinued, or in the case of movable error messages in Ultima Online (a highly 
valuable ‘rare’ in the game) through programming errors. The most common 
manifestation of this type of resource across the various MMORPG universes is 
virtual land. Ultima Online produced by Electronic Arts had a land crisis as its 
virtual world of Britannia became fully occupied, and prices for virtual land began to   331
  spiral. In response, the game’s developers added a new continent to the world. 
While these electronic fantasy worlds have some similarities to the off screen 
economy, actions like this electronic version of continental discovery show that the 
analogy is far from perfect, although the parallel with analogue European colonial 
expansion is compelling. The resultant land rush as this new continent was opened to 
sale meant that at one virtual location there were thirteen players’ avatars, each 
player trying to buy the land by continuously clicking their mouses on the spot while 
they waited for the ‘option to purchase’ in the game to be turned on. In the end only 
one player got to build their tower when the option was activated.64 In this case it 
was time, effort, enterprise and luck that resulted in this virtual wealth. Players 
generate not just their individual character’s skills and possessions but also generate 
culture and community within the game. Taylor notes that this collective 
construction of the game environment is often overlooked.65 Humphrey divides the 
MMORPG production in the virtual environment into ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ 
virtual assets.66 Tangible assets are those that can be attributed a value in relation to 
an individual, virtual gold coins, a magic sword, their skill as a blacksmith etc. 
Intangible assets on the other hand are those that are created by the communities and 
social environment that the game activates. Humphrey notes that these assets are 
created through both the paid labour of the game’s developers, and the unpaid labour 
of the players as both combine to create the unique text of the particular game. 
Tangible assets can potentially be transferred from one player to another, whereas 
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intangible assets are the product of the community and the game represent a kind of 
virtual public good. 
 
These games are nominally designed to be ‘stand alone’ environments. As such, they 
have an internal consistency that rewards time and effort on the part of the players. 
Their borders at first seeming closed, rather are quite porous. These games they exist 
within space created through the Internet, access to which is a prerequisite to play the 
games in the first place. The borders of these stand alone environments expand 
outside the direct control of the games developers as players interact with each other 
through different applications online. A proportion of the ‘intangible wealth’ created 
by both the collective group of players and the game developers is manifested in this 
environment through discussion fora and game-related Web sites. Given this it is of 
little surprise to see activities in these out of games spaces having repercussions 
within the ‘closed’ space of the game.  
 
In October 2000 a long time player of EverQuest had the account for his character 
‘Mystere’ suddenly terminated while he was playing. After some investigation, the 
player found that this action had been taken due to the potentially offensive nature of 
some ‘fan fiction’, a story he had written about the background to his character, that 
he had posted on the Elf Lore and EQ Vault online message boards.67 While neither 
of these sites is affiliated with Sony Online, the company had received complaints 
about the graphic nature of the story and acted, it said, in order to protect the image 
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of the game.68 In 2003 Peter Ludlow’s Sims Online Character ‘Urizenus’ was a 
celebrity eviction from that game. He published his own web site the Alphaville 
Herald named after the main city in that game. His offence was to expose some of 
the seedier sides to the game including virtual conmen and virtual prostitution, and 
the fact that both were, according to the Herald, being carried out by underage 
players off screen. Electronic Arts stated in a letter explaining their actions ‘we feel 
it is necessary for the good of the game and its community’.69  
 
While both these reactions by the games owners can be understood in terms of their 
concerns about the off screen image of the respective games, the reaction of the 
players, and the effect on their on screen image, illustrates the role of the players in 
creating value through the generation of intangible capital. Players in EverQuest 
reacted to the eviction of Mystere by closing their own accounts, shutting down their 
fan sites on the Internet, and writing fan fiction of a more graphic nature than 
Mystere and then demanding that they too be banned from the game.70 Sony online 
responded by the CEO of the game, John Smedley, writing a letter officially 
apologising to the players, and personally calling Mystere’s player to invite him back 
into the game (he declined). Without the community created by the players, and the 
revenues from their subscriptions the game’s resources have no value. 
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The ‘tangible’ wealth generated by creating goods and developing character abilities, 
and stored in real estate also manifests outside the closed games environments as it 
comes to represent off screen value, rather than just being redeemable within the 
MMORPG worlds for virtual currency. Edward Castronova: 
The minute you hardwire constraints into a virtual world, an economy emerges, 
One-trillionth of a second later, that economy starts interacting with ours. 71 
 
Using the exchangeable value for virtual goods as determined by EBay sales, 
Castronova estimated the GNP of Norrath – EverQuest’s virtual world – to be 
$US135 million, which were it an analogue Nation State would place it as the 
world’s 77
th richest economy,72 roughly equivalent in terms of GNP per capita with 
Russia.73 
 
Players are able to buy and sell goods, character abilities, and real estate through the 
Internet, as well as through trading in the virtual game. 
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Figure 100 
Castle: $2,053 EBay resale price, photo by Ken Brown 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set= 
[accessed 25.4.2004] 
 
 
EBay category 1654 is reserved for goods from Internet games. In 2003 more than 
$US9 Million was traded through this service.74 These sales exclude one of the 
largest of the virtual economies represented by EverQuest. 
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Figure 101 
EBay 
http://www.ebay.com.au/ 
[accessed 15.1.2005] 
 
This value of tangible virtual wealth is based on the intangible value created by the 
players and the developers of the various games. As Raphael Koster stated 
For every person you see selling an [Ultima Online] account on EBay… there 
are a bunch of people bidding, too. And they are bidding on intangibles. They 
are offering up their hard-won real money in exchange for invisible bits and 
bytes because they see the intangibles of UO as being something worth having. 
A tower for a sense of pride… I find it odd that people think this cheapens the 
whole thing. I think it validates it. 75 
 
Without the combination of the intangible value from the players of Ultima Online, 
and the product produced by Electronic Arts that makes game an enjoyable 
experience the account would have no value. It is only able to realise its off screen 
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value in its on screen context. Without the intangible value created by both the 
players and owners of a MMORPG the tangible wealth has no foundation. 
 
As Koster recognises, within the game environment, players are divided in their 
attitude to this cross border trade. This debate can be distilled into one of time 
against money. Players who have spent time in the various games generating virtual 
wealth resent others who are able to effectively buy their way into a powerful 
position in the game with their off screen and out of game wealth.  
 
 Gender vs. Predominant occupation 
Non - 
employed, 
non-
student  Student  Home maker
Administrator / 
Owner of large 
business 
Administrator / 
Owner of small 
business  Professional 
Technician / 
Semiprofessional
% of Males  2.6 42.5  0.2  11.1  0.4  3.2  14.6 
% of Females  0 19.1  4.3 12.8  2.1  4.3 10.6 
              
 Gender vs. Predominant occupation 
Office 
worker / 
White 
collar 
Tradesperson 
/ Blue collar 
Un -skilled 
worker  Sales / Service Farmer / Fisher  Arts  Other 
% of Males  6.3 2.8  0.8  3.6  0.2  2.8  8.7 
% of Females  17   0.0  2.1  10.6  0  0  17 
Figure 102 
Breakdown of MMORPG Players by Profession and Gender 
 http://www2.sfu.ca/media-lab/onlinegaming/report.htm 
[accessed 6.11.2004] 
 
The argument follows that this disparity allows inequalities in the off screen world to 
permeate the game world, and works against the leveling effect of each new player 
entering in the game with the same basic avatar. The counter to this argument is that 
this situation unfairly advantages those players who have time to spend in the game 
at the expense of those who have less capacity to play, but often higher disposable   338
income. Vendors of virtual goods refer to this as a need for ‘power leveling’. 
Interestingly both arguments are premised in the desire for all players in the game 
environment to be equal. While there is a degree of hostility to ‘power leveling’ or 
EBaying as the practice is known, there is much less player disquiet about the 
practice of ‘Twinking’ where a new player is ‘gifted’ equipment and other resources 
from an existing character,76 perhaps due to the transaction occurring entirely within 
the borders of the game. 
 
Different games have different attitudes towards extragame trading. Some such as 
Linden Lab’s Second Life http://secondlife.com/ encourage the growth of the game 
beyond its virtual borders, and are happy with free trade across their virtual territory. 
Philip Rosedal, CEO of Linden Lab: 
It’s great. It’s hyper-liquid. When you reduce trade borders you get faster 
development.77 
 
Others however are more protectionist and actively work to block this type of trade. 
EverQuest attempts to keep the game behind closed borders. The Sony end user 
license agreement (EULA), that the players must agree to at the start of each online 
session states ‘…You may not buy, sell or auction (or host or facilitate the ability to 
allow others to buy, sell or auction) any Game characters, items, coin or copyrighted 
material.’78 Sony Online has an agreement with EBay since April 2000 that none of 
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the games virtual goods will be sold through category 1654 (or anywhere else on the 
auction site)79. Chris Kramer, Sony Online Director of Public Relations: 
The official line is that the selling of characters, items or equipment in 
EverQuest goes against our end user agreement. It’s currently not something 
the company supports and causes us more customer service and game-
balancing problems than probably anything else that happens within the 
game.80 
 
For the owners of the games, the time it takes each character to develop both skills 
and equipment is central to their economic model that requires each player to have to 
invest time to develop their character, and thus provide revenue from subscriptions. 
However as Taylor notes, the fact that games, particularly EverQuest, provide 
mechanisms for trading and sales of items within their ‘closed’ worlds both 
facilitates the ‘cross border’ trading and makes the magnitude of the offence 
ambiguous.81  
 
In 2002, Dark Age of Camelot http://www.darkageofcamelot.com/ owned by Mythic 
Entertainment, closed the accounts of Black Snow Interactive for selling large 
numbers of high level or powerful avatars in their game world and were 
subsequently taken to court for unfair business practices in a case that remains 
unresolved. The same Black Snow Interactive was itself unsuccessfully sued by 
Anarchy Online http://www.anarchy-online.com/ for ‘grinding’ too many accounts.82 
Grinding is the industry phrase for taking basic entry level avatars and playing them 
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until they become more powerful, and then selling them to new players. This process 
engages an economic constancy of production. Each unit produced requires just as 
much time and resources as the unit before, and the unit after. Many of the other 
tangible goods in the game share a similar production pattern, the same amount of 
virtual and off screen resources needed to make each virtual product. When this 
process is conducted in an organised way it generates a fordist mode of production in 
an otherwise post-fordist casual economy. Similarly for those involved, it crosses the 
line between these environments marking spaces where the players are engaged in 
recreational activity, to one where they are involved in virtual labour. As Caillois 
postulated ‘it may be of interest to ask what becomes of games when the sharp line 
dividing their ideal rules from the diffuse and insidious laws of daily life is 
blurred’.83  
 
The role of the multiple actors, both players and developers, involved in the creation 
of the ‘text’ of each of these games has generated considerable debate about the 
private ownership of this type of virtual public space. Taylor notes that this is due to 
the evolution from the essentially public ‘not for profit’ spaces of the text based 
MUDs and MOOs to the commercialised industry of MMORPGs.84 A number of 
writers have noted there may be a need for new understanding of intellectual 
property and copyright to be developed for these environments.85 Although as 
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Castronova86 notes the extensive use of EULAs in this industry heavily favours the 
owners and developers of the games at this time. These can however also be seen as 
a kind of explicit social contract that each players agrees to before entering the 
world. 
 
There is much debate over who owns the fruits of virtual labour in these virtual 
worlds. Are the players able to do as they wish with the product of their labour, 
including exporting it to the off screen world, or is this virtual produce still subject to 
the copyright of the games owners, and still their (virtual) possession? Are the goods 
owned by the company that produces the game, the virtual owners of the means of 
production, or the players that cause the production within the game, the virtual 
workers, who thus should own the produce of their virtual labour? Within this 
context, the debates about how the game is ‘played’ take on a classic Marxist 
positioning. As Lee Cadwell, Director of Sales at Black Snow Interactive, stated: 
What it comes down to is, does a MMORPG player have rights to his time, or 
does Mythic own that player’s time?87 
 
The monetary importance of this question is evident by the fact that the trade in 
virtual goods generate more than US$300 million each year, which is more than 
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double the revenue from subscription payments made by players to the various 
MMORPG operators.88 While it would seem that the law in most cases would 
support the ownership of copyright, and enforcement of the end user licences 
agreements by the developers of the games over the players, courts in China have 
notably come down in favour of the players ruling that it is they who own the fruits 
of their labour, perhaps reflecting the State’s communist ideology.89 Julian Dibbell 
describes the MMORPG economy: 
It's a whole new species of economy – perhaps the only really new economy 
that, when all has boomed and crashed, the Internet has yet given rise to. And 
how poetic is that? For years, the world's economy has drifted further and 
further from the solid ground of the tangible: Industry has given way to 
postindustry, the selling of products has given way to the selling of brands, 
gold bricks in steel vaults have given way to financial derivatives half a dozen 
levels of abstraction removed from physical reality. This was all supposed to 
culminate in what's been called the virtual economy – a realm of atomless 
digital products traded in frictionless digital environments for paperless digital 
cash. And so it has. But who would have guessed that this culmination would 
so literally consist of the buying and selling of castles in the air? 90  
 
The virtual borders of these games are made porous through a number of 
mechanisms. EBay http://www.ebay.com/, – the online auction site –, has provided 
one of the main marketplace for exchanges. This is turn is facilitated by fund transfer 
and trust enabling services such as PayPal https://www.paypal.com/. These services 
are further aided by the use of email, instant messaging, the World Wide Web, and 
the telephone service for different customers and vendors to meet in a virtual digital 
marketplace.  
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While some trading both within and outside of the various MMORPG environments 
is done between individuals, there is also a role in this market for traders or 
merchants to buy and sell goods and act to facilitate transactions between buyers and 
sellers. The tower from Ultima Online’s Britannia was sold along with the rest of the 
user’s account for US$500 after the player was unable to find work off screen and 
needed to realise some of the value of their on screen assets. The tower and land, 
along with belongings and characters, was put up for auction on EBay, but before the 
auction took place, the player was contacted by a MMORPG trader, Bob Kiblinger, 
who broke up the various virtual assets for sale on his web site 
http://www.l2treasures.com/.91 While these traders were originally individuals, or 
small teams, there has been an increasing move within the industry towards larger 
organisations. One of the first of these was the Black Snow Interactive (BSI). This 
was one of the first major players in the virtual goods industry, and provoked the first 
set of litigation in this area, both initiated by BSI against Mythic Entertainment, and 
also directed towards the company from Anarchy Online. However by June 2002, the 
company and its directors had disappeared, without paying their legal bills (amongst 
many of the company’s other suppliers), and the case against Mythic was dropped.92  
 
Internet Gaming Entertainment (IGE) http://www.ige.com, founded in 2001, has 
become the largest player in the tertiary virtual goods industry. With its corporate 
headquarters in the United States at New York and Miami Beach, it has an office in 
Hong Kong and over one hundred employees, growing at approximately five new 
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staff a week, processing orders for virtual goods.93 While IGE sells a wide variety of 
virtual goods, there are other companies that are more specialised. Gaming Open 
Markets (GOM) http://www.gamingopenmarket.com/ provides a currency exchange 
between different MMORPG worlds, as well as the off screen US Dollar. This 
service renders the borders of these virtual worlds porous to each other without 
having to pass through the off screen world for currency exchange. The company 
tracks the values of different virtual currencies, which fluctuate according to their 
supply and demand.94 
 
 
Figure 103 
Gaming Open Markets 
http://www.gamingopenmarket.com/market.php?symbol=SLL 
[accessed 21.6.2005] 
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This company’s operations illustrate the complexity of trading across the many 
borders between virtual worlds. To bank money with GOM, a player first goes to 
their Web site and opens an account. They can then book a deposit, when an avatar 
of one of the company’s agents will arrange a time, and virtual location to meet and 
transfer the currency. The agent is an avatar of a real person rather than a computer 
simulation or bot, as GOM does not have access to the computers running the 
various games in which they operate. The player is told via email of the secret 
password that the agent will use, so that they know that they are a legitimate 
employee of Gaming Open Markets and that they are not giving their currency 
deposit to a fraud. The player then replies with their own secret password to verify 
their identity to the agent. This currency, once banked, can then be traded through 
the company’s Web site. If the player wishes to buy virtual currency for off screen 
cash, then they make a deposit to GOM using PayPal. For GOM, the danger is that 
the company running the MMORPG in question will become displeased with their 
operation, and locate and delete one of the avatars that hold their virtual cash 
reserves. However while the company running each game does, as illustrated above, 
have this sovereignty over life and death of the avatars within its various worlds, 
they are not omnipresent. Detecting the actual agent could prove problematic. This 
difficulty is accentuated by the ability of GOM to have multiple agents that join and 
leave the game and transfer assets between each other. 
 
This type of virtual meeting is a standard part of doing business across the borders of 
MMORPG worlds. When the tower and land in Britannia was on sold by L2treasures 
its new owner was delivered the keys by an avatar named Blossom. This turned out   346
to not even be Bob Kiblinger, but his cousin Eugene, who he pays US$10 an hour to 
make his various deliveries and pickups in the virtual world.95 Blossom/Eugene 
fulfils the role of customer service in this industry. While requiring a certain level of 
literacy in the operation, employing agents such as this allows for the more efficient 
use of those with the stronger literacy required to value, purchase and sell virtual 
goods, who then can concentrate on this revenue generation. 
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Figure 104 
Lore Brand Comics 
http://www.lorebrandcomics.com/currencyexchange.html 
[accessed 12.11.2004] 
 
There is more to this virtual digital economy than this surface view of the MMORPG 
environment provides. Ken Selden the Chief Economist at Internet Gaming 
Entertainment: 
There’s a relationship between real-life economics and a virtual economy. I 
happen to believe that these virtual economies are very real, serious 
economies.96 
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The Invisible Empire lays down an added layer of disadvantage on that already 
present off screen. The MMORPG environment becomes a surprisingly good 
illustration of this. The constancy of production of goods in the virtual games makes 
them more analogous to off screen goods than other digitised goods and services that 
can be easily copied and transported. It is of little surprise then to find that the 
production of these goods comes to mirror patterns found in the off screen 
environment. The production of goods that require relatively complex skills remains 
at the core, and to this end the companies trading in virtual goods will purchase rare 
and expensive virtual items from active players based in the various games. 
Production that requires relatively unskilled labour can be conducted more efficiently 
through the exploitation of cheap labour in the periphery.  
 
Black Snow Interactive were the first company to act on this understanding that a 
form of production that requires time, unskilled labour, and is able to be located 
anywhere with access to the Internet, would be most efficiently done where hourly 
wages were low, and then this produce could be sold where money was relatively 
abundant.97 While the company was claiming in its lawsuit against Mythic 
Entertainment that it was defending the interests of players in The Dark Age of 
Camelot,98 it had in fact, rather than merely acting as a trader, also set up its own 
production facility in Tijuana Mexico. BSI had a production facility with a T1 high 
bandwidth Internet connection, eight computers, and was running three shifts to keep 
the operation going 24 hours seven days a week using relatively cheap unskilled 
Mexican labour to grind characters in the game for resale to American players. This 
                                                 
97 Or at least were the first company to have been exposed in the process of engaging in this process. 
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was in the words of Julian Dibbell the world’s first virtual sweatshop,99 where the 
Invisible Empire and the American Empire interfaced. In the case of the division of 
labour at Amazon.com the digital core and periphery inhabited the same space in the 
off screen world. In the MMORPG world with its constancy of virtual production the 
on screen and off screen periphery and core conflate. 
 
While Black Snow Interactive ceased operation, IGE seem to be following a similar 
business model. The company needs to send its avatars into a game where it is 
trading, and travel within the virtual world. This ‘travel’ however can be based 
anywhere. The company has therefore located their distribution operation in Hong 
Kong, which runs 24/7. The company describes their suppliers as a group of more 
than 100 hard-core players who sell the company their excess currency, weapons and 
other goods.100 However many of these ‘hard core players’ are subcontractors 
operating in mainland China running operations similar to that at Tijuana, although 
this time on a much more expansive scale.101 Large ‘farms’ largely based in China, 
but operating wherever wages are low, house large numbers of computers running 
‘bots’ programs that run the various money making activities in each game and 
overseen by low wage virtual farmers. These workers in China earn around 56 cents 
an hour.102 In this context China’s laws on the ownership of virtual labour in 
                                                 
99 J. Dibbell, ‘Serfing The Web: Black Snow Interactive and the World’s First Virtual Sweat Shop’, 
Wired Magazine. January 2003. http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/blacksnow.html [accessed 
22.7.2004]. 
100 D. Terdiman, ‘When Play Money Becomes Real’, Wired Magazine. 7
th April 2004. 
http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,62929,00.html [accessed 28.4.2004]. 
101 J. Dibbell, Play Money, Meet Big Money. 18
th November 2003. 
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J. Lee, ‘Wage Slaves’, Computer Gaming World. 5
th July 2005. 
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102 J. Lee, ‘Wage Slaves’, Computer Gaming World. 5
th July 2005. 
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MMORPGs, rather than protecting a virtual proletariat, may instead be a facilitator 
for off screen exploitation. 
 
 
Figure 105 
Virtual Sweatshops in Fujian province, China 
http://www.1up.com/do/feature?cId=3141815 
[accessed 6.7.2005] 
 
Thus IGE’s operations in relation to the MMORPG economies stretch from the very 
core of the Invisible Empire to its periphery. At the core, the various games 
companies and suppliers of virtual goods fight for control of the discourse of digital 
sovereignty that will support their understanding of how the capitalist system should 
operate. In this struggle it is of little surprise to see a division of Sony, a member of 
the Recording Industry Association of America and Motion Picture Association of 
America central in the fight for ownership and enforcement of game owners 
copyright.103 The company takes the EverQuest slogan ‘You’re in Our World Now’ 
quite literally.104 While Sony Online was able to shut down EBay trades in 
EverQuest virtual goods, this may have helped spawn organisations like IGE which 
will have far greater influence, both on the game and in their ability to influence the 
discourse, than a few individual traders might have. Also close to the core of 
                                                 
103 Not to mention one of the companies funding the Music Industry Piracy Investigation (MIPI) 
within Australia. 
104 T. L. Taylor, ‘“Whose Game Is This Anyway?: Negotiating Corporate Ownership in a Virtual 
World’, in F. Mäyrä (ed), Computer Games and Digital Cultures Conference Proceedings. Tampere: 
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Invisible Empire are those smaller traders such as L2treasures who are able to exploit 
their high level of literacy in this area of the digital environment to make a profit. 
Further from the core, but still a long way from the edges of periphery, are those 
employed at the intermediate levels of this trade, at the digital semi-periphery. These 
include the IGE employees in the Hong Kong office engaged in processing 
customer’s orders and the delivery avatar for L2treasures. Both examples of those 
employed in virtual customer service. This digital core and periphery is then laid out 
on top of existing off screen economic relations. Cheap labour in Mainland China is 
exploited and serviced by companies based in Hong Kong. This labour is then in turn 
exploited as its production is used to service those in the core of the Empire in the 
United States. 
 
The players in the game debate whether it is they – the workers – who own the fruit 
of their labour and thus can take the rewards for this labour outside the game, or 
bring their external resources into the game, or if it is the companies running the 
games, the – owners of the means of production – who own what is produced in 
those games and academics grapple with the question of governance of privately 
owned public space. While at the periphery, both digital and off screen, and beyond 
their ability to engage from the digital core, there is exploitation of labour in the 
grinding of the virtual goods at the centre of these debates. Just as the mills of 
Manchester used to drive the production of cotton in the colonies of the British 
Empire, so to the virtual sweatshops at the periphery of the Invisible Empire are 
driven by production at the core. 
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Figure 106 
Spinning the Web: the global cotton industry  
http://www.spinningtheweb.org.uk/industry/trade.php 
[accessed 10.11.2004] 
 
In this case, the intangible capital created by both players and game designers in the 
production of the complex texts of MMORPGs at the core provides the foundation 
for the value of the tangible assets cheaply mass-produced at the periphery. 
MMORPGs do not require a high level of literacy to play. This makes them perfect 
vehicles for the extraction of value by unskilled, low paid workers who inhabit both 
the off screen, and digital periphery. As with other areas of the digital periphery, 
these workers cannot be seen, and indeed are not spoken of, in the debates at the 
digital core. Richard Florida’s distribution of the ‘creative class’105 in this context is 
reinterpreted and reinforced by the Invisible Empire. 
 
                                                 
105 R. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class and How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community 
and Everyday Life. Australia: Pluto Press, 2002. 
R. Florida, The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for Talent. New York: 
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Within the Invisible Empire there is no King. There are the trappings of empire 
without the benefits, no protection, and no new social technological structures for 
those at the periphery. The Invisible Empire has no military. It defends and invades 
no real space, however the off screen core and on screen periphery can exist within 
the same geographic area as represented through the differing levels of literacy and 
context manifest in separate individuals. The fact that a person can be disconnected 
and separate from the Empire illustrates that the Invisible Empire and the digital 
citizenship it activates is very different to any that have gone before, all of which 
required troops on the ground (or the threat of the same) to maintain the empire, 
whether it be a spatial or ‘Nation State’ based empire, such as the British Empire, or 
a more ambiguous economic empire, such as the United States. The Invisible Empire 
is a new type of manifestation, and it has very different interactions with the world to 
that which have gone before. The Digital Raj is not the same creature as those that 
ruled India for Britain. In the Invisible Empire the digital periphery cannot be 
directly experienced. While, through redundancies in the packet switching emails 
may go missing, in Africa – they never arrive. 
 
When dealing within the realm of Invisible Empire both within the core and on the 
digital periphery, the markers of gender, class, race, and distance are invisible. It is 
the interface of access, where the periphery intersects with the core that these 
markers once again manifest and become apparent. Access is the point of transition 
from periphery to core and it is within the Nation State, the analogue sovereign, that 
this point of transition occurs. It is the place in which access is negotiated. For Homi   353
Bhabha, it is the third space where the in between translation takes place.106 The 
core-periphery as negotiated through access is a fluctuating and highly unstable 
relationship, and moves as both digital sovereignty and access are negotiated. As a 
result of this movement, it is very difficult to map. It is due to this highly disjointed 
nature of digital sovereignty at this point, that the Nation State is the only available 
structure capable of taking the role of negotiating that point of access, and having the 
opportunity of enabling the best position for its citizens. The next chapter then 
explores the construction of resistance to empire and colonial domination, and the 
central role played by the Nation State in this construction. 
                                                 
106 H. K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. London & New York: Routledge, 1994.   354
Chapter 7  
Resistance and the Nation State 
 
Figure 107 
Resistance 
http://www.raisethefist.com/ 
[accessed 17.5.2005] 
 
And did those feet in ancient time 
Walk upon England's mountains green?  
And was the holy Lamb of God  
On England's pleasant pastures seen?  
 
And did the Countenance Divine  
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?  
And was Jerusalem builded here  
Among these dark Satanic Mills?  
 
Bring me my Bow of burning gold: 
Bring me my Arrows of desire: 
Bring me my Spear! O clouds unfold!  
Bring me my Chariot of fire. 
 
I will not cease from Mental Fight,  
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand  
Till we have built Jerusalem  
In England's green and pleasant land. 
 
JERUSALEM From Milton, a poem in two Books (1804-1808) 
by William Blake. 
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Introduction 
This chapter probes resistance to the Invisible Empire, stressing the role of the 
Nation State in configuring a place where that resistance can be activated. Starting 
with a brief critical history of the colonial process, the analysis moves from Spain’s 
conquest of the new world through to the proliferation of the academic field of 
Postcolonial Studies in 1978 with the publication of Orientalism by Edward Said. 
This thesis explicitly draws together Postcolonial Studies and Internet Studies, both 
of which draw on a common intellectual heritage from the post structuralist 
movement in France and the intellectual influences tied to the Algerian War of 
Independence.  
 
Acknowledging this framework and intellectual ancestry, my chapter explores the 
interaction between the analogue Nation State and the digital Invisible Empire, 
exploring the function of the Nation State as a site of resistance to colonial 
oppression and then how this is transformed in the digital environment. This analysis 
then is exemplified, specifically investigating the island nation of Tuvalu, and it 
interface with the Invisible Empire. From this relatively successful story of resistance 
the analysis then turns to South Africa.com and NewZealand.com, and the two 
countries concerned unsuccessful struggle against the exploitation of what they 
perceived as the digitised natural resources. 
 
These arguments are significant in the context of the argument presented in this 
thesis. This chapter introduces the Nation State, as a traditional site of resistance to 
imperial control, and how that structure can potentially maintain that position in   356
relation to the Invisible Empire. This resistance is activated differently from earlier 
modes and methods. This background is necessary to instigate strategies for 
intervening in the power relations configured within and by the Invisible Empire, and 
providing voice for the Subaltern. 
 
The Colonial Critic 
 
Figure 108 
Bishop Bartolome Las Casas 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/philosophers/las_casas.html 
[accessed 14.1.2005] 
 
Bishop Bartolome Las Casas was the first Catholic priest ordained in the new world. 
He is credited with being the first prominent intellectual to articulate an objection to 
the colonial process. His 1542 book, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies 
questioned the legal and moral standing of the Spanish occupation of Americas. He 
was famous for humanitarian critique of Spanish colonialism, particularly with its   357
blessing from Pope Paul III and the Spanish King Charles I to bring Christianity to 
non-believers. In the time of the conquistadors, there was little ambiguity in the 
moral character of colonisation.  
 
 
Figure 109 
Adam Smith 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Smith 
[accessed 29.3.2005] 
 
Another strong although secular critic of the process of colonisation was Adam 
Smith. In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, first 
published in 1776, Smith outlines his objections to the impact of the monopoly of 
trade that existed between the colonies at the periphery and the colonising European 
country. In his case, he spoke primarily of England and North America.  
We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those 
of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily 
beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful.1  
 
                                                 
1 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan 
London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1904. Fifth edition, p. 133.  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html [accessed 17.3.2005].   358
Smith’s objections were of a purely economic persuasion in contrast to Las Casa’s 
moral objections to the practice. Smith does indicate that he does not specifically 
object to colonial expansion, and critiques only its distorting effect on the market. 
But the former are so beneficial that the colony trade, though subject to a 
monopoly, and notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still 
upon the whole beneficial, and greatly beneficial; though a good deal less so 
than it otherwise would be.2 
 
The more recent phenomenon of neocolonialism is often seen as both a product of, 
and partner in, the expansion of global capitalism. While the process of colonialism 
and neocolonialism is understood through the gauze of economic exploitation, one of 
the most prominent early advocates of the capitalist market objected to the process 
precisely on economic grounds. 
 
Karl Marx writing in the century following Smith, and highly critical of the capitalist 
economic system, wrote: 
The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation lies 
unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable 
forms, to the colonies where it goes naked.3 
 
While Marx affirmed the rise of all the workers of the world against capitalist 
oppression, he did not offer any specific strategy for resistance to colonial 
exploitation. Rather he viewed it as a logical extension of the expansion, in contrast 
to Smith or, as Young described it, ‘Both a cause and effect of the development of 
capitalism’.4 Marx not unlike Smith does not specifically object to the colonial 
process itself, seeing it as necessary for the socialist revolution. Marx and Engels 
                                                 
2 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan 
London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1904. Fifth edition, p. 133. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html [accessed 17.3.2005]. 
3 K. Marx, Surveys from Exile: Political Writings. Vol. 2, Translated by B. Fowkes & P. Jackson, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. as cited in R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical 
Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 
4 R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 
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developed the proposal that the Nation State, and nationalism could act as an 
institution and ideology of resistance to global capitalism, their focus in particular 
being Ireland.5 Marxist theory advocated critiquing and changing the existing social 
and economic structure in order to alter the social circumstance the disadvantaged 
find themselves in. While in this case Marx was advocating a global socialist 
revolution to overthrow the global capitalist system and empower the working class, 
the impact of his writings and theories has greatly influenced the subsequent writers 
with a focus critical of the colonial and postcolonial condition. 
 
Postcolonial theory critiques the structure and processes of colonisation, imperialism, 
neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism and the postcolonial. The field of study traces its 
immediate origins back to the work of Edward Said, and more directly to his book 
Orientalism first published in 1978.6 Said’s work developed the idea that colonialism 
was a discourse of domination, as well as a form of military domination.7 Said, 
writing in relation to the representation of Arab cultures, critiqued the construction of 
the Orient as ‘the other’ to the normalised west. This biased construction then acted 
to influence not only the study of the orient but also to provide the foundations for 
European imperialism in the region. Said argued that  
This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its 
subject matter but also blinds its practitioners.8 
 
  While not denying that differences existed, Said argued for a more critical 
evaluation of those differences, and a more detailed study rather than a generalised 
                                                 
5 K. Marx & F. Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question: A Collection of Writings. New York: 
International Publishers, 1972.  
Marx & Engels On Ireland. Transcribed by E. O’Callaghan & A. Blunden 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/ireland/ [accessed 4.7.2005]. 
6 E. Said, Orientalism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1978. 
7 R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001 p. 
383. 
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understanding of what constituted the orient. He also, significantly, called on the 
Oriental to be given their own voice, rather than to be described from a distance by 
scholars in the west. 
 
 
Figure 110 
Edward Said 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/%20conferences/said2004/ 
[accessed 6.4.2005] 
 
While Said’s work is generally agreed to be an origin and foundation of Postcolonial 
Studies,9 the academic field can trace its intellectual history to the structuralist 
                                                 
9 The influence of Said’s work can be seen in a range of scholarship in the last two decades.  B. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised 
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Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 
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Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 
G. C. Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine. London: Routledge, 1993. 
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Princeton University Press, 1994. 
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movement often associated with the Prague school of linguistics in the 1930s and 
more directly to the post structuralist movement that followed. Post structuralism had 
much of its academic drive from continental Western Europe, and France in 
particular. The Paris student riots and general strike of May 1968 drew much of their 
inspiration for social change from this movement.  
 
Figure 111 
Protesters in Paris during the May 1968 general strike 
http://www.mai68.net/ 
[accessed 7.4.2005] 
 
Emerging from post structuralism was a number of broad disciplines with 
overlapping and mobile borders. Specifically of interest here are the development of 
Cultural Studies as an academic area of enquiry in England in the works of 
academics such as Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, and E.P. Thompson. Much of the 
emerging field of Internet Studies can trace its origin through this lineage. 
Postcolonial writing, emanating largely from the United States, although often by 
academics who originate in other more peripheral regions of the world, also can be 
seen as emerging from the broader post structuralist movement, as can the Indian 
based writings of the Subaltern Studies Group.10 This thesis is an attempt to bring 
                                                 
10 P. Chatterjee (ed), Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal. Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1995.  
P. Chatterjee & G. Pandey (eds), Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
D. Chakrabarty, ‘A Small History of Subaltern Studies’, in H. Schwarz & S. Ray (eds), A Companion 
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postcolonial theories into dialogue with a Cultural Studies inflected understanding of 
Internet Studies. 
 
Following from the early criticisms of the colonial process from Las Casa, Smith, 
and Marx, theorists of colonisation emerged in the poststructuralist writing in France, 
and specifically linked to the French occupation of Algeria. The movement is also 
closely associated with the events of May 1968, however as Young notes: 
If ‘so called poststructuralism’ is the product of a single historical moment, 
then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War of 
Independence – no doubt itself both a symptom and a product. In this respect it 
is significant that Sartre, Althusser, Derrida, and Lyotard, among others, were 
all either born in Algeria or personally involved in the events of that war11 
 
Paul Virilio was also conscripted into the French army for this conflict, and Franz 
Fanon, an author frequently mobilised in Postcolonial Studies writing, was also 
involved with the Algerian conflict.  He was the head of the psychiatry department of 
a hospital in Algeria when the war erupted. Michel Foucault also spent significant 
time in another French colony in Tunisia. The writings of these poststructural 
theorists have impacted greatly on later writers of postcolonial theory. Interestingly 
much of the language of colonial domination in English comes from French origin. 
The words authority,  obedience,  soldier,  garrison,  guard,  crown, and throne all 
come into English from the French, arriving with the invading army and sovereignty 
of William the Conqueror.12 The French language also provided English with words 
for mobilising resistance to colonial control, the words justice and liberty in 
particular. 
 
                                                 
11 R. Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 412. 
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While the development of poststructuralist writing was implicated by many theorists 
in French colonialism, it was the former colonies of the British Empire and then the 
United States that produced many of the most influential writers in postcolonial 
theory. Edward Said was born in Jerusalem while it was under British mandate, 
raised in Egypt, and studied and worked at universities in the United States. Homi K. 
Bhabha was born in India, studied in India and Britain, and then moved to the United 
States. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak similarly was born in India where she completed 
her undergraduate studies before also moving to the United States. It is difficult to 
‘locate’ such mobile theorists in relation to the core and periphery. Postcolonial 
theory illustrates the ambiguity of a person’s identity and spatial location 
demonstrated by where many of its prominent theorists were born, where they teach 
and write, and whom they teach and what they research. The French 
poststructuralists wrote in Paris and other continental universities at the core.13 
Perhaps capturing a shift in the centre of power in the world since that time, 
Postcolonial theorists are now more likely to be based in the United States.14  
 
This mobility is not restricted to cultural theorists. The Sydney Morning Herald 
produced a list of the fifty most influential Australians in early 2005.15 Of these only 
seventeen, less than forty percent, lived in Australia, with twelve living in Sydney 
                                                 
13 Foucault was based at the College de France, having previously taught in Uppsala in Sweden and 
the University of Paris,  
Sartre spent most of his life in France, 
Althusser was born in Algeria but as an academic was based in Paris, 
Derrida taught in France, and then later (perhaps as a sign of things to come) in the United States, 
Lyotard also taught predominantly in France. 
Fanon was born in the French colony of Martinique but studied in France after World War Two 
before moving back to the French colonies. 
14 Homi K Bhabha works from Harvard University, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is based at 
Columbia University, as was Edward Said until his death in 2003. Dipesh Chakrabarty is based at the 
University of Chicago. 
15 D. Dale, ‘Advanced Australians’, The Sydney Morning Herald. 22
nd January 2005. 
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(probably as a result of its world city status, but also perhaps reflecting the 
publication’s own bias). There were fifteen based in the United States with five each 
in New York and Los Angeles, and a further ten in the United Kingdom with eight in 
London. More of the fifty most influential Australian lived in the three centres of 
empire – London, New York and Los Angeles – than live in Australia. Location, and 
identity, while becoming more fluid over time, is still influenced by the geography of 
periphery and core relationships. National identity it seems moves with an individual 
when they leave a nation’s geographic space. Conversely individuals are still drawn 
to the physical location of the core. 
 
Postcolonial theory seeks to critically examine the condition of the colonised and the 
formerly colonised, the ongoing relationships between the coloniser and the 
colonised and the mechanisms through which both control is maintained, and 
resistance to that control is potentially activated. In this context the end of the formal 
control of many former colonial possessions following the Second World War, while 
significant, did not signal the end of colonial relations and imperial oppression at 
both the periphery and core respectively. As Tara Brabazon cautions: 
Postcolonialism is an inadequate, and at times, a dangerous term. It does 
suggest that colonial relationships and institutions have been replaced – that 
colonialism is over.16 
 
The complex social and economic consequences of former colonial relationships 
now stretch from the peripheral former colonies through to the households of 
metropolis Los Angeles, from child labour manufacturing soccer balls in India to 
imported domestic help in the United States. Within these relationships, the place of 
the underclass, those without a place to speak of their experience and a 
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consciousness of their position, can trace a lineage of study and advocacy back 
through Marx and his study of the conditions of the working class, through the 
Bishop Las Casas and his concern for the treatment of the local colonised people in 
South America. Contemporary Postcolonial Studies similarly place a particular 
emphasis on the conditions of the underclass, those rendered as subaltern.  
 
The Nation State and Colonial Resistance 
Following the foundation of the Nation State at the Peace of Westphalia, this 
construction was ‘exported’ to the rest of the world through European colonial 
expansion. In this context it became, rather than a political mechanism to prevent 
religious war, instead a construct of colonial domination. The Nation State as a 
structure, having been determined as static and unchanging at the peace of 
Westphalia, once applied to the periphery became transient and fluid. The borders at 
the periphery were reshaped by the ebb and tide of different actors at the core. 
Colonial maps were redrawn after wars between European empires, and the absent 
sovereign was replaced as structures of domination remained in place. The aftermath 
of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the 
transformation to colonial ownership following the Spanish-American was all being 
potent examples of the seemingly transient nature of the Nation State at the 
periphery, despite is inception as an unchanging territory. 
 
The core is reinterpreted at the periphery. The Nation State, while installed as a 
vehicle for the administration of domination from the core, was also subject to 
reinterpreted at the periphery and became a vehicle for resistance to that domination. 
Control of the land was vital to the analogue colonisation project. Regaining control   366
of the land and its resources were a central element of the struggle for liberation from 
colonial control. Edward Said argued that, 
One of the first tasks of the culture of resistance was to reclaim, rename and 
reinhabit the land. 17 
 
The people of India were able to use the formation of the Nation State as a vehicle 
for crossing through ethnic and religious lines that might otherwise divide them. 
While the European empires rapidly retreated following the Second World War, the 
Nation States they had put in place remained, both as a residue of their presence as a 
potentially enabling formation to resistance to those empires influence. All empires 
leave a residue of prior manifestations. The Nation State as a site of resistance can be 
similarly activated against the colonial influence of the Invisible Empire. 
 
The Nation State and the Invisible Empire 
At first glance, it would seem that the sovereign Nation State is best served by 
keeping its citizens firmly at the periphery of the Invisible Empire and enmeshed in 
the Westphalian mode of citizenship that is specifically bound to this institution. 
Access is the point at which the Nation State’s control and exclusive sovereignty 
over the citizen can be maintained, without them ‘escaping’ the grasp of the Nation 
State through their projected digital identity. Blocking access allows for both 
colonisation and disempowerment to continue. While in some cases this does occur 
(there is not a great deal of Internet access encouraged in North Korea) this analysis 
disregards the role of the Nation State as the traditional site of resistance to 
colonisation, or more accurately, it misunderstands how resistance to the Invisible 
Empire is realised. Traditional national resistance to empire involves the restoration 
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of history of the colonised, integration and community building and liberation to 
form a nation. It also involves resistance to the military presence of the empire.18 
 
In the digitised environment, this resistance is differently executed and applied. 
Digitisation is colonisation by other means, particularly for those who, on the 
periphery, have no access themselves. A person’s image can be digitised through a 
mobile phone camera, and then displayed on web sites without the knowledge of the 
person of whom the image has been taken. Without access to the Internet they will 
have no way of becoming aware. There are no obvious markings of geography, race 
or gender between those at the core, and those at the periphery. On screen, the 
periphery is invisible and unrepresented. Off screen the core is invisible and 
inaccessible. When opposing the Invisible Empire, traditional national resistance is 
turned on its head, rather than expelling the core. It is a process of joining the core, 
or perhaps, expelling the periphery.  
 
It is hard to formulate resistance when the core and periphery exist side by side, 
invisibly within the population of the Nation State. It is the disempowered within the 
Nation State that most often find themselves at the periphery. The Internet moves 
through many national borders, however the users, while exercising their projected 
digital selves, and engaging with the digital environment as digital citizens, at the 
same time inhabit their various analogue sovereign territories, and engage with their 
separate national governments off screen. Those national governments still exercise 
their sovereignty off screen. While other transnational organisations may play some 
role in attempting to resist or mitigate the effects of digital colonisation, it is the 
                                                 
18 E. Said., Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus 1993.   368
Nation State with sovereignty and responsibility for citizens that is positioned to be 
the primary site of resistance. 
 
There are myriad processes through which the Nation State resists the Invisible 
Empire, both through enabling individual citizens, and more broadly as a nation. 
Many of these echo traditional resistance to colonisation, but adapted to the new 
digital environment, and the unique nature of resistance in this area. Traditional 
resistance to the process of colonisation involved the restoration of history, and 
integration and community building to form an independent nation. Within the 
digital context, this type of resistance is illustrated by individual Nation States 
enacting policies to promote and project their unique culture and language into the 
digital environment. Prominent examples of this can be seen in France and Canada 
which both share a concern for the French language. Particularly in Canada, cultural 
difference from the United States plays an important role in the shaping of the 
nation’s identity. As Douglas Rushkoff notes: 
By getting online each culture spreads its own iconography back to the rest of 
the world.19 
 
While the Invisible Empire does stretch across the jurisdictions of multiple Nations 
States, this does not mean that those thus colonised are without a negotiating position 
in regard to their own domain within the Internet. For any nation to unilaterally enact 
laws or regulation in relation to the Internet would result in a conflict of sovereignty 
whenever the Internet interfaced with other sovereign territory. However each nation 
has its own domain name suffix to designate its virtual ‘space’ on the Internet. While 
many nations choose to regulate only to the point of how domain names within this 
                                                 
19 D. Rushkoff, ‘Americaphobia and the Engineered Fear of Progress’, paper presented at the 
Conference on the Internet and Society, Harvard University 28-31 May 1996. 
http://www.aec.at/meme/symp/panel/msg00091.html [accessed 9.4.2004].   369
suffix are distributed, if at all, other nations have taken a more proactive, creative, 
and innovative position. 
 
Tuvalu 
 
Figure 112 
Flag of Tuvalu 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/flags/tv-flag.html  
[accessed 15.4.2004] 
 
In 1978 the former British Colony of Tuvalu was granted independence. Tuvalu 
means eight standing together, a reference to the eight traditionally inhabited atolls 
of the group of nine that make up the nation. It is a small (26 sq km) nation, where 
the highest point rises to only five meters above sea level. It is the world’s fourth 
smallest nation by landmass, and one of the most isolated. Tuvalu has a limited 
telephone network in the capital. There are 871 telephone lines listed in the current 
telephone directory.20 Contact with the outer islands is through radiophone. There is 
only one Internet Service Provider. The single radio station broadcasts on the AM 
band for approximately forty hours a week. 
 
The Tuvalu economy consists primarily of subsistence fishing and farming. The 
American Central Intelligence Agency lists the islands as having no arable land, and 
no naturally occurring fresh drinking water. The average income per capita is around 
                                                 
20 Tuvalu Telephone Directory. http://www.tuvaluislands.com/telecom/telecom-index.htm [accessed 
4.7.2005].   370
US$1,100 for each of the approximately 11,305 inhabitants.21 M u c h  o f  t h e  
government’s income is derived from foreign aid, largely from Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea. This is supplemented by the 
sale of stamps and coins, and from money returned to the Islands by citizens working 
overseas, the majority of whom work in Nauru,22 although with the running down of 
the phosphate mining in that island many of these workers are now being repatriated. 
There are no known mineral deposits or other significant natural resources on 
Tuvalu. While there is a Tuvalu currency, the Australian Dollar is the most common 
legal tender in circulation. By any measure, Tuvalu is at the periphery of the world 
both economically and spatially.23 The nation was formerly part of the British 
Empire as a colony up until the late 1970s (Queen Elizabeth II, the Queen of 
England, is still the head of State). The islands were also occupied by United States 
forces in 1942 as part of the war in the Pacific. Having arguably moved from being a 
part of the British Empire, and then later the American Empire, Tuvalu has proved be 
one of the most innovative states in the way it negotiates its relationship with the 
Invisible Empire. 
 
The Tuvalu nation is one of the foremost examples of the Nation State serving as the 
site of resistance to digital colonisation, or more accurately being able to take 
advantage of the changing nature of sovereignty in an increasingly digitised and 
online world. While access to the Internet and telephone system in Tuvalu is severely 
                                                 
21 World Fact Book 2005. USA: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tv.html [accessed 14.4.2004]. 
22 Some estimates place up to 1000 individuals in this category, or nearly 10% of the population. ‘A 
Brief History of Tuvalu’ 
http://www.tuvaluislands.com/history.htm [accessed 14.4.2004]. 
23 In digital discourse, Tuvalu, like much of the Pacific, is spoken about, not too. 
T. Wesley-Smith, ’ Net Gains? Pacific Studies in Cyberspace’, The Contemporary Pacific. Spring 
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limited, both by infrastructure and literacy with technology, this does not mean that 
Tuvalu is without national assets or resources in this area, and the government there 
has chosen to exploit them more effectively than any other. In 1999, Tuvalu signed a 
treaty with the United States, which exchanged access to the fisheries in the 
country’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone for regular royalty payments. Following 
this trend in 2000, the government traded exclusive control of access to its Internet 
domain suffix of .tv to a private US based company .TV Corporation http://www.tv/ 
for royalties that produced approximately five million dollars revenue each year.24 
The .tv corporation has since been purchased by VeriSign.25 The revenue generated 
by the deal was twice as much as Tuvalu’s previous gross domestic product.26 Prior 
to this deal, in 1998 the country had produced a similar revenue stream by leasing 
access to its area code for the use of ‘900’ number telephone services, once again 
based largely in the United States.  
 
To nominate a sign is to mark it, or render it special. Those in power rarely require 
special status, legislative rights or lobby groups to defend and define their interests. 
In such an environment, women, black and gay communities are marked signs, 
othered by ex-nominated cultural forces. Those commonly seen as unmarked or 
exnominated are colonised, white-dominated citizens and nations, men and 
heterosexuals. Such semiotic systems also operate digitally. Within the Internet, the 
ubiquitous .com is unmarked. Other domain name suffixes are nominated firstly in 
                                                 
24 The domain name ‘news.tv’ is advertised on the company web site for sale for one million dollars 
[accessed 14.4.2004] as was the domain name business.tv. http://www.tv/en-def-
29fe86927f91/en/index.shtml. [accessed 6.5.2004]. 
25 Following the colonial tradition the new owners of the domain have unilaterally reduced these 
royalty payments to closer to two million dollars a year as the deal see to be growing less attractive 
for the people of Tuvalu. 
26 C. Hanley, ‘Two little letters bring riches, and questions, to tiny, trusting nation’, AP Worldstream, 
4
th July 2004.   372
terms of position and organisation such as .org, .gov or .edu and secondly by where 
they originate. .au indicates from Australia, .uk from the United Kingdom, and .dz 
from Algeria. These national suffixes not only mark the country of origin, but in 
doing so mark a particular address in relationship to its core-peripheral positioning 
within the off screen world. 
 
Tuvalu, formally a colonised nation, has done something extraordinary. They have 
transformed themselves, or at least their Internet domain from a nominated, to an 
exnominated sign, utilizing capitalism as the method for revisioning and reclamation. 
Tuvalu’s .tv has been transformed from the marked status of a formally colonised 
Nation State, via American capital, into an exnominated sign for a globalised media. 
Almost a boutique exnominated sign, it has moved from a minority signification to 
an elite signification. Tuvalu did not actually sell or cede their sovereignty to .tv, but 
rather leased the virtual space, not dissimilarly to a pastoral lease. They have leased 
governance of the domain while ultimately not their sovereignty. However as no 
nation yet exercises any sovereignty within their designated Internet domain this is 
hard to distinguish. This was a loss of governance that the country could not use. The 
people of Tuvalu are a long way from crossing the digital divide from periphery to 
core. They are not in a position to experience the assets that they have ‘sold’. This 
example shows however that the Nation State, acting as a point of resistance to 
digital colonisation, can negotiate a better deal from the new Invisible Empire by 
understanding, and negotiating the lease of the nation’s new digital sovereignty. The 
colonised have to understand the language of the coloniser to enable an effective 
resistance. This was true for traditional colonisation, but it is doubly true for 
colonisation from the Invisible Empire. The lease of these assets that Tuvalu’s   373
citizens could not access can potentially provide resources that one-day might enable 
a level of economic development where this access will be possible. The realisation 
of these ‘resources of sovereignty’ is in part due to the nature of the country’s 
‘sovereign territory’ on the Internet. They are unlike traditional assets of sovereignty, 
such as a nation’s embassy, which actually impinge on the sovereign territories of 
other nations. Had Tuvalu sold these assets to a hotel chain to make all that chain’s 
hotels outside the jurisdiction of the nation in which they reside, it no doubt would 
have caused some level of resistance within the international community. As no 
Nation States have as yet exercised their own sovereignty over their designated 
Internet ‘domain’, the decision of one country to grant a private company exclusive 
use of this area of their sovereignty has gone largely without comment. 
 
Figure 113 
Map of Tuvalu 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tv.html 
[accessed 15.4.2004] 
 
Only other Nation States are in a position to respond to the hypothetical lease of 
Tuvalu’s embassies throughout the world, and similarly its lease of its designated 
domain name would face potential resistance only from this quarter. Once again, the   374
lack of a ruler of the Invisible Empire and lack of intent as it interfaces with the 
world of the analogue sovereign preclude any such reaction. 
  
The Nation State is significant in negotiating with the interface of Invisible Empire, 
and acting as the agency for the activation of resistance to digital colonisation. The 
actions of Tuvalu in negotiating this relationship, while unique and highly 
successful, needs to be seen in the context of the many fronts at which the Nation 
State potentially engages resistance to digital colonisation. The traditional paths of 
resistance to colonisation are transformed by the unique requirements of the digital 
environment. Whereas in the traditional colonial struggle the control of the land, and 
the expulsion of control from the core of empire is paramount, digital colonisation 
requires different strategies. Rather than control of land being central this struggle is 
centred on access, and rather than trying to expel the centre, access is used to 
negotiate the colonised away from the periphery towards the digital core. Whereas 
Tuvalu sought to utilise it digital assets as a nation through its national domain name, 
other nations have sought to exert their sovereign control over what they perceived 
as their domain within the exnominated sign of the .com.   375
Southafrica.com 
 
Figure 114 
South Africa.com 
http://www.southafrica.com/  
[accessed 15.4.2004] 
 
In 1995 a Seattle based company Virtual Countries Inc. registered the Internet 
domain name Southafrica.com, as it did for the domain names of thirty other 
countries27 including Newzealand.com, Russia.com and Korea.com, the latter it later 
sold to the South Korean government for five million US dollars.28 On the 30
th of 
October 2000 the South African Department of Communications issued a press 
release stating its intention to take Virtual Countries to the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO), which acts as a domain name dispute body. It was 
reported that Virtual Countries had asked for between five and ten million dollars to 
allocate the domain name to the South African Government.29 
 
                                                 
27 ‘The Right to Southafrica.com’, Sedo.com. 13
th March 2001. 
http://www.sedo.com/links/showhtml.php3?Id=140&language=us [accessed 19.7.2004]. 
28 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media 
International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106. 
29 ‘The Right to Southafrica.com’ Sedo.com. 13
th March.2001. 
http://www.sedo.com/links/showhtml.php3?Id=140&language=us [accessed 19.7.2004].   376
 
Figure 115 
Virtual Coutntries.com 
http://www.virtualcountries.com/  
[accessed 15.4.2004] 
 
In response, Virtual Countries on the 3
rd of November 2000 filed a law suit with a 
United States District Court in New York that asked that both the Republic of South 
Africa, and the South African Tourist Board be barred from taking any action to 
reallocate control of the domain name, and that the court recognise Virtual Countries 
as the legitimate owner of the domain name. South Africa successfully argued in this 
case that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the court to make any such judgement, due 
to the legal immunity the Republic of South Africa enjoyed as a sovereign nation. 
The exceptions to this immunity under United States law (as outlined in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976) were deemed to not be applicable and the case was 
thrown out in a ruling on June 18
th 2001.30 At the time South Africa also indicated 
that it would not pursue the case through WIPO at that stage.31 
 
Figure 116 
Flag of the Republic of South Africa 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/flags/sf-flag.html 
[accessed 22.4.2005]  
                                                 
30 ‘US Court Declines Jurisdiction Over Southafrica.com Dispute’, ICANN Watch. 25
th June 2001. 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=01/06/25/092829&mode=thread [accessed 19.6.2004].  
31 L. Harrison, ‘US dotcom keeps ownership of SouthAfrica.com’, The Register. 12
th July 2001. 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/07/12/us_dotcom_keeps_ownership/ [accessed 19.7.2004].   377
 
However South Africa then went on the lobby for greater recognition of national and 
place names under the ICANN dispute resolution procedures through the Second 
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process in 2002. Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law 
at the University of Miami commented on the South African submission for changes 
to the WIPO dispute resolution procedure: 
The South African ambassador, whose nation is involved in litigation in the US 
over its attempt to hijack the southafrica.com domain from a non-resident 
company, argued passionately that country names on the Internet (by which it 
turned out she meant mainly .com) are the property -- yes, property, just like 
natural resources! -- of the nation and should not be subject to colonialist 
expropriation by non-resident foreigners. The argument makes almost no sense 
to me, since I think language is our common property, but I could not help but 
be struck by the passion with which it was delivered.32 
 
South Africa argued in its submission to the process that many companies had been 
able to register domain names associated with different developing nations before 
those nations were aware of those activities, or how they would later impact on the 
nation’s control over what South Africa views as its national resources.33 As 
Matthew Rimmer from the faculty of law at the Australian National University notes: 
The Republic of South Africa read the dispute in terms of post-colonialism. 
The appropriation of identity, place and language remain important matters in 
the context of developing nations.34 
 
While for the South African Government this was seen in the context of postcolonial 
struggle, much of the broader domain name ownership debate is more closely linked 
to intellectual property laws associated with trademarks. Important transformations 
occur as this analogue legal foundation is digitised. Off screen it is possible for more 
                                                 
32 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media 
International Australia, Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106. p. 133. 
33 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media 
International Australia, Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106.  
34 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’ Media 
International Australia, Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106, p. 133.   378
than one holder of a trademark to legally coexist, however once on the Internet, there 
can be only one unique domain name for each of these trademarks to use throughout 
the exnominated designation of the .com. While countries’ names do not constitute a 
trademark South Africa argued that its national symbols, including its national 
domain name was protected under the Paris Convention of 1883,35 a treaty that 
provides for the protection of such symbols, not as trademarks, but to prevent 
unauthorised exploitation of those symbols (and is also administered by the WIPO). 
While this argument was not without merit, the treaty, while protecting the official 
names of countries, does not protect their common name. 
 
The law specifically pertaining to domain name registrations within the United 
States, and thus applicable to Virtual Countries through the sovereign territory it 
inhabits, is the Anti Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999.36 Once again, 
this law was designed to support the owners of commercial trademark, rather than 
Nation States. As with much recent Internet regulation in the United States, this 
legislation supports the generation of private, as opposed to public capital.37 While 
the government of South Africa structured the conflict through the prism of post 
colonialism, Virtual Countries took the position that it was a case of ‘reverse 
hijacking’, where a more powerful organisation tries to usurp control of a web 
address from a less powerful, but legitimate owner of that address. A process often 
facilitated by this type of legislation. 
                                                 
35 Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property. 1883. 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm [accessed 20.7.2004]. 
36 S.1948 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 (Introduced in the 
Senate), enacted as P.L. 106-113 (29
th November 1999) http://www.patents.com/acpa.htm [accessed 
21.7.2004]. 
37 M. Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media 
International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy. February 2003, number 106, p. 127.   379
 
By the end of 2002, the dispute remained unresolved and at least in the medium term 
in Virtual Countries’ favour. In October 2002 WIPO submitted to ICANN its Report 
of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process.38 Amongst the 
recommendations was the country names be afforded special protection as domain 
names. These recommendations were adopted at the ICANN board meeting on the 
15
th of July 2005.39 However the protection will not be retrospective. South Africa 
will not be able to gain access to this domain name through this mechanism. 
Following the unsuccessful appeal by New Zealand to the WIPO over Virtual 
Countries ownership of Newzealand.com, the South African government began 
negotiations with Virtual Countries in May 2003.40 
 
Throughout this dispute, both sides sought to maximise their chance of success by 
choice of jurisdiction and adjudicator in the dispute. This choice reflected the ability 
of these rival digital sovereigns, in this case fighting over virtual property, to make 
the best utilisation of their differing assets and abilities. The Greg Paley, the 
American owner of Virtual Countries, tried to position the dispute in terms of free 
speech: 
                                                 
38 World Intellectual Property Organisation, The Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the 
Internet Domain Name System: Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, 3
rd 
September 2001.  http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/html/report.html [accessed 29.7.2004]. 
39 ICANN Board Meeting, Luxembourg Approved Resolutions. 
http://www.icann.org/minutes/resolutions-15jul05.htm#p2 [accessed 16.7.2005].  
40 S. Whitford, ‘SA Negotiates for Southafrica.com’, IT Web: The Technology News Site. 6
th May 
2003. 
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/internet/2003/0305061036.asp?O=S&cirestriction=southafrica.com 
[accessed 19.7.2004].   380
They want to stop free speech. They want to stop a US business from allowing 
people in SA to congregate on a site and discuss issues close to their hearts in a 
forum not controlled by them.41 
 
This was an interesting position given that Virtual Countries is a commercial site the 
promote tourism, rather than a place for political discussion and debate. However by 
trying to draw this into the debate, Virtual Countries was hoping to receive 
protection under the United States constitutional guarantees for free speech. For its 
part, the South African Government was able to avoid the judgement of courts in the 
United States through its sovereign immunity from such courts, and instead tried to 
have the dispute resolved through WIPO where, as a Nation State, it possessed more 
influence. 
 
Figure 117 
New Zealand.com 
http://www.newzealand.com/ 
[accessed 22.4.2005] 
                                                 
41 P. De Wit, ‘Government wants Southafrica.com’, 1
st August 2001, www.itweb.co.za, as cited in M. 
Rimmer, ‘Virtual Countries: Internet Domain Names and Geographical Terms’, Media International 
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In 2003, the New Zealand Government bought newzealand.com from Virtual 
Countries for a figure reported to be near one million New Zealand dollars.42 Prior to 
this time, the New Zealand government had an appeal to the WIPO over ownership 
of the domain name, which had ruled against the country to the point where Queen 
Elizabeth II, in her capacity as head of state for New Zealand, was found guilty of 
reverse domain name hijacking. 
 
Figure 118 
New Zealand Coat of Arms 
Surmounting the New Zealand Cost of Arms is the St Edward's Crown, which was used in the 
Coronation ceremony of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. The crown symbolises the fact that 
Her Majesty is Queen of New Zealand under the New Zealand Royal Titles Act 1953.43 
 
WIPO found that New Zealand, in a questionnaire response to the Second WIPO 
Internet Domain Name Process in 2002, stated that New Zealand law did not ‘in any 
                                                 
42 ‘SouthAfrica.com petition launched’, Demys News Service. 28
th May 2003.   
http://www.demys.net/news/2003/05/28_za.htm [accessed 9.7.2005]. 
43 ‘New Zealand’s Coat of Arms. Aotearoa/New Zealand: Memanatu Taonga’, Ministry for Culture 
& Heritage. http://www.cultureandheritage.govt.nz/coat-of-arms.htm [accessed 21.7.2004].   382
circumstances’ preclude the use of country names as part of any special protection 
for the domain name system.44 As a result the WIPO ruled that the dispute over 
newzealand.com had been brought before it in bad faith. The Government of New 
Zealand, may well have felt aggrieved at this as they had successfully used the same 
appeal process to gain control of newzealand.biz in October 2002. In this earlier 
case, the London based company concerned iSMER, perhaps influenced by sharing 
the same sovereign in whose name the dispute was brought, had agreed to relinquish 
the domain and explicitly acknowledged that it was ‘in the wrong’ in this case having 
registered the name in bad faith.45 It seems that this type of resolution process is less 
arbitrary, or perhaps more subject to rule based on the litigants, than it otherwise 
might like to be seen as being.  
 
Internet addresses then can be seen to provide different signifiers in different levels 
of their domains. Each of these domains is provided with its signified content by 
separate dialogues. My personal email address is mikekent@iinet.net.au, from the 
domain name of my Internet Service Provider (ISP) iinet.net.au. This address can be 
broken into its component levels. The .au at the end signifies and marks that this 
address is specifically from Australia.46 It is signified by the fact that it will have 
been issued by an Australian organisation, and more than likely represents interests 
or entities within Australia. In the case of my professional email address 
mike.kent@popularculturecollective.com, this sign is left deliberately unmarked, 
                                                 
44 ‘HM The Queen Found Guilty of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking’ Demys News Service. 20
th 
December 2002. http://www.demys.net/news/2002/12/02_dec_20_queen.htm [accessed 19.6.2004]. 
45 ‘HM The Queen Wins Domain Name Dispute’ Demys News Service. 8
th October 2002. 
http://www.demys.net/news/2002/10/02_oct_08_zealand.htm [accessed 19.7.2004]. 
46 .au has been available from March 1986, having been allocated to Robert Elz of Melbourne 
University to manage, soon after the domain name system was implemented.   383
indicating on one level that there is no particular national affiliation,47 and no need 
for any such affiliation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 119 
The Popular Culture Collective 
http://www.popularculturecollective.com/  
[accessed 10.4.2005] 
 
The next level of the domain represents the broad type of address that is represented. 
While initially there were only a few of these designators available, such as .com .net 
.org and .edu, in recent years many more have become available (the .biz from the 
New Zealand case study being a good example of this new wave). The designators 
                                                 
47 Although often this default affiliation is seen as coming from the United States, for whom the 
marking of .US is virtually never used, having only been released to the general public in 2002, until 
that time it was reserved for non-federal governments in the United States and educational institutions 
offering less than four year university degrees. 
P. E. Steinberg & S. D. McDowell, ‘Mutiny on the bandwidth: The semiotics of statehood in the 
Internet domain name registries of Pitcairn and Nui’, New Media and Society. March 2003, volume 5, 
number 1. 
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.com and .net used in my addresses are two of the most common, making up 47% 
and 7% respectively.48  
 
Figure 120 
Domain Name Registrations, April 2005 
 http://www.verisign.com/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsletter/030725.pdf  
[accessed 15.7.2005] 
 
The next level of the domain name is the proper name of the domain itself, and is 
determined at the time of registration. The signified nature of this is closely linked to 
the law of trademarks off screen, yet the southafrica.com and newzealand.com 
examples show that this is clearly removed from the national designations such as .au 
and .tv. Finally when the domain is part of an email address, the signifier of an 
individual before the @ sign is the signified representation of either an individual, 
such as mike.kent, or a position, such as admin or info. 
                                                 
48 VeriSign, The Domain Name Industry Brief. May 2005, volume 2, issue 2. 
http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/domainbrief/2004/report_200406.pdf [accessed 20.7.2004].   385
 
These examples of the attempts of Nation States to project their sovereignty and 
possessions into the digitised Internet environment need to be understood in that new 
context. Thus in the case of Tuvalu, the country was able to lease out some of its 
digitised national territory in the form of the .tv domain name. This domain was 
specifically set-aside for that Nation State, and needed Tuvalu to act before it could 
become active. Within the .au domain of Australia, it is under Australian law that 
disputes are resolved over ownership, and as such the domain can be seen to be 
subject to Australian sovereignty. However once outside that sovereign territory 
when New Zealand and South Africa tried to assert their respective national 
ownership of the unmarked .com domain names, they were no longer within that 
national territory, and the private company resident under the sovereignty of the 
United States was found to have the superior position by virtue of having been the 
first to register these addresses. 
 
These are both examples of different, and rival, digital sovereigns negotiating their 
relationships with each other. However there is something that sets the Nation State 
apart as a subset of these rival sovereigns. The two key differences between the 
Nation State and large corporations has always been firstly the exercise of the 
monopoly of legitimate violence by the Nations State within its territory (the 
dominion of the East India company over India notwithstanding), and the secondly 
that the Nation State is comprised of a population of citizens who live within this 
jurisdiction (as opposed to shareholders). Once digitised on the Internet these 
distinctions start to become less relevant, as digital citizens are highly independent of 
their national territory of residence, and violence, legitimate or otherwise, becomes   386
more complicated to exercise. However the Nation State maintains the residue of the 
space where it is the dominant political division within the world, and the ability of 
sovereign nations to influence the digital colonial administration through this residue 
sets them apart from other competing digital sovereigns in this respect. 
 
Said confirmed that, ‘One of the first tasks of the culture of resistance was to 
reclaim, rename and reinhabit the land.’49 In the digital environment this traditional 
mode and site of resistance transformed. Rather than control of the land and a spatial 
understanding of what separates the coloniser from the colonised, in this new 
environment the line between the digital citizen and the digital underclass is 
determined by access. This access and the quality of the access, determined by the 
interface of hardware, software, wetware and cultware, becomes the primary point at 
which the core-periphery line is determined in the Invisible Empire. Unlike 
traditional resistance, the core and periphery cannot directly experience each other. 
The underclass lacking access have no way of experiencing the digital environment, 
and the understanding the potential of citizenship that it embodies. Conversely, as the 
digital underclass has no digital identities to project, they cannot be experienced 
within the digital environment, and go unmarked, and unnamed at the digital core. 
Access is required before any reclaiming, renaming, or habitation is possible. 
Without access the core periphery line is impermeable. 
 
The Nation State, as a point of resistance to digital colonisation, has a number of 
strategies to combat this divide. In terms of physical infrastructure, this resistance is 
evident in Australia through the Universal Service Obligation, and other programs to 
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provide access to technology throughout society, particularly to those who might 
otherwise find themselves at the digital periphery. While access to this infrastructure 
is vital, it is literacy, the understanding of the digital environment, and being able to 
engage with it, that is the critical barrier to access.  
 
Simon Gikandi noted that at the periphery of the British Empire, it was impossible to 
experience the ‘true’ mother England; rather it was projected as an avatar through 
books and stories.50 While able to play cricket in Pakistan, it is not the same 
experience ideologically or socially as that played at Lords. Rather it is an 
interpretation of the core at the periphery. For those in the digital periphery this is 
further magnified by the inability to directly perceive the medium in which the core 
manifests. The Internet is often portrayed as a haven for explicit sexual content, 
credit card fraud, extreme political views, and Spam. This serves to keep those at the 
periphery away from the medium. National attempts to overcome this negative image 
are evident in legislation acting to regulate content. In the Australian context in 
particular this was seen as a way to make the Internet ‘safe’ for the population at 
large, and encourage broader penetration. The funding of Internet access in public 
places, such as libraries and schools, is another strategy of resistance aimed at 
mitigating the effects of periphery for the digital underclass, and promoting 
understanding and literacy in relation to the technology.  
 
Within this context of resistance, the Nation State’s bid to gain control of ICANN51 
and other aspects of the digital colonial administration can now be seen in terms of 
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resistance as well as an attempt to reassert sovereignty in this new environment. 
However, as Bill Clinton notes:   
There are a lot of very brilliant people who believe that the nation-state is fast 
becoming a relic of the past.52 
 
This post-Nation State environment becomes a quite sinister prospect for the future. 
However the announcement of the end of the Nation State maybe somewhat 
premature. 
 
All empires rise and fall over time. It is the actions of those in command of empires 
in the past that have either impeded or enhanced the speed at which this process 
occurs. The Invisible Empire has the potential to greatly enhance the lives of people 
throughout the world. What actions can be taken to prevent the inevitable fall of 
empire? What agency can act and how, or is it already to late to save the Invisible 
Empire as it stands? Analogue empires end. They peak in power and then – 
inevitably – retract and decline. Will this be mirrored in the digital environment, 
indeed has it already begun? Empires are transitory. Each contains a ‘use by’ date. 
The ruling institution can influence the timing of this ending, but the Invisible 
Empire lacks a ruler. While traditional empires have been able to act to prolong their 
lives, with no ‘Internet Emperor’ how would any such strategy be put in place in to 
context of the Internet? The Internet may have already reached its natural point of 
penetration within the United States.53 Recent studies have shown that a staggering 
33% of the population in the United States has actively decided that they will not 
participate, online or seek out any kind of Internet Access. This population has 
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decided actively, intentionally, and with consciousness to exclude themselves from 
this mode of communications. While no figures are currently available for Australia 
it can be assumed that there must be some analogous group in society.54 As the 
Internet grew, in terms of content and accessibility to the population, it allowed for 
more people access to the digital core. This growth could be expected to occur 
naturally to the point at which it reaches a maximum level of penetration within a 
society acting as its own momentum. As this growth occurs, there is a natural 
expansion at the core, and a reduction in the numbers trapped on the periphery. 
However as the penetration level plateaus, the line between core and periphery 
becomes static and will remain so without some further innovation that leads to 
greater penetration, or without some kind of outside intervention to work against this 
type of structural inequality.  
 
The expansion of the Internet is a product of a growth in the accessibility and literacy 
of the technology in the portion of the population spatially and socially positioned to 
take advantage of it, particularly those who share a predisposition to engage in the 
new mode of citizenship. These individuals thus move toward the core of the 
Invisible Empire. This growth could be expected to continue naturally to the point at 
which it would meet resistance as the factors effecting access became more a product 
of literacy than of technology and economics. Once the point is reached where 
penetration within society has reached its natural peak on the momentum generated 
by the existing parameters of hardware, software, wetware and cultware, then the 
border separating the periphery and the core becomes static and impermeable unless 
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there is outside intervention. The Invisible Empire as an institution holds no intent or 
will to remedy this inequality. Market forces do not solve social problems. It is a 
function of the way that the Invisible Empire is determined structurally and activated 
within the environmental constraints in place. At this point in time, the Nation State 
is the place where this social and digital inequality is addressed, if it is to occur 
anywhere. 
 
The way that the analogue sovereigns are able to engage with the Invisible Empire 
will play a large role in determining at what point the Empire reaches the limits of its 
expansion, and how long it is able to resist decline. Spam is a good example of this. 
Currently the prevalence of Spam is starting to threaten the utility of email that has 
up until this point been the most successful of the ‘killer applications’ of the digital 
environment.55 This may prove to be the Internet’s equivalent of the fall of fortress 
Singapore to the British Empire before it. Spam has become prevalent despite almost 
universal condemnation due to the structure of the Internet and its inherent flaws in 
the nature of capitalist commerce with no sovereign to enact and enforce the law. 
Attempts by national governments to address this problem until now seem to 
indicate, that like the guns of Singapore that all faced to sea when the city was 
threatened by land, that there is an inherent misunderstanding of how to deal with 
this problem. This metaphor is not meant to suggest that the injustice and inequality 
cannot be solved. Rather, it requires a different understanding of sovereignty. 
Currently, no Nation State exerts sovereignty through the area designated by their 
domain name suffix. This however need not be the case. As with the resistance to 
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colonisation through the negotiation of access, the Nation State may prove to be the 
structure through which the Invisible Empire, and the potential benefits it enables, 
can be maintained and enhanced. At the edges of the Invisible Empire the Nation 
State has the potential to again be reinterpreted and provide a basis for a new 
understanding of digital sovereignty based on these domain name designations.56 
 
The Invisible Empire occurs at the interface of the on screen discourse of digital 
sovereignty and the off screen world of the analogue sovereign. The Empire is 
influenced by the residue the empires that had gone before it. It appropriates the 
former modes of citizenship, but it is something different, engaging as it does with 
the new mode of citizenship embodied in the digital citizen. By examining the 
slippages and hybridities, looking at how space and the markings of class and 
colonisation are changed in this environment, this chapter has illustrated some of the 
implications of this difference. 
 
The manifestations of core and periphery are different within this environment. The 
traditional markers of space in the traditional core-periphery relationship are missing, 
replaced with divisions based on literacy, such as is evident through the 
Amazon.com labour structure. At the same time these on screen relationships can 
interface with the off screen world, and the current global hegemony manifest in the 
Empire of the United States and off screen core-periphery relationships. This 
relationship is illustrated through activities within the MMORPG economies. The 
digital core and periphery cannot experience each other, from the digital core, class, 
race, spatial location, and even gender are hidden. The Invisible Empire is an 
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unstable formation, it is unsettling and it requires translation and negotiation, no one 
can say exactly ‘this is what an Invisible Empire is’. It is constantly being 
renegotiated and moving. Until now, the transition between core and periphery, as 
happens at the point of access, has been ‘naturally’ moving to embrace the core. Now 
that the Internet’s growth is tapering, understanding the Invisible Empire for the 
analogue sovereign becomes particularly critical. Because it is within the Nation 
State, at that point of access, where race, and class, and gender, and distance once 
again manifest and where the Nation State can act to influence the position of its 
citizens within the Invisible Empire and act as a site of resistance to the influence of 
digital colonisation. 
 
Empires expand and retract. They are unstable. None had the highly fluid 
foundations of the Invisible Empire based on the fractured nature of capitalism 
without the rule of law to provide the civil society required for it to function 
normally. Similarly these previous empires were ruled by intent. The Invisible 
Empire, controlled by the discourse of digital sovereignty on screen and its interface 
with the analogue sovereign off screen, lacks this intent. This leaves the structure 
vulnerable. The rise of Spam, and the inability of the Invisible Empire to overcome 
this threat is a good example of this. In this case the Empire can potentially look to 
the Nation State for salvation, however, the Nation State’s attempts to act against his 
problem, up until now have been hampered by a misconception of the environment 
in which they operate. 
 
Access to the Internet and the recourses at the core of the Invisible Empire are 
potentially of great value to any members of a society. In Australia where there are   393
high levels of literacy in English (if not always technology) and a sufficient level of 
economic development to enable the technology to access the Internet to be 
relatively abundant, the digital periphery should be in a shrinking minority. What of 
those who live on the digital periphery, invisibly passing through a society of digital 
citizens, both unseen, and unable to communicate with those at the digital core. What 
are the roles and limitations of the analogue sovereign in the digital environment, and 
how does it become involved in the negotiation of access? Can the digital subaltern 
speak?   394
Chapter 8 
The Digital Subaltern 
 
 
Figure 121 
The Real Digital Divide 
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Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight:  somewhere in sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun, 
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
 
 
The Second Coming – William Butler Yeats1 
 
Introduction 
In moving through the final phases of this doctoral research, it is necessary to discard 
the brightly coloured jacket of the metaphoric digital flâneur. His strolling with 
purpose allowed problems to be diagnosed and contradictions to be revealed. Yet he 
must make way instead for the role of the intellectual to act as a translator and 
advocate for those that fall outside the borders of the Invisible Empire. To critique 
and influence the existing order rather than observe. Up to this point, the role of the 
digital flâneur has been appropriate to take a critical and political view of the digital 
boulevard. This journey began with the historic relationship between 
telecommunications, the citizen and the state in Australia, at the interface between 
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digital and analogue worlds as is manifest in the changing nature of the Universal 
Service Obligation. The implications of this transformation are addressed in Chapter 
Two: ‘The Gates of Empire’. Here the unique construction of Internet access, and the 
implications of the screen as the point of manifestation for the Internet for each 
atomised potential user was evaluated. This point is where hardware, wetware, 
software and cultware are all activated. In Part II attention was turned to an 
examination of the nature of the digital self, and the construction of the digital 
citizen. From there, the focus moved to the complex construction of sovereignty that 
creates the context for the digital citizen to interact with others and the analogue 
state. As the Internet spans across many national territories. Part III then turned its 
attention to the role of the Internet in creating an Invisible Empire across the globe, 
an empire that exists both within and between many Nation States. In each of these 
studies of the citizen, sovereignty and empire, the development of the concept 
through time in the analogue environment was used to illustrate how these constructs 
are transformed in the digital context.  
 
The consequences of these separate yet related components are now reflected in the 
impact of digital colonisation and the specific construction of the digital subaltern. 
This chapter is significant in this journey. In previous chapters the focus centred on  
the illustrating the imperial core of the Invisible Empire. Focus now turns to the 
colonised periphery to the digital underclass: those who are potentially most 
disadvantaged by the constructs of Invisible Empire. Without the cultware and 
literacy to access the Invisible Empire through the screen, the disadvantages are 
rendered as invisible to the Empire. This generates a new type of subaltern agency, 
one that is not only without voice or consciousness, but also without tangible   397
manifestation within the walls of the Invisible Empire. The changing nature of that 
Empire within Australia – as Internet penetration begins to plateau and the borders of 
the Empire become more difficult to breach – presents a danger that the place of the 
digital underclass will become perpetuated. The strategies for resistance to digital 
colonisation will need to be carefully developed in this changing digital environment. 
 
Former European colonial possessions were able to mobilise the ideologies, 
institutions and structures of the Nation State imposed on them by their colonial 
masters, as a place of resistance to that colonial rule and a vehicle through which to 
seek their independence. It had originally been my intention to focus in this chapter 
on the role played by the Nation State in its interaction with the Invisible Empire. 
However, while the Nation State provides a site of potential resistance to digital 
colonisation, the reason for this resistance, and what dangers are posed by the 
Invisible Empire, are best illustrated through an examination of those most 
negatively impacted on by its presence: those who are left without access.  
 
Having constructed the Internet as an Invisible Empire, this chapter draws on 
postcolonial theory to examine the relationship between the colonised periphery and 
the core. Off screen postcolonial theory provides a set of intellectual tools for 
analysing the effects of colonisation and imperialism off screen. These tools can then 
be used to examine the impact of the Invisible Empire as it manifests in the digital 
periphery. Within this context the place of the underclass, or in the parlance of 
postcolonial theory, the subaltern, can be used to illustrate the condition of the digital 
underclass. 
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Antonio Gramsci constructed the subaltern in relation to the working class of Italy.2 
For him, the role of the intellectual in speaking for the subaltern, and providing this 
group with consciousness of their position, was central to activate his proposed 
societal transformation. The role of the digital intellectual, intervening on behalf of 
the digital subaltern becomes crucial to the context where digital core and periphery 
no longer share any space to manifest; no space where dialogue or translation can 
occur. Saint Isidore wrote in his Book of Maxims: 
The conscientious reader will be more concerned to carry out what he has read 
than merely to acquire knowledge of it. In reading we aim at knowing, but we 
must put into practice what we have learned in our course of study.3 
 
The role of the intellectual this chapter moves to discussion of contemporary 
postcolonial theory, the study of the (analogue) subaltern and the role of the 
intellectual as an agent of intervention. This analogue context is then used as the 
backdrop to illustrate the nature and impact of colonisation’s digital counterpart. The 
process of digital colonisation is then evaluated along with how it differs from the 
analogue process. Harold Innis’ work linked space and time to transport and 
communication within the core and peripheral relationships of analogue empires.4 
This understanding is now further conflated with the link between identity and 
literacy, and the contextual positioning of cultware in determining positioning in 
relation to the digital core and periphery. Within this construction of digital 
colonisation, the subaltern agency conferred on the digital underclass becomes 
particularly significant, as does the role of the (digital) intellectual and their place in 
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activating potential resistance to digital colonisation. Resistance to the Invisible 
Empire is activated differently to its off screen counterpart. Rather than trying to 
exclude the core, it is an exercise in being inclusive of the subaltern. Consciousness 
or more specifically, an absence of consciousness is a central tenet of the 
construction of the subaltern. In the manifestation of the digital subaltern, attempts to 
raise consciousness are particularly problematic in the face of the invisible nature of 
the subaltern in the on screen environment. The corresponding lack of manifestation 
of overt markings of disadvantage usually obvious in the off screen environment 
makes this particularly difficult. To advocate this process rhetorically often 
resembles advocating the analogue colonial process with the potential danger of 
promoting the ‘white man’s burden’ of the digital flâneur. The possible pitfalls of 
this strategy as the Internet becomes increasingly postcolonial concludes the chapter. 
 
The Subaltern 
Within Postcolonial Studies, the subaltern has become synonymous with any 
marginalised or disempowered group, particularly with regard to race and ethnicity. 
For Spivak in her pivotal essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’,5 the subaltern represented 
‘subsistence farmers, unorganised peasant labour, the tribal and communities of zero 
workers on the street or in the countryside.’6 Spivak used the ritual of sati during 
which a widow would jump or was placed into the burning funeral pyre of her 
husband, and the banning of the practice by the British colonial administration from 
1829, to illustrate the subaltern agency of these women. Local indigenous men 
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protested the new laws, claiming it violated the rights of the women concerned to 
show their fealty to their departed husbands. Spivak characterised this conflict as 
‘white men saving brown women from brown men.’7 Gramsci had originally used 
the ‘subaltern’ to refer to class, specifically the subordinate class in southern Italy.8 
A formation of class and consciousness following from Marx:  
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.9 
 
For Gramsci the construction of the subaltern was intimately linked to economic 
relations and class consciousness.10 The development of the consciousness of the 
subaltern and their understanding of their position and solidarity with others in a 
similar position was central to Gramsci’s intellectual project. Spivak, through the use 
of Derrida, then added gender, race and colonialism to the understanding of the 
subaltern.11  
Can the subaltern speak? What must the elite do to watch out for the 
continuing construction of the subaltern? The question of “women” seems 
most problematic in this context. Clearly if you are poor, black, and female 
you get it three ways.12 
 
As the essay illustrates, ultimately no one can question the women who have actually 
burned on the pyre. For Spivak, commenting on the context of colonial production, 
there is no place in which the subaltern can speak. This understanding of the place in 
which the disadvantaged are given voice becomes a central focus of Subaltern 
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Studies. In Spivak’s later essays, the understanding of the subaltern grows to include 
a variety of disadvantaged groups in the west including women and migrants.13 
Within this context, there are those who now travel to be colonised: the imported 
underclass of Turkish workers in Germany. There are accompanying social problems 
that come from the manifestation of this phenomenon, for example, as experienced 
by Filipino maids in Singapore and Mexican labourers in the United States, those 
who now move through space themselves in order to activate and maintain colonial 
relations. In some respects this can be seen as a logical and almost predictable path 
for the movement associated with colonisation, from the original colonisers to the 
peripheral colony, then from the colonised within the periphery, and now the 
colonised from the periphery moving to the core. For Spivak, there is no space for 
the subaltern to speak and make their experiences and interests known from their 
own perspective. They are instead spoken for, largely by those who exploit them. 
Following the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004, Herman Kumara, head of the National 
Fisheries Solidarity Movement in Negombo, Sri Lanka, illustrated this phenomena in 
an email sent out colleagues around world: 
The funds received for the benefit of the victims are directed to the benefit of 
the privileged few, not to the real victims. Our voices are not heard and not 
allowed to be voiced.14 
 
Foucault confirmed that the subaltern was not authorised to talk in the ruling 
discourse, but rather to be engaged in many discourses of their own.15 Bhabha also 
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describes the interaction between colonised and coloniser, noting that it is not always 
adversarial. He constructs a third space where mediation between the dominant and 
the subordinate occurs.16 Both the coloniser and colonised share physical space, if 
not the literacy and authority, where it is possible to communicate. This 
understanding of a third space, a place where the subaltern can interface with the 
ruling discourse will become highly problematised when appropriated into the digital 
environment;  particularly with an understanding of the screen as a gateway, 
traversed only through the literacy of the individual user.  
 
The digital subaltern manifests in a significantly different environment to their 
analogue counterpart. Young describes the construction of the subaltern:  
The concept of the subaltern ascribed a new dynamic political agency to those 
who had formerly been described as the wretched of the earth, the oppressed 
and the dispossessed. By means of the subaltern the oppressed assumed 
political agency to become the subject of history no longer its abject object.17 
 
Gramsci advocated that the path to empower the subaltern, providing them with a 
place and authority to speak, required the development of class-consciousness, and 
specifically a solidarity within the working class. In his case the construction of a 
common cause between industrial factory workers in the north of Italy and the 
peasant farmers of the south18 Spivak significantly provides no remedies for 
subaltern agency,19 rather she is descriptive of the problem. For Young it would 
seem that the mere understanding of the circumstance of the subaltern is 
empowering.  
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The Intellectual 
Antonio Gramsci assumed a need for the underclass to be represented in his writings 
on the place of the intellectual. Gramsci theorised that in order for a new class-
consciousness to enable the subaltern proletariat to take their, in his view, destined 
place as the dominant class in Italy, it needed to overcome existing divisions into 
different trades. Writing from prison, where he spent the last years of his life after 
being sentenced by the Mussolini-led Italian government, Gramsci wrote over three 
thousand pages in his notebooks which were later smuggled out and published. He 
devoted an entire volume of these writings to the role of the intellectual. For 
Gramsci, intellectuals are leaders. As he explained, ‘All men are intellectuals, one 
could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.’20 
Gramsci postulated that there were two types of intellectuals, the traditional 
intellectual and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals represent the academy, 
priests, and writers. While they might see themselves as autonomous to the ruling 
class within Gramsci’s construction these intellectuals existed within, and maintained 
the existing social order. 
every “essential” social group which emerges into history out of the preceding 
economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, 
has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals 
already in existence and which seemed indeed to represent an historical 
continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in 
political and social forms.21 
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This analysis follows from Marx that ideas of the dominant classes tend to be the 
dominant ideas.22 Gramsci’s second type of intellectual, the organic intellectual, was 
seen as coming from within a class, and providing that class with consciousness and 
agency.  The organic intellectual came from outside the existing social order to 
challenge its assumptions and power structures. 
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social 
and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the 
industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a 
new culture, of a new legal system, etc. 23  
 
For Gramsci, in order to create the class consciousness needed to unite the working 
class within Italy, these organic intellectuals needed to not just work within their own 
class, but also to contest ideas of the traditional intellectuals, and convince them of 
the correctness of their cause; to colonise them and bring them on side with the 
struggle of the working class. 
 
Spivak constructs the concept of the intellectual along similar lines. However she 
views the attempts by western intellectuals to critique neocolonialism and act on 
behalf of those most oppressed by the system as a failure to take into account their 
own place within the existing system of oppression: Spivak specifically criticises 
Deleuze and Foucault in this context. Moore-Gilbert notes that within this critique 
these intellectuals are: 
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Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, pp. 3-23. 
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assuming that they are transparent vis a vis the objects of their attention. In 
other words such ‘radicals’ too easily suppose that they are outside the general 
system of exploitation of the ‘third world’ – in which western modes of 
cultural analysis and representation (including ‘high’ theory itself) and 
institutions of knowledge (such as the universities in which such theory is 
characteristically developed) are in fact deeply implicated.24 
 
By trying to provide a voice for the subaltern, these theorists are instead standing in 
their place, and representing or speaking on behalf of the subaltern themselves. They 
follow Gramsci’s understanding of the natural intellectual, while thinking that they 
are outside the existing social order, when they are in fact implicated in maintaining 
it. Spivak is also engaged in this process in the very act of describing its 
manifestation in others. While the intellectual may play a role in the perpetuation of 
the existing order, they are still best positioned to speak for the underclass.25 
Ultimately it is the role of the intellectual, following Gramsci, to provide a voice for, 
and consciousness of, the subaltern – his will be particularly true for the digital 
subaltern.  
 
The borders of Invisible Empire are porous. The transition from core to periphery, or 
the journey from the colonised at the periphery to the citizens at the core of the 
metropolis is achievable. Knowledge and literacy provide the new markers, and these 
have the potential to be overcome more easily than the analogue subaltern markers of 
race, class, gender and geography. Within this context the Invisible Empire can be 
seen as part of the process described by Kwame Nkrumah: 
neo-colonialism is not a sign of imperialisms strength, but rather its last 
hideous gasp. 26 
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The Invisible Empire creates its own form of invisible colonisation, which generates 
a very different relationship between those within and outside its borders. These 
relationships between the empowered and disempowered can be better illuminated 
through focusing attention on the consequences of the Invisible Empire for those at 
its periphery: those who are without voice, and crucially without consciousness of 
their relationship with the Invisible Empire. These individuals, atomised and 
disempowered – the digital underclass – are a product of the discourse of power and 
entitlement constructed by the Invisible Empire. 
  
How then does the understanding of the Subaltern change once the Invisible Empire 
becomes an application of imperial power? The digital underclass, those without 
access to the cultware, needed to access the Internet, and not only to project an 
identity through the screen. Currently, they are not seen from on screen. They do not 
share a common space in which dialog can occur. They are trapped in a periphery 
where the centre cannot be experienced and reinterpreted. Theories of colonisation 
and the analogue subaltern were modernising, grand narratives with big answers to 
big problems. The digital subaltern presents a post-modern strategy, fickle and 
fragmented, a person can be empowered in one way and disempowered in another; 
moving quietly and quickly move between those states.    407
The Digital Subaltern 
The digital subaltern is significantly different to its previous analogue 
construction. However the potential to reproduce two separated strata of citizens 
remains.27 As Paul Virilio warns: 
The society of tomorrow will splinter into two opposite camps: those who live 
to the beat of real time of the global city, within the virtual community of the 
“haves”, and the “have nots” who survive in the margins of the real space of 
local cities, even more abandoned than those living today in the suburban 
wastelands of the Third World.28 
 
The digital subaltern like their analogue counterpart has no place in which to speak 
and no consciousness of their position. Unlike their analogue counterparts however 
they do not have any shared space where a potential dialogue with those in power is 
possible. With no shared space with the coloniser the digital subaltern has no ability 
to perceive what it is that they are excluded from. Their inability to access the 
Internet obscures their view of that from which they are excluded, and prevents the 
core from being able to perceive their exclusion. This results in an environment for 
the digital underclass where they are denied a voice, much like their off screen 
counterparts (and obviously the overlap between these two groups will be not 
insignificant). They are as invisible within the borders of the Invisible Empire, as the 
empire is to their perception facing a screen without the literacy to activate its 
potential as a gateway. The screen becomes like the funeral pyre for the Suttee, 
messages do not come from the other side to explain the subaltern’s experience in 
their own words.29 They can only be spoken about and for by others within the 
                                                 
27 Kroker also warns of a potential class division between the working class: ‘ground in localised 
space’, and the technocratic lass ‘floating away in the virtual zone of hyperspace’  
A. Kroker, ‘Virtual Capitalism’, in S. Aronowitz, B. Martinsons & M. Menser (eds), Techno. Science 
and Cyber Culture. New York: Routledge, 1996. 
28 P. Virilio, Open Sky. London: Verso, 1997. 
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Invisible Empire, and while they remain outside of access, this dialogue will occur 
without their experience. 
 
There is a spectrum of Internet access. Recent Pew Internet and American Life 
research30 confirmed that the 58% of Americans that has access in 2003 stretched 
from intermittent users through to those with access to broadband Internet at home. 
Similarly the 42% of those who do not have access fall into different categories. 
Approximately eight percent of the population the study labels as ‘net evaders’, these 
individuals are aware of the Internet, and vary from those who have others translate 
the Internet directly for them by doing online research and communications on their 
behalf, through to those who actively reject the Internet and avoid all contact. A 
second group are labelled ‘net dropouts’, they made up approximately 17% of the 
population. These individuals have previously been online, but have now fallen 
outside of access, most often due to hardware problems, with either their computer, 
of service providers. A final group, labelled ‘truly disconnected’ in the report have 
no direct or indirect contact with the net. Not only do they not have access, but they 
do not associate with others who have access. This group, consisting of nearly a 
quarter of the entire population at 24% are the digital subaltern. 
 
                                                 
30 A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever 
Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, 
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Figure 122 
The Spectrum of Access 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88  
[accessed 5.7.2005] 
 
When the Empire is invisible, it is different to conceptualise and create concrete 
resistance to its influence. Its central power and authority is deeply fragmented as 
each individual makes their own interpretation of and contribution to, the discourse 
of digital sovereignty and citizenship. The postcolonial theoretical construction of 
the subaltern recognises the fragmentation of class structure at the periphery, just as 
the broader area of study recognises the fragmented structure of the core. The 
Invisible Empire, and the discourse of digital sovereignty, share and augment this 
understanding of a splintered structure, just as the digital subaltern represents an 
atomised and removed underclass, no longer directly marked by class, race and 
gender. These concepts are activated on the analogue side of the screen. 
   410
Foucault theorised the analogue subaltern as not having authority within the 
discourse of control in which every one speaks and that exists all around them,31 for 
the digital subaltern this discourse takes place in a venue that the subaltern has no 
experience of. This greatly limits the potential for Bhabha’s third space in which 
translation can occur or common ground to be found, a place where this might occur 
exists only through the screen. The edge that separates core and periphery in the 
Invisible Empire is sharp and small.  
 
Gramsci constructed the south of Italy as having the status of exploited colonies – 
what Lenin characterised as Internal Colonies.32 This terminology becomes useful 
for describing those who exist in the neo-imperialist fringe of Invisible Empire. 
Gramsci pondered how to have the proletariat factory workers in the north of Italy 
make common cause with the peasant farmers in the south in the context of a class 
struggle. Whereas the south of Italy represented a geographic region within the 
borders of the nation, those who are the subject of digital colonisation are harder to 
group geographically. People access the Internet on their own as atomised off screen 
individuals. Colonisation consequently becomes itself an atomised experience. Those 
on the outside of the borders of Invisible Empire are left without voice to express 
their position on screen where the Invisible Empire manifests, and they are also 
without consciousness as a group, united unknowingly only by their ignorance of 
what they have no access to. Gramsci’s understanding of political control, moving to 
civil control is now further enforced as the whole, now internalised, structure of 
                                                 
31 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume One: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. 
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domination and empire vanishes, invisibly, behind each individual screen. The 
fragmentation of both the colonising core of empire, and the location and 
understanding of the individual identity within digital colonisation, can place 
themselves on a continuum with process that have been occurring for the last three 
millennia. The digital subaltern however is confronted with the barrier of the screen 
between an atomised individual and the gates of the Invisible Empire. This creates a 
relatively clean black and white line through the increasingly grey area of 
postcolonial relations within the borders of the Invisible Empire. 
 
Consciousness 
Central to the construction of the subaltern both on and off screen is their lack of 
consciousness of their position. For Marx, the role of the party was to raise the 
consciousness of the workers. Those without political consciousness, the lumpen 
proletariat, had to be made aware of their exploitation and become politically aware 
as a precursor to a proletarian revolution.33 This process, with all involved gathered 
together on the factory floor, seems relatively easy when compared to the process 
that Gramsci sort to initiate in raising consciousness amongst the geographically and 
socially dispersed peasantry of Southern Italy and their industrialised, potential class 
allies in the north.34 
 
For the digital subaltern, attempts to raise consciousness are further complicated, by 
their invisible presence both on the screen and also moving through the off screen 
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population. There is no one to act as a translator as is the case for the ‘net evaders’, 
or direct experience of the ‘net dropouts’. In order for any translation to occur, a way 
needs to be found to locate and communicate with this group, to translate from the 
core of Empire, and facilitate the development of the matrix of access that will allow 
these excluded the potential to have access at the screen. The invisible and dispersed 
nature of the subaltern can be seen as following the trend at the periphery over time 
as the subaltern is further removed from the experience of the core. The core of 
Empire, on the screen, can similarly be seen to follow this trend to be further 
removed and abstracted from the periphery. The truly disconnected have no 
experience of their exclusion, further complicating attempts to provide and enable 
any consciousness of their position. 
 
For Gramsci’s organic intellectual to be able to speak for the subaltern, to act as a 
translator, they must themselves possess the literacy for access. Yet, the digital 
environment changes the strategy for the intellectual as well. Translating for cultware 
and literacy in the current increasingly post-industrial environment requires different 
strategies to translating between geographic location and class in the industrial 
environment that confronted Marx and later Gramsci. The role of the intellectual 
must be to translate the nature of both the digital metropolis at the core and the 
digital subaltern at the periphery and advocate for intervention within the political 
structure of the Nation State.35 Cultural Studies have a history of advocating social 
justice and responsibility, particularly critiquing the existing order and acting as an 
advocate for the excluded, the underclass. It has focused on the relationship between 
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cultural practice and power. Providing a voice for those who share no common 
ground with those on screen, no place in which translation can occur otherwise. The 
plight of the digital underclass calls for a new digitised application of this 
intervention. 
 
Marx identified the role of the Nation State and nationalism in acting as a focal point 
for resistance to colonial domination.36 Within the Invisible Empire, the Nation State, 
while it does have influence, is a construction of the analogue, not digital, world. The 
space that binds nations in the Treaty of Westphalia does not manifest on the screen. 
The Internet passes across and within national borders. Therefore, a geographic 
understanding of nationalism will need to be reinterpreted in order to provide 
resistance to the influence of the Invisible Empire. The Nation State has the potential 
to be a vehicle for intervention for the digital subaltern. Resistance to Invisible 
Empire, rather than trying to remove the influence of the core from the periphery, 
this becomes an attempt to include the peripheral digital subaltern in the core. Rather 
than an armed struggle for geography it is a cultural struggle for literacy. Within this 
struggle, the place of the intellectual to act as a translator for the subaltern is crucial 
to influence public policy and create the necessary conditions for the equitable 
distribution of access to the digital core. The strategies required to intervene 
successfully for the digital subaltern will be different to those of providing Internet 
access more generally through the population. To facilitate these changes, the 
intellectual must act to translate for the subaltern, both their voice for the Invisible 
Empire, and the discourse of the Invisible Empire for the subaltern, they must also 
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act as an advocate of change of the existing order, activating the Nation State as a 
site of resistance to that order. 
 
The Nation State holds myriad functions and roles of resistance to the Invisible 
Empire. It must have intent to act as the site of resistance, as there is no inherent 
function of resistance activated by the Nation State. Unlike the discursive nature of 
Internet Sovereignty, the analogue sovereigns of the Nation State can act with intent, 
and be selfishly motivated to act in their own (and hopefully their nation’s) best 
interests. The invisible nature of the Empire makes this public policy difficult to 
conceptualise and implement. The Nation State becomes the node for resistance, the 
only site where access for those at the periphery who are not part of the now ending 
natural growth of the medium, can be negotiated. It is in the interests of the Nation 
State’s legislators and leaders for this to occur for a number of reasons.  
 
Economically, the more of the Nation State’s citizens who participate at the core of 
the Invisible Empire, then the greater the level of prosperity and participation within 
that state. Access to the new trade route of the Invisible Empire provides for a greater 
number, and more efficient, consumers for the economy. Those who are able to 
compete, and manifest, in the economy of the core will be more rewarded than those 
who remain at the periphery. Additionally, the economic structure of the Invisible 
Empire overlays existing patterns of disadvantage. If ignored, it will have the effect 
of enhancing the level of polarisation within any given society between the well off 
and the needy.37 
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The ability to readily communicate through numerous projected selves on the 
Internet provides an efficient means of delivering information and services between 
the government and the people. However for this to occur on an equitable basis, and 
more importantly to be able to be targeted at those most in need, it is important that 
access to this medium is distributed throughout society. Additionally, the relationship 
between the state and communications both between the state and its citizenry, and 
between citizens, has a direct relationship to the quality of democracy.  
 
People at the periphery cannot be seen from the core. They are written about – not to. 
They have no on screen presence. As such, they start to lose their relevance to the 
trade routes of the Invisible Empire (except as a source of exploited labour). They 
are not useful or needed for the economy. They become doubly and triply colonised 
because they lack the literacy to interact with this new mode of citizenship. They are 
completely cut out of the post fordist economic relationships. Similarly those at the 
periphery cannot experience the core. They are (in effect) rendered Subalterns, those 
who are subordinate or dominated, but who are unaware of their circumstance. They 
are without voice, and without consciousness. 
 
The Invisible Empire thus creates an environment where those at the periphery, 
already without consciousness of their circumstance are unable to perceive the 
Empire that causes their disadvantage. These individuals then manifest within the 
geography of the Nation State, which while having the potential to act as a site of 
resistance to digital colonisation, will have difficulty to activating this resistance as 
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the digital subaltern are disguised within the rest of the (online) population. In order 
to enable this potential resistance there will be a need for translation, both for an 
agency to speak on behalf of the digital subaltern and to speak to the subaltern, to 
make them aware of their disadvantage and the Invisible Empire, to develop 
consciousness of their circumstance and position. The potential for the intellectual to 
act in this role is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
Until recently, the drive for Internet penetration focused on promoting the benefits of 
Internet access, and facilitating the provision of physical infrastructure, assuming, 
correctly, a large public potentially wanting to be online, but not yet within the 
borders of Invisible Empire. This group was predisposed to getting access, existing 
within sufficient bounds of cultware, literacy, economics, and with the potential to 
find useful content and communication capability online. To drive the take-up of the 
Internet required access to fall within the economic and cultural parameters, and to 
have access to the infrastructure to provide carriage for, and interpretation of, the 
TCP-IP protocols. Different strategies to encourage Internet take up have focused on 
these different areas. However, Pew research has shown through its survey results in 
the United States that this public has been largely included within the Internet, and 
that growth in the penetration of the Internet has subsequently slowed as the market 
‘matures’ and the Internet becomes ubiquitous throughout society.38 The slowing of 
Internet growth indicates that those citizens with the predisposition for access, the 
latent cultware to activate the Internet, have been or will soon be reached and 
included. It is reasonable to conclude that a similar process will, and is, occurring in 
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many countries with similar Internet penetrations.39 Different countries will have 
distinct levels of a predisposed population for access, depending on their wealth, 
infrastructure and level of education within the population. The borders of Invisible 
Empire are becoming less porous. Those left behind walking invisibly through the 
population off screen as the digital subaltern. The concern with regard to Internet 
access must now move from a position of trying to encourage those who could have 
access but have not taken it up, to those who lack the cultware and the literacy to 
engage with the digitised environment. In this situation, the disadvantage of 
exclusion becomes the focus over the benefits of inclusion. It is the subaltern, not the 
delayed adaptors, that requires our attention.  
 
Raymond Williams, one of the influential foundational scholars of Cultural Studies, 
believed that ‘language and communication were where we lived, not just what we 
use to live’.40 When the subaltern is excluded from the Invisible Empire, where so 
much interaction and communication occurs for the rest of the society, they begin to 
inhabit a separate and disadvantaged world from those around them. This exclusion 
is compounded as Internet access becomes more ubiquitous. While the Internet 
produces much that is unique to that environment, it also mirrors many off screen 
functions. When the Internet has a relatively low penetration throughout society 
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much of this mirroring will be supplemental in nature. Banks will have online 
facilities as well as branches in bricks and mortar. Government information and 
services may develop an online component, but once again this will mirror services 
that exist off screen. However as the Internet becomes part of popular culture and 
immersed in social practices, many of the off screen alternatives disappear, to the 
disadvantage of those who cannot access the on screen alternatives. Similarly there 
are aspects of the Invisible Empire that will not have off screen equivalents. Access 
to the Internet becomes assumed in popular culture, whether this be participating in 
debates on current affairs through the Foreign Correspondent site at the ABC,41 or 
being able to access the Web-cams in a Big Brother house.42 Google43 and 
Ninemsn44 are spaces that exist only on screen and represent cultural spaces that 
completely exclude the digital subaltern. While access is assumed for ten percent of 
people, this assumption will not be a major disadvantage for the remaining ninety 
percent. However once the situation is reversed the disadvantage of the remaining 
minority without access, and the exclusion from the rest of society is magnified far 
beyond that when it is only a small minority with access, as with the early adaptors.  
 
Lury argues that in a consumer society, the ability to consume is a fundamental 
human right.45 As consumption moves online, then the ability to consume online 
follows in order for individuals to be able to fully participate in society, whether this 
consumption is goods and services, or popular culture, this then becomes an area of 
the exclusion of the digital underclass. Much has been written about the notion of the 
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digital divide. The understanding that with differing levels of access to the Internet, 
there develops a divide in society between the information haves and the information 
have-nots that will mirror and amplify the separation between material haves and 
have-nots, and that like the latter the greater this division between the top and the 
bottom the worse society is off as a whole as it threatens social cohesion and 
challenges social justice.  
 
Moving beyond the impact of an individual’s access requires an understanding of the 
penetration and distribution of literacy and cultware. Such inequalities are often 
spoken about in economic terms,46 thus looking at the creation of online consumers 
through a higher rate of Internet access penetration. It can also been seen as a 
measure of the wealth of a society, and how economically competitive it is in 
relation to others. Thus the debate on whether Australia had an ‘old economy’ or a 
‘new economy’47, while looking at the types of goods and services produced by the 
economy, also looked at the penetration of computers and Internet access into both 
homes and businesses. This ‘branding’ of the economy and society as being ‘online’ 
has in some cases been one of the explicit driving forces behind public policy 
initiatives. A good example of this was the move to have online voting for two 
extraterritorial upper house seats in the South Australian Parliament, which was 
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driven by the image of that state that such a move, even at the proposal level would 
help to create.48 
 
The greater the penetration of Internet access across a society the greater utility that 
comes from putting government, goods and services online, and the greater potential 
return for commercial activity online as the ‘market size’ for these goods and 
services grows. By making government services available online, the government 
has the potential to wind back its services in the off screen landscape, and redirect 
the resources that would have been used to provide the services in other areas. This is 
particularly true in cases such as Australia where the government has been a leading 
proponent, encouraging the use of the Internet to provide goods and services and 
leading by example. It has not only been taking advantage of an existing widely 
distributed medium or the economic benefits of engaging electronically with 
contractors and suppliers, but rather it has been actively building the skills and 
expertise in the area, growing the country’s cultware. Related to this process is 
Lury’s notion of the ‘right’ to consume. If the government is seeking to promote 
businesses moving into an online environment, then the government has a 
responsibility to help disempowered people in society have access to engage with 
those businesses and the goods and services that they provide.  
 
While government programs within Australia have been active in promoting Internet 
access, the development of the residue digital subaltern will impact on the 
effectiveness of these programs. While it is the federal government with the 
responsibility for the regulation of telecommunications, many activities specifically 
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promoting literacy in relation to the Internet are run through local libraries, funded 
by local councils. At this level of government, the resources available are unequally 
distributed. Councils in more wealthy areas have more money at their disposal, 
derived from local rates. As such, if these local governments continue to play a major 
role in providing intervention for the subaltern, for example through local libraries 
and senior citizen centres,49 there is the potential for off screen disadvantage to be 
reflected on screen, as the subaltern becomes a function of socio-economics and 
geography. 
 
The identity of those who remain outside of the Invisible Empire, those without 
access, is changing. Providing and encouraging the take up of Internet access, until 
this point, has involved the promotion of the service amongst the majority of the 
population who live within a context of cultware that supports access and have the 
literacy to activate that access, the digital subaltern will require different strategies. 
Effective intervention is still possible. Inequality based on class, race, gender and 
geography is often entrenched. While class is an indicator of likely Internet literacy 
for an individual, literacy is a much more dynamic and changeable condition. 
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The White Man’s Burden of the Digital Flâneur? 
 
Figure 123 
Advertising Poster from the Empire Marketing Board, December 1928 
 
There are a number of criticisms of the approach advocated throughout this 
doctorate, with the aim to intervene in digital and analogue inequalities. In activating 
resistance to the Invisible Empire for the subaltern, the intellectual is actually 
advocating an expansion of empire, extending the boundaries and jurisdiction. There 
must be overt research in the condition of the digital subaltern, constructing policies, 
literacies and strategies to intervene and alleviate the potential disadvantage. This 
intervention is in stark contrast to the tradition postcolonial critique that speaks to 
resistance of empire, and the expulsion of the influence of the core.50 The process of 
advocating the expansion of Invisible Empire, especially from one who is writing at 
                                                 
50 As Said was quoted in the previous chapter ‘One of the first tasks of the culture of resistance was 
to reclaim, rename and reinhabit the land.’ E. Said, Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & 
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the core of that empire, has an uneasy resonance with advocates of analogue empire. 
This is the white man’s burden of the digital flâneur.  
 
Take up the White Man's burden-- 
No tawdry rule of kings, 
But toil of serf and sweeper-- 
The tale of common things. 
The ports ye shall not enter, 
The roads ye shall not tread, 
Go mark them with your living, 
And mark them with your dead. 
 
Take up the White Man's burden-- 
And reap his old reward: 
The blame of those ye better, 
The hate of those ye guard-- 
The cry of hosts ye humour 
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:-- 
"Why brought he us from bondage, 
Our loved Egyptian night?" 
 
Take up the White Man's burden-- 
Ye dare not stoop to less-- 
Nor call too loud on Freedom 
To cloke your weariness; 
By all ye cry or whisper, 
By all ye leave or do, 
The silent, sullen peoples 
Shall weigh your gods and you. 
 
Take up the White Man's burden-- 
Have done with childish days-- 
The lightly proferred laurel, 
The easy, ungrudged praise. 
Comes now, to search your manhood 
Through all the thankless years 
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom, 
The judgment of your peers! 
 
From The White Man’s Burden – Rudyard Kipling 189951 
 
                                                 
51 Modern History Sourcebook. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/Kipling.html [accessed 
22.1.2005]. While the poem was written in response the United States take over of the Philippines 
following the Spanish American War it offers contemporary resonance in both Iraq or Afghanistan.    424
What are the consequences of subaltern access to the Internet? Beyond consumerism, 
would the Internet change in a way that is not desirable for the empowered? In India 
and Africa, the formerly colonised changed in ways outside the ideologies and 
historical parameters of the former coloniser. This discursive dissonance was evident 
when the early adaptors had to give up their exclusive hold on the Invisible Empire, 
the realm may change again in unexpected ways once those currently without voice 
are allowed to manifest.52  
 
Once through the gateway of the screen the subaltern, the disempowered, starts to 
engage in a space shared with the empowered. In such a space, translation becomes 
possible. The two collectives and ideologies dialogue in the same environment and 
become aware of each other’s existence. While the empowered may try to resist any 
challenge to their existing authority, this resistance will develop a manifest existence 
for the disempowered. Consciousness is the necessary first step to resistance. It is not 
possible without access to the gates of the Invisible Empire. The level of authority of 
each individual voice will determine its level of influence on the discourse of digital 
citizenship/sovereignty for another.  
  
This chapter, and the overarching configuration of this thesis, enacts work in the 
intellectual style that Spivak critiques. This concern has some significant 
                                                 
52 Of the non-Internet users surveyed by Pew Internet and American Life Project in 2002 only 40% 
thought that they would go online at some stage. When the non-users were asked what they though of 
the Internet there was a significant shift from the answers of those who were already online. 20% did 
not know how to describe the Internet as opposed to 5% for those who had access. While 61% of 
Internet users used the library as a metaphor to describe the Internet, only 36% of non-users used the 
same description.  
A. Lenhart, J. Horrigan, L. Rainie, K. Allen, A. Boyce, M. Madden & E. O’Grady, The Ever Shifting 
Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and The Digital Divide. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, 2003. pp.14-16. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=88http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r
=88 [accessed 5.7.2005].   425
consequences. In seeking to speak on behalf of the subaltern, there is the potential for 
less emphasis to be focused on acting as a translator, trying to include the digital 
subaltern in on screen discourses without listening to what it is that they are saying. 
It is likely for example that the use of the Internet by the digital subaltern would be 
different to that of other users. Additionally there are, at the edges of the Invisible 
Empire, places where some translation does occur, where those who have limited 
access through a combination of cultware and literacy are able to engage with some 
of the discourses of digital sovereignty. There is danger that the intellectual while 
trying to act to translate will inadvertently stand in the way and serve to perpetuate 
the existing order. Wetware and cultware that is borrowed is of far less worth than 
that which is developed for each individual. 
 
This intervention can also be seen in the context of a reflection of the neo-imperialist 
need for more online consumers, rather than digital citizens. Less than one percent of 
all Internet traffic in Australia is directed at political sites, and within that small 
sample three quarters is directed at international sites.53 I cited Celia Lury and her 
thesis that in a consumer culture, the ability of an individual to consume, as well as 
how the goods and services that they consume are provided, defines their social 
position.54 Identity and consumerism are (increasingly) intertwined. The digital 
citizen on screen enacts their role as the good citizen not by merely following 
analogue political party Web sites, but through each individual engaging with the 
discourse of citizenship and sovereignty while online. However there is an 
undeniable commercial and economic aspect to this activity. While trying to speak 
                                                 
53 S. Younge & P. Chen, ‘Downloading Democracy’, The Age. 15
th January 2005. 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/01/12/1105423548673.html [accessed 15.1.2005]. 
54 C. Lury, Consumer Culture. Oxford: Polity Press, 1996, p. 43.   426
for the digital subaltern it seems, following Spivak’s thesis, it is also that one 
promotes a form of digital neo-colonialism.  
 
While both these positions advise caution in the approach taken to translate, without 
the intellectual to provide consciousness and translate for the subaltern the existing 
construction of digital colonisation will be extended and perpetuated. While Spivak 
critiques the place of the intellectual in speaking for the subaltern, for her, this is still 
an important position. Without the intellectual attempting to translate the digital 
subaltern will remain in their disadvantaged position. However this points to a third 
criticism. The Internet is becoming postcolonial. The Invisible Empire is transformed 
when it is consumed in the off screen periphery and this creates further problems for 
attempts to intervene for the digital subaltern. 
 
The assumption that the Invisible Empire is a coherent, uniform, if highly mobile and 
post modern construction is predicated on its western origins and the dominance of a 
shared online language, if not community. While this reflects the world of the early 
Internet it is an assumption that may no longer be valid. Derrida criticised the 
domination of western philosophy and metaphysics within the colonial discourse off 
screen.55 Stuart Hall follows this line of critique:  
I came from a society where the profound integument of capitalist society, 
economy, and culture had been imposed by conquest and colonisation. This is 
a theoretical, not vulgar critique. I don’t blame Marx because of where he was 
born; I’m questioning the theory for the model around which it is articulated: 
its Eurocentrism.
56 
 
                                                 
55 J. Derrida, Margins – of Philosophy. Translated by  A. Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1982. 
56 S. Hall ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies’ in L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, P. A. Treichler, 
L. Baughman & J. Macgregor Wise (eds), Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 1992.   427
This thesis must be subject to this criticism following a clearly Western bias in both 
its history and philosophy. This focus must be understood in the context that the 
Invisible Empire emerged from the history of these western intellectual 
constructions, and they thus serve to illustrate the structures as they developed. 
However it may no longer be appropriate to talk of the Invisible Empire, as it has 
existed for the past decade since the World Wide Web transformed to scope and 
reach of the Internet. In 1996, 80% of the online population used English, by 
September 2004 this had fallen to 35.2%, having lost its majority status in 2000. 
Similarly 2004 was the first time that the United States accounted for less than half 
of all ecommerce transactions online.  
 
Figure 124 
Evolution of non-English-speaking Online Population 
http://global-reach.biz/globstats/evol.html 
[accessed 22.1.2005] 
 
This is not to say that the United States does not play a significant role with regard to 
the Internet. The US economy was still responsible for 47% of all electronic   428
commerce in 2004.57 Researchers such as myself who study the use and spread of the 
Internet primarily through the English language are now studying a minority group 
of users (although still the largest overall language group).  
 
TOP TEN LANGUAGES 
IN THE INTERNET 
Internet 
Users, 
by Language
Average 
Penetration
World Population 
Estimate for 
Language 
Language as % 
of 
Total Internet 
Users 
English  291,821,168 26.3 % 1,109,729,839  32.8 %
Chinese  113,414,713 8.6 % 1,316,007,412  12.8 %
Japanese  67,677,947 52.8 % 128,137,485  7.6 %
Spanish  56,844,480 14.6 % 389,587,559  6.4 %
German  54,244,805 55.4 % 96,141,368  6.1 %
French  37,502,485 10.0 % 375,066,442  4.2 %
Korean  31,600,000 42.0 % 75,189,128  3.6 %
Italian  28,610,000 48.8 % 58,608,565  3.2 %
Portuguese  21,691,837 9.5 % 227,621,437  2.4 %
Dutch  14,655,328 60.5 % 24,218,157  1.6 %
TOP TEN LANGUAGES  718,062,762 18.9 % 3,800,307,391  80.8 %
Rest of the Languages  170,618,369 6.5 % 2,611,759,794  19.2 %
WORLD TOTAL  888,681,131 13.9 % 6,412,067,185  100.0 %
(*) NOTES: (1) Internet Top Ten Languages Usage Stats were updated on March 24, 2005. (2) Average Penetration is the 
ratio between the sum of Internet users speaking a language and the total population estimate that speaks that referred 
language. (3) The most recent Internet usage information comes from data published by Nielsen//NetRatings, 
International Telecommunications Union, and other reliable sources. (4) The population information is from world-
gazetteer.com. (5) For definitions and navigation help, see the Site Surfing Guide. (6) Stats may be cited, giving the 
source and establishing an active link back to InternetWorldStats.com. ©Copyright 2005, Miniwatts International, Ltd. All 
rights reserved. 
 
Figure 125 
Internet users by language 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm  
[accessed 10.7.2005] 
 
The Invisible Empire is becoming postcolonial. English, once thought of as the 
language of the Internet that would impose itself as the lingua Franca of the digital 
world is no longer the language used by the majority of Internet users and its share of 
the language pie on the Internet, given the relatively low penetration rate of Internet 
                                                 
57 Global Reach, ‘Forrester projects 6.8 Trillion for 2004 (B$)’. 
http://glreach.com/eng/ed/art/2004.ecommerce.php3 [accessed 1.12.2004].   429
access in the next two largest online languages on Chinese (13.7% of Internet users) 
and Spanish (9% of Internet users), can be expected to further retract over time. 
China is set to pass the United States in total broadband subscriptions by 2007.58 
 
 
Figure 126 
Online language populations 
http://glreach.com/globstats/ 
[accessed 14.1.2005] 
 
Each subject of the Invisible Empire reinterprets the Empire to suit their own local 
image, ideology, and needs. This atomised process further complicates the plight of 
the digital subaltern, as the digital core further fragments and literally divides into 
different areas with limited ability to converse. While Google translates Web pages 
between languages with a moderate level of success, the literacy required to even 
                                                 
58 ‘China to Top U.S. in Broadband Subscribers’, Electronic News. 5
th April 2005. http://www.reed-
electronics.com/electronicnews/article/CA529685?nid=2019 [accessed 8.6.2005].   430
have the potential to directly experience the diversity of Invisible Empire is now 
beyond the grasp of a single person, no matter how well developed and articulate 
their projected digital self. This presents a challenge to the English-biased field of 
Internet Studies. This field is still in its infancy, yet already much of its academic 
production dates quickly and loses resonance in the digital world. 
 
This picture of the decline of English language on the Internet is complicated by the 
massive growth in the use of English off screen. The Invisible Empire has played a 
key role in the adoption of this language across the globe. More than half of the 
value of electronic commerce that occurred in 2004 was initiated in English speaking 
North America,59 while the number of users is growing the majority of the wealth on 
screen still resides with the English speaking minority. The language of the Internet 
is changing, however English still makes up more of the online population than any 
other language by a significant margin. The code maintains its bias towards Latin 
script written left to right. 
 
While the number of non-English speakers online is growing dramatically, so too is 
the number of these people who are learning English as a second language. It is 
estimated that within the next ten years two billion people will be studying English, 
and three billion people will speak it. Even now native English speakers are 
outnumbered by a factor of three to one by non-native speakers.60 However 
following other postcolonial practice, the language of the core is being reinterpreted 
                                                 
59 Once Canada is added to the US online economy North America accounts for nearly 51% of global 
electronic commerce. Global Reach, ‘Forrester projects 6.8 Trillion for 2004 (B$)’. 
http://glreach.com/eng/ed/art/2004.ecommerce.php3 accessed 1.12.2004]. 
60 C. Power, ‘Not the Queens English: Non-native English-speakers now outnumber native ones 3 to 
1. And it's changing the way we communicate,’ Newsweek International. 2005. 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7038031/site/newsweek/ [accessed 23.3.2005].   431
at a local level. English is developing local dialects such as Englog, Japlish, and 
Hinglish in the Philipines, Japan, and India respectively.61 These dialects and the use 
of both first and second languages on screen will need to be understood within their 
own terms. There is the potential within an English biased understanding of Internet 
Studies to develop a new form of online Orientalism. 
 
The Edge of the Screen 
Sekyi-Otu observed of colonisation that, ’the colonial situation leaves the colonised 
in a world without a public political sphere, with no mediation possible between the 
rulers and the ruled’.62 In the context of the Invisible Empire, this situation is further 
exacerbated. Access, or more specifically the screen, is an impermeable barrier 
crossed only through literacy that prevents a public sphere providing a co-inhabited 
space for the digital citizen and the digital subaltern. In Sekyi-Otu’s criticism of the 
colonial condition the colonised and coloniser still share a common corporal 
manifestation. Within the Invisible Empire, the digital underclass has no 
manifestation. They are not encountered by those on screen, and provide no place for 
a common discourse of any kind. Foucault’s construction of multiple discourses, 
where the analogue subaltern is excluded by lack of authority, is similarly not 
provided for by the circumstance of Invisible Empire. The on screen Invisible 
Empire presents a very different framework, as the subaltern lacks not just the 
authority to speak but any kind of presence, or place from which to speak. The 
                                                 
61 C. Power, ‘Not the Queen’s English: Non-native English-speakers now outnumber native ones 3 to 
1. And it's changing the way we communicate,’ Newsweek International. 2005. 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7038031/site/newsweek/ [accessed 23.3.2005] 
62 A. Sekyi-Otu, Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. as 
cited in A. C. Alessandrini, ‘Humanism in Question: Fanon and Said’, in H. Schwarz & S. Ray (eds), 
A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.   432
condition of the digital subaltern is similarly problematic for Bhabha’s understanding 
of a shared ‘third space’ where dialogue can occur, no shared space exists. Access 
provides a real ‘edge’ although it hides behind the invisible façade of Invisible 
Empire, indeed marking its borders, while ambiguity and resistance can build up on 
either side of the border, the screen – the point of access – is an impermeable barrier 
between those outside, and those within the borders of empire. This invisible division 
makes any form of resistance hard to mobilise. Similarly the discourse of digital 
sovereignty creates a decentred authority not unlike Derrida’s conception of the 
structure without a centre,63 further hampering the construction of any type of 
resistance to digital colonisation.  
 
The digital subaltern does have a shared space with the digital citizen off screen.  In 
these circumstances, there are very limited markers of the subaltern or empowered 
status of any individual, race, gender and age all provide their own off screen 
markings, but are not so directly tied to on screen empowerment or disadvantage. On 
screen they have no tangible manifestation, and the gated border at the screen is 
visited by each person alone in front of the keyboard. This creates a structure where 
change and resistance on the part of the disempowered and colonised is particularly 
hard to develop, and where disadvantage is hidden. 
 
While provocative and illustrative of the circumstance of the subaltern, Spivak 
provides no direct strategy for change and few answers to help the subaltern gain a 
voice.64 Her task was to historicize, contextualize and understand. Within Gramsci’s 
                                                 
63 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference. Translated by A. Bass, London: Routledge, 1976. 
64 B. Moore-Gilbert ‘Spivak and Bhabha’ in H. Schwarz & S. Ray (eds), A Companion to 
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framework, the attempt to develop class consciousness within the subaltern is also 
made particularly difficult given the atomising of the individual at the point of 
access. However his concept of the organic intellectual rising from a particular class, 
and more specifically the role and responsibility of those intellectuals to provide a 
voice for that class in learned discourse, may show the way for the subaltern to be 
given a voice and provided with consciousness. As Edward Said confirmed, 
Part of what we do as intellectuals is not only to define the situation, but also to 
discern the possibilities for active intervention, whether we then perform them 
ourselves or acknowledge them in others who have either gone before or are 
already at work, the intellectual as a lookout.65 
 
While this strategy has the potential of having the intellectual stand in the place of 
the subaltern and provide a less than authentic translation of their voice, this must be 
balanced against the potential of inaction. Whereas the former colonial possessions 
of the British Empire were able to mobilise the Nation State as the central site of 
resistance to colonisation, the Invisible Empire is different to this earlier construction 
and requires different strategies. Rather than trying to remove the core from the 
periphery, resistance to digital colonisation is focussed on gaining better access to 
the core, developing the literacy and cultware to transverse the barrier of the screen. 
In this context the potential for the Nation State to be the site of resistance is once 
again central. However rather than looking to expel a colonial invader the Nation 
State must look inside its borders to find and empower those who are excluded from 
this new construction of Invisible Empire.  
 
If any agency is going to provide the means of intervention between these two 
groups, invisible to each other, then the digital off screen and the subaltern on screen 
                                                 
65 E. Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism. New York: Columbia University Press 2003, p. 
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respectively, living within the same off screen populations side by side, it has to be 
the Nation State. However the Nation State will not necessarily be aware of the 
divide because of its invisible nature. In order for the Nation State to intervene the 
intellectual, a necessary hybrid of Gramsci’s division between the organic and 
traditional intellectual must act as an advocate of this intervention. These 
intellectuals must work to create a space where both the digital citizen and the digital 
subaltern are aware of each other’s presence as a precursor for translation to occur. 
They must activate resistance to digital colonisation through mobilising the apparatus 
of the Nation State to intervene on behalf of the digital subaltern and provide them 
with access through the gates of the screen to the Invisible Empire. There are 
currently many government-sponsored programs in place attempting to bridge the 
digital divide. The changing nature of exclusion as the rate of Internet penetration in 
Australia matures, and the challenges presented by the digital subaltern will require a 
change in focus for many of these activities. 
 
The fragmentation of the core and the periphery is seen in the move from the earlier 
land-based empires, through to the naval domination of the British Empire, and then 
through to the neo imperialism on the post cold war hegemony of the United States, 
and this evolution continues within the Invisible Empire. As stated in The Second 
Coming, the centre as a coherent entity does not hold and fragments. But does this 
state of affairs represent the Spiritus Mundi, the spirit of the world, the sinister 
manticore on his way to Bethlehem,66 the greatest trick of the devil in disappearing 
as an understood and visible manifestation while still active in the world, or does this 
fragmentation truly represent the ‘last gasp’ of empire.  
                                                 
66 A subject of Roman, and then later British colonialism and now an outpost of the Invisible Empire, 
the Bethlehem Internet Café, can be found at beit jala in the old town.   435
 
Figure 127 
The Manticore 
http://monsters.monstrous.com/manticore.htm 
[accessed 22.1.2005] 
 
A consequence of the structure of Invisible Empire may be the appearance that 
digital colonisation results in a world where, ‘the best lack all conviction, while the 
worst are full of passionate intensity’.67 This is the imperative for the intellectual to 
intervene, to speak for the digital subaltern, will ensure that the increasingly 
numerous gates to the Invisible Empire can be accessed.  
 
Software and hardware have previously been the drivers of Internet growth, reducing 
the level of literacy, and growing the number of users. The size and complexity of 
the resulting network creates an environment that then requires new wetware or 
literacy to navigate in a way that makes full utilisation of the network utility. The 
growth in the power of hardware and the relative simplicity of the interface 
established through software meant that the walls of empire were porous. Gaining 
access to the gateways of access was relatively obtainable. However this growth, the 
increase in network utility, is now impeded for those who remain outside the gates 
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by issues of literacy and context, of wetware and cultware. This is a new situation 
and potential solutions are inhibited by the invisible nature of the empire. Those on 
either side of the walls cannot perceive the barriers and borders, let alone those who 
reside on the other side. In this situation, the intellectual must act as a translator, to 
shed light on what has been invisible for both sides, and to translate for the digital 
subaltern.   437
Conclusion: The Intellectual 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it 
was the age of foolishness, was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of 
incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the 
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we 
had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going 
direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, 
that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or 
for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only. 
     Charles  Dickens,  A Tale of Two Cities (1859)1 
 
Dickens wrote these words almost one hundred and fifty years ago. His descriptions 
are echoed in Paul Virilio’s caution from 1997 that society will ‘splinter into two 
opposing camps.’2 The Internet provides great opportunities, but it is no longer the 
fodder of dreams and unbridled optimism that the now primitive technology, 
applications and platforms, The Well and LambdaMOO, invoked for the early users. 
The Invisible Empire is diffused and integrated into contemporary Australian 
society, having rapidly become a daily tool for the majority of the population. 
Crucially for this research, the once rapid growth of the medium has tapered.  The 
walls of empire are closing to those on the outside. In this environment Virilio’s two 
opposing camps are crystallizing and activating. This thesis has demonstrated that 
the structure of the Internet renders digital subalterns invisible to the core, just as the 
Internet is invisible to this group who are without access themselves.  
 
This situation requires intervention.  Gramsci’s intellectual has a translational role, to 
provide the subaltern with consciousness and speak on their behalf within the core. 
In the structure of the Invisible Empire this role of translator is even more important 
                                                 
1 C. Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities. http://www.litrix.com/twocitys/twoci001.htm#1 Letrix Reading 
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than in the analogue age. The screen is creating an impenetrable barrier.  There is no 
shared space, no edges at which resistance can be activated. The core of this research 
has been to expose the current positioning of disadvantage within the Invisible 
Empire. Social justice demands that further intervention is undertaken. 
 
The Internet provides a wide variety of information, goods and services, both as 
public goods and private capital. The introduction to this thesis cited Perry Barlow, 
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
There has been much written both celebrating and denouncing cyberspace, but 
to me this seems a development of such magnitude that trying to characterize it 
as a good thing or a bad thing trivializes it considerably.3  
 
While such an evaluation could be made when viewing society as a whole, focusing 
on the impact of the technology for those with access, the impact on individuals 
within society left outside of the growing Invisible Empire is both serious and 
negative. In the late 1990s, scholars began to focus on the impact of the Internet on 
those who were without access, and concern about the digital divide began to enter 
debates about communications policy.4 As the Internet was further integrated into the 
economy, popular culture and people’s lives, the exclusion of those who are without 
access was exacerbated. If the Internet is activating the best of times for some, then 
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for those excluded the disadvantage becomes worse over time as the Internet 
becomes more integrated with people’s daily lives. While this was a cause for 
concern, the rapid growth of Internet penetration through society might have led to 
the assumption that this was a transitory phase. 
 
My thesis has demonstrated that access to the Internet has reached a critical political, 
economic and social moment. The borders of the Invisible Empire, having previously 
been rapidly expanding outward, are now static. Those who have access and those 
without are becoming locked in place. While the drop off in this once rapid growth is 
being described in terms of the market maturing,5 this needs to be understood in the 
context of the matrix of access and the specific factors limiting access. Early factors 
that restricted access and required the development of hardware and software, 
communications cables and web browsers, are giving way to barriers to access that 
manifest in wetware and cultware, in literacy and the context in which an individual 
finds themselves off screen. This moment and mode of inequality will require 
different strategies to overcome disadvantage than those that have previously been 
deployed to promote access. 
 
This thesis began with a stroll of the digital flâneur along the boulevards of the 
Invisible Empire. The intent was to critically observe the digital surrounds and their 
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consequences, both on and off screen. Part I – the first three chapters of this thesis – 
provided a background for how the Internet manifests within Australia. Chapter One, 
‘A History of Exclusion: Telecommunications and the Universal Service Obligation 
in Australia’, gave a history of access to telecommunications in Australia, and how 
this has changed over time as the understanding of what constitutes the concepts of 
‘Universal’, ‘Service’ and ‘Obligation’ have developed. This chapter also explored 
the conditions of those who are left outside of access to telecommunications enjoyed 
by their fellow citizens. The first chapter is significant in that it provides the 
background for the analysis that followed.  
 
Having set this background of telecommunications access in Chapter One, Chapter 
Two turned the focus specifically to the construction of Internet access. The screen 
acts as a gateway that both provides a point of passage through the walls of the 
Invisible Empire and excludes those who do not meet the requirements to transverse 
the portal. Hardware, software and wetware must all meet at the screen to enable 
access at any point in time and space. This atomised point of access then exists and is 
enabled by the context in which it manifests, the fourth ‘ware of access, cultware. 
There are no obvious markings of those without access to set them apart from those 
with access. The nature of this construction – with each user alone at the screen – 
provides for no shared space in which the digital citizen on the screen and the digital 
subaltern restricted to the analogue world can interact. The digital subaltern does not 
have a manifestation through the screen. There is nothing in the analogue world to 
indicate who has passage of the gateways of Invisible Empire and who does not. 
Chapter Two introduced these conditions invoked at the gateway which were 
interrogated in more depth in the following chapters.   441
 
Chapter Three, ‘Networks and Digitisation’, focused on the transformations and 
reinterpretations that occur in the digitised environment. This chapter continued the 
analysis of the construction of access. Specifically it tracked how the different ‘wares 
have developed within the digital environment and the consequences this has 
generated for the development of the Internet. These factors, particularly the limits to 
network utility that wetware and cultware are coming to represent, are acting as 
forces to limit Internet growth. Analysis then moved to the digital political economy: 
how the digitised environment transforms capitalism in a context where information 
becomes simultaneously a currency and an interface, the conflict between the 
propriety ownership of ideas through copyright and patents, and the value of the free 
flow of ideas through society that is produced under these conditions. Attention 
turned to the manifestation of the self in the digital environment, in particular, the 
construction of the digital self which consists of a multitude of discrete digital 
identities spread across different applications and relationships. Chapter Three 
provided the background for a critical examination of the Invisible Empire and an 
analysis of the on screen environment.  
 
Part I revealed the telecommunications environment in Australia, the construction of 
Internet access, and the transformations active in the digital environment within 
chapters one to three. Part II of The Invisible Empire entered the on screen digitised 
environment. The construction and foundations of political power, citizenship and 
sovereignty is transformed in this space. Chapter Four, ‘The Digital Citizen’ built on 
this understanding of the digital self, refining the analysis to investigate the political 
construction of the self on screen, and the formulation of the digital citizen. Since the   442
rape in cyberspace of 1993, profound and complex issues have emerged relating to 
law, punishment and identity on the screen. This chapter tracked the development of 
citizenship in the analogue world, its relationship to communication, and how this is 
then transformed on the screen. This transformation required an understanding of 
both the relationship between the individual and their projected digital identities as 
well as the ability to enforce social norms and the law in such an environment. 
Citizenship within the context of the Invisible Empire is both a noun and a verb. 
Rather than an analogue citizenship laid down by the authority of a sovereign Nation 
State, in the Invisible Empire this understanding is fickle and subject to 
reinterpretation and change at each point of access. Such a realization triggers 
questions of the non-citizen, those who fall outside the parameters of digital 
citizenship, or the digital deviant. Off screen, the criminal and the underclass 
conflate. Those who do not fulfil the requirements of citizenship are often seen as 
also those most likely to not live up to the responsibilities of citizenship. Within the 
Invisible Empire, this is transformed. The criminal, the digital deviants, are more 
often hyper literate, more than meeting the requirements of digital citizenship, yet 
failing to meet the responsibilities, wilfully transgressing the laws of the digital 
society. 
 
Having investigated the self and the relationship of the digital citizen to the laws and 
customs of the digitised environment, Chapter Five examined how this environment 
has been constructed. The chapter followed the history of sovereignty and its overlap 
with controls to the distribution and interpretation of knowledge – in particular the 
Bible and the ‘Word of God’, leading through the reformation to the establishment of 
the modern Nation State in the Treaty of Westphalia. This Treaty bound sovereignty   443
and the monopoly of violence that it represents in space. This relationship is then 
transformed on the screen as the Internet moves across and within the borders of the 
Nation State. Sovereignty, as with citizenship, becomes unstable and mobile. While 
each digital citizen interprets the discourse of citizenship at each instance of access, 
rival digital sovereigns attempt to influence the contested discourse of sovereignty. 
This chapter explored the origins and motivation of some of these rival sovereigns 
and how they attempt to influence the discourse. 
 
As Part I set the background environment for the Invisible Empire, Part II outlined 
how the Invisible Empire manifests on the screen. Part III, using the conditions 
illustrated in these earlier sections, focused on how the Invisible Empire projects 
beyond the screen and across national borders. Chapter Six detailed the construction 
of the Invisible Empire across these borders. This chapter tracked the change in the 
nature of past empires and their core-peripheral relations from Rome through to the 
present. It explored how this digital periphery both conflates with its analogue 
counterpart and creates new types of disadvantage within the borders of Nation 
States.  
 
The study of empire is a study from the core, by contrast, living and writing on the 
periphery requires a concentration on colonisation and its consequences. The Nation 
State, initially a tool of European colonialism, was reinterpreted at the periphery as a 
site of resistance to colonial domination. The Nation State has the potential to act as 
a vehicle for resistance to the Invisible Empire. Chapter Seven examined how this 
resistance is necessarily transformed when applied to the digitised environment. 
When resistance is activated to the Invisible Empire, the vehicle of the Nation State   444
can be used to provide access to the core for those who would otherwise be left 
outside the gates of empire. The invisible nature of the empire means that this is not 
an obvious path. Rather, there is a role for the intellectual to reveal this mode of 
resistance and illuminate the otherwise hidden influence and consequences. To enact 
this process, the chapter tracked the development of Postcolonial Studies as a 
discipline. This thesis took the theories articulated by Edward Said, Homi Bhabha 
and Gayatri Spivak, to inform an understanding of resistance to the new digital 
colonisation. This chapter explicitly acknowledged that link and the development of 
academic critiques of the colonial process. 
 
Chapter Eight focused on the consequences of the Invisible Empire for the colonised 
and dispossessed. This chapter explored the condition of the analogue subaltern. 
Following Antonio Gramsci, it also illustrated the role of the intellectual in providing 
the subaltern with consciousness of their condition and acting as an advocate for 
change. Moving from analogue theories, the chapter then probed the condition of the 
digital subaltern. The invisibility of the subaltern both in the analogue and on screen 
environment makes both intervention and translation problematic. Creating 
consciousness in these circumstances is especially difficult, with no shared space for 
the digital citizen and the digital subaltern to cohabit, there is no place where 
translation between the two can potentially occur. In the digitised environment the 
role of the intellectual is of even greater importance for developing consciousness of 
the conditions of the subaltern both within the underclass and at the core. The 
intellectual must act to create consciousness for the subaltern and must also to act as 
a translator, enabling the Nation State to act as a site of resistance. This chapter 
represented the conclusion of all arguments, bringing the focus on the consequences   445
of the Invisible Empire for the disadvantaged at the periphery and the role of the 
intellectual as an instigator of intervention. Spivak warns against the arrogance of 
assuming that an outsider can presume to speak for the subaltern. Rather than 
translating, the commentator may instead be standing in the place of the subaltern, 
preventing them from speaking for themselves. Such a concern is made more 
troubling in the digital environment, which is fragmenting and becoming 
postcolonial as it diversifies and reinterprets the original colonial discourses of its 
American and English speaking origins. In this increasingly disjointed environment, 
the danger of the subaltern being rendered further invisible both at the core and 
periphery is elevated. So what can be done to speak for the digital subaltern? What 
sort of intervention is possible, and is there a way to create the structures of dialogue 
between the core and the periphery? While the Nation State can potentially act as a 
site of intervention, the invisible nature of both core and periphery makes activating 
this resistance problematic.   
 
A decade ago the electronic frontier represented an unchartered frontier without a 
population or history, for noble settlers to lay down civilisation in the digital new 
world. Ten years later, this thesis has illustrated that the frontier is now the 
disenfranchised periphery of empire. As the Internet fragments further into different 
cultural splinters the disadvantage of the digital subaltern – those outside of the 
empire – is further entrenched as they become further marginalised and unseen. My 
original contribution to knowledge is to display the causes and consequences for not 
addressing – overtly and clearly – those who are excluded from the digital 
environment. The development of cultware, as an addition to the matrix of access 
(hardware, software and wetware), provided a context for the otherwise atomised   446
point of access. The mobilisation of post colonial theory within Internet Studies 
facilitates analysis of that context and illustrated its implications. This thesis focused 
on the Australian environment in the broader context of global Internet Studies, 
moving beyond the research data and projects from the United States and Europe. 
The end of rapid growth in the spread of Internet penetration will further emphasize 
this need for incisive interpretation, which this dissertation fulfils.  
 
The borders of Empire are closing to, and on, those left outside. Growth in access to 
the Internet is stagnating in ‘developed’ jurisdictions such as the United States and 
Australia. Many of those who are now without access are unlikely to change this 
situation without intervention. This stasis requires the frontiers – once thought of as 
empty and fertile land reserved for the adventurous homesteaders – to be secured. 
However border protection in this context is radically transformed. Rather than 
excluding the ‘other’, those outside these borders, ‘protection’ in the digital context 
involves tracing those borders through the Nation State, to find those who are 
excluded and securing their access. 
 
Marx observed that ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point however is to change it.’6 This thesis began with the wanderings of 
the digital flâneur and observations about the construction of the Invisible Empire. 
However these observations revealed a significant digital underclass, one whose 
positioning is set to be perpetuated, and whose disadvantage is set to be compounded 
as the Internet becomes further integrated into daily life and Australian popular 
                                                 
6 K. Marx, ‘Theses on Feurback’, Marx/Engels Selected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers 1969. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm [accessed 13.7.2005].   447
culture. The role of the flâneur is important.  The construction of core and periphery 
in the digital environment render each invisible to the other, with little or no 
cohabited space where interchange and translation can occur between these two 
groups. To intervene in this situation, to act to ‘change it’, requires the intellectual to 
perform the role of translator, to speak to, and on behalf, of the subaltern, to stand for 
them without taking their place. This is a relatively new problem, but one that will 
compound over time. This thesis is timely in that intervention is required now. This 
research is the first step towards forging an intervention.   448
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